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Volume 1 Part 10
Countering Insurgency

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FOREWORD

It is over eight years since the Army last published counterinsurgency doctrine. Much has changed since then. This manual is a short guide to insurgency, and the principles and approaches needed to counter it. It has been written to complement allied and joint doctrine and the authors have been careful to ensure that the principles and framework that are explained in Part A are entirely coherent with those in UK joint doctrine and that of our principal allies, in particular USA, Canada and Australia. For maximum effect Part A should be read as a single continuous narrative while Part B can be read in its constituent chapters.

AFM Countering Insurgency describes how the British Army plans and conducts counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level. It explains that efforts must be focused on securing the local population and gaining and maintaining popular support. This is a task for the host nation, its security forces, British forces and our allies, in concert with our partners across government. The doctrine explains why this is not simply a military undertaking but a battle of political wills with a number of lines of operation acting in concert. It is axiomatic that security forces of all types lead in providing an environment sufficiently stable to allow the other instruments of governance can be brought to bear to improve the lives of the local population. Providing effective security is a complex, dangerous, and bloody business; it takes time and resources and it tests the resolve of all involved. These are enduring characteristics of counterinsurgency.

Doctrine is 'what is taught', and to be effective it needs to be read and understood. Pragmatism is needed, however, in its application. Every counterinsurgency campaign is different from the last, but history and experience show that a thorough knowledge of the doctrine and a clear understanding of the operational environment are two essential prerequisites. Doctrine provides commanders at the tactical level with the basis on which to build this understanding, and requires them to use their experience and judgement to develop the right approach to the particular circumstances in which they find themselves. As such it is focussed at the brigade level and below and educationally for the ICSC(L) student. While the authors of this publication have consulted widely with experienced practitioners and academic experts and endeavoured to include a broad range of ideas, it is not a comprehensive textbook on insurgency or counterinsurgency. Nor is it specific to a particular theatre of operation or a particular insurgent group. It provides the key themes which have emerged in recent years and thus reflects the contemporary situation. Given insurgency's constant adaptation, things will change and this publication will have to adjust accordingly. The authors will track developments in order to keep it relevant and take account of emerging views. In this respect your views and insights are important. Comments on this publication are encouraged and should be sent to LWC-WARDEVSO1-TD-DEV@Land.Mod.UK.

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CHAPTER 1

THE FUNDAMENTALS

SECTION 1 – BASICS

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1-1. **Counterinsurgency is Warfare**. Until recently, the word counterinsurgency appeared to be synonymous with low-intensity operations, or operations other than war. It conjured up images of British soldiers in the Malayan jungle, or on the streets of Northern Ireland. The U.S. military's experience in Iraq 2003-2008, and the British campaign in Helmand Province in Afghanistan since 2006 have demonstrated that military operations against irregular insurgents can be as intense as combat in conventional warfare. The intensity of operations is not the issue at stake. Insurgency and counterinsurgency are two sides of a very complex form of warfare, where a group or groups resort to violence and take up arms to achieve political objectives. Typical objectives are replacing an existing government, securing the status quo and challenging a nascent or emerging state. Today's hybrid threats – any adversaries that simultaneously and adaptively employ a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal behaviour in the same battlespace to obtain their political objectives – are constantly seeking to exploit what they perceive to be the vulnerabilities of regular forces. They do this by using terrorism and subversion, by blending into the population amongst which security forces operate, and by exploiting their most effective weapon which is the influence that they can extend through the media. Counterinsurgency is warfare; it is distinctly political, not primarily military; and it involves the people, the government, and the military. The strength of the relationship between these three groups generally determines the outcome of the campaign.

1-2. **Principles**. The ten principles for counterinsurgency, explained in Chapter 3, are:

1. Primacy of political purpose.
2. Unity of effort.
3. Understand the human terrain.
4. Secure the population.
5. Neutralise the insurgent.
6. Gain and maintain popular support.
7. Operate in accordance with the law.
8. Integrate intelligence.
9. Prepare for the long term.
10. Learn and adapt.

1-3. **Security**. The principal security task is to secure the population from violence. By securing the population and by stabilising the situation, governance can be re-established for the benefit of the population. A stable, sustainable security situation is a pre-requisite for improving both governance and the population's prospects. Securing the population has several essential elements. While it may be possible to take some risk with each of them, experience shows that delay is dangerous. The essential security elements of counterinsurgency are:

- **Security for the Population**. The success or failure of an insurgency is largely dependent on the attitude of the population. Insurgents use force to bring parts of the population under consensual or involuntary control; the host government's task is to secure the population from such influence. This requires active security measures, which include controlling movement, imposing curfews in times when the threat is high, conducting a census to establish who the people are, introducing positive identification methods such as identity cards and biometric measurement, and building security infrastructure such as gated

- **Presence**. In counterinsurgency, presence matters. The population has to be secured where it lives, and it must be secured on a permanent basis. This means that the military commander must establish and maintain a continuous and effective presence on the ground. The accepted rule of thumb is 20 security personnel (soldiers, police, para-militaries and auxiliaries) for every 1000 people in the area of operation. If insufficient security personnel are available, commanders may have to devise plans to reduce areas of operation to provide the optimum force ratio. Experience shows that it is easier to deal with insurgents when the security forces live amongst the population than when they have to deploy to an area on a temporary basis.

- **Continuity**. The population is the one constant in the equation and so continuity of approach to the population is essential. Continuity helps to avoid mistakes being repeated, it allows relationships between the population and the security forces to be developed and maintained, and acknowledging the need for continuity addresses in part the fact that the long term solution to an insurgency rests with the host nation, its government and its people. Continuity also helps build confidence with allies. The use of purpose-designed standing HQs manned on a trickle basis, together with individual officer and soldier tours of as long duration as is acceptable will promote continuity.

- **Intelligence**. Intelligence is essential in any operation but especially so in counterinsurgency. It ensures that the insurgents are correctly targeted and neutralised by whatever means is most appropriate. Good intelligence also helps avoid civilian casualties or infrastructure damage. Intelligence depends as much on the tactical level pattern of life in each area of operations as it does on the top-down feed of intelligence from operational and strategic levels. Intelligence has to be integrated at every level of command and across and between agencies engaged in counterinsurgency.

- **ISTAR**. Effective counterinsurgency depends on efficient and persistent ISTAR coverage. Airborne surveillance offers considerable advantages both in terms of the situational awareness that it provides to ground forces in their task of securing the population, and in the deterrent effect on the insurgents. Airborne platforms give the commander a distinct advantage over the insurgent; for that reason, they are crucial in counterinsurgency.

- **Embedded Training Teams**. Host nation forces invariably require training and development. Where British training teams are deployed, experience proves that they are at their most effective when they are embedded with the unit or formation that they are training, and when they bring with them the enabling capabilities of ISTAR, joint fires, command and control, and CSS, particularly medical and logistics. Training the host nation's security forces and partnering and mentoring them on operations is an essential part of achieving long-term security which the host nation can sustain. Those selected to train host nation security forces themselves require to be trained in cultural awareness and theatre specifics so that they can fit in with their charges from the outset.

- **Influence**. Counterinsurgency is about gaining and securing the support of the people both in the theatre of operations and at home. Influence activity therefore underpins everything which British forces undertake because counterinsurgency is as much about the battle of perceptions as it is about military operations targeted against insurgents.

- **Education**. Those who have to put counterinsurgency doctrine into practice have to know what the doctrine says. This requirement is not limited to UK doctrine; commanders must also be versed in the doctrine of other nations with which they are likely to operate. They need to have the knowledge and confidence to adapt doctrine to meet the challenges that they face. Without flexibility and pragmatism in its application, doctrine becomes dogma, *"...to be seized upon by mental emasculates who lack virility of judgment, and who are only too grateful to rest assured that their actions, however inept, find justification in a book, which, if they think at all, is in their opinion, written in order to exonerate them from doing so."*[1] Counterinsurgency warfare is complex and is not at all suited to learning the basics in the heat of the campaign. That is the time to adapt the approach to meet the demands of the situation based on a clear understanding of the doctrine, approaches, and best practice. This places a clear onus on the Army and Defence to provide comprehensive education for counterinsurgency.

1-4. **A Framework for Counterinsurgency**. A number of conceptual frameworks have been developed which provide a way of thinking about the principal themes or tasks in counterinsurgency. The framework adopted in this manual is a general model of Shape-Secure-Develop, which groups together the main tasks which forces may be called upon to carry out during the campaign under each of its three headings. The emphasis will shift between the three dependent on the security situation and campaign progress. For example, if the threat is high, 'secure' operations may dominate. If the situation is more stable, 'develop' activity may be the focus. It is important to note that Shape-Secure-Develop is a general model; operational commanders may well develop an approach which reflects the specifics of their campaign or the doctrine of a non-UK superior commander.

1-5. **The Continuum of Operations**. The campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere have shown that as the host nation builds up its own security capacity, UK armed forces are required to operate effectively across the continuum of operations. Combating insurgents can be, at times, as fierce, demanding, chaotic and violent as warfighting. While this form of combat is undesirable, particularly if it takes place among the population that the security forces are in place to protect, all forces should

[1] J.F.C. Fuller, *Reformation of War*, London: Hutchinson 1923, p. 254.

be prepared for periods of intense fighting. No counterinsurgency exists at just one point on the continuum of operations. Its intensity will vary in time and place. At any one point in the campaign there might be a humanitarian crisis in one district, and a violent outbreak by insurgents in another. At any one place in the theatre of operations, in one week there might be an operation to clear, secure and hold a village, and a development task to restore electricity and water supplies the week after.

1-6. **Stabilisation and Counterinsurgency**. JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation – the Military Contribution* describes the relationship between stabilisation and counterinsurgency. JDP 3-40 uses Figure 1.1 to illustrate the likely relationship between stabilisation and counterinsurgency. It shows how a counterinsurgency operation sits within the three major sectors of a stabilisation campaign: Governance, Security, and Development. Although the provision of security contributes to all three sectors, it will inevitably be the main effort, particularly in the initial stages of a campaign. The size of the 'COIN bubble' will depend on the scale of the insurgency and it will vary as the campaign develops. How it changes will depend on the capacity of other government departments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations. These depend, in turn, on the contribution that security forces can make to developmental and governance activities. A key aspect of all stabilisation tasks will be to prepare the host nation to take responsibility for its own security, development and governance. Within this sector, the security forces will inevitably have a significant role to play in training and mentoring, through embedded partnering, the host nation's security forces to provide security.




Figure 1.1 Stabilisation and Counterinsurgency

1-7. JDP 3-40 describes the military contribution to security and stabilisation, set in the context of wider cross government efforts. The military contribution is in four areas:

- Intervention by a Joint Force as part of a UK coalition operation.
- Provision of specialist military capabilities to develop and then underpin host nation capacity.
- Direct support to the host nation government through advisors, training and mentoring teams.
- Provision of advisors to augment existing UK representation.

1-8. In some circumstances, for example after a regime change, or in a situation of complete state failure, security forces may be called upon to discharge the responsibilities of an occupying power in accordance with their obligations under international law. In such cases opposition should be expected from disaffected, disenfranchised, or displaced groups, and the use of coercion, intimidation, and armed force are likely until security is established and governance can be exercised. JDP 3-40 describes this as irregular activity, or the use or threat, of force, by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority.[2] This manual focuses on the most difficult and demanding scenario, that of countering an insurgency.

SECTION 2 – DEFINITIONS

'Of course events in real life don't lend themselves to such clear cut definitions.'[3]

1-9. **Security**. Almost without exception, the issue at stake in counterinsurgency, is the establishment or re-establishment of security. Once security is in place, further lines of operation can develop. For the purpose of this publication, security is defined as follows:[4]

- *Security is the condition where there is sufficient protection against hostile acts to enable effective civic and civil life to continue.*
- *Sustainable Security is that condition where security can be maintained over time through the host nation's security, civic and civil institutions with reduced direct intervention from allies or partners*.[5]

1-10. **Insurgency**. For the purposes of this manual, insurgency is defined as '*An organised, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority'*. Insurgencies have many aims, the most common of which are: to gain control of territory, seek resolution of a grievance or seek the overthrow of the existing authority. An insurgency's origins may be ideological, religious, ethnic, sectarian, class-based, or, most probably, a combination of these factors. While the majority of insurgencies will have a strategy, some may not. Within a group or affiliation, some elements may not agree on any one goal except where they seek the removal of a government, or preventing a government to form. Some insurgent groups may fight for criminal or personal reasons, with no goal beyond financial gain, personal satisfaction, or revenge. An insurgency may be formed from groups who are normally ideologically opposed but come to a loose

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[2] Irregular Activity (IA) is 'The use or threat, of force, by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority.' JDP 0-01 '*British Defence Doctrine'* (3rd Edition), Chapter 2.
[3] Lieutenant General Sir Frank Kitson, Practical Aspects of Counter Insurgency.
[4] Based on definitions developed by HQ Multination Force Iraq – April 2007.
[5] JDP 3-40 divides Security further into Human, Personal, National and Physical Security (Chapter 1).

affiliation in order to fight a common enemy. Insurgents use a mixture of subversion, propaganda, terrorism and armed force to achieve their objectives and may have close links to criminal activity.

1-11. **Counterinsurgency**. Counterinsurgency is defined as "*Those military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, while addressing the root causes*". Successful counterinsurgency requires a multifaceted approach that addresses the political, economic, social, cultural and security dimensions of the unrest.

SECTION 3 - OPERATING IN A SOVEREIGN NATION

1-12. **Policy Assumption**. The approach to counterinsurgency described in this publication is based on the assumption that Her Majesty's Government will use British Armed Forces and its other instruments of power to conduct discretionary military operations in support of policy; to support a legally recognised state in the restoration and maintenance of law and order, good governance and where necessary, essential services. It should be noted that there may be occasions when a state is recognised by some governments and organisations but not others.

1-13. **Legitimacy.** In the context of counterinsurgency operations, legitimacy is a population's acceptance of its government's right to govern or of a group or agency to enforce decisions. Without legitimacy, a political settlement will not endure. Legitimacy is neither tangible nor easily quantifiable. Popular votes do not always confer or reflect legitimacy. Legitimacy comes from the idea that authority is genuine and effective, and is used fairly and legally. Legitimacy is the central concern of all parties directly involved in a conflict. Equally important is the international and domestic community's views of the legitimacy of any intervention operation.

1-14. **Complexity**. Globalisation, the proliferation of information and information technology, and a myriad of state and non-state actors make the operational environment very complex. At first glance the many actors and rapidly changing influences may appear unmanageable, often contradictory, and confusing. The situation is not made any easier by their variation in time and place; what seems vital today may not be tomorrow; something which is important in one place may have little significance elsewhere. In many cases, violence stems from corruption, organised crime – in particular narcotics – tribal issues, religious disputes, land ownership and power struggles between warlords. However complex the situation appears, some sense needs to be made of it. One starting point is to recognise the inter-action between three identifiable groups involved: those who destabilise the situation; those seeking to improve stability; and those caught up in or observing the conflict.

1-15. **Working within a Comprehensive Framework**. There is unlikely to be a purely UK solution to countering an insurgency, and UK armed forces are likely to be working in a multi-agency and coalition framework. This adds further complexity to the situation. It is implicit in such operations to ensure that military headquarters, at every level, should be able to accommodate and enable partner civilian, host nation and allied military organisations to work with them. At the strategic level this requires a partnership between the host nation government (when it is effective) and the coalition partners; at the operational level it involves close relations between the local government, the civilian agencies and the coalition. At the tactical level it might mean the military undertaking many of the tasks that the civilian organisations are not prepared to do within a non-permissive security situation.

SECTION 4 - THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION – INFLUENCE ACTIVITY

1-16. The need to win and maintain popular support in the theatre of operations and at home is vital to both sides. Gaining and Maintaining Popular Support is a principle of counterinsurgency and is discussed in Chapter 3. The idea of 'popular support' is acknowledgement that counterinsurgency operations have a very strong psychological dimension. All actions taken by military forces, whether or not they involve the use of force, have an effect, and such effects as can be determined require to be considered as plans are drawn up and operations undertaken. In the same way, actions carried out by the enemy require careful consideration so that weaknesses and inconsistencies they offer can be exploited.

1-17. The contest for the support of the population provides counterinsurgency with its principal distinguishing characteristic; it is concerned primarily with moulding the population's perceptions. This is a difficult and intangible business. It is one made even more complicated when operating in a country whose culture is not well understood by the intervening forces. It places a premium on developing cultural awareness and maintaining continuity in approach. Each counterinsurgency campaign requires an agreed single vision of the future for the host nation that is consistent across any coalition or alliance. The 'vision' is a competing 'narrative', the statement of what the UK with allies and civilian partners is trying to achieve. The narrative should be stronger than the insurgent's message, should seek to persuade rather than coerce, should emphasise security and development within its text and should be reflected in the UK Information Strategy. The importance of Influence Activity is described below while the details of how to conduct it are covered in Chapter 6.

1-18. **The Narrative: Mobilising the Population.** The narrative is central to the counterinsurgency effort. The narrative must be a carefully crafted message which aims to strengthen the legitimacy and build the authority of the indigenous government in the eyes of the population. It has to resonate with the local population, use their words and imagery in a way that taps into deep cultural undercurrents. The narrative aims to convince the people that the indigenous government, supported by international forces and organisations, can deliver a better future in terms of security, justice and material wealth. Commanders must strive to operate within the context of the campaign narrative.

1-19. **Shaping Perceptions.** It should be assumed that every decision made, action taken, and message published or broadcast shapes the opinion of the indigenous population, the insurgent, allies and domestic and international audiences. Commanders should focus on shaping perceptions through their activities in the physical, cognitive and information domains. The issue is to persuade:

- The local communities and their leaders that they should support the government.
- Opposition groups to give up their armed struggle and seek other ways to meet their aims.
- The affected country's government to meet the needs of its people particularly their security and stability.

The UK approach to operating in the cognitive and information domains is called Influence Activities[6] . These activities are best described as the combined actions of Information Operations, Media Operations and CIMIC. They link 'word' and 'deed' and Influence Activities are undertaken in the context of coordinated UK government action. The complex web of effects and perceptions is woven by the sum of activities from the strategic to the tactical. There is no doubt that the battle to gain and secure the support of the key audiences is difficult to execute but crucial to campaign success.

SECTION 5 – THE ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

1-20. **Direct Military Action May Be Required**. Some non-military organisations involved in countering insurgency may consider that the need to take direct military action and undertake high intensity security operations is a sign of failure. This is not the case. There will be times when the only method of providing security for the population is through direct military action which involves neutralising any irreconcilable insurgents by whatever legal means are appropriate. Commanders and their staff have a remit to explain to the non-military groups the importance and value of direct military action, when it is needed, and how it is to be applied. This might be through Clear-Hold-Build operations as explained in Chapter 4 or any other method most appropriate in the circumstances. Direct military action may be the least palatable course of action, but with the necessary safeguards in place to limit civilian casualties and damage, it may be the only option to regain control of an insurgent area.

1-21. **Both Sides Have a Political Imperative**. Although the root cause of insurgency may be religious, ethnic, political, sectarian or nationalist the outcome invariably requires a political resolution. The insurgent is unlikely to be satisfied without some form of political change. This may not need to go as far as the overthrow of a government; formal recognition of a grievance and significant and lasting action to address it may be sufficient. The counterinsurgent, on the other hand, should not be satisfied until security and the instruments of government are re-established allowing normal civil and civic activity to continue.

1-22. **The Population is Central to the Outcome**. The population is central to the outcome of the campaign. This means that security has to be restored to allow normal civic and civil life to continue. The support of the population is as important to the insurgent as it is to the counterinsurgent. The support of the population is, however, conditional. Experience shows that the general population's support is gained through influencing and encouraging a small active minority within it. Any action taken by the host nation or coalition forces matters. Support may well be lost if what the counterinsurgent does seems to be detrimental to the legitimate interests of the population.

1-23. **The Solution is Multifaceted**. To paraphrase General Sir Frank Kitson, there can be no such thing as a purely military solution to an insurgency because insurgency is not primarily a military activity. Although addressing a political or economic grievance might have prevented the insurgency from developing in the first place, once it has taken hold political, economic, security and diplomatic measures have to be integrated and applied simultaneously.[7] Regardless of how violent the

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[6] Influence Activities affect the character or behaviour of an individual, group or organisation; they realise cognitive effects. JDN1/07 Joint Action.

[7] Kitson, *Bunch of Five*, p. 283

situation may be, violence is only a symptom of deeper problems which have to be resolved before the situation can improve. Security measures alone will not solve an insurgency.

SECTION 6 - BUILDING HOST NATION CAPACITY AND CAPABILITIES

1-24. **Host Nation Capability**. In order to produce the mass required to eventually defeat an insurgency, coalition forces may have to recruit and train the host nation's security forces at the same time as conducting a range of operations. The issue at stake will be how quickly indigenous forces can take the lead and sustain security operations. It is generally a matter of balance. Development programmes will be required to professionalise armed forces and the police. These take time to have an effect but there will come a point when the aphorism that 'it is better the locals do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly'[8] will apply and transition to the host nation's forces should take place. In the meantime, developing the host nation's security forces requires very careful attention. They will be the forces ultimately responsible for security. Until they can take the lead, external support will be required. Developing the host nation's forces is not just an issue of 'train and equip'. Their nascent forces will require highly capable, well-equipped mentoring teams which are embedded throughout, and have critical enablers such as ISTAR, joint fires, medical care and logistics in direct support.

1-25. **Transition to Host Nation Primacy**. The process of transition underpins counterinsurgency. In overall terms where armed forces have to act to support the civil authority they should transfer such security responsibilities to the civil police as soon as conditions allow. Any sense of a permanent presence by allies or partners is likely to be exploited by insurgents and critics both home and abroad.

1-26. **Guidelines for Working with the Host Nation**. The difficulties of operating within a coalition in support of a weak host nation are significant. Coordinating the wide variety of international opinions with those of the host nation requires a great deal of diplomatic and political effort. Nevertheless, it is important to have some guidelines as a start point which can be considered when integrating British efforts with the host nation and other coalition partners. The guidelines discussed below are as applicable at the tactical level as they are at the operational:

- **The Interests of an Ally Should Take Second Place**. The interests of an ally should, unless absolutely necessary, take second place to those of the host nation. This reinforces the notion of host nation sovereignty and contributes to the legitimacy of allied or coalition efforts. It is easier when the host nation has the capacity and the means to exercise some control over the situation, and when its institutions are operating effectively. Much also depends on the political boundaries set by the coalition's overall strategic plan.

- **The Host Nation Requires a System to Prosecute the Campaign**. No arrangement will work unless the host nation itself has a properly ordered system for prosecuting the campaign. This may be through existing government channels or through a system set up specifically to deal with the problem in hand. Much will depend on the mandate that allies or partners are granted through international law or other such protocols and the relationship

[8] The fifteenth of T E Lawrence's 27 Articles. See T E Lawrence, "The 27 Articles," *The Arab Bulletin*, 20 August 1917. Accessed at http://telawrence.net/telawrencenet/works/articles_essays/1917_twenty-seven_articles.htm.

between the host nation government and the coalition. Much depends on the efficacy of the host nation institutions. For example in Malaya where the High Commissioner derived his authority from the UK Government, the instruments of the Malayan Federation had to be significantly reorganised to deal with the Communist insurgency in a more coordinated and effective manner.

- **Allies Should Co-Ordinate their Efforts Through One Focal Point**. The ally should be able to co-ordinate its effort through a single focal point which can represent it to the host nation's government in order to help formulate overall policy.

- **Allies Should be Represented at Every Level**. The coalition needs to be represented in an advisory capacity at as many levels of the host government's administration as possible. In this way the alliance or coalition can exercise some essential influence over the legitimate use of its resources, avoid duplication of effort and minimise waste. The key is full co-operation between the host nation and the ally and the integration of a full range of civil and military resources and efforts. This will inevitably require some prioritisation when resources are stretched.

- **All Organisations and Institutions Should have a Common Understanding of the Problem**. Developing a common understanding is a very necessary condition to reach but in practice is difficult to achieve. This is because domestic political contexts and objectives may vary between international partners, and between agencies and organisations. One of the first tasks to undertake is the development of pragmatic work-around solutions to overcome inevitable national restrictions applied to sharing intelligence.

Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus

Although unity of command is the ideal for military and civilian agencies participating in a counterinsurgency operation, political considerations usually dictate division of the necessary authorities amongst a variety of actors. Division of civil and military power places a premium on the creation of a clear, common understanding of the political and security goals and how the counterinsurgent forces and agencies intend to achieve them. Only then does unity of effort become a viable substitute for unity of command.

During the Iraq War the civil-military command structure divided responsibilities for security and other lines of operation first between the Coalition Provisional Authority and Combined-Joint Task Force 7 and later between the U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad and the Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq. The civil-military relationship was not always a smooth one as the personalities of various leaders created friction that occasionally hampered a smooth working relationship between the CPA, Embassy and military staffs. The civil-military relationship improved dramatically when Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus assumed their positions as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq in early 2007. General Petraeus was responsible for security matters, while Ambassador Crocker had primacy over the political, economic, and diplomatic lines of operation. Nothing had formally changed in the command and control structure from that under which previous leaders operated; however, the ability of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus to form a smooth working relationship was essential to the creation of effective unity of effort during the "surge" operations of 2007-2008.

Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus worked closely together from shared meetings with principal Iraqi and Coalition figures to the creation of civil-military working groups that hammered out the essentials of a joint campaign plan and supporting activities that chartered the way ahead in the war effort. General Petraeus invited key Embassy staff to participate in his daily battlefield update and assessment briefings which gave both military and civilian personnel a better grasp of each other's activities and progress (or lack thereof) in key areas. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker would jointly host Congressional delegations, key Iraqi leaders and other dignitaries in both informal social settings and more formal briefings that made it clear that they were of one mind on the essential issues. It is not readily apparent why their relationship worked so much better than those that preceded them but it was clearly a more effective partnership. Personalities play a key role; in this regard, part of what made the Crocker-Petraeus relationship work was their professional and personal respect and admiration for each other. Beyond this aspect, they both understood the enormous stakes at risk during the surge and likewise were attuned to the need to work together to achieve the ambitious goals that the President had articulated for the war effort in Iraq. Despite procedural arrangements that precluded formal unity of command, Crocker and Petraeus worked together and achieved unity of purpose and effort. This approach made possible the manifest successes achieved by Coalition and Iraqi forces in 2007-2008.

SECTION 7 - COUNTERING INSURGENCY
THE NEED TO ACT

1-27. The presence of an illegal armed force should be intolerable to any government. An insurgency will gather strength quickly if it has a viable strategy that can take advantage of any inertia in the host nation's government. The longer it takes for the host nation government to act, the more rapidly the insurgency will grow. As the insurgency grows stronger, the government and the economy tend to weaken, drawing the country towards state failure. If nothing is done the host nation government will become ineffective, the security situation will become intolerable and the economy will collapse.

1-28. In order to prevent a friendly state from failing, the international community might decide to act in its support. Ideally, any intervention should be at the invitation of the host nation government and support its legitimate aims; however this may not always be possible and a coalition may be formed to conduct a mandate such as a UN Resolution to prevent a humanitarian crisis. Whatever the circumstances, the counterinsurgent must act legally, fairly and decisively.

SCALES OF EFFORT: PRESENCE MATTERS

1-29. Presence matters in counterinsurgency if security is to be established and sustained. Only when force levels are high enough can security be both generated and sustained effectively. Evidence from many previous campaigns indicates that a ratio of twenty counterinsurgency forces – host nation police, military, and paramilitary and allied or partner counterparts – per thousand head of population is required to establish an effective presence.[9] The present-day conundrum is to strike the right balance between host nation and allied forces, and between regular, police, para-military and auxiliary forces. As it is unlikely that any contemporary coalition can deploy and sustain such numbers it is essential that the host nation security forces are developed so that they become capable of fulfilling this role. This development of host nation security forces is known as Military Capacity Building (MCB) and must be an early priority in any counterinsurgency campaign. Chapter 10 explains MCB in more detail.

> By separating and dissipating our effort from Iraq, we were unable to surge at the same time as the Americans. Our over-commitment has contributed to our inability to conduct COIN according to our own doctrine.
>
> Divisional Commander - Iraq 2008

[9] See James T Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," *Parameters*, Winter 1995, pp. 59-69, and James Dobbins et al, *America's Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003.

RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION

1-30. Countering insurgency requires some sort of political accommodation. Reconciliation is a two-way process, best undertaken from a position of strength. Reintegration is the process by which individual insurgents forsake their violent struggle and come across to the government side disarmed, demobilised, and accepted into normal life. They will need employment and some form of political franchise. Reconciliation normally occurs once one side has the upper hand and there is little prospect of its opponent achieving its political objectives without further cost. It involves the host nation government taking account of some of the insurgents' aspirations on condition that the insurgent ceases to promote the use of violence and supports the overall political settlement. Reconciliation is central to securing longer term stability and it will have to be underpinned by a wide range of political, economic and security measures if it is to be sustained.

1-31. Reconciliation is a delicate process that takes a great deal of effort and time and should be initiated by politicians rather than soldiers. However, the security forces must be acutely aware of any reconciliation and should be prepared to actively support the process. Former insurgents who have reintegrated are often vulnerable in the early stages. Reconciliation is briefly discussed in Chapter 8.

THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE LINES OF OPERATION

1-32. UK policy will determine the in-theatre balance of British political and diplomatic assistance, armed forces deployed and economic investment. This balance is likely to be dynamic and adjusted as conditions on the ground change. In general terms, it is possible to identify three theoretical approaches that balance national political, military and developmental effort to a counterinsurgency campaign.




Figure 1-2 - The Range of Responses

Vignette: Direct and Indirect Approaches: Al Qa'im 2004-2006

Al Qa'im is a city in Iraq of over 100,000 people that lies along the Euphrates River on the Syrian border. In November 2005, the 3/6th Marines, 2/1st Marines and an Iraqi Army Brigade conducted an operation named STEEL CURTAIN that successfully destroyed elements of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in the city. The operation is notable because of the success of the Clear-Hold-Build approach, the way it protected the population and U.S. forces partnering with the Iraqi Army. This approach proved to be more successful than earlier attempts where force levels insufficient to gain any lasting effect.[1]

Indirect Approach

The USMC had previously cleared the city in 2004 and had attempted to carry out clear and hold tactics. AQI and other insurgents retaliated by applying immense pressure on USMC and Iraqi security forces in and around the city. The Marines, hampered by casualties and the hostility of the community, pulled out and created Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in three locations outside the city. By late summer 2004 they had switched to an 'indirect approach.'

Following the USMC withdrawal from the city, the local Albu Mahal tribe, having lost their ability to control the local black market and smuggling, and who did not like AQI enforcing strict Islamic law, turned against AQI and formed their own tribal militia, the Hamza battalion. The USMC remained outside the city and provided support. Coalition forces and Hamza traded intelligence but AQI put increasing pressure on the tribal battalion, coercing or intimidating other tribes to fight until the Albu Mahal tribe was a beleaguered minority. The Marines were forced to stand back as the Hamza battalion eventually pulled out of the city. AQI seized control of Al Qa'im in early September 2005 and declared the Islamic Republic of Qa'im.

Direct Approach - Clear-Hold-Build

It was clear from these events that the 'indirect approach' was the wrong approach. By early November 2005, having learned some valuable lessons from their recent experiences, the USMC adopted an enduring clear-hold-build policy. They began a clearing operation on 5 Nov 2005.

The 3/6 Marines under the command of Lt Col J D Alford, next set out to hold and build with Iraqi forces. The unit, along with an Iraqi Army (IA) Brigade, dispersed throughout the city into outposts, living, eating and patrolling in partnering teams. The Marines and the Iraqis each provided one platoon; the platoons carried out constant patrolling, day and night, interacting with the community and gaining valuable intelligence.

Lt Col Alford's 'Focus of Efforts' concentrated on six areas:

- Training and supporting the IA where his approach was to 'put an IA face out front, IA in the lead and recruit locally.'
- Using paired USMC and IA Combined Action Platoons that lived, ate and worked together; each patrol was combined and shared intelligence.
- Building the Iraqi Police Force from the ground up with the Sheikhs' support; rebuilding key infrastructure and using a police transition team to help develop the police force.
- Engaging the enemy, pursuing locally and where this was not possible, conducting border interdiction, targeted raids which were focused with the guidance to 'kill selectively, avoid complacency; be patient, persistence and present'.
- Civil affairs and reconstruction.
- Interacting with local leadership; living among the people.

By the summer of 2006, the city had become fairly secure. The Iraqi government had empowered the local Albu Mahal tribe through military positions[2] and economic initiatives. The tribe was well represented in the local 850-man Iraqi Police force and provided close to 40% of the recruits for the IA brigade, including the Brigade commander and two battalion commanders.

As with other local successes in and around Iraq in 2005 and 2006 there were a number of keys to the success: first, applying a clear framework for the operation - in this case - Clear-Hold-Build; second, partnering with IA units; third working with tribal elders; forth, separating and protecting the population from AQI and other insurgents. The 'tide' began to shift in Iraq as the Americans applied key tenets of counterinsurgency.

1. See Carter Malkasian, "Did the Coalition Forces need more forces in Iraq? Evidence from Al Anbar", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 46, 3rd Quarter 2007.
2. Originally it was stated that IA brigades in Al Anbar could not be composed of Sunnis, this all changed in Al Qaim.

1-33. **The Indirect Approach**. The military contribution to an indirect approach is likely to be small and based on specific capabilities such as Special Forces and intelligence. The role will be to provide expert advice and assistance to the host nation's security forces. The principal contribution to the counterinsurgency effort will be through the provision of political advice and economic and development assistance to the host government. The best example of the indirect approach – some would say the best example of British counterinsurgency – is the support the British government provided to the Sultan of Oman 1970-1975. US support to the El Salvadorian government in the 1980s is another successful example.

1-34. **The Direct Approach**. The direct approach requires the involvement of both coalition and indigenous security forces in order to re-establish legitimate authority. The Kenyan Emergency 1952-1956, although currently viewed as controversial in terms of the tactics adopted, is a good example of a successful direct approach. Aden (1963-1967), on the other hand, is an example of where despite a hard fought military operation, changes in British foreign policy eventually undermined efforts to maintain security and retain control.

1-35. **The Balanced Approach**. A balanced approach is where political and economic development and military assistance are integrated comprehensively under political control to meet the three main challenges of engaging or re-engaging the political process, securing the population and developing governance and economic conditions to secure stability. Having a broad, politically led approach which carefully integrated all the government's efforts proved effective in Malaya. The United States' Surge in Iraq 2007-08 was part of a similarly balanced, integrated approach to restore security in Iraq and provide the Iraqi Government with the political freedom it required to encourage and obtain cross-party accommodation.

SECTION 8 - THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME

1-36. **Time as a Factor**. Countering insurgency takes time. It takes time for a government to recognise and respond to the scale of the insurgent problem; it takes time for it to build up the intelligence picture that will allow political, security, and economic measures to be developed and targeted; it takes time to develop the physical capacity in ministries; it takes time to re-establish law, order and security; it takes time for political accommodations to be made. Reflecting the psychological dimension of the problem, it takes time to change mindsets, and time to gain or regain and secure the support of the population.

1-37. **Time and the Insurgent**. Time tends to favour an insurgency. While it may take the insurgent time to build up support and strength, it tends to be the insurgent who initiates the campaign when the circumstances suit. Insurgents see time as an ally and understand that it takes patience to build an organisation. In the early stages at least, the insurgent has to avoid government strengths and tends to act cautiously to avoid being killed or captured. The insurgent has the advantage of being able to advance the campaign or disengage and recuperate depending on the effectiveness of the government's response. This is because the insurgent typically has the choice of where, when and how to attack. In contrast government forces are by nature reactive, and highly dependent on time consuming intelligence processing. Once the insurgency is under way, insurgents can wear down the political and public appetite for counterinsurgency by careful application of terrorism, armed action against security forces, or engagement in political activity.

1-38. **Time and the Population**. The support of the population is the key to success for both sides. The population is not a single entity; affiliations, views and interests will vary. Nevertheless, the side which eventually gains and holds popular support will ultimately win. It takes time to convince the population that one side has established a strong, potentially winning position. History shows - for example, the Chinese in Malaya – that it is unusual for many significant elements of the population to declare their support for the counterinsurgent early in the campaign. Rather, it is often the case that people wait to see which side seems likely to win, despite the fact this will perpetuate insecurity and instability.

1-39. **The 'Half-Life' of Intervention**. Intervening forces have been noted to have a 'half-life'[10] where they may be seen favourably when they first arrive but, as time goes on, they are increasingly portrayed as occupiers. They can be portrayed as being a major part of the problem, particularly if their actions cause civilian casualties, and they fail to make demonstrable progress in improving the situation.[11] This perception must be considered from the start of a campaign, and countered to prevent the notion from becoming reality. The first step in this regard is to secure the population. By establishing a strong local presence, by taking the fight to the insurgent, and by demonstrating resolve and perseverance, the population's sense of security will improve and with it, its support for security forces. This will take time to achieve, months not weeks. The result, however, will be to take advantage of the dynamic created by the initial intervention, and to avoid falling victim to the 'half-life' phenomenon.

> *What is dubbed the war on terror is in grim reality, a prolonged, world-wide irregular campaign - a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and moderation. In the long-term effort against terrorist networks and other extremists we know that direct military force will continue to have a role. But we also understand that over the long term we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. Where possible, kinetic operations should be subordinate to measures to promote better governance, economic programs to spur development and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented from which the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideology.*
>
> US Secretary of State for Defense - 2008

1-40. **The Conundrum**. The factors described above create a conundrum; how to balance the time required to produce effective indigenous forces against the negative effect of prolonging an ally's presence? The former will often require residual, continuing support in the form of liaison, mentoring and monitoring teams beyond the commitment of major military forces. The latter will be felt locally, nationally and domestically within the host nation.

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[10] '*The time required for any specified property to decrease by half*'. Concise OED.

[11] LTG David H Petraeus, "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq", *Military Review*, January-February 2006, pp. 2-12.

1-41. **Time and Sovereignty**. Due consideration should be taken of how the host nation's view of its own sovereignty changes over time. Its relationship with its allies or partners may very well change as its confidence grows and its capability increases. This may not always be for the better. In general, increasing host nation sovereignty should be a positive development if confidence and capability are closely linked. The danger comes if the host nation exercises its sovereignty in a way that outstrips its national capacity. This situation may expose political divisions between the host nation's government and the alliance or coalition:

- **Acting Before Being Fully Prepared**. In order to reinforce its sense of sovereignty a host nation's government will wish to be seen to be using its own indigenous forces to create security. If the host nation acts rashly before its forces are trained and equipped to undertake such operations, it is likely to fail. This could lead to confidence being lost in both the host nation's political and military capability and could set the overall campaign back by years.

- **Failing to Create Sufficient Capacity**. If the host nation cannot build enough capacity it may well be dependent on long term allied or partner support. As long as the host nation is reliant on external support it is unlikely to be seen as a viable state in its own right.

In both cases it is important that every level of command is aware that the host nation's sense of sovereignty is likely to change over time, and that this may affect the conduct of military operations as part of the overall counterinsurgency plan.

1-42. **Time, Domestic Opinion and Campaign Progress**. Public opinion is closely linked to campaign progress. If demonstrable progress towards a legitimate and popular end state is not made, and costs (in blood and treasure) mount, changes in public opinion within alliance or coalition countries may well influence nations' commitment. One outcome may be a foreshortening of a national contribution. The natural reaction from the counterinsurgent forces is to generate a strong sense of urgency to achieve near term goals which, in turn, will demonstrate progress. As is so often the case in counterinsurgency, a balance has to be struck between seeking early, easy successes, trying to win the campaign during one military roulement, and recognising that mindsets take time to change.

1-43. **Compressed Levels of War**. The reality is that a campaign is unlikely to be won in months. However, months of slow or no progress may set it back or jeopardise campaign success completely. Worse still, single incidents, however isolated or justified they may have appeared to the commander on the ground, can change the strategic situation almost in an instant and introduce the risk of failure. Military failures can be retrieved and order restored, but where the population is antagonised or the authority of the host government is undermined, it is likely to take some considerable time before progress is regained. Errors of judgment can have far reaching results in the theatre of operations and at home; this phenomenon is an aspect of the compression of levels of warfare[12] in contemporary operations.

[12] Levels of warfare are strategic, operational and tactical. ADP Land Operations, May 2005.

CASE STUDY 1

THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERING INSURGENCY

THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE

BRIGADIER GAVIN BULLOCH

PREAMBLE

1. It is curious to record that despite the extensive experience gained by the British Army in counterinsurgency during the twentieth century, relatively little has been recorded as official doctrine in military publications. A large amount has been written about counterinsurgency unofficially and, partly through this, military doctrine has evolved and developed. Official doctrine, when published, has always lagged behind events, and in the last decades of the last century it took nearly twenty years to replace the previously extant publication.

2. The slow development of any counterinsurgency doctrine can be marked by utilising the dates for official military publications as a chronological guide to the way in which doctrine has developed during the last hundred years.

DOCTRINE BEFORE 1939

3. In 1896 a soldier, Colonel Charles Callwell, who was later Director of Military Operations in the First World War, wrote the book *"Small Wars – Their Principles and Practice"* from which he drew together some doctrinal strands on countering insurgency or rebellion, by using a number of examples from previous campaigns. By today's standards the book is both too simple and unsophisticated. It also omits many factors that would be considered important, such as intelligence. Nevertheless the book was widely read, republished in 1904 after the Boer War, and taught at the Staff College until the early 1920s.

4. The first official linkage between general conflict, the civil authorities and the law came in 1914 when the Manual of Military Law recorded some legal principles by which imperial policing was to be conducted. These principles seemed to satisfy the requirements of the day when General Sir John Maxwell was left to carry on without political instruction during the 1916 Easter Uprising in Dublin. However, they came under very great strain in 1919 after the rioting at Amritsar in India. Until then the principle of 'minimum force' only applied if the situation was still under the control of the Civil Authorities. If civil control had been handed over, as was the case at Amritsar, the principle of minimum force was no longer mandatory. Fresh and updated principles were rapidly republished in the Manual of Military Law later that year.

5. However, it should be noted that while the police in India had effectively monitored and suppressed a revolutionary movement in India from 1907 onwards without the assistance of the Armed Forces, this was not the case in Ireland after 1914. The Civil Authorities including the police were not organised to control any insurrectionist movement within Ireland. Charles Townsend's book *"Policing Insurgency in Ireland 1914-23"* describes police incompetence and very poor civil-military relations as the root causes for operational failure in this campaign. Mismanagement of intelligence also played its part. The lessons of effective policing in India had not been transposed to Ireland until it was too late.

6. During the 1920s, two developments arising from imperial policing were tried; both were in some part successful and helped in maintaining control around the Empire. The first was the development and use of auxiliary forces, in effect the creation of a 'third force' between the Police and Armed Forces. The attempt to bridge this gap was started in Palestine by the formation of a Gendarmerie, and other forces were established elsewhere. In general terms this third force option was effective only when the situation was quiescent. When trouble came, these forces were largely ineffective and were subsequently disbanded.

7. The second development was the use of air power in counterinsurgency situations. Countering insurgency was a tactic employed by the newly formed Royal Air Force, partly to maintain its *raison d'etre* after the First World War and also to allow the Treasury to save money by using air power to police remote and distant parts of the Empire without deploying so many troops. Large empty portions of the Middle East, Iraq, Sudan and parts of the North West Frontier of India were subsequently controlled by the RAF. This doctrinal approach was sponsored by Air Vice Marshal John Salmond in the early 1920s but it gradually lost favour during the 1930s when it was seen clearly that aircraft can only bomb and shoot once the intimidating and deterrent effect of air power had worn off. Following a serious uprising in the NW Frontier region of India in the mid 1930s the Army quickly re-established overall control of operations in these areas. The Air Force as the sole proponent of countering insurgency was perceived as too crude and blunt to be effective as an instrument of policy. In today's parlance, it has become the *Supporting Component* within a wider counterinsurgency approach.

8. In 1923 the government issued a policy document entitled *"Duties in Aid of the Civil Powers"* which became the basis of all military dealings with the Civil Powers, both at home and abroad, until 1937 when it was updated and revised. As the title implies, it was useful in regard to supporting a Civil Power, but of not much use in advising on countering insurgency in its more general sense. Indeed the involved and rather mechanical process of dispersing unlawful crowds was still in use up to 1955.

9. The *Army Quarterly* published an article written by a Major B C Denning in 1927 entitled *"Modern Problems of Guerrilla Warfare"*. He advocated that the most effective remedy to counter insurgencies would be to remove the cause of grievance, although he gave no hint of how to do this. He did, however, advocate the need for an intelligence organisation, and the use of ID cards to control population movement.

10. An official publication *"Notes on Imperial Policing"* was produced in 1934 and did advance the cause of a concerted and coordinated military plan in dealing with disturbances. Intelligence, cordons, and detailed searches were encouraged and can be classed as the forerunner of tactical manuals published in later years. Certainly the usefulness of this doctrinal publication was helpful in quelling the Arab Revolt in Palestine in the late 1930s. General Dill in another publication *"Notes on the Tactical Lessons of the Palestine Rebellion 1936"* recorded his appreciation for the document.

11. At the same time (1934), a soldier-author Major General Sir Charles Gwynn wrote a book entitled *"Countering Insurgency - Imperial Policing"*. A former Commandant of the Staff College, Sir Charles Gwynn's instructions on principles and doctrine were important. He clearly states that all situations are different and both discipline and common sense should be the basis of thinking through any problem. He recorded that:

- The Civil Authorities are, in effect, always in charge, and that decisions taken should be loyally supported.
- The amount of military force employed must be the minimum the situation demands.
- Firm and timely action to bring a quick end to the problems.
- Cooperation with the police and Civil Authorities is important.

12. To these general principles Gwynn devoted some attention to the conduct of operations, but, like Callwell he makes no mention of intelligence, or of the analysis necessary to discover the root cause of an insurgency and how to deal with it.

13. Gandhi's campaign in India between the two world wars was a sign of developments to come, and showed that, given a cause, civil disobedience from large masses of people could achieve much, to embarrass and upset the government of India without causing wholesale chaos on the streets. Nevertheless, the Indian police were adept at targeting organisers and arresting them where necessary. The campaign eventually collapsed. The campaign did however show, for those who cared to observe, that it was not necessary to involve troops or to conduct a prolonged military campaign , but that it was necessary to pay attention to the local conditions prevailing at the time.

14. Finally, before the Second World War the legal tenets recorded in the Manual of Military Law in 1919 were updated and revised in 1937, no doubt as a result of Gwynn's book and the lessons learned in many parts of the Empire - particularly in India, Palestine and the Middle East.

15. The local conditions in Palestine between the wars made it almost impossible for the British to take proper account of both Arab and Zionist aspirations. Satisfactory political negotiation was not feasible and counterinsurgency operations were not always effective. The Arabs generally conducted their operations outside suburban areas, whereas the Zionists based their actions from within their own communities in towns and cities. Good intelligence was virtually impossible to obtain. Eventually the Arab revolt was suppressed by a massive military effort supported by the large scale use of the Jewish police and by strengthening the Jewish militia, the *Haganah*. The payment for this use of Jewish support came after the Second World War.

POST WAR DOCTRINE UNTIL 1969

16. During the Second World War British troops were involved in counterinsurgency operations (India 1942, Palestine 1943 and other places) but were also involved with raising and supporting many successful insurgencies in enemy occupied areas. After the war had ended countering insurgency operations rapidly became a major preoccupation, particularly in India, Palestine and the Far East. In some instances there seemed to be a return to a policy of collective punishment, in others the civil and military law may have been bypassed by the use of methods more associated with insurgency and general war.

17. Nevertheless it took until 1949 for another official pamphlet to be published. An updated post-war version of *"Imperial Policing and the Duties in Aid of Civil Power"* was produced which noted these fresh developments but reaffirmed much of the pre-war doctrine on countering insurgency. The pamphlet did however recommend periodic meetings with civil officials, and a coordination of police and

military boundaries. It provided no direct reference to intelligence and only a passing interest in countering the effects of aggressive communist tactics (either in Europe or the Far East).

18. Attitudes and policies at government level had also changed. The centralisation of intelligence became a feature of government control, and with it a growth in the development of counter-intelligence. The overall control of imperial police forces was centralised in the Colonial Office but took time to become effective and was marred by poor intelligence about insurgencies in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus. The separate compartmentalisation of the various colonial governments began to break down with the result that lessons learned from one campaign could also be studied and used for campaigns elsewhere, but this also took time to develop.

19. It was in the early 1950s that books and publications began to be produced which covered many military lessons learned during particular campaigns - and implicitly pointing towards the need for a modern form of doctrine for all types of counterinsurgency campaigns. Pamphlets such as *"The Conduct of Anti Terrorist Operations in Malaya"* written largely by Colonel Walker (later General Walker) and published in 1952, and *"A Handbook of Anti Mau Mau Operations"* sponsored by General Erskine which appeared in 1954 are good examples of this. These publications and their reprints had an obvious and direct benefit for those involved in these campaigns but were not encapsulated into any overall official Army doctrine until the pamphlet *"Keeping the Peace"* was published in 1957 and later revised in 1963. These two editions covered communist style insurgencies, with the Maoist model to the fore, and picked up many points learned in Malaya, but had little of direct assistance for officers and NCOs in Cyprus, Kenya and parts of the Middle East where other types of insurgency were occurring at the time. The 1963 publication did however break new ground by mentioning the growing importance and role of the media, and in cautioning against the use of collective punishments and large scale restrictive controls.

20. During the latter part of the1960s, very little by way of fresh doctrine was developed despite the operations in Borneo, Cyprus (1963), Radfan and Aden. In 1966 Sir Robert Thompson, a Senior Civil Servant in Malaya, published the book *“Defeating Communist Insurgency”* in which five principles for countering insurgency were first elaborated. Thompson outlined the requirements for successful counterinsurgency as the need for government to have a clear political aim; to function within the law; to establish an overall plan, whereby all political, socio-economic and military responses were coordinated; to give priority to the elimination of political subversion; and to secure the government’s base area before conducting a military campaign. Implicit within the five principles was Thompson’s belief in the primacy of the police over the military, while, in terms of military operations, Thompson stressed the need for small-unit operations to meet and defeat the insurgents in their own element. These principles became the centrepiece for British Army thinking and incorporated into doctrine in the 1969 publication when the Army rationalised all its tactical publications into a series of Volumes under the generic title of *"Land Operations"* in which a newly written *"Counter Revolutionary Warfare"* publication covered aspects of counterinsurgency. This still contained the heavy scent of the jungle and rural operations in far away colonial territories. Little if any attention was paid to the Latin American style of left wing or communist insurgencies. Not even the communist/racist events in British Guiana (1964) or the UN sponsored operations in the Congo (Zaire) sparked any lessons for the future. Intelligence,

however gets a full chapter, along with psychological operations, public relations and a small chapter describing the UN and its methods of operating.

21. This latest publication was, by chance, issued (29 Aug 69) as British troops were being deployed on the streets of Northern Ireland to encounter a very different military situation. The subsequent comment that the troops there expected some kind of internal security situation on the lines of Cyprus, Aden, or perhaps British Guiana, is not without some justification.

DOCTRINE POST 1969

22. The 1969 version of *"Counter Revolutionary Warfare"* after two amendments was rewritten and updated in 1977. It took no account of the then current events and experience of the Army in Northern Ireland where the troops were deployed to provide Military Assistance to the Civil Power (MACP). The publication did however become more general in its world wide application, although still harking back to traditional communist tactics of conducting rural operations with large groups of revolutionaries. Although it excluded any chapter on psychological operations, it did include one on information and countering propaganda.

23. The only real indication that the experience gained in Northern Ireland had been reflected in army units, was by the training of those units before they deployed to Northern Ireland for duty. The training was up to date, effective and extremely flexible. Hostile tactics were studied, changes in training promulgated quickly, and troops informed immediately. None of this seems to have been reflected in any official doctrine, although a large number of Aide Memoires were produced by the General Staff over the years.

24. Since then in the absence of any official publications on the doctrine of counterinsurgency, others sought to fill the gap. In Britain, General Kitson, General Clutterbuck and Colonel Tugwell, amongst others, all recorded their experiences. In addition they wrote doctrinal works on how insurgency and terrorism have developed and offered more up to date principles and guidelines on how to defeat these two scourges of the late Twentieth century. Abroad, Carlos Marighela the Brazilian terrorist leader won a degree of dubious international recognition in some circles for his book *"The Mini Manual of Urban Guerrilla Warfare"*, and a large number of other more respectable authors wrote books about the war in Vietnam and other campaigns elsewhere. Instruction at Staff College from the mid 1970s began to reflect these changes and developments in their teaching as well as covering military developments in Northern Ireland, but against a background of no doctrinal updated publications capturing and reflecting other nations' experience in Indo-China or Africa: in simple terms counterinsurgency doctrine within Britain stagnated during this period, fuelled perhaps by a sense of hubris that the British understood counterinsurgency because of their colonial experiences.

25. Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the momentous changes in Europe after 1989, the British Army has adopted a manoeuvrist approach to the conduct of all operations. It has fought a short but high intensity war in the Gulf (1991) and has made many contributions to UN Peacekeeping forces in areas around the world. Doctrinal publications and manuals have also changed to reflect these developments, dealing afresh with the doctrine for counterinsurgency. The Army has taken due note of the similarities, particularly at the tactical level, between counterinsurgency, support to the Civil Authorities, and stability operations on behalf of the UN in areas of strife or disturbance. In more recent times the Army has, in

conjunction with coalition forces, been operating in Iraq and Afghanistan to counterinsurgency in more complex and frustrating circumstances. This has led to a wholesale review of the principles and operational procedures surrounding insurgency – particularly in dealing with radical extremists who operate on a regional, and perhaps international stage, and who have very different goals in mind.

CONCLUSION

26. The British Army has a long experience of dealing with civil populations, both benign and hostile, and their current military policies reflect this long experience. Before 1939 the military authorities firmly supported the imperial view that insurrection had to be dealt with quickly with firmness and impartiality. Three broad fundamentals of policy have been developed and adapted in the post colonial era for counterinsurgency, largely as a result of Northern Ireland experience. Minimum force, civil/military cooperation and tactical flexibility, continue to provide an essential backdrop for the newer and more recent forms of peace support operations. In doctrinal terms, the most glaring omissions in any official pamphlet or publication have been the lack of any means to analyse the nature and causes of an insurrection, the near absence of any mechanism to coordinate the military contribution within an overall counterinsurgency campaign and in modern times the perceived absence of any overarching direction and control surrounding the resolution of an insurgency. Equally, the failure to capture the lessons of Northern Ireland and to analyse fully how success was gained is a stark omission.

27. Notwithstanding the periods of doctrinal stagnation covered above, several themes emerge that are current today. A Comprehensive Approach where countering insurgency is the sum of the parts of a cross-government policy delivering a political solution: the need to secure the consent and support of the people including the use of Influence Operations, the primacy of intelligence, neutralisation and a long term solution were principles that emerged from hard-won experience. Equally, the core functions of **Shape-Secure-Develop** have their roots in British and other nations' experience. They were not always articulated as such, but history and experience have led to their evolution.

CHAPTER 2

INSURGENCY

SECTION 1 – CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENCY[1]

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2-1. The starting point for any counterinsurgency is to correctly identify the character of the problem it faces. This requires careful analysis based on sound intelligence from which a clear picture of the insurgency should start to emerge. The picture will be by no means complete, and experience suggests that this is rarely achieved quickly. To help focus analysis, several writers have developed models by which insurgency can be categorised. Previous editions of this publication have used Professor Bard O'Neill's approach of categorising according to common attributes.[2] Others writers have distinguished one insurgent force from another by their capabilities, organisation and methods of operation. Whichever method is used, the aim should be to identify an insurgency's strengths and weaknesses so that the former can be neutralised and the latter exploited. An illustrative classification of insurgency, developed from Dr John Mackinlay's work, is provided at Annex A.

CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENCY

2-2. **Regional and National Context**. Each insurgency is different but there are likely to be identifiable similarities between them. For example, countries or regions where there are similar social divisions, or where there are similar racial, cultural, religious or ideological differences, may be vulnerable to similar insurgent threats. This risk increases in areas which are economically weak and lack efficient, stable or popular governments. Much also depends on the effectiveness of the rule of law in an insurgent-affected country, the prevalence of corruption and criminality, and the extent to which malign external regional or international influences undermine government authority. For this reason, it is important to establish the regional context early when analysing an insurgency.

2-3. **Political**. Ambitious political objectives are likely to be a strong characteristic of insurgency. Insurgents recognise that it is not necessary to defeat the counterinsurgent's military forces in the field; eventually they may be able to achieve their goals through the legal political process.

2-4. **Criminality**. Although many insurgencies have strong links to organised crime, most criminals are not insurgents. Crime might play an important role in sustaining an insurgency, but an insurgency depends on much more than criminality to

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[1] Acknowledgements for the central themes of this Chapter are due to Drs TX Hammes, John Mackinlay and Steven Metz.

[2] Professor Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, Potomac Books, 1990.

organise, develop and sustain support for its activities. Nevertheless, dismantling criminal organisations which feed and support an insurgency will be an important step. The criminal dimension of insurgency is one that is all too easy to ignore, yet its effects are often far more widespread than threats to security. Effective counterinsurgency requires to address criminality as much as it addresses the security challenge that insurgency poses.

2-5. **International**. The effect of insurgency often spreads well beyond the physical borders of the country within which it is prosecuted. Its effects are likely to be felt regionally and internationally, especially among expatriate communities and diaspora. It is, however, at the local level, within the country affected that the effects of insurgency are felt most powerfully. It is the pressure and control that insurgents apply within a district or neighbourhood which the population feels most acutely.

2-6. **Networked**. Insurgencies have always depended on people to keep the underpinning political or ideological message alive. They do this through extensive networks which are enabled by globalised, technically advanced communications systems and media. Networks are resilient, flexible and swift to convey information and messages. They are fast to adapt to changing circumstances and developments in the political or security environments. In many ways, these networks are 'Coalitions of the Angry', where activists are motivated to support each other either by a common goal or an underpinning ideology. The Coalitions of the Angry may also include those groups that have nothing more in common than a desire to drive out either an outside power or the government. Networks exist locally, regionally, globally and in cyberspace. It is through the networks of personal contact and through cyberspace that external actors such as foreign fighters are drawn towards the insurgent's message and into the conflict.

2-7. **Supported Externally**. External support remains a significant reason why insurgencies can occur and flourish. There are three main sources.

- **Foreign State Support**. Foreign state support for insurgencies continues to be a significant destabilising influence; even if the foreign state's motivation is different from that of the insurgent. It requires strong diplomatic and, *in extremis*, military action to counter or contain. The type of foreign support available includes military (technical, training facilities, instruction, arms), intelligence, financial, political and logistic. States also provide safe havens for insurgent groups to rest, train and move. If the reasons for foreign state support can be identified then effective counter measures can be developed and applied.

- **Dispersed Expatriate Nationals and The Diaspora**. Struggles in the homeland can be keenly felt by migrant communities around the world. Individuals in these communities may be either strongly for or against the insurgency and some may have even fled the country in order to avoid becoming involved. Extreme expatriate communities and diaspora have provided finance, arms, recruits, international funding, technical expertise and assistance to insurgent groups. They can play an important role in sustaining the campaign in their country of residence, through political influence and providing an alternative narrative to counter the government's message. In other areas, such as the provision of safe havens and training, they are generally less effective, although this should not be overlooked.

- **Other Non-State Support**. A variety of other non-state groups can provide support to insurgencies. The effectiveness of these groups varies but they have proven to be successful at providing support. Often they will only overtly provide support once an insurgency appears to be successful. They fall into two main categories:
    - **Other Insurgent Groups.** Other insurgent groups can be a valuable source of support and advice to an insurgent movement. They add a transnational dimension and provide networks within which insurgent groups can collaborate, share information and provide each other with support.
    - **Influential Individuals**. Wealthy individuals can be a source of much finance and logistic support to an insurgency. Such individuals may be motivated by religious, moral or ethnic considerations.

SECTION 2 – CAUSES, AIMS AND ELEMENTS

THE CAUSES OF INSURGENCY

2-8. Even though the majority of insurgents eventually have political ambitions, many begin with minor dissatisfactions which grow into a unifying cause. Causes tend to stem from the unfulfilled aspirations of a group, or from what are perceived as legitimate grievances, or possibly from minor issues that can eventually be manipulated by a powerful group into their narrative or message. Most insurgencies mirror the cultures from which they stem. If the culture is fairly unified, then the insurgency may be as well. However, if an insurgency comes from a very diverse society, it may not be as tightly bound, and could be prone to schism. Typical causes for insurgency include:

- Nationalism.
- Ethnic, tribal or sectarian disputes.
    - Religion, either as an expression of a separate identity, or through religious fundamentalism.
    - Resistance to what is perceived as neo-colonialism, where control of critical sectors the economy by foreign business interests, or the where the presence of foreign troops offends nationalist sentiment within the population or part of it.
    - Alienation of influential individuals – for example Mao Zedong, Che Guevara, Abimael Guzman and Carlos Marighela – or a sector of society, for example the disbandment of the Iraqi Army in 2003
    - Maladministration, corruption, discrimination and repression.
    - Economic failure, where extremes of wealth and poverty, especially in countries where the upper and lower classes are of different ethnic origins, exacerbate existing social, ethnic or sectarian tensions.
    - Unfulfilled expectations among one class or one sector of society.
    - External support and agitation by states with claims on a territory or other reasons to seek to destabilise another country.

2-9. There may be many other perceived grievances which can be used to gain some popular support, even if they bear no actual relevance to the movement's

primary objectives. Clearly it is crucial to develop as full an understanding of these underlying reasons as possible. How these grievances might develop into an insurgency is illustrated in Figure 2.1. It shows how a grievance can be exploited by an insurgent and, if unchecked, gain popular support and grown into an insurgency campaign. This is a vicious circle that becomes more difficult to break as time moves on and the insurgent campaign gains its own legitimacy in the eyes of the people.




Figure 2.1 – The Development of an Insurgency

THE AIM OF AN INSURGENCY

2-10. Most forms of insurgency tend to follow a strategy that uses all means available to achieve the aims: political, economic, social and para-military. There is no guarantee, however, that an insurgency will either keep its original form or stick to its original aim as the movement and its campaign develops. Insurgencies tend to evolve and it may be that the insurgency's original *raison d'être* may eventually become irrelevant as the counterinsurgency changes the political and security environment. New leaders may bring new ideas and new strategies to the insurgency which overtake the old. Such developments provide the counterinsurgent with opportunities to exploit as changes to the insurgency's *raison d'être* or the adoption of a new approach may fracture support within the group.

2-11. The fact that an insurgency has an aim does not necessarily imply its leadership is united and that there is effective control within the group. This is generally the case, but views change, and events can occur which affect significantly

the role of individual insurgent leaders not least if they are killed or imprisoned. When this happens it is common for rival groups to emerge with differing aims and priorities which may not be reconciled with the original aim of the group. It is important to be alert for signs of schism within an insurgent movement. A series of successes by counterinsurgents or errors by insurgent leaders can cause some insurgents to question their cause or challenge their leaders. Rifts between insurgent leaders offer opportunities to be exploited. One particularly powerful method of such exploitation is to offer amnesty or a seemingly generous compromise. Both can cause divisions within an insurgency and present further opportunities to split or weaken it.

2-12. Criminality, an important source of funding for an insurgent group, can also shift the motivation and character of an insurgent movement away from the political or ideological basis. Pursuit of economic gain and the development of self interest may come to dominate. Nevertheless, the threat such groups pose through terrorism, criminality, disorder or the ability to conduct an armed insurgency remains a concern that will have to be tackled through application of the counterinsurgency principles by co-ordinated government action.

THE MECHANISM OF MOTIVATION

2-13. Whatever the type of motivation a group has, the insurgent leader must explain the belief or idea behind it in a way that people can understand, appreciate and believe in. The movement's ideology must explain the difficulties its followers are experiencing and point to the only means (insurgency) by which those ills can be remedied. A strong message will help to mobilise support. Examples of such difficulties include: religious based persecution; wrongs committed against a group, sect or religion; desire for justice; ethnic aspirations or liberation from foreign occupation; influence and exploitation. Ideology provides the focus, the lexicon and a means by which followers can understand their condition and the ways and means by which the insurgent will correct it.

2-14. The mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is the narrative. The idea of the narrative applies to all parties. The counterinsurgent needs one. A narrative can be an organisational scheme expressed in simple form. Narratives represent the collective identity of for example, religious sects, ethnic groupings, and tribal elements. Stories about a community's history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions and as the means for interpreting the intentions and actions of other groups.

ELEMENTS OF AN INSURGENCY

2-15. Though insurgencies take many forms, most share some common organisational attributes. An insurgent organisation normally consists of five elements which are illustrated in Figure 2.2 below:

- **Leaders**. Movement leaders provide strategic direction to the insurgency, articulate and announce the ideology that underpins it and direct its planners. Leadership is usually exercised through force of personality, the power of ideology and personal charisma. In some insurgencies leaders may hold their position through religious or tribal authority.

- **Combatants**. Combatants do the actual fighting and provide security. Although they are often mistaken for the movement itself they exist to support the insurgency's broader political agenda, to exercise control over insurgent

areas, to train recruits and to facilitate the flow of money, weapons and foreign and local fighters.

- **Political or Ideological Cadre**. The cadre forms the political or ideological core of the insurgency. It is actively engaged in the struggle to accomplish insurgent goals. It may also be designated as a formal political party. The cadre implements guidance and procedures provided by the movement leaders. Modern non-communist insurgencies rarely use the term 'cadre'; however these movements usually include a group that performs similar functions. Additionally, movements based on religious extremism usually include religious and spiritual advisors among their cadre.

- **Popular Support**. The cause and the leader have to appeal to as wide an audience as possible. The insurgent's political plans will endeavour to enlist the support of as much of the population as possible. Neutrals are neither recognised nor tolerated by insurgents. They have to be persuaded or coerced to support the cause. Popular support is not only important from a political point of view but is essential to the provision of logistic support, to the development of an intelligence network and to the creation of a protective security screen around the insurgents' clandestine organisation.

- **Auxiliaries**. Auxiliaries are active followers who provide important support services. These include running safe houses, storing weapons and supplies, acting as couriers, providing intelligence, giving early warning of counterinsurgent movements, and providing funding from lawful and unlawful sources.




Figure 2.2 – The Dynamics between the Elements of an Insurgency

2-16. The relative size of each element depends on the strategic approach that the insurgency adopts. A conspiratorial approach will not pay much attention to combatants or a mass base. Military-focused insurgencies downplay the importance of a political cadre and emphasise military action in order to generate popular support. The popular approach is the most complex; if the state presence has been eliminated the elements may exist openly but if the state retains a continuous or occasional presence, the elements may adopt and maintain a clandestine existence.

SECTION 3 – INSURGENT VULNERABILITIES

2-17. While this Chapter has stressed the difficulties insurgencies present, they have vulnerabilities that the counterinsurgent must seek to exploit:

- **Military Capability.** By their very nature insurgents will normally be at a disadvantage to the counterinsurgent in terms of traditional military capability. An insurgent is unlikely to have the firepower, ISTAR, logistics or manoeuvre capabilities to match viable security forces except when he is prepared to concentrate much of his force against a specific target. However, the overall narrative that an insurgent uses may include indicating that he has the ability and will to challenge the security forces. This will expose him to direct tactical engagement with security forces and risks him losing manpower and resources as well as alienating the population.

- **The Need for Secrecy**. Any group beginning from a position of weakness and intending to use violence to pursue its aims tends to adopt an initially covert approach to its planning and subsequent activities. This can be counterproductive once an active insurgency begins. Excessive secrecy can limit the insurgent's freedom of action, reduce or distort information about his goals and ideals and restrict communication within the insurgency. These effects can be avoided if the insurgency splits into political and military wings allowing the movement to address the public (political) requirements of an insurgency while still conducting clandestine (military) actions.

- **Inconsistencies in the Insurgents' Message**. In the early stages of an insurgency, leaders may be tempted to go to almost any extremes to attract followers. To mobilise their base of support insurgent groups can use a combination of propaganda and intimidation and they may overreach in both. Effective counterinsurgents use information operations to exploit inconsistencies in the insurgents' message as well as their excessive use of force or intimidation.

- **The Cause**. The insurgent cause itself may also be a vulnerability. For example, an insurgent doctrine based on an extremist interpretation of an ideology can be countered by appealing to a moderate interpretation of the same text. When a credible religious or other respected leader passes this kind of message the counteraction is even more effective.

- **The Need for a Base**. Insurgents require a viable base from which to mount their operations. Clearly one that is remote makes establishing control of the population difficult, but a base within a major population centre risks becoming the focus of the counterinsurgency. The insurgent has to strike a balance between using forward bases from which operations can be mounted and rear bases where training and support can be concentrated. Rear bases in

remote areas or in a foreign country offer best protection but moving between these bases and the area of operations makes the insurgent vulnerable.

- **The Need for External Support**. Insurgent movements often rely on freedom of movement across porous borders. Insurgencies usually cannot sustain themselves without substantial external support which is an aspect which has taken on a new significance with the contemporary transnational dimension of insurgency. Insurgents may train in one country and fight or conduct other types of operations in another country, but the movement of fighters and materiel is vulnerable to intervention or attack.

- **The Need to Obtain Financial Resources**. All insurgencies require funding to some extent. Criminal organisations are possible funding sources but may be unreliable. Co-operation between insurgents and organised crime should attract attention from the host nation's and other country's authorities. Funding from outside donors may come with a political price that affects the overall aim of an insurgency and weakens its popular appeal. Counterinsurgents can exploit insurgent financial weaknesses. Controls and regulations that limit the movement and exchange of materiel and funds may compound insurgent financial vulnerabilities. Financial transaction can also be another valuable source of intelligence. These counter actions are especially effective when an insurgency receives funding from outside of the state.

- **The Need to Maintain Momentum**. Controlling the pace and timing of operations is vital to the success of any insurgency. Insurgents control the start of their campaign and have some measure of control over subsequent activity. While many insurgencies have failed to capitalise on their initial opportunities others have allowed counterinsurgents to dictate the pace of events and scope of activities. If insurgents lose momentum, counterinsurgents can seize the initiative.

- **Informants within the Insurgency**. Nothing is more demoralising to insurgents than realising that people inside their movement or trusted supporters among the public are deserting or informing on them. Although counterinsurgents may attract deserters or informants by removing fear of prosecution or by offering rewards, informers have to be confident that the government can protect them and their families against retribution if they are to come forward.

A CONTEMPORARY CLASSIFICATION OF INSURGENCY

2-A-1. The categorisation used in this publication identifies five types of insurgency. It is just one of several methods available;[3] JDP 3-40, for example, uses a slightly different model when categorising irregular actors. Each category of insurgency can be distinguished by its motivation, its strength, the environment in which it operates, its leadership and organisation, and its international reach. The five categories described below are not mutually exclusive but are listed in descending order of political threat they pose. The development of thinking on types of insurgency is illustrated in Figure 2-A-1.

POPULAR INSURGENTS

2-A-2. The concept of the popular insurgent evolved directly from the Maoist prototype and 'popular' refers to the support of a population or a community. Popular insurgencies still emerge in Asia, Africa and South America and many now have an international dimension. They tend to be well organised and well trained, as the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) demonstrated in Colombia in the 1990s. The empowering nature of the ideology is central to the movement. Without a strong cause, popular insurgency struggles in a strong state with an educated population and competent security forces, as the Colombian counterinsurgency campaign since 2002 has shown. Popular insurgents living in urban areas dominated by the opposing regime survive by being legitimately employed and conducting their insurgent responsibilities in a clandestine manner. Only insurgents living in areas beyond government control can afford to move and live as military groupings.

2-A-3. Popular insurgencies which are vigorously opposed have to organise themselves carefully, with complicated structures to achieve security. Their campaigns might last for decades wearing down the population, eroding democratic institutions and brutalising the participants. Popular insurgents could only survive if they were supported by a sufficient element of the population to sustain them. The energy of their overt political organisations reflects the importance of this relationship. For popular insurgents, however, the canvassing, subversion, coercion and organisation of the local population are not the primary aim; they must focus on eliminating opponents by acts of violence and by terrorising the population into compliance. To succeed, attacks cannot be impulsive; they need careful planning and reconnaissance before they can be implemented.

MILITIAS

2-A-4. Militias are not a new problem; their existence has been an important factor in the balance of power in many nations throughout history. Recently, Shi'a and Sunni militias, the latter in concert with al Qaeda in Iraq, were the principal antagonists in Iraq's descent into widespread sectarian violence between 2006 and

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[3] This categorisation was provided by Dr. John Mackinlay, of King's College London. Other well known academics working in the field of insurgency include Professor Bard O'Neil, (*Insurgency and Terrorism: from Revolution to Apocalypse*, Washington DC: Potomac Books, 1990, revised 2005), Dr. Steven Metz (*Rethinking Insurgency*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2007), and Dr. T. X. Hammes (*The Sling and the Stone. On War in the 21st Century*, St Paul, MN: Zenith, 2006).

2008. Since militias challenge legitimate authority, action has to be taken to control their influence or disband them. Those who direct militias will neither give up control easily nor support their disbandment. This means that, more often than not, the issue will have to be confronted and a violent backlash dealt with if order is to be restored.

2-A-5. Militias emerge or form for a number of reasons. All are very similar to those that result in insurgency and centre on the gap between their political, ideological, religious, class, ethnic, or sectarian expectations and what is available. While some militias may support political objectives, other than self-aggrandisement, they may not represent a classical insurgent threat to the state in terms of replacing a government. Their political aims and objectives, however, do pose a threat. The response to this type of militia will vary according to circumstances. A purely military organisation can be dealt with by militarily means. One with a political agenda may need a broad counterinsurgency strategy if it draws political strength from a part of the population.

2-A-6. Militias can take several forms. The main ones are:

- A militia linked directly to a legitimate political party, with popular support.
- A militia that is the personal army of a powerful political or religious leader.
- A militia that emerges from a part of the armed forces, where its training and access to military materiel make it a potent adversary.
- A militia formed to defend a section of the population from a real or perceived threat, which may be the government or another threat with which the government has failed to deal.
- A militia that seeks to capitalise on a government's weakness.

2-A-7. Militias may seek to discharge 'quasi-state' responsibilities, providing some functions which a government should normally perform but cannot, either because of its lack of capacity or because the security situation prevents normal civil and civic life from continuing. 'Quasi-state' functions include the provision of security, civic administration and quasi-government, education, and health.

2-A-8. Militias raise funds in a variety of ways ranging from legal contributions from its population to illegal activity such as extortion, protection rackets, robbery, counterfeiting, narco-trafficking, vice, smuggling and kidnapping. The line between militias and large scale organised crime is often blurred.

CLAN OR TRIBAL RIVALRY

2-A-9. Some insurgencies are based on clan structures and organisations. Violence tends to be sporadic and focused in tribal areas but however localised, these rivalries can be violent and temporarily highly disruptive. Motivation and tribal or clan loyalties are typically very strong. Familial ties are very resilient and cultural identity is a powerful if not always discernable characteristic. A tribal or clan view can be held for generations and the narrative that supports them will be a powerful influence.

2-A-10. Tribal or factional leaders will compete for political and economic power. This adds a political dimension to the threat that their destabilising activities pose, particularly within failed or failing states where the government struggles to contain strong local power struggles. In the competition for power and resources tribes or clans may well use illegal measures to sustain their activities, exert pressure on local

political leaders and raise a militia to defend their own population and interests. More concerning for the host government is the probability that they will seek to subvert politicians and civil servants and infiltrate the security forces. Having established influence in these areas, tribes or clans will be able to control essential services. They may resort to crime, such as drug-trafficking, prostitution and protection rackets. A further complicating factor is the tendency for groups to coalesce if they recognise that their interests are better served by doing so. While such adaptations will complicate attempts to impose legitimate governance and security through the rule of law, the general principles of counterinsurgency remain effective albeit that police led action is likely to be more appropriate than a purely military response.

FERAL GANGS

2-A-11. Feral gangs have a largely local disruptive effect and are generally found among the unemployed or an unemployable stratum of society where there is no obvious controlling or regulating social structure. Their presence contributes to the conditions in which more potent forms of insurgency thrive. Feral gangs tend to operate on the margins of society and the law. Hostage taking, corruption, and threatened and actual violence are common tactics. Feral gangs find it difficult to counter a concerted campaign to deal with them and generally disperse quickly or are eliminated if they fight. The main problem they pose is the malevolent influence they hold over routine life in their area where they intimidate the local population, disrupt normal life and challenge the local police through minor disturbances, the use of armed violence and their links with crime. The political ambitions of such gangs tend to be limited, perhaps only seeking to retain control of their immediate area along with control of whatever crime rackets present. Money and peer group credibility are important motivating factors; conventional political standing is not likely to be important. The larger a group gets the greater its attraction becomes, and burgeoning support increases the group's ability to control whatever resources are available, such as weapons, drugs and people.

GLOBAL INSURGENTS

2-A-12. Global insurgents are a distinct category separated from other insurgent groups by their aims, their global reach, their international recruiting base and supporting organisation. In many ways, global insurgents are similar to popular insurgents in their organisation, use of cellular structures and their constant need to cultivate popular support which involves the use of propaganda and information. The notoriety and among some populations, the popular success of al Qaeda and its affiliates have challenged the traditional views of insurgency. Al Qaeda's strategy, and in particular the information operation it continues to mount to justify and to sustain its position, is a product of global changes and raises the problem of countering insurgency to a new level.

2-A-13. Information technology and supporters within expatriate communities and diaspora are factors in helping to spread and to promote an insurgency's philosophy. They add a global dimension to insurgency. This is not an entirely new phenomenon. Communist insurgency had a global effect, manifesting itself in South East Asia, Africa and Latin America. Cold War dynamics kept some form of equilibrium in the relationship between the superpowers and their proxies thus preventing direct attacks on their homelands that would have escalated tensions rapidly and perhaps catastrophically. Global insurgents are not so constrained. However, those countering the threat they pose are so constrained; it is difficult to deter non state actors who are present in Western societies or indeed, in any sovereign state

however weak or broken. In spite of these difficulties it is important to recognise the importance of cause and effect. In the case of al Qaeda, Arab nationalism and ideology based on an interpretation of religious belief spawned a non state insurgent group which sought to achieve intra state political objectives. It uses a particular religious interpretation to support what would ultimately be a political outcome.

2-A-14. A global insurgent movement both cultivates and threatens different populations by its actions. First, they must demonstrate their capability and the truth of their message to their natural affiliates worldwide. Second, they must demonstrate that the forces arraigned against them are incapable of countering the threat they pose or more importantly, countering their message effectively. In both cases, propaganda plays an important role, particularly propaganda of the deed. It is clear that worldwide media coverage can have a stimulating effect on fund-raising, recruitment and ground level support.

2-A-15. At first, it was thought that the threat that global insurgency posed was more challenging than classical counterinsurgency theory could counter. It is now clear that although global insurgents may have the ability to carry out terrorist attacks, their capacity to extend their area of geographical control is being contained by the application of revised counterinsurgency theory and doctrine. At the same time, there is evidence that the actions of some insurgent groups have undermined their own ideological message. For example, the depredations imposed on Sunni tribes in Iraq by al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) proved to be a turning point in the campaign and it was the Sunni tribes who subsequently led the fight to eradicate AQI and its ideology. At the time of writing although remnants of AQI still exist in Iraq and they are capable of mounting terrorist attacks, they have no popular support and pose little residual threat to Iraq's government.




Figure 2-A-1 Historical Categorisation on Insurgency

CASE STUDY 2

THE GROWTH OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

1. **General.** Following the success of Mujahideen forces against the Russians in 1989 in Afghanistan, large numbers of fighters returned to their homelands in the Middle East or moved to take up further insurgent activity in support of their extremist religious beliefs. Thus began the gradual build up of a variety of insurgent groups across the Middle East whose aims and methods were designed to promote their versions of the Muslim faith. There are many separate causes (Israeli/Palestine problems, Kashmir, Saudi Arabia) but the main overriding cause appears to be anti-American – particularly after the Gulf War in 1991 when US forces built up several military bases in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. The most extreme groupings, such as al Qaeda, have the ability to engage in terrorism through mafia like activities and terrorist franchise on a near global scale rather than on the more traditional based understandings of insurgency. For Osama bin Laden, its spiritual leader, the events of 9/11 mark the resumption of a war for the religious domination of the world that began in the seventh century. If the West is to deal successfully with the threat posed by al Qaeda, it needs to be clear about identifying the insurgent, his strategic objectives, and bases of political, economic, and military support. It would be wiser strategically to recognise al Qaeda operating a global insurgency armed with a world view and ideological support that at present finds fertile ground in the greater Middle East. A more accurate concept of their current militancy is as a global insurgency waged against certain Western democratic states and some Muslim states. Classic insurgency methods are used within failing or failed states (Somalia is but one example) while simultaneously utilising limited but networked and technologically capable means to wage other forms of insurgency (terrorism in London and Madrid, near-conventional operations in Chechnya) to achieve their aim.

2. **Operations in Islamic States.** Military Operations to remove the Taliban government and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan following al Qaeda's actions on 9/11 were successful, but they failed to follow this with swift and effective rebuilding of the country after many years of civil war. As a result both Taliban and al Qaeda have been given time to rebuild and extend their ability to influence extremist Muslim groups elsewhere around the world. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 provided a major distraction away from Afghanistan and encouraged many thousands of those intent on a struggle against the West the opportunity to engage US forces in Iraq following the regime change.

3. **Global Insurgent Operations.** The operational characteristics of al Qaeda as an insurgent group – vice a terrorist group – have now been examined by many of the world's counter insurgent experts. The position is that al Qaeda is a dynamic ideological movement and part of a growing global insurgency. The threat faced by the West from bin Laden and al Qaeda is not the episodic terrorist campaign typical of those perpetrated by the more traditional insurgent groups. It is rather a worldwide insurgency against 'Christian Crusaders and Jews', which is being waged by groups bin Laden has loosely controlled or inspired. Al Qaeda is probably best defined as a religiously inspired, global insurgent movement that uses terrorist tactics. One expert identifies the crux of the issue which is that the 'enemy' is an ideology, a set of attitudes, a belief system organised into a recruiting network that will continue to replace terrorist losses until it is defeated politically. The al Qaeda

insurgency appears to be especially powerful because it has successfully utilised the features of globalisation to include air transport, telecommunications, and computers to maintain and manage a global insurgency. Thomas Mockaitis has observed, "The current threat differs from insurgencies primarily in scope and complexity. Previously insurgents operated in a local arena; now they act on a global stage". Al Qaeda is presently the most deadly of the more than 100 Islamic militant groups formed over the past 25 years. The danger it poses flows from its willingness to employ 'weapons' of mass effect, its global reach, its focus on targeting the West and, most importantly, its revolutionary and expansionist ideology. The size of al Qaeda, its political goals, and its enduring relationship with a fundamentalist social movement provide strong evidence that it is not a terrorist group as such, but an insurgency. It indicates a mindset that is rooted in a more profound and widespread fear and detestation of modernisation, secularisation and decadence of Western societies that appear to undermine Islamic values throughout the world.[1] Armed action is its primary tool, but there are intriguing aspects of mass mobilisation techniques that serve to strengthen its organisational impact and resilience. Components that are unique to its methods of operating include transnational networking and the use of a multiethnic society. Together these factors comprise an evolving style of a religious based insurgency that is altogether different from the Maoist people's war model which has underwritten most insurgency doctrine in recent decades.

[1] Acknowledgements to Professor Sir Michael Howard. This short extract is from his book *Liberation or Catastrophe. Reflections on the History of the Twentieth Century* published by the Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd in October 2007.

The Evolution of Counterinsurgency Principles

Thompson *Defeating Communist Insurgency*	Land Ops *Counter-Revolutionary Warfare*		Land Ops *Counter-Revolutionary Warfare*		Kitson *Bunch of Five*	*Staff College Notes on Counter Insurgency*	AFM Vol. 1 Pt. 10 *Counter-Insurgency Operations*	US Army FM 3-24 *Historical Principles*	AFM Vol 1 Part. 10
1966	1969		1977		1977	1994	2001	2006	2008
	General Principles of Government Action	Operating Principles	Conduct of Security Force Operations	Planning					
								Legitimacy Is the Main Objective	
The government must have a clear political aim			Political Awareness			Recognition of the Political Nature of the Problem and by Definition the Solution	Political Primacy and Political Aim	Political Factors Are Primary	Primary of Political Purpose
The government must have an overall plan	National Plan	Civil Authority							
	Co-ordinated Government Action	Co-operation	The moment of intervention – Police and Military Co-operation	Co-operation between Civil and Military authorities	Establish coordinated machinery at every level for the direction of the campaign	Civilian Dominated, Coordinated System of Command and Control	Coordinated Government Machinery	Unity of Effort Is Essential	Unity of Effort
		Minimum Force	Minimum Necessary Force						
Intelligence (Chapter 7)	Security Intelligence			Intelligence and Security	Set up an intelligence organisation suited to the circumstances	Information, Collated into Useable Intelligence	Intelligence and Information	Intelligence Drives Operations	Integration of Intelligence
								Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment	Understand the Human Terrain
In the guerrilla phase, secure base areas first						Neutralisation (including selective destruction) of Insurgents	Neutralising the Insurgent		Secure the Population Neutralise the Insurgent
Give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas	Public Opinion and Popular Support Strong and Popular Security Forces		Popular Support		Ensure that the insurgents do not win the war for the minds of the people	Separate the Insurgent from the People	Separating the Insurgent from his Support	Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support	Gain and Maintain Popular Support
Function in accordance with law			The Law		Maintain a legal system adequate to the needs of the moment			Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential	Operate in Accordance with Law
						Development of Long-Term Government Reforms to Prevent a Resurgence of the Trouble	Longer Term Post-Insurgency Planning	Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment	Prepare for the Long Term
				Training Research and Development	Education and Training (Chapter 9, *Low Intensity*			[Contemporary Imperative: Learn and Adapt]	Learn and Adapt

Figure 3-1 –The Evolution of Counter Insurgency Principles

CHAPTER 3

THE PRINCIPLES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

Politics, People, Perceptions and Paradoxes

'*But at the end of the day, this is all about people. Yes, in Afghanistan we are living, operating and fighting when necessary, among the people - but more importantly we recognise that people are more than just the environment, they are the object of our endeavours, so what we are doing is about the people and for the people of Afghanistan, of the Region and of the international community more widely.'*

CGS at Chatham House[1] -15 May 2009

SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION AND PRINCIPLES

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3-1. Since the first British doctrine for small wars was published in 1909, the principles of counterinsurgency have evolved as the operational environment has changed. The last counterinsurgency Field Manual published in July 2001 listed principles developed with lessons from Northern Ireland in mind. The principles laid out in 2001 were published to provide a logical sequence which would shape a campaign plan and allow campaign progress to be assessed. They were: political primacy and political aim; co-ordinated government machinery; intelligence and information; separating the insurgent from his support; neutralising the insurgent; longer term post-insurgency planning. The origins of these principles can be traced back directly to those published by Sir Robert Thompson in 1966 in his book *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam*. British counterinsurgency operations of the 1960s through to 2001 did so against a backdrop of colonial and post-colonial administrations, and the principles developed during that period reflected the constraints and considerations of operations abroad. The evolution of British counterinsurgency principles, including reference to the US Army's FM 3-24, is laid out in Figure 3-1 opposite.

[1] Chatham House is the home of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

3-2. The principles drawn up for this publication of counterinsurgency doctrine return to the more general framework needed for expeditionary intervention operations. They reflect the considerations and constraints affecting today's campaigns. The principles of counterinsurgency are:

- Primacy of Political Purpose.
- Unity of Effort.
- Understand the Human Terrain.
- Secure the Population.
- Neutralise the Insurgent.
- Gain and Maintain Popular Support.
- Operate In Accordance With The Law.
- Integrate Intelligence.
- Prepare for the Long Term.
- Learn and Adapt.

PRIMACY OF POLITICAL PURPOSE

3-3. A contemporary observer might be forgiven for assuming that military operations are the dominant factor in counterinsurgency. Such an assumption would owe a great deal to the focus that the media is able to place on highly visible security operations. The perception this creates distorts the fact that there is no purely military solution to the problem. David Galula's assertion that 'counterinsurgency is 80 percent political action and only 20 percent' military is still widely accepted.[2] The relative percentages are not important. What is important is the principle that in counterinsurgency, political purpose has primacy. As Clausewitz noted, even in 'less intense' conflicts, the political aim is more complex and more prominent. This makes counterinsurgency no different from any other type of military operation because for the UK and its allies, the military operates in support of legitimate political objectives. This is the case whether the task at hand is general war or counterinsurgency. Political purpose and effective governance must have primacy and be seen to be working to better the lives of the people.

> That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. But in Afghanistan we need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means.
>
> David Miliband – Foreign Secretary - 27 July 2009

3-4. Policy should be a guide for how a campaign develops which means that active political involvement is required throughout the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of counterinsurgency operations, and must involve the host nation's government. Military operations may meet their military objectives but if they are conducted without ensuring that their likely outcomes are clearly in pursuit of political objectives, the results they achieve may be entirely counterproductive. It is important that the military commander ensures that his actions advance rather than hamper progress towards the desired political settlement.

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[2] David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964, reprinted 2006, p. 63.

UNITY OF EFFORT

> We lacked a Campaign Plan for Afghanistan; one that brought together the International Community, the UN, the Government of Afghanistan and the military; that provided the framework for coherence and unity of effort across all Lines of Operation. We lacked cohesion. At times, it felt as if we were running an increasingly Balkanised operation, with nations conducting independent and isolated operations, following what appeared to be different campaigns and agendas. Unless nations adopt a theatre level approach, we risk defeat in detail. A campaign plan, laid out on behalf of the Government of Afghanistan, and bought into by the key actors, would provide the essential framework and context which this operation demands.
> COS ARRC

3-5. **Why Unity of Effort?** An insurgency can only be defeated if the host government, a coalition or alliance, and the many instruments of state work together towards a common end. Their actions must be compatible and not counterproductive. It is important that major non-governmental organisations and the principal international organisations share the campaign objectives, or do not work at odds with them. It is through an approach which seeks to unify essentially voluntary efforts that political primacy is achieved. Without the structures and procedures to make such an approach work (persuasion, negotiation and in extremis, coercion within the law), it will be difficult for a government and those acting in support of it, to make the best use of all the strengths at their disposal. Effective co-ordination is required from top to bottom and between departments and agencies to ensure that:

- There is unified action across all lines of operation.
- The actions of one government department do not cut across and disrupt the efforts of others.
- Lines of operation are balanced and evolve in unison.
- Needless duplication is avoided.
- There is a single strategic narrative which all campaign elements work towards.
- Information is shared across all lines of operation and government departments.

3-6. **Unity of Effort within a Coalition**. Harmonising action across the lines of operation will be more difficult to achieve in a coalition due to:

- Coalition partners' competing international agendas and differing domestic imperatives.
- Coalition partners' differing relationships with other Regional Protagonists.
- Coalition partners' views conflicting with those of the host government.
- Coalition partners' differing legal constraints.
- Dissonant views and factions within the host government.

3-7. **Integration**. It is important that the host nation achieves and maintains a properly ordered system for prosecuting the campaign. Assessing, supporting and

developing this system are vital early activities for a coalition. This is often a considerable undertaking but without it, not only will the host government struggle to re-establish its authority in disrupted areas, but its allies will find it difficult to prioritise, co-ordinate and apply their capabilities to the problem. The fundamental requirement is for close co-operation between the host nation and its allies to enable the full range of civil and military efforts to be prioritised, integrated, and synchronised. This means that:

- An ally or partner should be able to channel its aid through one representative or committee to the host nation's government who can help to formulate overall policy.
- The ally or partner needs to be represented at every level in an advisory role to the host nation.
- Coalition efforts have to mirror the arrangements above and the various contingents have to have a common understanding of the problem.

Close cooperation with the agencies of the supported government is undoubtedly vital for ultimate success. But commanders at all levels must be alive to the possibility that some elements of the host nation may be part of the root cause of the insurgency and inimical to the political progress necessary for its resolution. Careful analysis is essential before action.

3-8. **The Campaign Plan**. A campaign plan is the means by which political, security, economic and diplomatic measures can be integrated and implemented. Although it is a military device and not necessarily familiar to all those involved, a joint, combined plan provides the means by which objectives can be determined and resources and activities prioritised, targeted, and co-ordinated. Ideally it will be produced through combined planning between the host nation and its partners. The plan should be adaptable enough to take account of local variations. Even though the military will have the lead for the security line of operation, other lines of operation will run in parallel. In the early stages of the campaign the security situation may preclude civilian organisations from working in many areas. The military should therefore anticipate being asked to contribute to the other lines of operation until military operations stabilise the security situation and other agencies can begin to operate. This may take some time and as developments in Iraq 2007-08 show, it is possible for security operations to make progress that gets them ahead of political or economic development. This can cause problems. Unity of effort at every level will allow the campaign lines of operation to be managed and kept in step. The campaign plan is examined further in Chapter 4.

3-9. **The Regional Context**. Very careful attention should be paid to the regional situation and its dynamics. Not all regional parties will be co-operative. A clear understanding of the regional situation will allow more effective diplomatic and international pressure to be applied to change or ameliorate antagonistic or malign influences. Similarly, it may be possible to enlist positive regional support, not just to counter negative influences. All this needs to be addressed through co-ordinated planning and action.

3-10. **Frictions**. There is a great deal of scope for friction between the multiple organisations and agencies. Much effort will be required from all involved to minimise and marginalise it. Success will depend greatly on the local capacity of organisations, the experience and motivation of those involved, leadership, personality and the ability to communicate effectively. Early consultation, discussion and resolution of important decisions such as leadership and authority, responsibility,

timelines, and the priorities for the allocation of resources will be necessary. Those who should be involved in this process include:

- Government officials, civil servants, diplomats.
- The intelligence services.
- Planning staff.
- Liaison and information operations staff.
- Representatives of international organisations and where possible, NGOs.

3-11. **Implications for the Commander**. If the threat is high the activities of civil servants and workers from international organisations and NGOs may be neutralised or constrained. In this case the local military commander may find himself as the only representative of co-ordinated government action who can access the area of operations to work. The commander's skills as a soldier-diplomat, soldier-administrator and soldier-politician will be tested.

UNDERSTAND THE HUMAN TERRAIN

3-12. Counterinsurgency is very much a human activity. It cannot be conducted effectively without having a detailed understanding of the human terrain. This is a broad and complex subject which brings together sociology, political science, geography, regional studies, linguistics and Intelligence. Its scope ranges from understanding individuals, particularly key leaders, through groups to societies and trans-national influences. Soldiers need to understand the human terrain in which they will operate so that their efforts are productive. Failing to understand the human terrain can lead to misunderstandings or, worse, bring soldiers into conflict with the local population.

3-13. **Language**. Operating in non-English speaking states places a premium on language training. To help bridge the cultural gap, soldiers should be able to use the conversational basics of the local language. It is an operational imperative that they know the critical words of command required to bring a situation under control, and to avoid misunderstanding. Examples include giving simple instructions, and issuing warnings before opening fire. Inevitably, the prime means to communicate will be through interpreters. These may be either military or civilian. Interpreters provide the immediate conduit into gaining and securing popular support. There are many issues concerning the use of contracted interpreters – language skill and their ability to convey the right message, impartiality, motivation, and trustworthiness – but they have to be worked around to ensure that soldiers communicate effectively with the population they are seeking to secure.

3-14. **The Political Environment**. If military personnel are to support government intentions, they need to understand the broad political context of the campaign, in particular the aims and parameters of the host government, Her Majesty's Government, and those of coalition partners. These require to be understood down to the lowest tactical level, reflecting the reality that tactical actions can have strategic effect. Forces also require a clear understanding of the insurgents' political aims so that they predict and pre-empt insurgent actions to promote their own case or undermine the standing of the government and coalition. By ensuring that all ranks understand the reasons behind what they are doing, and their freedoms and constraints, they will be able to respond to changes and challenges in their area of operations effectively and appropriately. The compression of levels of warfare and the ever-present battle for perceptions using formal media and informal networks mean that tactical actions can rapidly produce undesirable strategic effects.

3-15. **The Cultural Environment**. Culture[3] is an immensely powerful factor in people's lives. Understanding the local culture is important in ensuring that the planning and conduct of operations takes account of how the population might respond. In practical terms, it will allow the security forces to engage with the population in a positive manner. Cultural knowledge will be crucial in the training and mentoring of the host nation's security forces. As a minimum, the following areas require careful study and consideration:

- **Ideology and Religion**. Ideology and religion are often are the pre-eminent influence on the daily lives of the population, and their influence thus needs to be understood. Misunderstanding ideological or religious customs can cause immense offence and alienate the soldier. Soldiers should be trained to understand the most likely ideological and religious customs they will encounter before they deploy on operations.

- **Differing Cultures**. Even though a campaign may take place in a single country it may have to take account of a wide spectrum of different cultures which may span international borders. A message that is well received by part of this population may not be understood or may be offensive to another. Understanding these nuances requires soldiers to be trained, preferably using local expertise.

- **Social Structures.** Most societies are made up from a number of groups. Effort is necessary to analyse and understand social networks, including both formal and informal institutions and organisations, their roles, status and behaviour. Significant areas to consider and understand include:

  - The importance of honour.
  - The role of women in a particular society.
  - Courtesies.
  - Business practices, in particular contracts and financial agreements, including the attitude to what we would see as bribery and/or corruption.

> The US experience in Vietnam divided us as a nation and eroded our confidence in the effectiveness of our foreign policy and our military capability. Our understanding of this tragic episode still remains superficial because we have never grasped the obsessive commitment with which the Vietnamese clung to and fought over their vision of what Vietnam was and what it might become. To understand the war, we must understand the Vietnamese, their culture and their ways of looking at the world.
>
> US Military Observer 2001

- **Power and Authority.** The basis for power and authority within a society needs to be understood so that efforts can be made to gain influence over groups within it.

  - **The Political Process**. The political process includes how power is exercised; the government, its departments and agencies, the political parties and the mechanics for deciding the distribution and transfer of

[3] The customs, ideas, and social behaviour of a particular people or group. Concise OED.

political authority. Patronage is an important feature of many systems and needs to be understood so that its strengths can be utilised and its disadvantages avoided.

- **The Role of Force**. A society's view of acceptable levels of coercion and force are often closely linked to its cultural norms. How a society or groups within it regard the use of coercion and force are likely to have a bearing on how military operations are perceived. It is therefore an important factor to take into account when planning and conducting operations and when reacting to events.

- **Economic Power**. Economic power plays an important role in determining the dynamics of social interaction. It takes a number of forms, from the importance of trading culture to control of natural resources. Instability in Iraq, for example, stemmed in large part from the struggle between groups to control oil. Commanders and planners need to understand how the economic aspects of a country work and are controlled.

- **Interests**. Interests motivate behaviour and include physical security, basic necessities, economic well-being, political participation and social identity. Understanding a group's interests will help to identify opportunities to meet or, where required, to frustrate those interests. One group's interests may become grievances if the host government does not adequately satisfy them. Such grievances may well be a cause of the insurgency in the first place. Factors to be considered when addressing grievances are:

  - What are the population's principal concerns and what are their grievances?

  - What are the insurgents' grievances?

  - From the perspective of the local population, would a reasonable person consider the population's grievances valid?

  - What does the host government recognise as the population's grievances? How does it judge their validity? What is it doing to address them?

  - What actions can be taken in the short-, mid-, and longer-term to address interests or grievances?

3-16. **Time to Develop Understanding**. In counterinsurgency, it is clear that there is a particular need for comprehensive background knowledge against which trends can be judged and information assessed. Knowledge like this cannot be built up overnight; no period of preparation and planning can be too long, or start too soon.

SECURE THE POPULATION

> 'As in Iraq one of the principal problems in Afghanistan is security. Without it, nothing gets done'.
> Frank Gardner, BBC Security Correspondent – *Blood and Sand*, Bantam Books.

3-17. The principal focus for the security line of operation in counterinsurgency must be the security of the population, rather than security for the forces themselves, or attrition of insurgents. The latter two are important considerations. Force protection is important to maintain operational effectiveness, and neutralising the insurgent is a crucial part of restoring and maintaining security. Experience continues to demonstrate that until the local population starts to believe it is secure it will not start to support its government, nor will it begin to provide the intelligence and information crucial for effective counterinsurgency. During the early stages of a campaign a difficult balance will have to be struck between necessary operations to find and strike insurgents and establishing the framework to secure the population. This balance will change as information and intelligence is developed, and the situation changes. As the intelligence picture develops, so the optimal balance of effort between framework, surge and strike operations will become clear. No opportunity to disrupt the insurgent should be missed, and the intention must always be to provide greater security for the population and to advance host government authority.

3-18. The effective presence of security forces and the operations they conduct will enable co-ordinated government action to be brought to bear on the insurgency, and to allow good governance to develop. This means deploying units in sufficient strength to centres of population. In the early stages of a campaign at least, it means giving priority to the more developed areas because efforts there will offer a better opportunity to provide tangible evidence of improving security and progress. Operations to secure key centres of population allow the host government to demonstrate its capability, and allow it to start to instil confidence among the people in its competence and long-term intentions.

3-19. A population which has been under the control of insurgents, and among whom insurgents may still live, is not going to be transformed overnight. Units allocated an area of responsibility have to live in that area, and they have to be given the forces and the resources required to conduct effective operations to re-establish security and control. This includes ISTAR and medical capabilities. Once an area is secured it should not be abandoned; it should be permanently controlled and protected by day and by night in order to prevent insurgents re-infiltrating and killing or intimidating those who have supported the counterinsurgency efforts. Once the population is secure the political and development processes can resume, and progress towards reconciliation and accommodation is possible.

3-20. The population has to be protected by security forces until the security situation has normalised. It is important that the host government and its local authorities assume responsibility to protect and control cleared areas as soon as possible. The intention should always be to transition away from military operations conducted by the outsider to those where host nation security forces, in particular the police, are restored to primacy. This will be the point when any residual threat that an insurgency poses can be dealt with as a criminal rather than military entity.

NEUTRALISE THE INSURGENT

3-21. The insurgent can be neutralised by a blend of physical and psychological means. Security operations should focus on removing the insurgent's freedom of action and ability to influence the population. The essence of the problem is to identify and separate those who can be reconciled from those who cannot. Dealing with those who are amenable to reconciliation will require some political accommodation. Those who will not be reconciled and insist on fighting on will require to be neutralised – as shown in Figure 3-2 below. Framework operations generally provide an effective, coherent and consistent approach to conducting the tactical aspects of a counterinsurgency. They enable focussed surge and strike operations to take place which deter, disrupt, dislocate or degrade insurgent groups using enough force but no more than is absolutely necessary.

3-22. A vital step in neutralising insurgents is to establish a strong forward presence among that part of the population which insurgents seek to control. Not only will this allow security measures to be implemented to protect the population, but action can then be focussed to deter, disrupt and dislocate insurgent activity within each area where forward presence of security forces is established. At the national level careful consideration will be needed to control or even close borders and create physical barriers in order to prevent the movement of insurgents using neighbouring states as sanctuaries or supply sources. This is not easy and requires the dedication of a large number of resources. The overall security aim should be to neutralise the insurgents on their own ground using developmental activities, information operations, political processes and no more force than is absolutely necessary. Military success may not be complete or indeed final before the situation is won over to government control. Once insurgents are neutralised or they lose influence, it is essential to exploit every opportunity by introducing permanent measures to prevent re-incursions or resurgences and to demonstrate government capability and resolve. Typically, the neutralisation of the last remnants of an insurgent movement is time-consuming and requires strategic patience.




Figure 3-2 – Separating the Various Groups

Neutralising the Insurgent: Fighting With Indigenous Forces

Major A P L Watkins RM, OMLT Commander Afghanistan 2009

Four years on and we are still incredibly ignorant about our battlespace and our enemy. To some extent that was excusable in places like Garmsir where we had just taken over the battlespace but in other areas less so. The spectrum of the insurgency can be described as existing from the so called irreconcilables down to the 'ten dollar Taliban.'

Our campaign is all about driving the wedge between the two. What we must identify is how these groups are readily identified and targeted and where exactly on the spectrum to place the wedge. In Garmsir and Nawa, through a series of probes away from the patrol base line we managed to establish that local insurgents were pressed into defending key nodes (often canal crossings, food/shops and a clinic with satellite phone) around which they lived. The insurgent presence at key nodes explained the quick response times of the enemy and the ease with which they prepared defensive positions which included IED screens.

Out of area and foreign fighters transited through these nodes and used them as safe havens and caches in order to launch direct and indirect attacks upon the coalition and Afghan security forces in Garmsir or to transit even further north. Without the backbone of Out of Area and foreign fighters the local insurgents could and did melt away because they were local boys and frankly could be won over or at least dissuaded from violent struggle if we kept a permanent presence; they were the playground weaklings that would have an allegiance to whichever bully was hardest or most influential.

My Afghan soldiers understood this to an extent but frustratingly did not or could not articulate it to me (perhaps I was asking the wrong questions); though never refusing the fight, they were relatively reluctant to keep on attacking local insurgents. I began (as the relationship with my interpreter developed) to realise they often appealed to local insurgents in the shuras we held after contacts. These playground weaklings/local insurgents were useful tools to fix the real target (the out of area or foreign fighter) but much of the time fighting them was counter productive to the campaign.

Among the locals, some had a degree of education and training but most were someone's son, brother, father in that village and the coalition had killed them for being in, what amounted to them, a neighbourhood watch scheme. Just because they fought does not mean to say they were the enemy we should have fought. It takes a sophisticated, patient and disciplined counterinsurgent force with the full backing of its population to play that kind of game. This took me about four months to establish, so who knows how much damage we did to the campaign before I stopped picking fights with the playground weaklings and focused my attention on the bullies; I will have no doubt created more insurgents and IED emplacers for our successors in Garmsir to deal with. Our ability to recognise any of this on the ground recedes as we cower behind armoured firepower.

Once I realised this, I adopted the following approach: I would usually attack and go forward into the contact, even when we received casualties. The exception was if I was caught off balance and therefore by doing so compromised the casevac process. I know some commanders across the brigade would sit and cue fires or cut and run either on contact or if they received casualties (even if swift casevac was assured) -

that was their decision to live with and explain post patrol/tour.

The Afghan Army were often suited to the attack, were much more agile compared to my heavily laden soldiers and morale was very high once weapons and ammo were captured and kept (not that they lacked either). Critically, unless really on the back foot, I did not wait for friendly 'inorganic' Fires (though rarely on a fighting patrol without something dedicated such as CAS, 81mm, 105mm, etc) which took too long to cue and risked causing collateral damage no matter how swept up the FST; it was up to them to catch up with me and the fight.

In going forward I raced to be up on the enemy and we could therefore recover enemy dead, dying, wounded and unscathed which was atypical of many contacts in Helmand. We did not know who these people were, though some had ID cards and many mobile phones on them. So the best way to ID them was for the bodies to be bagged/light weight stretchered, loaded on vehicles (4/6 man lift, local wheel barrow, ANA Ranger vehs, or ISAF vehs) and delivered them to the Nawa or Garmsir authorities who sometimes knew these men personally or knew the loved ones would come to the base to reclaim the bodies.

I told the Afghan Army that I was doing this so that they understood both what we were trying to achieve in delivering bodies to the authorities. The Afghan Army were very reticent to deal with bodies and nine times out of ten it was the OMLT that did the dirty work. I had to spend some time talking to my soldiers about why they handled bodies and the parts thereof; I think they understood.

GAIN AND MAINTAIN POPULAR SUPPORT

3-23. Gaining and maintaining popular support is an essential objective for successful counterinsurgency. It gives authority to the campaign and helps establish legitimacy. Unless the government gains its people's trust and confidence, the chances of success are greatly reduced. The degree to which it is achieved is in effect the measure of campaign success. The level of and basis for support from the population will evolve over time. When security is fragile it is unlikely that the majority of the host nation's population will overtly support the coalition forces, but they will understand the need for them to be there. For example, as long as the military is seen to be legitimate, its actions are seen to benefit the population, and it acts with cultural sensitivity and in accordance with the law, the neutral population should support their presence and their activities to provide security and stabilisation. The actions of a coalition and its partners must seek to convince the majority of the population, and wider audiences including opponents, that the host nation government will prevail.

To deal with this challenge we must adopt a COIN policy. This must be 'population centric' as David Kilcullen describes it. Whilst securing key terrain and destroying the enemy's ability or will to fight remain important if we are to succeed, our focus must remain on the people, as influencing them is achievable and completely securing key terrain or destroying the insurgent is not. Perhaps our greatest and most natural allies are the population who all seek a return to normalcy, with relative levels of acceptable security. The population also remember vividly what it was like to be ruled by the Taliban and it is not a time remembered fondly.

RC South Operational Design

3-24. The principle of gaining and maintaining support is coupled closely to the principle of securing the population; but security by itself is not enough to make the population support its government. The population has to make the choice between what the insurgent offers and that which the government can provide politically, economically and socially – *the host government with its coalition partners must be seen to offer a better life.* The important message that the host government should convey is that the benefits which follow once security has been restored are worth the risks, irritations and dangers associated with the operations necessary to achieve it.

3-25. **Influence**. Gaining and maintaining support cannot be achieved without well resourced influence activity including media and psychological operations. Instant access to traditional media and the increasing plethora of informal information networks has implications at every level of command. The brevity of this paragraph is inversely proportional to the importance of influence activity which is examined in detail in Chapter 6.

> There has been a lot of talk about asymmetry. The true asymmetry of the campaign is that the Taliban rely on 90% psychology and 10% force whereas we rely on 90% force and 10% psychology in an environment where perception is reality, memories are very long and enemies easily made. Brigade Commander's post tour interview – 2008.

3-26. **Separating Insurgents from Their Support**. It is axiomatic that gaining consent will reduce support available to the insurgent, and this will weaken the insurgency. The insurgent will not give up support easily and a fierce backlash should be anticipated when operations get underway to secure the population. This is another reason why numbers and presence matters for security forces.

- **Eliminating the Insurgent Subversive Support System**. Insurgents need a support system to provide basic logistic support, recruits, training and intelligence. Support organisations tend to be embedded in the population from where the insurgents can exercise local control, draw in support, conduct their own information operations and co-ordinate influence activity. Dismantling support organisations is therefore, a prerequisite to defeating active insurgent groups. Where an insurgent group is tribal or social, the elimination of the support system will be a more complex business than where insurgents are incomers and have imposed their ways on the local population. Having a clear understanding of societal and cultural systems is necessary to avoid harmful second and third order effects while attacking a support system. An intensive information campaign will be needed which differentiates between legitimate familial ties and group bonds, legitimate political action, and the illegal support for the use of force to achieve political ends.

- **Psychological Separation**. Separation of the insurgent from the population psychologically is perhaps the most complex aspect of separating the insurgent from his support but it must draw due attention as it offers a more enduring result with less risk of unintended consequences if achieved. It needs careful planning and implementation by trained personnel to obtain good results and to avoid elementary pitfalls. The three main areas or targets for such psychological activity are the population, the insurgent, and the counterinsurgent. This subject is examined in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 6. Local leaders have a major part to play in amplifying the counterinsurgent's message.

3-27. **Minimum Necessary Force**. The use of minimum necessary force has been the British Government's long-standing policy for the armed forces when acting in support of a civil power. The message is simple: *no more force must be used than is absolutely necessary and reasonable to achieve the immediate military aim*. Minimum force should not be interpreted as 'do not use force'; not using enough force may fail to protect the soldier or those whom he is protecting. Nor does it mean deploying the minimum necessary forces. There is no simple calculus but there will be times when more force than might have been thought essential should be employed in order to sustain containment of a situation. Numbers matter as the U.S 'Surge' in Iraq and the effect it had in helping to secure Baghdad and the central provinces clearly demonstrated. When and how much force is to be used are two of the most complicated decisions to be made in counterinsurgency and the circumstance surrounding them will inevitably be complicated, confused and fraught.

The Origins of the Policy of Minimum Force: General Dyer and the Amritsar Massacre

The policy of Minimum Force has been variously and often erroneously attributed to such influences as the demands of colonial and imperial policing and the English Class system. The defining point for UK Government policy came at Amritsar in the Punjab, on 13 April 1919. The legal background the problem can be traced back to the 1912 edition of the Manual of Military Law. It made the connection between the civil authorities and the legal use of force when the Army was used to restore law and order under the control of the Civil Authorities. It made the distinction between a riot, when only that force necessary to restore law and order could be used, and insurrection, which challenged the authority of the Crown directly, when "the law permitted 'any degree of force necessary'".[4] In such circumstances, minimum force therefore no longer applied. It was General Dyer's actions at Amritsar that highlighted the dilemma the two separate conditions created. Dyer, believing that he faced an insurrection, and that he was therefore justified in the use of lethal force, ordered soldiers to open fire on some 10,000 unarmed protestors. They killed 379 and wounded over a thousand. Widespread outrage followed, martial law had to be imposed, Dyer was relieved of command, and a turning point was passed in Indian nationalist politics. Lord Hunter's subsequent enquiry focussed on the legal distinction between rioting and insurrection. Hunter concluded that both Dyer's decision to order his troops to fire on the crowd without warning, and for troops to continue to fire whilst the crowd dispersed were unjustifiable.[5] The British Government affirmed Hunter's findings, and its subsequent policy established minimum force as a cornerstone of the British Army's approach in small wars: *The principle which has consistently governed the policy of His Majesty's Government in directing the methods to be employed, when military action in support of civil authority is required, may be broadly stated as using the minimum force necessary. His Majesty's Government are determined that this principle shall remain the primary factor of policy whenever circumstances unfortunately necessitate the suppression of civil disorder by military force within the British Empire*.[6]

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[4] Srinath Raghaven, "Protecting the Raj: The Army in India and Internal Security, c. 1919-39," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 16, No. 3, December 2005, p. 257.

[5] *Ibid*, p. 258.

[6] British Government despatch to the Government of India, cited in Sir Valentine Chirol, *India Old and New*, London: MacMillan, 1921, at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15586/15586-8.txt.

3-28. **The Force Dilemma**. One of the main difficulties stems from the fact that insurgents will live among and shield themselves behind the population whether the population supports them, is neutral, ambivalent or is under duress. Insurgents know and seek to exploit the fact that this creates a dilemma for the counterinsurgent; how can force be used to achieve objectives without jeopardising public tolerance of its effects? Force may solve a tactical problem – a firing point neutralised, a fleeting target engaged, or a strongpoint destroyed – but if the use of force is perceived as excessive or ill targeted the neutral segment of the population may be antagonised or alienated and it may leave a lasting feeling of resentment and bitterness. Worse still, active support for the insurgents by those suffering or observing the effects of force may be engendered. This is particularly so in those tribal cultures where codes of personal and family honour, justice and vengeance are strong. Here the killing or perceived ill treatment of a family member (especially females) could result in other members of the family joining the insurgency. On the other hand – and this is the difficult part of the minimum force dilemma – security forces must make every effort to retain control of a situation and to demonstrate they have the ability and resolve to restore and maintain security. They must remain credible because anything which can be interpreted as weakness will only encourage the uncommitted to take away any support from their government.

3-29. **Force Decision Making**. Much depends on the form of violence faced. Where public disorder is the problem - riots, communal or anti-Government protests – and it has passed beyond the point where civil authorities can maintain control, firm action will be needed by the security forces in their task of restoring civil authority. In these situations there is an even greater requirement for effectively estimating the degree of force required. The burden of responsibility falls on commanders, who have to put the decision to use force in the right context and this means having a clear understanding of what the likely outcomes may be. Being able to make the right decision requires a high level of training, trust and discipline among the forces deployed, appropriate equipment and a high level of understanding and situational awareness. Factors to be considered include:

- **Justification**. There must be a justification at law for each act of force and each act should not be continued for any longer than is necessary.
- **Prevention**. The only two valid objectives for the use of force are the neutralisation of adversaries and the restoration of order.
- **Legal Obligations**. Armed forces must comply with the law and act impartially in doing so.
- **Safeguarding the Population**. Care must be taken to avoid endangering non-combatants.
- **Maintenance of Public Confidence**. Military activities must seek to gain and secure public confidence.
- **Evidence**. It is the responsibility of deployed armed forces, where the tactical situation allows, to record accurate evidence in a timely manner at the scene of an incident.

OPERATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW

3-30. It should be self-evident that professional, well-trained and well-led armed forces will operate in accordance with the law.[7] It is always counterproductive for security forces to operate outside the law and it always undermines, perhaps catastrophically, their credibility and that of the governments involved. Operating in accordance with the law not only fosters the rule of law, which is an important end in itself, but it is a crucial part of maintaining legitimacy of the host government and of the security forces. It is, therefore, a crucial factor in gaining consent.

3-31. Insurgents do not recognise the law of the host government although they may adhere to one of their own choosing; counterinsurgents must operate in accordance with official law albeit there are likely to be agreed exceptions for coalition forces formally established under a status of forces agreement. UK forces are subject to UK law at all times. It should be expected that insurgents will do everything possible to undermine the authority and legitimacy of the government and security forces. This is likely to include attempting to provoke an over-reaction and fostering frustration with legal constraints. Insurgents or their overt sympathisers may try to induce uncertainty and unease within the security forces regarding their legal powers with the aim of reducing soldiers' effectiveness. There is a requirement for service personnel to be trained in the exercise of their legal powers and informed of the legal authority and arrangements under which they are to operate. This complex area is examined in detail in Chapter 12.

3-32. There have been instances in the recent past where it was alleged and occasionally subsequently proven that British forces broke the law. Irrespective of whether the allegations are proven or not, the consequences of the allegations or crimes have major implications for the conduct of the campaign and the overall reputation and standing of the UK. The shooting dead of 13 people by British troops in Londonderry on 30 January 1972 – 'Bloody Sunday' – had, and continues to have a profound influence on the peace process in Northern Ireland. Similarly, the serious abuse and unlawful killing of civilians by British troops in Iraq in 2003 and early 2004 had profound implications for the standing of British forces domestically, in Iraq and internationally. Areas that require careful consideration and explicit policy and training include the use of force, the conduct of search operations, detention, and questioning. No matter what the circumstances, expediency is not an excuse to operate outside the law.

INTEGRATE INTELLIGENCE

3-33. In counterinsurgency operations information is more important than firepower. Good intelligence is perhaps the greatest asset for a government combating an insurgency. Without it, security forces are at risk of conducting unfocused operations which waste resources, including time, resulting in alienation of the local population while creating tensions with partners, regional and international audiences. Once an adversary has been sufficiently well identified, and then located to allow his removal either by arrest or attack, the security forces normally have more than enough physical resources with which to act. The difficult part is developing the intelligence required, particularly where the insurgent hides himself in the midst of the

[7] Annex B to Chapter 1 of British Defence Doctrine 2008 discusses 'UK Defence and the Law'. When conducting military operations UK armed forces operate under, and must comply with, UK domestic law and international law. They may also be subject to the laws of the host nation depending upon jurisdiction arrangements agreed by HMG with the government of the host nation, for example under a status of forces agreement.

population and in a blizzard of irrelevant or conflicting information. The importance of intelligence cannot be overstated. In Northern Ireland, for example, 'the insurgency could not have been broken and the terrorist structure could not have been engaged and finally driven into politics without the intelligence organisations and processes that were developed.'[8]

3-34. Information is produced from a wide range of sources and it must be integrated from top to bottom to make full use of deep local knowledge developed within an area of operation. Actions at the tactical level require to be backed up by higher level collection and analysis and *vice versa*. To make full use of the wide range of sources of intelligence, information and material requires civil, police and military intelligence to be integrated at every level of command. Intelligence is important in any operation but in counterinsurgency there is one significant difference; the tactical level commander has a crucial role to play in developing the intelligence picture from the bottom up. In terms of understanding day-to-day pattern of life, the traditional top-down flow of intelligence is reversed, and the routine intelligence picture is built by units developing and maintaining the pattern of life for their area of operations. Continuity is essential if this knowledge is to be maintained between units. Pattern of life information draws on background information gathered by surveillance, from the patrol reports from framework security force operations, and from contact with the local population. Time-consuming collation of detail and painstaking analysis is then required to improve understanding of the local area and to identify the insurgent's habits, weapons, and organisations and support.

> 'Good info is occasionally produced from other sources, but the bulk of valuable intelligence is produced by troops on the ground. All troops on operations must at all times be alert for information about Communist Terrorists e.g. footprints, food dumps, noises and odours made by terrorists. Having obtained the info it must be passed as quickly as possible to the local comd and to the Bn CP.'
>
> 1st Battalion The Loyal Regiment, Standing Orders for Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, 23 May1958.

3-35. Tactical commanders therefore, require their own trained, integral specialist intelligence staff with which to distil, archive and pass information and to integrate the intelligence provided from higher-level sources. Considerable effort is necessary to train unit and sub-unit intelligence staffs. Equally important is continuity of knowledge between units and the effective handover of intelligence databases as units rotate. Consideration should be given to tying tactical intelligence staffs to particular locations rather than parent units in order to build deep situational understanding over time.

3-36. Counterinsurgency places a considerable demand on and for intelligence staffs. They must have the specialist skills and techniques necessary to identify and assess the threat. Their processes must be able to cope with the volume of information and the numbers of collection means and then to share it with relevant agencies and authorities. Considerations which are not present in general war pertain in counterinsurgency. For example, gathering intelligence from the population may challenge human rights and liberties, or open those who provide intelligence to threats of reprisal. These factors could undermine popular consent. It is important

[8] Army Code 71842. *Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland*, London: Prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff, July 2006, p. 8-5.

therefore, to set up an intelligence organisation sensitive to the circumstances. There is considerable value to be gained by focussing effort and resources on identifying those elements of an insurgency which may be reconcilable. From this, intelligence effort can help in then identifying how to separate potentially reconcilable insurgents from those who are irreconcilable.

3-37. Obtaining information from the wider population – human intelligence – is a crucial component of counterinsurgency. It is generally the case that the best intelligence comes directly from the population, but its value is greatly enhanced if integrated with and verified by objective intelligence gained by independent technical means. There is a link between the use of force, the relationship between the security forces and the population it seeks to influence and the information that that population provides. If the population has confidence in those protecting it, it tends to have the confidence to pass information on in order to safeguard it yet further. If the insurgent has the upper hand the population is unlikely to risk reprisals by providing the security forces with information. Good intelligence, sensitively collected leading to increasingly effective action creates a virtuous circle – the reverse is also true.

PREPARE FOR THE LONG TERM

3-38. **Planning**. Countering insurgency takes time as Chapter 1 explained. Preparing for the long term through the campaign plan is the means by which effective integration of cross-government effort can be maintained. It also helps in avoiding making overly optimistic assumptions based on short-term security successes. Enduring success depends on suitable long term plans to enhance the economic and social aspects of civil life and elimination, or at least suppression, of the political causes of the insurgency. It also requires the right number of forces and resources to be allocated from the outset. Long term plans are required at every level of government and are likely to cover the following areas:

- Security sector reform.
- The development of the rule of law and the justice system.
- The development of further government capacity.
- Economic development, for example financial sector reform, and commercial improvements.
- Social development programmes, such as education and housing.

> One of the biggest challenges both military and civilian commanders on the ground face is managing the tension between the reality of slow (and expensive) progress, and the domestic political urgency to speed that progress up in order to limit exposure (both to consent and the budget). This can drive the hunt for quick fixes (tribal militias/power-brokers etc) which are high-risk if not downright counter-productive. Hence the need for strategic discipline, perspective and patience.
>
> Brigade Commander – Afghanistan 2008

3-39. **Approach**. The UK currently operates a policy of six month tours for formation HQs and units and, inevitably, there is an understandable desire to demonstrate progress during each deployment. Commanders must acknowledge, however, that it is unlikely that a campaign will be won during their deployment, and that their tour is but one of a number of steps towards overall success. Initiating

action and maintaining momentum in line with informed, realistic local expectations are important and an enduring outcome is more likely if a long term view is adopted. Taking such an approach is important because it takes account of the population's view. Populations are unlikely to actively support their government until they are convinced that the government has the means, ability and stamina to provide security and further their interests over the long term.

LEARN AND ADAPT

3-40. History shows that military forces must quickly and continually adapt conventional capabilities and approaches to the particular demands of a counterinsurgency if they are to be successful. Insurgents, being the conventionally weaker side, are necessarily highly adaptable and will seek to obtain, use and exploit technology quickly to take advantage of what they learn of security force constraints, habits, tactics and equipment. Counterinsurgent forces must overmatch this ability by ingraining an effective learn and adapt mechanism and mind-set. This needs to reach from individual to institutional level. There are four elements to learning and adaptation: education, training, the immediate operational response, and analysis and research.

> In Iraq, we've seen how an army that was basically a smaller version of the Cold War force can over time become an effective instrument of counterinsurgency. But that came at a frightful human, financial, and political cost. For every heroic and resourceful innovation by troops and commanders on the battlefield, there was some institutional shortcoming at the Pentagon they had to overcome. Your task, particularly for those of you going back to the services, is to support the institutional changes necessary so the next set of colonels, captains, and sergeants will not have to be quite so heroic or quite so resourceful.
>
> US Secretary of State for Defence – September 2008

3-41. **Education**. Insurgency is fought by the effective combination of civil and military measures being brought to bear on the population to gain its support. Soldiers whose business it is to know how to fight have therefore to understand how to achieve influence and use civil instruments of power. Detailed knowledge and understanding of this sort does not come from pre-deployment training alone. It is built up by education on professional development and career courses and self study. How the Army adjusts its courses to meet the demands of counterinsurgency at this juncture is most important. An army's residual level of understanding in the sphere of counterinsurgency requires to be good enough to meet the initial or immediate demands of a campaign. In the past, most notably in Malaya and Northern Ireland, the Army took some time to re-adjust to the tactical and intellectual challenges it faced. In both cases, early mistakes were costly not just in tactical terms – inappropriate operations or a flawed approach taken – but in gaining and securing public support. Those campaigns indicate that learning about the first principles of counterinsurgency while committed to operations is inefficient and potentially dangerous. The remedy is to ensure that professional military education teaches the principles of counterinsurgency and the lessons from history thus providing a grounding from which an understanding of the particular contemporary operational environment must be developed. These are broad, complex and important subjects, which take effort and experience to master. It is the duty of all professionals to grasp the challenge.

Learning and Adapting: The Influence of General Kitson

Attention generally falls on the emphasis General Sir Frank Kitson's placed on intelligence in counterinsurgency. However, the chapter he devotes in *Low Intensity Operations* to the issue of education and training is equally important and it reinforces considerably one of the fundamentals of the British approach; learning and adapting. The requirement to educate those required to plan and conduct a counter insurgency campaign was one which Kitson took every opportunity to explain and reinforce. Indeed, ten years after publishing *Low Intensity Operations*, he was still making the point as the visiting Kermit Roosevelt Lecturer in the United States. Note the inter-agency approach he describes:

The second area of preparation concerns the education which we give to all those who are likely to become involved. In this case the problem is more difficult because so many of the people who will be most influential in determining success or failure are not in the armed forces at all. They are the politicians, civil servant, local government officials and police, in the area where the insurgency is taking place, and, as I said earlier, that may be in someone else's country… Service officers must be taught how to fit together a campaign of civil and operational measures; they must know what is needed in terms of intelligence, and the law, and of moulding public opinion.[9]

Kitson was clear: '...officers must be prepared to pass their knowledge on when the need arises and go on agitating for suitable action until all concerned are aware of what is required of them – or more probably until they are sacked for being a nuisance.'[10]

3-42. **Training**. Counterinsurgency requires a high level of skill and expertise from the forces deployed. They have to be highly proficient in their normal skills of marksmanship, weapon handling, patrolling, intelligence and first aid. They also have to learn about the insurgent and those aspects which will help troops to cross cultural divides (cultural understanding, history, basic linguistic skills), and support effective communications through media training and influence activity. Soldiers have a tremendous capacity and ample opportunity for gathering information and analysing what they have seen; counterinsurgency training needs to reflect this. Each campaign will require theatre-specific training because there will be differences between one campaign to another, and changes overtime within a single campaign. The challenge for theatre commanders is to identify the right lessons to learn and the aspects of training to stress. The theatre HQ, being responsible for the conduct of operations, should dictate the training requirement that deploying units and formations are required to meet. Theatre-specific training – which has in the past been conducted in-theatre[11] – should be set in the right context and in a realistic and

[9] Lieutenant General Sir Frank Kitson, *Practical Aspects of Counter Insurgency*, Kermit Roosevelt Lecture delivered May 1981. Kitson was then Deputy Commander in Chief.

[10] *Ibid*, p. 14.

[11] During the Malayan Emergency, the Jungle Warfare School was set up at Kota Tinggi with the express purpose of preparing units for jungle operations, identifying lessons, establishing best practice and developing doctrine. See Daniel Marston, "Lost and Found in the Jungle: The Indian Army and British Army Tactical Doctrines for Burma, 1943-45 and Malaya, 1948-1960," in Hew Strachan, ed, *Big*

instructive framework. Previous doctrine underlined the value of permanent, well organised theatre training centres where methodical analysis of the insurgent's frequently changing tactics and techniques could be properly studied and a common doctrine taught to new units. There must also be provision made for continuation training for deployed units as required. Finally, relevant and realistic training should focus not simply upon military skills.

3-43. **Immediate Operational Response**. Although armed forces are highly competent at conventional operations, insurgents recognise that they can be slow to respond to new threats. Until a new threat is neutralised technically, tactically or, more likely through a combination of both, the insurgent has an advantage. A battle of ideas takes place, therefore, between the protagonists. In many cases, the most effective responses to new threats or to developing patterns of activity come from those who face them at the tactical level. Those involved in the operation can keep the initiative by maintaining the mindset to learn and adapt, in the same way that the enemy adapts. This is particularly important at the lowest tactical level, with those who understand the operational environment the best, who are in the optimal position to judge local conditions, and can tailor their response to a new threat or a new enemy TTP accordingly. By making adjustment to tactics, techniques and procedures, then promulgating them across the theatre, and providing feedback to those preparing for operations via reachback and an effective lessons process, much can be done to maintain effectiveness.

> 'An effective counterinsurgent force is a learning organisation. Insurgents constantly shift between military and political phases and approaches. In addition, networked insurgents constantly exchange information about their enemy's vulnerabilities – including with other insurgents in distant theatres. A skilful counterinsurgent is able to adapt at least as fast as the insurgents.'
>
> FM 3-24

3-44. **Analysis and Research**. Very often the immediate operational response may only find a temporary solution to the problem that insurgent tactics and weapons pose. It is also inherently reactive – the enemy has the initiative at least for a limited period. Analysis and research provide the important link between what is happening on the ground and longer-term tactical, technical or equipment-based solutions. Analysis should also strive to predict changes in insurgent capability and behaviour in order to seize the initiative or at least prepare mitigation measures. It is a mistake to think that analysis and research are the sole responsibility of a scientific advisor or defence science and technology agencies. It is important for sub-unit commanders to evaluate tactics, to think ahead and to establish the patterns of behaviour among the population and the insurgents if tactical level operations are to keep ahead of or respond quickly to new developments. A specialist in-theatre analysis and research capability provides the link to the home base and the Army's formal lessons process, and aids greatly in maintaining corporate knowledge of patterns, trends and responses.

Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War in the 20th Century, London: Routledge, April 2006, pp. 84-114.

LESSONS FROM SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN

The Soviets failed to understand the Afghan culture and its resistance to any form of domination, or control was not understood.

Soviet activity in Afghanistan failed due to several key strategic factors:

- They failed to remove the extensive external support provided to the Mujahideen;
- Inability of the Soviets to exploit internal weaknesses among the insurgents;
- Absence of a stable government in Kabul commanding popular respect.

The Soviets failed to adopt an effective counter-insurgency strategy including:

- There was no integration of military and political objectives and tactics.
- The immediate exploitation of intelligence;
- They focused almost exclusively on search and destroy operations;
- They had no understanding of the local community;
- They failed to restrict the enemy supply lines and communications networks;

Numerical superiority was lacking – an estimated Soviet and Afghan Government force of 400,000-500,000 was required.

Endurance, will and moral commitment were lacking.

Soviet Studies Research Centre

SECTION 2 - THE PARADOXES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

Adapted from US Army Field Manual 3-24 - Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency requires highly trained soldiers who on the one hand can take on and defeat a determined insurgent and on the other help build and develop. It needs soldiers who can think and can act. The difference between fighting insurgents and development is one of the many paradoxes countering insurgency creates. As with so many aspects of counterinsurgency the soldier who has to fight the insurgent is the soldier who will have to get involved with local politics, local economic development projects, and programmes to improve local services and create and sustain conditions for national development. To be able to make these transitions effectively requires some thought and consideration. This will help to make sense of the very different approaches and mindsets that are needed to meet all the tasks the counterinsurgent faces. The paradoxes this section introduces are by no means exhaustive and experience shows that they have been helpful in stimulating thought and discussion and improving understanding of what complexity means. It is important to bear in mind that much depends on local conditions: while the paradox may generally be the case, how it is addressed will vary from one place to another.

The More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You Are

Ultimate success in counterinsurgency is gained by protecting the population not by force protection. Population security is the primary task and it cannot be achieved without establishing a capable, effective forward presence where the population lives. The population cannot be protected by stand-off means, although stand-off capabilities have their part to play. The forward presence must be a constant presence, not one that surges in and out. A constant presence means that forces protecting the population share the same risks as the population, and it provides the opportunity to build connections with the people, and with them confidence.

The More Force You Use, the Less Effective You May Be

The use of force has many effects, not all of which can be foreseen. The more force that is applied, the greater will be the chance of collateral damage and mistakes, and kinetic military activities will be portrayed as brutal by enemy propaganda. Restrained use of force strengthens the rule of law that military operations are trying to help establish.

The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is, the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk Must Be Accepted

This paradox is really a corollary of the last. As the level of violence drops and conditions for transition start to be met, the expectations of the population will increase and the ability of the host government to exercise its sovereign powers grows. The process of transition allows more reliance to be placed on routine security measures; ROE may become more restrictive and considerable restraint may be required.

Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction

Insurgents carry out a terrorist act with the primary purpose of prompting an overreaction, or at least react in a way that can then be exploited. If a careful analysis of the effects of a response concludes that more negative than positive may result, an alternative should be considered. It may be better for the soldier not to shoot at the gunman in the crowd and save innocent bystanders than to kill the gunman and those around him.

The Best Weapons for Counterinsurgency Do Not Shoot

Counterinsurgents make the most meaningful progress when they gain and secure popular support, and with it legitimacy for the host government. Security establishes the foundations on which political and economic development can be built. Money and votes become more important than the application of force.

The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably is Sometimes Better than Us Doing It Well

Consider who is performing a task; do not just evaluate how well it is done. Long-term success requires the host nation to establish viable institutions that can carry on without significant allied or partner support. The longer the process takes, the more popular support for continued partner support will wane. There will come a point when the population will want to be certain of the legitimacy of their own government and its forces. Their ability to do things themselves will be the determining factor. Until the host government can act effectively in the eyes of its own people, allied or partner support will be required. T.E. Lawrence advised "Do not try and do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them." He was writing of the Bedouin, and cultural norms vary, but the general point remains valid.

If a Tactic Works this Week, It Might Not Work Next Week; If It Works Here, It Might Not Work There

Insurgents who want to survive adapt. They are often part of a widespread network that communicates constantly and instantly. They quickly adjust to successful security force tactics and equipment and they rapidly disseminate what they have learnt throughout the insurgency. The more effective a counterinsurgent's tactic is, the faster it may become out of date because insurgents have a greater need to counter it. Security forces must overcome complacency and remain at least as adaptive as their enemies. They must constantly evaluate tactics, think ahead and establish patterns of behaviour in the population and the insurgents if tactical level operations are to keep ahead of to new developments**.**

Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing

Military actions by themselves cannot achieve success in counterinsurgency. Tactical actions must not only be linked to operational and strategic military objectives, but also to the essential political goals of counterinsurgency. Without those connections, lives and resources may be wasted for no real gain. The starting point is the joint campaign plan and the mechanism to ensure tactical activity is properly integrated is through co-ordinated government machinery at every level.

Many Important Decisions Are Not Made by Generals

Mission command and the manoeuvrist approach require competence and judgment by all soldiers. In counterinsurgency it is the so-called "strategic corporals" who make decisions at the tactical level that can have strategic consequences, both good and bad. Senior commanders set the proper direction and climate through training, education and clearly articulated statements of intent and concepts of operation. Mission command requires them to trust their subordinates to do the right thing. Training and education underpin this relationship. Leaders must be trained and educated to adapt to local conditions, understand the legal and moral implications of their actions, and exercise initiative and sound judgment in accordance with their senior commanders' intent.

CHAPTER 4

A FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONDUCT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION

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4-1. Counterinsurgency is a form of warfare which depends on psychological actions as much as physical. At times it will involve high tempo, violent and complex military operations that are every bit as dangerous and challenging as conventional operations. The major difference between counterinsurgency and conventional operations is that the counterinsurgent focuses on securing the population, and not simply on finding and defeating the enemy.

4-2. There is no single antidote to an insurgency and there is no simple way to deal with it. This has been the consistent message in British doctrine for very many years. Each insurgency is unique, and each results from a particular combination of conditions, be they political, social, economic, cultural, or sectarian. This means that each counterinsurgency has to address the underlying conditions which led to the insurgency arising in the first instance. Military measures alone are unlikely to address the specific causes of any particular insurgency, although effective security measures will help deal with its most severe and destabilising symptoms. Experience shows that success in counterinsurgency comes through very carefully co-ordinated cross-government action based on a well understood framework. Notable examples of such an approach include the British campaigns in Malaya once the Briggs Plan was introduced in June 1950, Kenya after Lt Gen Sir George Erskine became *de facto* director of operations in 1953, the Oman (1972-1976), Northern Ireland and the US-led Coalition campaign in Iraq from February 2007.

4-3. The ability of a country to counter an insurgency depends greatly on its state of development. In newly independent or underdeveloped countries an insurgent movement may be only one of many problems a government may face as part its attempts to stabilise the situation. The government's capacity for effective administration, particularly its ability to provide essential services to the population, the state of the country's financial sector and its economy and the level of political stability may be just as problematic as the security challenge posed by insurgents. In such cases, to paraphrase Sir Robert Thompson, *it would be futile to succeed in defeating the insurgency, especially by military means alone, if the end result is a governing system which is not politically and economically viable and which might therefore fall victim to a future violent challenge to its authority.* JDP 3-40 - *Security and Stabilisation – The Military Contribution* discusses the wider stabilisation issues in much more detail.

THE JOINT, OPERATIONAL LEVEL APPROACH

4-4. As with any plan, that for countering an insurgency must fit within the overall campaign directive. JDP 3-40's stabilisation model has three broad, overlapping areas that underpin successful stabilisation efforts: the building of human security; the stimulation of economic development; and the fostering of host nation governance and legitimacy. Figure 4-1 illustrates how key tasks are likely to fall within these broad areas.[1]




Figure 4-1 - The Stabilisation Model

4-5. The extent to which non-military personnel are able to operate in the area of operations is described as the 'permissiveness' of the environment. The level of permissiveness will dictate the nature and extent of the involvement by non-military institutions and organisations. JDP 3-40's stabilisation model shows the relationship between permissiveness and the military contribution. In non-permissive environments security forces may have to provide varying degrees of support to most or all of the key political and development tasks. The exact nature of these will depend on circumstances, both in scope and detail, depending on the particular context. As the degree of permissiveness increases such tasks should be handed over, as soon as conditions allow, to other appropriate agencies within the coalition

[1] The UK Dept for International Development (DfID) prioritises further by introducing the concept of 'survival functions', understood as the set of core functions critical to the survival of the state, and articulated as monopoly of the use of violence; the ability to raise revenue through taxation; and the ability to rule through law. See, 'States in Development: Understanding State-building', DfID working paper, 2008.

and/or host nation government. Establishing security is one part of the campaign, as this example campaign plan from ISAF illustrates (Figure 4-2), where the counterinsurgency campaign is nested within the overall plan:

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign Plan Summary (Unclassified)
November 2008
MISSION
ISAF conducts operations in partnership with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and in coordination with Operation Enduring Freedom, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the international community in order to assist GIRoA to defeat the insurgency, establish a secure environment, extend viable governance, and promote development throughout Afghanistan.
LINES OF OPERATION
•Security
•Governance
•Reconstruction and Development
COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRATED APPROACH
•*Comprehensive*: Working concurrently across all three lines of operation.
•*Integrated*: Operating in a coordinated manner with GIRoA and the international community.
KEY PLANNING FACTORS
•Counterinsurgency campaign.
•Shape, in order to clear in order to hold and build.
•Prioritize the areas to clear and hold.
•Establish and maintain freedom of movement.
•Apply greater effort on the narcotics-insurgency nexus.
•Identify and engage key Afghan community leaders.
•Interdict and disrupt insurgent movement to and from sanctuaries in the border region.
•Build Afghan capability, capacity, and credibility.

Figure 4-2 – Integrating Campaign Themes: ISAF

SECTION 2 – A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

4-6. This Chapter describes a conceptual framework for counterinsurgency. It is Shape-Secure- Develop. The conceptual framework builds on proven counterinsurgency theories, such as those proposed by Thompson, Galula and Kitson, and it takes account of more contemporary views.[2] It places the security of the population at the centre of military operations and it allows all of the counterinsurgency principles to be applied as the situation requires. *It is a way of thinking about the principal tasks in counterinsurgency as a whole, rather than being simply a sequence for operations*.

4-7. As a concept, Shape-Secure-Develop is analogous to an operational framework such as Deep, Close and Rear Operations first laid out in Army Doctrine Publication *Operations*, and with which the Army became so familiar.[3] Deep, Close and Rear Operations provided the framework within which military tasks were integrated by function (what was to be achieved) and geography (where it was to be

[2] John Mackinlay, *Defeating Complex Insurgency: Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan*, London: RUSI, Whitehall Paper Number 64, 2005; Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, St Paul, MN: Zenith, 2006; David Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency *Redux*," *Survival*, Vol. 48 No. 4, Winter 2006; Steven Metz, *Rethinking Insurgency*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 2007.

[3] Army Code No 71565. Army Doctrine Publication, Volume 1, *Operations*, London: Prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff, June 1994, p. 13.

achieved), and the Army learnt how to apply it in the context of general war. Shape-Secure-Develop is similar framework by which the principal functions in counterinsurgency can be considered, integrated, synchronised and executed as a whole at the tactical level. It draws on the three themes of the Stabilisation Model: fostering the political process, establishing security, and stimulating economic development. Echoing the Stabilisation Model, the main tasks under each of the headings are illustrated in Figure 4.3:




Figure 4.3 – Illustrative Tasks in the Shape, Secure, and Develop Framework

4-8. Although all three themes are interdependent, security is the key determining factor, at the local, district, provincial and national levels. If demonstrable security exists, it will be easier for economic development and improvements to governance to take place, and broader development agenda to be followed. Without security, few organisations that are able to deliver economic development programmes will be able to operate. In non-permissive or marginal conditions, other government departments and NGOs may not work. In which case, responsibility is likely to rest with the security forces to do as much as possible until they bring the security situation under control. The balance of effort placed on the themes of Shape-Secure-Develop can vary between areas of responsibility within an area of operations and with time. This is illustrated graphically at Figure 4-4:




Figure 4-4 - Variations in Effort between Areas of Operation

SECTION 3 – SHAPE-SECURE-DEVELOP

4-9. **Sequences and Priorities**. *Shape-Secure-Develop* describes the essential themes of a general counterinsurgency approach. It is a way to describe and group the main activities with which armed forces may be involved. It is explicitly not necessarily a sequence that must be followed slavishly. The three groups are inter-related and inter-dependent. Action taken in support of any one theme is likely to have an impact on the other two. If resources available are limited, commanders may well have to prioritise. They should, however, strive to act simultaneously where possible. Where circumstances dictate commanders will have to determine priorities, how the immediate situation will affect them and, if necessary, how activities are to be sequenced. The key will be to keep in mind the guiding principles of political factors having primacy over military, co-ordinated government action, population security, and gaining and securing popular support.

SHAPE

4-10. For the purpose of this manual, Shaping *is the ability to influence and inform the perceptions, allegiances, attitudes, actions, and behaviours of all principal participants* in the Area of Operation, and in the regional, international and domestic audiences as well. Shaping operations influence the population; they are human activities and they require personal engagement. Shaping activities also increases counterinsurgents' understanding of the problem and the human terrain in which they are operating. Engagement *is the process conducted to gain or exchange*

information and to extend influence. Shaping operations generally support the political line of operation, which seeks to establish the political conditions necessary for a successful outcome. These conditions are achieved by a number of activities among which dialogue or engagement is crucial. Shaping is important in overall terms to help reach a political accommodation. This means that all protagonists must eventually understand one another's objectives and aspirations, and that they will have to make accommodations. Shaping is not an end in itself.

4-11. In general terms, Shaping should be planned to cover those groups within the area of operations. This requires a clear understanding of the human terrain to ensure messages and actions will be clearly understood by the audiences concerned. Shaping will involve key leader engagements to discuss specific issues, engagement with more general assemblies and meetings, and a general interaction with the population. This is discussed further in Chapter 8. In each case, account needs to be taken of neighbouring groups, whose influence, positive or malign, may be significant. This may particularly feature in areas where borders are porous, where influence may extend freely from one side to another, but where the counterinsurgent may be geographically limited to the host nation's side of the border. In such cases, broader diplomatic engagement will be necessary, and the perceived gap between the strategic and the tactical will be very small. The issue of borders is examined further in the section dealing with Secure.

4-12. **The Value of Engagement**. When permissiveness is low, the ability of security forces to move about their area of operations becomes an important enabling factor. It may well be that they are the only representatives of the host government who can get out to meet the population and to continue a dialogue with key leaders. Security forces thus become an important facilitator. Irrespective of the security situation, those who conduct engagement must be seen to act as honest brokers. Conducting engagement offers several clear advantages which an adverse political or security situation might otherwise restrict. The advantages are:

- It keeps dialogue open between sections of the population.
- It allows differences to be discussed and resolved without recourse to violence.
- It allows factual information to be disseminated and rumours countered.

> Getting amongst the people and really getting to know them is key if we are to develop their trust and confidence. Our time is short enough as it is. We may feel safe in our bases when resting and in our armoured vehicles when moving between tasks, but when we get to our destination we should operate on our feet, amongst the villagers. Always take interpreters and talk to those you meet. Begin to understand the atmospherics. Get a feel for what is normal and what is out of place. As people get to know you and trust you the safer you will actually become. They will be more likely to turn in IEDs, warn of impending threats, call 'hotlines' and deny insurgents access to their villages. Talk to local elders and leaders, attend *shuras* and *jirgas*, invite them to your own meetings, listen to them and share your thoughts with them. Be honest, be polite and above all respect them and their opinions. Treat them with dignity.
>
> RC South Operational Design

SECURE

4-13. *The object of security operations is to provide the population with the opportunity to go about their daily lives without the fear of violence*. It is important to note that success in terms of security operations does not mean there is no violence. Rather, success, particularly in the early stage of security operations, is a reduction of violence to manageable levels. If military operations effectively secure the population, insurgents will to make the decision whether to continue with violence or to find some way back into the political process since violence would be an unlikely way of achieving their aims.

4-14. The focus of any counterinsurgency operation is to secure the majority of the population so that it can turn against violence and in favour of the government's desired political settlement. Security is both physical and psychological. It is obvious that since the population is the source from which the host nation government will gain support, insurgents will seek every opportunity to attack and undermine the government's ability to secure its people. This will be supported by the insurgents' own propaganda. Counterinsurgents will often have to fight to establish security in areas that are effectively under insurgent control and the longer that the insurgents have been in control the harder the fight normally becomes. The insurgents' propaganda will also have to be tackled through influence activity.

4-15. **Persistent Security**. Security needs to be persistent so that people can go about their daily lives without fear. Persistent security can only be achieved by *holding* what has been secured. This means creating a sense of permanent security, and fostering the belief among the population that security forces have regained, and will maintain their control of an area. *Holding* should not be seen, therefore, as a separate activity to clearing or securing, and must be planned and resourced fully from the outset. Any security operation is unlikely to succeed unless it addresses both the physical and psychological aspects of the problem. The population will only start to trust the counterinsurgent when it *believes* that it will not be abandoned to the insurgent, that commitments by its government are starting to be honoured and that its interests are aligned with those of its government. While an effective security force presence must be retained in the area of operations, the decisive factor in improving the lives of the population will be the speed with which a government's political initiatives and economic development can follow.

4-16. **Force Levels: Presence Matters**. Security cannot be achieved without sufficient numbers of security forces. Providing sufficient troops and equipment is rarely within the gift of the military as decisions on force numbers are normally political. Ideally, the campaign should have sufficient numbers of troops and equipment to provide security from the start, but history shows that this is unlikely to be the case. It is now generally accepted that twenty counterinsurgents are required per 1,000 residents as the *minimum* troop density required for effective counterinsurgency operations. Without the right force levels, commanders will find it difficult to secure the population, they will find it hard to hold their area of responsibility, and they risk spreading their soldiers too thinly on the ground. Key to achieving the right force ratios is developing effective indigenous security forces that will contribute to, and eventually provide, overall security.

4-17. **Clear-Hold-Build**. At the tactical level, Clear-Hold-Build is one way to sequence security operations within the framework of Shape-Secure-Develop. Clear-Hold-Build is designed to wrest an area from insurgent control, secure the population and allow the restoration of the host government's control. Where it is not possible to secure the population permanently but where it is necessary to disrupt, dislocate or

interdict insurgent activity, the traditional core functions of Find-Fix-Strike-Exploit should be applied. The Clear-Hold-Build model is discussed in Section 5.

4-18. **Tiers of Operations**. There are two tiers of operation to secure the population. Framework and surge operations, conducted by conventional forces, are Tier 1. Tier 2 operations are strike operations, normally conducted by Special Forces, exploiting the highest level intelligence, to engage high value targets and to write down insurgent capabilities. This is a rapidly evolving area and the tiers of operation are not mutually exclusive to either conventional forces or Special Forces.

4-19. **Special Forces**. Special Forces and specialist agencies have an important role to play in intelligence gathering, strike operations, high value key leader engagements and training specialist capabilities within the host nation's security forces. Usually self-contained, Special Forces operations are commanded at the highest level although they will require to co-ordinate their plans with and sometimes draw support from the unit or formation in whose area of operations they are to operate. This is a complex area and theatre procedures for the integration of Special Forces operations into framework and strike operations will be required. Special Forces are discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.

4-20. **Host Nation Security Forces**. The host nation will require effective security forces with the capacity and capability to maintain sustained security as conditions for the transition of security sector responsibility are achieved. In the time while these are being created, it is reasonable to expect that British forces will be actively engaged in fighting insurgents while simultaneously helping the host nation build its own security forces. When dealing with insurgents, the host nation's security forces may be required to perform functions not normally considered conventional. In particular, the army is likely to fill the internal security role usually conducted by the police. Similarly, the police may have forces so equipped and armed that they would normally be part of the military. In the near term, the host nation's security forces should be focussed on counterinsurgency operations, in partnership where necessary with allies or partners, and they should integrate their military capabilities with those of local, regional, and national police. Further detail on developing host nation security forces is provided in Chapter 10.

4-21. **Factors**. Operations to establish security take time and considerable resources. They are not an end in themselves: they are the means by which the population's broad support for its government can start to be gained. The complex counterinsurgency environment amplifies the need for co-ordinated government action. Security operations are a carefully co-ordinated part of the campaign plan, and must be balanced and supported by activities in the other lines of operation. To achieve this, several important factors must be considered when the plan at every level is developed.

- **Resources.** If operations are under-resourced the population will be put at greater risk because the security forces will be unable to maintain security. The force needs to be strong enough, therefore, to defeat insurgent forces. Subsequently it must remain strong enough to force any remaining insurgents to disperse, either within the area or to withdraw completely. In time, the host nation's security forces should take the lead but at the outset that may not be possible. Therefore, one priority of coalition or allied forces is to quickly begin the process of building the military capacity of the indigenous security forces; which is dealt with in detail in Chapter 10. Commanders will always find that the resources they require when formulating their plan are greater than those that can be provided; this is not unique to counterinsurgency. As with other

operations the commander will face the decision either to reduce his aspirations (and those of his superiors) or to take risk, possibly both, until resources are increased to meet the campaign objectives.

- **Co-ordinated Government Action**. Stabilisation activity may be possible from the outset but the scale of effort possible depends greatly on the conditions in a particular area of operations. The more secure an area is, generally, the more development activity is possible. Engagement with local leaders will help determine where to start with non-security operations. Whatever is decided, co-ordinated government action will be required, in line with the overall campaign plan and local priorities. The important point here is that delay has to be avoided if the achievements made by securing an area are to be capitalised upon and the initiative retained.

4-22. **Headquarters**. Depending on the size of the force deployed, a UK joint force headquarters may be deployed forward into the theatre of operations. Ideally it will be co-located with the principal allied/partner tactical headquarters through which it can integrate the UK contribution, assist in planning and provide situational awareness to the home base. It will be from the main operational allied/partner headquarters that unified command within the theatre of operations will be exercised. It would be the principal point of contact for allied or partner governments and international organisations. The principle of unity of effort will require military headquarters at each and every level to integrate their activities with an equivalent point of contact in the host nation's civilian and security infrastructures. The HQ will be allocated an area of operations and must be able to conduct, and be integrated into joint operations, and to conduct, and be integrated into civil-military operations, in concert with other agencies. This will require some adjustment of the headquarters structure, in particular in the areas of intelligence, Influence Activity, and planning and the way in which it can fit into and contribute to co-ordinated government machinery and action.

4-23. **Boundaries**. An area of operations should be clearly defined and should be co-terminus with the appropriate civil district or province. This is will allow the co-ordinated government machinery necessary to ensure joint and inter-agency activity is integrated and conducted effectively. If the civil district or province is either too large or too highly populated for a single brigade to manage then more than one brigade and a higher headquarters will be required.

4-24. **Securing Borders**. For any country facing both transnational insurgencies and organised crime, porous borders create a strategic problem. Should and can its borders be closed, or can the problem be controlled in another way? As long as a country's borders remain open, insurgents can move people and equipment in and out of the country almost at will, and they can enjoy sanctuary abroad to train, equip and sustain their operations. Criminal organisations also benefit through having access to international distribution networks and markets without the controls that legitimate international trade imposes. Establishing and maintaining effective border security is not easy, particularly if physical barriers are required. It involves a long term national commitment, the resources to build and maintain physical barriers, the legislation and population control measures – such as a national identification system – to support border security, and a broad approach to maintaining both national border integrity and supporting internal security.

DEVELOP

4-25. **Co-ordinated Government Action and Activities**. Development operations generally involve long-term activities and build on the opportunity that security offers. Local populations must derive some tangible benefit in terms of improving their lives in order to justify the costs associated with security operations. Such costs may include casualties, and damage to property, commerce, trade and agriculture. The host nation government should be firmly in the lead, supported by the allied/partner efforts, and effective communications with the population. Development is an area that is primarily a civilian responsibility and, where possible, such activities should have a civilian lead. The key is co-ordinated government action because, certainly for security forces, commanders need to be clear about what they can achieve in development terms and the effect they will have. How to train indigenous security forces is described in Chapter 10, and methods of establishing or restoring essential services, supporting development of better governance, and economic development are described in AFM Vol 1 Part 9 – *Tactics for Stability Operations*. Principal areas of development in which the military are likely to be called upon to contribute to are:

- Training, mentoring, monitoring and embedding with the host nation's security forces.
- Establishing or restoring of essential services.
- Supporting development of better governance.
- Supporting economic development.

If development activities are not co-ordinated effectively, individual projects risk undermining other projects, or broader programmes. The consequences are wasted resources and possibly lives.

> Every operation we did was different. The overall concept was to enhance security and to spread the influence of the Government. We had a strong Non-Kinetic Effects Team (NKET), which was split into company detachments. We were given $40,000 a month (which we converted into Afghanis and which was the same as the Commander of the Task Force), and we made a point of achieving some form of R and D (Reconstruction and Development) on each operation. This ranged from renovating schools and health clinics, and employing local workers to clear up areas of towns, to just spending money in the market on things like bread and fruit. However, 2nd Echelon forces can be quite transitory due to their very nature, so we made sure that we did not promise things that couldn't be done in our time; like a new hospital or school; unless this was agreed with Task Forces and PRTs.
>
> Commanding Officer – Afghanistan 2008

INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SHAPE-SECURE-DEVELOP FRAMEWORK.

4-26. Irrespective of the sequence followed, development operations require a large, co-ordinated influence activity effort to explain and publicise government action, civic development programmes and the benefits that such programmes can bring. This aspect of influence activity should be planned and resourced before the operation starts, since a complex range of audiences will have to be targeted by the medium best suited to each. The important messages and themes centre on explaining to the population what the security forces are doing, why they are doing it, and winning over the passive or neutral sections by demonstrating how the host nation government is going to make their life better. Further explanation is to be found in Chapter 6 and guidance on communication themes for Clear-Hold-Build is provided at Paragraph 34 below.

- **Shape**. Taking account of cultural norms, tactical commanders will aim to shape understanding and behaviour with local leaders through Key Leader Engagement. This needs to be linked to tactical objectives and synchronised with similar activities conducted by civilian partners providing the principal means of informing a sceptical population, promoting the indigenous government's plans and setting the conditions for both tactical framework and strike operations.

- **Secure**. Security has both physical and psychological dimensions. The local population needs to be reassured that they will be free from intimidation. In this battle of ideas, the insurgent's propaganda needs to be countered and the potential second-order effects of tactical activity examined.

- **Develop**. While develop within the conceptual framework implies economic and political development over the long term, the tactical commander will need to ensure his *Build* activities nest within higher level inter-agency development plans. The Commander will have a role in publicising wider development plans through his tactical CIMIC and Information Operations that are aimed primarily at maintaining consent.

SECTION 4 – TRANSITION: THE TRANSFER OF SECURITY SECTOR RESPONSIBILITY

4-27. **Transition Influences**. Transition is the process of the transfer of security responsibility from allies or partners to the host country's security forces. It is conditional upon the host country's forces developing the capacity, capability and confidence to operate effectively and independently and thus sustain security. Transition is a complex process and is fraught with potential pitfalls. This is because there is much more to the political dimension of security sector transition than what might appear to be a neat, linear relationship between the build-up of host nation capabilities and the reductions of allied/partner capabilities, and the resultant change of security responsibility. Although it is shaped predominantly by security issues, and it takes place largely within the security line of operation, the process of transition may be affected by economic, political and diplomatic factors. Sovereignty and legitimacy can be powerful and underpinning, potentially undermining if not managed effectively, influences which must be taken into account. Transition planning therefore needs to start as much with the host country's intentions as with its capabilities. Where they match, transition can take place. Where there is an imbalance, with, for example intentions outstripping capability, the risks associated

with transition to overwatch should be recognised and the process developed with a great deal of caution.

4-28. **Conditions-Based Transition and Planning**. Transition works effectively when it is part of a conditions-based approach. Conditions are used to determine the pace of allied/partner force reductions; transition which is not based on security conditions will rapidly descend into chaos. As a result, transition conditions need to be identified and developed as part of the overall planning process. This is as much an art as it is a science.

- The start point is to define those conditions necessary to achieve campaign objectives. Typically this should be determined for each line of operation.
- The next step is to identify the objectives for each line of operation by phase or stage (Near-, Intermediate- and Longer-Term). It is then necessary to analyse each objective to identify and define the conditions necessary to achieve each objective. These will be the conditions that characterise success. They define the thresholds for the end of each stage or phase of the campaign. These thresholds should incorporate, where possible, the notion of 'normalcy'. Defining 'normalcy' is difficult, principally because what is 'normal' very much depends on who is measuring it and the context against which it is judged.
- The assessment concept is then developed. This involves identifying indicators of change associated with each condition and the means by which change or progress can be measured.
- The objectives, conditions, indicators and metrics can be mapped out against the campaign plan, by lines of operation. Transition goals, objectives, and conditions will be clearly laid out in the campaign plan.

MANAGING THE TRANSFER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

4-29. The transfer of security sector responsibility to full host nation control requires careful management. This is so that the potentially conflicting themes of sovereignty and legitimacy can be balanced against conditions on the ground. It is reasonable to expect that the host country will want to resume full responsibility for its own security as quickly as possible and that allies and partners will want to reduce their force levels and contribution as quickly as possible. However, neither should seek to do so at the risk of jeopardising security gains, or putting at risk developing host country capabilities by committing them too early to complex independent operations. Conversely, given the so-called 'half-life of intervention', the longer allies or partners remain in the host country, the greater is the risk that their continued presence will lose legitimacy and tolerance in the eyes of the host country's population and, potentially, domestically and internationally.

4-30. The interests of the host country, and its allies or partners, can be managed effectively through a joint combined committee for the transfer of security responsibility. Such a committee, established at national level, should take a view of the progress being made against the transition goals, objectives, and conditions laid out in the campaign plan, province by province. Specifically, four key areas require attention:

- The threat posed by insurgents.
- The increasing capacity of host country security forces.

- The progress of establishing good governance in all its aspects.
- The capabilities of allied/partner forces.

4-31. Particular emphasis is required on the security component's ability to maintain a secure environment and the district or provincial government's ability to direct security force operations. The committee for the transfer of security responsibility can then make recommendations to the government on the timing of security sector transfer. It is also an effective mechanism by which the central government's desire to control security at both the national and provincial level is balanced with their capacity for self governance and security sustainability.

A MODEL FOR THE TRANSITION OF SECURITY SECTOR RESPONSIBILITY

4-32. The process of security sector transition can be managed in a number of ways. Transition was a key part of the campaign in Iraq, where the process developed had to take account of increasing Iraqi sovereignty, the increasing capability of Iraqi Security Forces and the requirement to reduce Coalition force levels as conditions allowed. The approach adopted by Coalition forces stemmed from an idea developed by Multinational Division (South East) in 2005 which took into account the major factors in a way that sensibly managed attendant risks. The approach was adopted by General Petraeus and a Transition Action Plan developed to support the campaign. As an example of best practice from a major campaign, the essence of the approach is presented here. In the Multinational Force Iraq model, three stages of transition were identified: lead, partner and overwatch. The progression from Coalition Forces taking the lead in operations to the point where they were an enabling reserve acknowledged increasing levels of risk and adopted a conditions-based approach in order to manage such risks as effectively as possible.

- **Lead**. In the lead stage, combined operations are planned and led predominantly by allied/partner forces. There may be times when allies or partners will have to conduct missions independently of host security forces. Nevertheless, the key part is the development of close relationships between local security forces and their allies/partners through training and operations, enabled by Military Transition Teams (MiTT) embedded with local forces. MiTTs have a crucial role to play; they are the lynch pin in the whole process because they provide situational awareness to allied commanders, they maintain an effective, visible, credible forward presence, and they provide expert support to local forces and the access to critical enabling capabilities such as ISTAR and fires.

- **Partner**. During the partner stage, the responsibility for planning and conduct of operations is shared jointly between the local security forces and their allies/partners. It is essential that local forces continue to succeed. Their confidence and that of the local population in their ability to maintain local security is crucial. There is, inevitably a difficult balance to strike between ensuring the local forces do not fail and allowing them the opportunity to succeed.

- **Overwatch**. There are three stages to overwatch and they reflect an increasing acceptance of risk by allies or partners:

    - **Tactical Overwatch**. In tactical overwatch largely independent operations are conducted by capable local security forces, enabled by allied/partner support as required. Allies/partners continue to develop local forces with training and some limited partnership. The key criterion is

to avoid the local forces experiencing tactical failure. Some independent local security force operations will take place.

- **Operational Overwatch**. Operational overwatch is characterised by host country security force operations being enabled by tailored allied/partner support to critical, planned operations. Allies/partners provide training teams and additional advisory and assistance forces as required. Direct allied/partner participation in local security missions decreases but a quick reaction force is maintained that can intervene and restore order in the event of a crisis.

- **Strategic Overwatch**. Strategic overwatch is where host country security forces conduct independent operations supported by limited allied/partner enablers which are provided generally by exception. Allies/partners maintain a strategic reserve capable of responding in a timely manner to a strategic level crisis. They provide combat, combat support, and sustainment support by exception only.

4-33. The central theme of the process is the increasing capacity demonstrated by host country security forces and the improvements achieved in the security environment. As host country capacity and capability improve, and the security situation becomes more stable, so allied/partner forces are able to move from a leading position to an intermediate stance where they partner with local security forces, before moving into overwatch. This process is explained in more detail in Annex B to Chapter 10.

SECTION 5 – CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD

> In essence it boiled down to a requirement to CLEAR, HOLD, BUILD where we could and DISRUPT, INTERDICT, DEFEAT where we could not. It also articulated a singular focus on our ability to influence the population of Helmand in order that we could retain, gain and win their consent. We were very clear that we were not going to CLEAR unless we could HOLD; and were not going to HOLD unless we could BUILD. If you cannot do that, then you must DISRUPT and INTERDICT; because that is what allows you to manoeuvre, but only in relation to your influence campaign. In conventional operations, we use information operations to describe what we are doing, but in Helmand, we used manoeuvre to implement our influence campaign.
>
> Brigade Commander – Afghanistan 2007

4-34. **Objectives**. Clear-Hold-Build operations are part of the overall security effort; they are executed in specific, high-priority areas experiencing overt insurgent operations. They have the following objectives:

- Create a secure physical and psychological environment.
- Establish firm government control of the population and area.
- Gain and secure the population's support. The extent to which popular support has been gained can be measured by its participation in local programmes to counter the insurgency, for example joining locally-recruited civil security organisations and providing useful information about the insurgents.

4-35. **Assumptions**. For Clear-Hold-Build to be effective, it has to be assumed that:

- The host nation has an overall plan which addresses root causes as well as symptoms of the insurgency. Self-evidently, if the host nation does not have a plan, it is incumbent on its allies or partners to help it develop one that reflects the principles of counterinsurgency and sets objectives that match the specific problems that the campaign faces.
- The plan focuses all efforts, including those of its allies or partners, on achieving a political solution.
- The plan is designed to secure the population first so that normal civic and civil life can continue, and that securing the population is the first step towards the political solution.
- The plan includes active measures to gain and secure the support of the population.
- The plan recognises that action against the insurgents is largely dependent on high quality intelligence.
- The plan takes the longer term view, particularly with regard to the conditions after the insurgency has been defeated.

CLEAR

4-36. The precise tactics to be used for clearing an area of insurgents will depend on the conditions present in the area of operation. From the start, troops clearing any area must have the welfare of the local population uppermost in their mind for it is their support that is the overall objective of the campaign. Ideally, the area to be cleared will be adjacent to an already controlled area from which the operation can be prepared, mounted and sustained. Particular importance must be placed on developing a detailed, integrated intelligence picture of the target area. Strike operations and raids may precede the main part of the operation with the intention of minimising insurgent capability, disrupting its organisation and gaining further intelligence. The main part of the operation sees the force move into the area to establish its network of bases and outposts and conduct framework operations. These include patrolling, the introduction of control measures, targeted cordon and search operations, and operations designed to isolate the target area from external interference.

4-37. The clearance stage of the operation requires a sufficient soldiers in order to generate the sort of presence which will reassure the population and, crucially, enable control of the situation to be secured. The force must be strong enough to establish control quickly. This is particularly important if the area is strongly held by insurgents, because the backlash from them will be violent. If the force is not strong enough in numbers, and it does not have the necessary enablers, it will be limited to protecting its forward operating bases, and it will not be able to create an effective presence that can meet its principal responsibility of protecting the population.

4-38. Throughout the clear stage, the focus is on establishing the security framework which will allow the population to be permanently secured. Although strike operations may take place, searching for the insurgent is secondary at this stage. This is because securing the population, and starting the process of isolating it from the insurgent to start to build confidence, will be the main effort. It will force the insurgent to break cover to challenge the security forces and the authority of the

host nation. A strong security presence will reinforce the host nation government's statement of intent and it will start the process of influencing the neutral majority.

4-39. Influence Activity will be necessary to support the need to avoid antagonising the population and provoking unnecessary clashes, and making good any damage and disruption, in full and without delay. While the initial operation to take control of the target area needs a heavy security force presence, operations should not be heavy handed. They must be targeted against insurgent activity and not against the population. There is an important difference between the two; operations against the insurgent will undoubtedly affect the local population, but the local population should not be treated as though they are in any way wrongdoers. This presents some practical problems for commanders; it will be a matter of fact that some of the population will have been active supporters of, or even participated with the insurgents. The message must be clearly understood that security forces are there to secure the population, not to punish it, and some engagement with active supporters or former insurgents may be a necessary step in the overall campaign.

US CLEARANCE OPERATIONS IN FALLUJAH 2004

Fallujah had been a thorn in the side of the Coalition forces since the invasion of Iraq. Protests in April 2003 against the military resulted in fifteen civilian deaths, and escalating violence throughout the summer forced the US to abandon its bases in the city. After the death of four US contractors an operation was mounted to try and prevent a recurrence.

The first battle of Fallujah in April 2004 involved two US Marine battalions assaulting the city from the north. Their enemy was the Anti Iraqi Forces (AIF), comprising former members of the Iraqi armed forces, insurgents motivated by religious and nationalist reasons and foreign fighters. After early gains, the Marines found progress increasingly difficult. After four days of fighting, sophisticated enemy resistance and the negative propaganda effects of substantial numbers of civilian casualties caused the Marines to pause. Allowing fifty thousand civilians to leave the city, the US ceased offensive operations. Six weeks later, after further serious harassment, the US announced a ceasefire and handed authority for the city over to an Iraqi Brigade. That summer, Fallujah once again became a sanctuary for foreign insurgent from which anti-coalition operations were launched. Enemy forces in Fallujah, estimated to be several thousand, were able to launch attacks both against the cordon and outside in other parts of Iraq. The decision was taken to neutralise the insurgents within the city.

The AIF had dispersed weapon and food caches and IED factories throughout the city. Maps later found indicated that the defence of the city was based on a ring of weapon sites and killing areas. Organised into groups of between 3-6 men banded into groups of 30, the AIF were using mobile telephones, commercial radio, night vision equipment and GPS. Owing to the tight US cordon around the city, the AIF's main problem remained resupply. Defence measures were again sophisticated and exploited perceived weaknesses in the attack plan, using suicide bombers, 120mm mortars, daisy-chain IEDs and 'protected' mosques for command and control centres. Information Operations were employed using Arabic and international media sources to recruit inform and sway public opinion.

Intending to deny the use of Fallujah-Ramadi as a safe-haven to insurgents, the US MEF[4] plan was to destroy the AIF in Fallujah, to deny its use to insurgents and restore legitimate governance to the city. Preparations for the attack included extensive training in Joint and Combined capability, urban operations and an enormous logistic expansion of the MEF base and supplies[5]. Preparatory operations lasting two weeks included feints of up to battalion strength to test AIF reaction, raids, artillery and CAS offensive fire support, Information Operations and SF targeting of AIF leadership. Phase 2 shaping operations the day prior to the main attack included isolating the city, electronic attack and the securing of bridges.

The decisive attack, was split into two phases. Firstly, the assault phase exploiting the 'shock, firepower and mobility of armoured forces' with offensive artillery and CAS support. Phase 2 was the 'Search and Attack in Zone', the detailed clearance of the city. The city effectively cordoned, the two RCTS[6] (seven battalions totalling 6,500 men) assaulted it from the north. While the US forces led, ISF battalions, totalling 2,000 men, cleared sensitive lines, secured lines of communication and helped gather intelligence. The final phase, saw the removal of bodies, the rapid deployment of CIMIC, distribution of food and humanitarian supplies and route clearance. By the end of the third day the Coalition had swept through the northern half of the city. Stiffening resistance in the south-west of the city slowed the advance down. Fighting only at night, use was made of offensive fire support to destroy infrastructure. After a week's fighting and forced into the south-west of the city, the AIF, now organised in larger groups of 50, fought and died. The US lost 69 dead and 619 wounded. AIF casualty estimates were 2175 killed and 2052 detained.

The strategic lessons identified were:

- Removal of the civilian population from the built-up area
- The use of overwhelming force in order to reduce casualties
- Understanding of the detailed nature of the different threat and imaginative ways to overcome them
- The rapid willingness to adapt tactics, techniques and procedures
- The willingness to accept significant collateral damage to save casualties
- The use of highly-motivated troops at every level. Right to the top.

HOLD

4-40. **Objectives**. The aim of holding a cleared area is to restore government authority in the area and to establish the security infrastructure to maintain local security. Measures to hold a cleared area depend greatly on the condition it was in before the clearance operation started. The more the area was disputed, the greater the efforts that will be required to hold it because the greater the likelihood insurgents will want to challenge government authority in its most vulnerable condition. Various control measures will be required along with the local security infrastructure necessary to protect the people, to isolate the insurgent from the population and to deal with causes of subversion in the area of operation. This will involve establishing enough security stations throughout the cleared area to be able to protect the places

[4] Marine Expeditionary Force, comprising 2 assault Regimental Combat Teams with USMC and Iraqi Security Force battalions, and a cordon Brigade. In total about 12,000 men.
[5] Named the 'Iron Mountain', constructed to treble the resources, and critically the pre-positioned supplies, available
[6] Regimental Combat Teams, effectively Brigades

where people gather during the day and to control the areas where they live at night. Neutralising any remaining insurgent threat will depend almost entirely on finding it through the acquisition of information to build an accurate intelligence picture. Gaining such information is the responsibility of every member of the force. Control measures to be considered include the imposition of curfews, the issuing of identity cards, and erecting security walls to protect the population and support movement control into and out of an area.

4-41. **The Importance of Rapid 'Follow Up' Action**. It must be clearly understood that the efforts made to clear an area will be wasted if they not followed up immediately by operations to hold the cleared area. The insurgents will return and reprisals against the population are inevitable. The government's standing will be seriously undermined by its inability to deal effectively with the insurgent threat and its failure to provide security for its people.

4-42. **Host Nation Lead**. Holding operations should be led by the host nation's security forces, under the control of the national and local government. The government's presence is essential and its efforts should be focussed on improving governance from the outset. This places a clear onus on the host nation, with the assistance of its allies or partners, to develop its security forces, and the intelligence, supporting infrastructure and any legal and judicial reforms necessary to support the undoubted increase in activity that will be required to counter the insurgency. In addition to security measures, local infrastructure will have to be secured and, where necessary repaired or developed. The government can have an immediate impact, with many social and economic benefits for the local population, by acting to improve health services, education facilities and commercial opportunities.

> The success of the operation was a watershed for operations in the Upper Gereshk Valley. The seizure and holding of ground by dismounted troops, providing the conditions in which to provide security and engage with the local population's undivided attention, is the Taliban's greatest fear and his military undoing. The enduring, non-kinetic operation has proven that if you can convince local nationals of the benefits of Governance and reassure them that Afghan security forces can bring stability, they will come on side. It is by no means easy and the steps forwards are costly and generally mingled with several steps backwards, or sideways. What is clear however is that, painful as they are, operations such as this succeed and make a difference, prove that we excel at what we do and also that it is absolutely necessary that we do it.
>
> Operations Officer - Afghanistan

4-43. **Protect People Where They Gather; Protect People Where They Live**. When the security situation is bad, markets are often the first aspect of normal life to close. They present too easy a target for an IED. When markets close, self-evidently, farmers and traders cannot sell their produce, and their economic rationale is removed. This is bad for the local economy and poor for the population's morale. Being able to re-open a market is a significant local milestone but it depends on the area being under effective security control because insurgents target places where the population gathers.

4-44. **Information Operations**. Information operations will focus on the population, explaining what the security forces are doing and why, explaining what is required of the population and making the government's longer term plans clear. Security operations and population control measures will have a significant impact on the local population, and thus the reason for them, and some indication of the conditions that will need to be met before they are lifted, must be explained carefully through the information operation.

4-45. **Unpredictability**. During framework operations, there can be a natural tendency to become set in certain ways and to establish a pattern of activity. An enemy will identify and exploit such vulnerability, which must be countered by careful planning. Continuity is also important: just because an idea appears new to one unit does not mean it has not been tried by another. Insurgents learn and adapt and will know security force patterns. Use of certain routes while mounted or dismounted, at particular times, will increase the likelihood of ambush or IED attack. Counter IED drills should be well-trained and exhaustively rehearsed, including 'actions on' and basic tactics. Commanders should be alert at all times to the 'come-on' whereby some action by the enemy is designed to turn security force drills or 'actions on' into an opportunity for further attack.

> After one patrol when a soldier was killed early in the 1980s, it was discovered that patrols had used the same route and the same formation at the same time each day for several days. Within the patrol, teams had developed the habit of following each other up the same street in a formation known as 'duck patrol'. This left the rear team vulnerable, and it was a soldier in the rear team who died. The officer in charge of the patrol resigned his commission. This salutary example was used for a long time in Northern Ireland Training Advisory Team (NITAT) briefings. *Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland*.

BUILD

4-46. **Objectives**. Even though build operations are the first step in the develop process they must continue to emphasise the central importance of securing the population and securing its support. Engagement with the population and key leaders remains essential if confidence in the counterinsurgency operation is to be maintained. Framework security operations should continue to reassure and deter and the lead should be taken by host nation security forces. Building will have a number of objectives but, at this stage, cannot be considered to be more than the precursor to the overall political and economic development plans that will need a more permissive environment in which to succeed.

4-47. **Consent Winning Activity**. Simple projects that gain consent of the local populace can help to create a permissive environment. Consent winning activity enables a commander to react quickly to address the population's immediate requirements. These activities are rarely a long term solution but must be part of the overall strategic development. They are intended to gain the goodwill of the community in order to initiate the engagement required to identify, plan and implement longer term programmes. Examples of consent winning activities include the provision of electricity and water, the removal of litter, the opening of markets and the repairing of roads. Such schemes should be only carried out by military

personnel who have taken advice from the other government departments to ensure that their actions are consistent with the overall development strategy. Consent winning activity will need a ready supply of money if it is to succeed and it should be aimed at addressing the immediate needs of the community.

4-48. **Influence Activity**. The build stage requires a large, co-ordinated information effort to explain and publicise government action, civic development programmes and the benefits that such programmes bring. This aspect of the operation needs to be carefully planned and resources allocated before it starts. This is because it will require a great deal of effort, targeted at a wide range of audiences, each of which will require expert local advice and resources to reach it. Key messages should be focussed on winning over the passive or neutral middle ground of the population by demonstrating how the host government is going to make life better, thus countering insurgent claims and promises. Table 4-1 below provides illustrative information operation themes for each stage of Clear-Hold-Build and for the host population, counterinsurgent and insurgent audiences.

	Message:		
Stage:	**Population**	**Counterinsurgent**	**Insurgent**
Clear	Explain that helping the insurgent will prolong security force operations and prevent their everyday life from improving.	Explain that security forces will remain in the area in order to work with the population and to gain and secure its support	Explain that security forces will remain in the area to defeat active insurgents: if they fight they will be defeated.
Hold	Explain that the security forces are here to stay. Make long-term contracts with local people for supply or construction requirements. Explain and obtain some measure of approval or at least understanding, for the actions that will affect the population (e.g. census, control of movement, etc.) Lay the groundwork for the eventual dissociation of the population and the insurgent.	Explain changes in missions and responsibilities associated with creating or reinforcing the host government's legitimacy. Explain that protecting the population remains important: gain people's support by assisting them; use measured force when fighting insurgents	Explain that security forces will remain in the area to defeat active insurgents: if they fight they will be defeated. Explain host government initiatives, for example amnesty. Insurgent forces will probably not surrender, but they may cease hostile actions against the host nation government agencies in the area
Build	Demonstrate how the host government is going to make their life better to win over passive or neutral people. Explain Escalation of Force measures to the population	Explain that they must remain supportive towards the population. Ensure they stay vigilant against insurgent actions. Ensure they understand the rules of engagement; they will become more restrictive as peace and stability return.	Create divisions between the movement leaders and the mass base by emphasising failures of the insurgency and successes of the government

Table 4-1 - Illustrative Information Operation Messages

SECTION 6 – CONTESTING OUTLYING AREAS

4-49. An insurgent presence in the outlying areas of a country can only be beneficial to the insurgents. Where such a threat exists, the population will be vulnerable, their support uncommitted, and viable, legitimate political processes will struggle to function. A government must act decisively to remove such a threat. The difficulty for the government is deciding when to act. If resources are short the government may be forced to dislocate and deter in the outlying areas while authority is established elsewhere in its priority areas. Much depends on the threat that the insurgency poses and the extent to which the insurgents can control an outlying area. Such an area provides a valuable sanctuary from which insurgents can mount operations elsewhere. As long as insurgents have a sanctuary, they retain the potential to strike. This is an important security consideration and one which must be taken into account in the provision of security in neighbouring areas. There is also a moral consideration; the degree to which insurgent control of an outlying area should be allowed to subjugate and intimidate the population. Although outlying areas are likely to be a lower priority than, for example, the capital, the longer the wait necessary for government action, the more damaging the effect on the population will be and the longer it will take to restore general public confidence. Allowing the insurgents to control outlying areas for extended periods can result in the population becoming accustomed to or even sympathising with the insurgency as the insurgent has the possibility of spreading his authority and narrative amongst the population in these uncontested outlying areas.

SECTION 7 – BEST PRACTICES IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

4-50. Learning from the past is an essential part of the principle of Learn and Adapt and former campaigns provide ample evidence of what works and what does not. In general terms, successful operational practices focus on the country's people and their belief in and support for their government. However, achieving this depends greatly on the way the principles of counterinsurgency are applied and in the manner in which operations are conducted. Operational analysis in 2005[7] examined 53 insurgencies and civil wars to identify which practices worked and which failed or proved counter-productive. The results of the analysis provide a useful ready checklist, a form of tactical conscience against which a proposed course of action can be taken. The analysis also identified the following recurring themes which serve to reinforce the value of counterinsurgency principles:

- **Human Security.** Counterinsurgency campaigns have failed where basic human security – physical security, food and water, healthcare, economic opportunity, access to education and religious freedom – are not present.
- **Intelligence and the Rule of Law.** Intelligence operations that detect insurgents and lead to their arrest and prosecution are the single most important practice to protect the population. Loyal, trustworthy, professional police forces have the trust of the population and can help uphold the rule of law.
- **Population Control.** Population control measures, such as ID cards and

[7] With acknowledgments to Dr Kalev Sepp, whose analysis of previous campaigns in Baghdad in May 2005 was one of the first steps the U.S. Army took in updating and revising its counterinsurgency doctrine and practices. See Kalev I. Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency", *Military Review*, May-June 2005, pp. 8-12.

check points, are effective in helping to isolate the insurgent from the population, particularly when measures are focussed at the local level.

- **Political Process**. The population must be encouraged to enter into the political process, and be informed of both what it needs to do to help the government improve security and what it can expect in terms of economic and social development.

4-51. A summary of successful and unsuccessful practices from a century of counterinsurgency operations appears in Table 4-2 below.

Successful	Unsuccessful
Emphasis is placed on developing intelligence	Military direction has primacy
Attention is focussed on the population, its needs, and its security	Peacetime government processes continue as normal in the host nation and amongst the coalition partners
Secure areas are established and then expanded	Success is measured by the number of insurgents killed or captured, not on gaining the support of and securing the population
Insurgents are isolated from the population (population control)	The resources required to prosecute the campaign are not forthcoming; manpower, equipment and cash are all required in large numbers
There is a single campaign authority	The focus for resources is on large battalion-sized operations rather than investing in company or small-scale operations
Effective, pervasive psychological operations campaign supports the lines of operation	Military units are concentrated in large bases for protection and administration rather than spreading into smaller bases amongst the population
Amnesty and rehabilitation are offered to insurgents	Special Forces operations are focused on kinetic effects such as killing and capturing insurgents rather than development tasks
The police leads; the military supports	There is only a low priority given in ensuring the correct resources are allocated to MCB and advisory teams
Building, training and mentoring host nation forces is a priority	Borders, airspace, coastlines are not controlled
Police forces are expanded, diversified and professionalised	
Conventional military forces adapt and re-organise for counterinsurgency	
Special Forces advisers are embedded with host nation forces	

Table 4-2 - Successful and Unsuccessful Practices

CASE STUDY 3

A SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN
OMAN (DHOFAR) 1965-1975
(A Balanced Approach)

ASPECTS OF THE CAMPAIGN

1. The British Army's counter insurgency campaign in the southern Dhofar region of Oman is generally considered one of the most successful counter insurgency operations of its kind of the twentieth century.[1] Lessons and strategies from the campaign are currently being re-examined, not only by the British but also by the Canadian, American and Australian Armed Forces. Success in Dhofar did not come quickly or easily; it took time to work out and apply the major strategies that eventually resulted in victory.

2. Dhofar is distinct from the north of Oman in both its terrain and its people. It comprises a coastal strip of rugged, mountainous terrain around 150 miles long, with the sea to the south and an inland desert plateau, known as the Jebel Dhofar, to the north. In the early 1960s, Oman had begun to benefit from oil revenues following the discovery of oil reserves in the 1950s, but basic health care and education were lacking throughout the country generally, and in Dhofar in particular. The Sultan of Oman, Said Bin Taimur, was uninterested in improving conditions, and in 1962, the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) came into being to fight for modernisation of the region. The DLF, although opposed to the Sultan, was still essentially conservative in nature, and supported traditional tribal structures and the tenets of Islam.

3. With the withdrawal of the British from South Arabia and the establishment of the neighbouring People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1967, the Dhofar insurgency expanded and took on a different form. The People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) was born, and immediately moved against the DLF. PFLOAG was fundamentally different from the DLF: it was a communist-inspired insurgency, materially supported by the Yemen. Its supporters wished to destroy the old tribal system and had no time for Islam. The insurgency quickly took control of the coastal mountains, establishing effective lines of communication and enabling distribution of supplies from across the Yemeni border.

4. The British role in the area was limited to an advisory mission; this limited position was reinforced by the British withdrawal from South Arabia in 1967. Initially, the insurgency was opposed only by the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF), a small force of two battalions, plus a small air and naval wing. The SAF deployed only two companies at a time in Dhofar. The British had an RAF base at Salalah.

5. Until 1970, the SAF was incapable of dealing with the insurgency due to lack of a clear counter insurgency strategy for the campaign. Development of a strategy had been greatly hampered by the Sultan's failure to understand the nature of the uprising. An internal assessment written by the commander of SAF in early 1970 provides a picture of the situation:

> 'SAF overall aim is purely military: to kill the enemy. No political aim inside from unconditional surrender, therefore no political or civil aids to the war. None of the established civil measures for counter insurgency exist.'[2] In

> Dhofar the ado (insurgents) had by the Spring of 1970 established themselves over the whole of the Jebel. The morale of the civilian population was low and many were unsympathetic to the SAF.[3]

6. The war took a turn for the better following a successful coup spearheaded by the Sultan's son, Qaboos bin Said, in July 1970. Qaboos was half Dhofari, as well as a graduate of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. He recognised that the war was being lost and set out to reform the government's strategy. British SAS advisers had arrived in early 1970, and the new Sultan was briefed by their commander who suggested that the SAS in Oman should contribute on the following 'five fronts': an information cell; an information team; a medical officer supported by SAS medics; a veterinary officer; and, when possible, to raise Dhofari soldiers to fight for the Sultan.[4] Thus the initial approach had **Shape-Secure-Develop** at its heart.

7. Following this strategy, the campaign was set: to secure and pacify the Jebel from the east to the west **(Secure)**. The Sultan and his government were always in charge of the campaign. The British offered counter insurgency advice that had to be amended to accommodate the different societal and religious structures on the Jebel. The Jordanian and Imperial Iranian governments also provided support, in the form of troops and advisors. This support was instrumental in refuting accusations that the whole campaign was a British imperial exercise. Notwithstanding such international awareness of the campaign and the military contributions, it was carried out in relative privacy; neither the British public nor Parliament paid a great deal of attention to it.

8. The first phase of the campaign, Operation JAGUAR, was launched in October 1971 in the east of Dhofar, to provide the SAF with a foothold from which they could slowly win back the region. The strategy was straightforward: the SAF, SAS and tribal militias (Firqats) would engage with the local population, secure the region, disrupting insurgent supply lines thus allowing development and pacification efforts to come in and help the local population, thus undermining the relationship between the insurgents and the people.

THE LESSONS FROM THE CAMPAIGN

SULTAN'S ARMED FORCES

9. Following the accession of Sultan Qaboos, the SAF was expanded to a fourth regiment, operating in the Jebel. The SAF as a whole went from 3,000 men to 10,000 men within three years **(Develop)**. The British proposed a two-tier buildup of the system, beginning with expansion of the existing seconded and contracted officer system from the British Army and Royal Marines. The advantage of this officer corps over a 'training team' was that officers were involved for the long term, and were embedded within the command structure of the unit. The British officers were to hold command of the battalion, company, and staff positions within the battalions. As one officer noted, the men selected were keen to serve alongside indigenous forces:

> 'The officers whom Britain sent to Oman, both contracted and regular, were highly trained volunteers. Most had the necessary commitment to stick it out and those who didn't left pretty soon. The patience and tolerance to live harmoniously in an unfamiliar culture; the fortitude to be content with less than comfortable circumstances for prolonged periods; an understanding of and

> sympathy for a foreign history and religion; a willingness to learn a new language; the flexibility, imagination and humility necessary to climb into the head of the people who live by a very different set of assumptions; none of these are to be found automatically in our modern developed Euro-Atlantic culture. These attributes, and the attitudes they imply, often have to be taught in addition to purely military skills.[5]

10. The British, with the help of Omani officers, created an officer training course for Arab officers coming from Oman and Jordan, as well as Baluch officers recruited from Pakistan. By the end of 1971, there were 21 commissioned Omani officers. By the end of 1972, this was expanded to a hundred officers, with others attending the Jordanian Military Academy and RMAS, as they still do today. **Development** was in full swing. The rank and file of the SAF was trained for six months before they joined their units. The instructors at the Sultan Armed Forces Training Regiment initially drew contract officers and NCOs from the British Army, as well as from Jordan and other Gulf States. The inclusion of more Arab and Baluch instructors took place over time.

11. In effect the SAF was expanded effectively and trained for war with the inclusion of seasoned seconded and contracted officers. Time was taken and proper plans created for the expansion of the force to the levels required to deal with an insurgency. The regiments would spend nine-month tours in the region and then return to northern Oman for refit and training, based upon the experiences recently gained.

FIRQAT

12. The British Army Training Team (BATT) set out to create company-sized units of light infantry to fight on the Jebel alongside their SAF counterparts and provide security for cleared areas. The SAS provided six to 10 men as the command and control, medical and fire support for the Firqat as well as the training component. The Firqat was not a new idea. All the Firqats, bar one, were raised along tribal lines, very similar to how the British had operated on the North-West Frontier of India in forming the Frontier Scouts from the Pashtun community living there.

13. At times, the Firqats suffered from issues of discipline and command and control, but overall they were critical to the military success in the region. Many surrendered enemy personnel (SEP) were part of the Firqats, which was a boon to information operations. Their impact on the war has been highlighted by one of the original proponents of a concept that has been supported since by other commanders:

> ‘The Firqats’ understanding of ground and their speed of manoeuvre were both superior to SAF troops’, but when it came to straight military tactics the SAF’s discipline told every time. The two forces were complementary; neither could have won the war alone. If the Firqats were the most important Government department to be created to win the war, Civil Aid must run them a close second.’[6]

JOINT CIVIL/MILITARY STRATEGY

14. The British and Omani officials understood that a true 'one-war' system was necessary to success in Dhofar. The process had to start from the bottom and progress upwards as the SAF and the development sector became established. The first stage in the **development** rested with the SAS; they created small civilian action teams (CAT) that engaged with the population and began medical and developmental projects in the secured coastal towns. As the Firqats and, later, the SAF secured areas, the CAT followed closely behind to provide further pacification. Once the area was considered **secure**, longer-term **development** began under the leadership of the Civil Aid department. By 1972, the Omani military and civilian apparatus was clearly ready to take over and the SAS withdrew from the Civil Action Teams programme. The Dhofar Development Department was established in 1972; it reported to the Sultan and set its policy, finance and advice direct through the Defence Secretary in Muscat. Weekly development meetings were attended by the Wali Dhofar (civilian lead); the Commander Dhofar; and members of the Oman Intelligence Service, Dhofar and the Dhofar **Development** Department.

15. The way the military and pacification sides of an operation were closely linked is highlighted by the Dhofar Brigade commander in 1974:

> 'A SAF operation in strength supported by a Firqat secures a position of the Firqat's choice which dominated its tribal area. Military engineers build a track to the position giving road access, followed by an airstrip if possible. A drill is brought down the track followed by a Civil Action Team [who set up] a shop, school, clinic and mosque. SAF thins out but still provides minimum security. Water is pumped to the surface and into distribution systems prepared by military engineers to offer storage points for humans and troughs for animals. Civilians come in from miles around to talk to the Firqat, SAF and Government representatives. They are told that insurgent activity in the area will result in the water being cut off. Civilians move out in surrounding areas and tell the insurgent not to interfere with what is obviously a good thing [they also provided intelligence]. Insurgents become very dependent on the civilians, stop all aggressive action and either goes elsewhere or hide. Tribal area is secure. All SAF are withdrawn.'[7]

CONCLUSION

16. The British were successful working within an Islamic and Arab environment because they paid attention to both the negative and position lessons of previous campaigns. While British commanders may have led operations at times, they were still answerable to the Omani civilian leadership and had always to be aware of not looking at the operational environment through the prism of a 'westerner'. The goals set by both the military and civilian leadership were tangible and worked out within the restrictive confines of a small military and limited civilian apparatus that had to be properly built up and supported over time. The military and civilian commanders understood that the war was for the support of the Dhofaris; they listened closely to their grievances and demands; and met the challenges as they arose. They did not set out to fundamentally change the indigenous society.

17. Even though they were unaware of it at the time the overall campaign plan was one of **Shape-Secure-Develop**. Once Sultan Qaboos had succeeded to the

throne in the summer of 1970 it was recognised that success could only be achieved by winning the consent of the population and the 'five fronts' were opened up. This was coupled to a security campaign that secured and pacified the Jebel from the east to the west. As security improved these areas became the focus of the Dhofar Brigade's development programme; this was overtly linked to security and by 1974 the population was comprehensively engaged with Firqat and the Government representatives. The rebels had lost the support of the population and the insurgency was resolved.

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[1] General John Akehurst, *We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman, 1965-1975* (Wilton, Salisbury: M Russell, 1982); Calvin Allen and Lynn Rigsbee, *Oman Under the Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970-1996* (London: Frank Cass, 1998); Ian Gardiner, *In the Service to the Sultan* (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2006); Tony Jeapes, *SAS: Operation Oman*, (London: William Kimber Publishing 1980) for more in details of the campaign.

[2] SAF Report, *Dhofar Operations as of January 1970*, P Thwaites Collection GB 0099, Box 1/2, Liddel Hart Center for Military Archives, Kings College, London.

[3] Major General J D C Graham, *Sultan's Armed Forces*, Pt I: "March to July 1970", *SAF Association Newsletter*, No 31 (June 1983).

[4] Tony Jeapes, p 31.

[5] Ian Gardiner, p 1974.

[6] Tony Jeapes, p 231.

[7] John Akehurst, pp 33-4.

CHAPTER 5

INTELLIGENCE

SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

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5-1. Effective, accurate and timely intelligence is vital in any phase of war and in any type of operation. Commanders at all levels should understand that their direction is essential in leading and focussing the intelligence effort; operations are command led and intelligence fed. In a counterinsurgency campaign, success or failure will depend upon the effectiveness of the intelligence effort. In counterinsurgency operations a tactical action can have a strategic effect, and the lines between tactical, operational and strategic intelligence are often blurred. Indeed, without understanding the implications of counterinsurgent force action at every level, it will be impossible to mitigate unintended second and third order effects. Securing and maintaining the consent and confidence of the population, minimising friendly force and civilian casualties and limiting opportunities for insurgent propaganda are all essential to mission success, and good intelligence is the foundation on which these are based. In short, all operations, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, have to be intelligence driven, or at the very least intelligence informed, and every effort should be made to deliver *actionable* as well as effective, accurate and timely intelligence. The intelligence/operations relationship is dynamic; intelligence drives operations and successful operations will generate intelligence.

5-2. Understanding the operational theatre is vital to success, and the intelligence staffs will be central to coordinating and maintaining this activity. Insurgents operate within and feed off social networks more so than conventional forces. Developing a detailed understanding of these networks will enable a commander to design a campaign and plan operations that will work with, rather than against, the society that he seeks to influence. This will avoid, for example, being drawn into a physical struggle amongst the population – something insurgents will seek to achieve. In order to analyse the significance of information and to advise on likely reactions to counterinsurgent force action, a baseline understanding of 'normality' in the theatre of operations is essential. Intelligence has to support planning for full spectrum operations, which necessitates understanding more than just the enemy. In counterinsurgency operations the intelligence effort may be best described as understanding the 'human terrain'.

5-3. Until the operational environment is understood, the insurgent has been clearly defined and the full implications of any counterinsurgent actions analysed, any line of operation will be difficult to develop. It is therefore important that the intelligence effort is maximised early in the counterinsurgency campaign. Early, accurately targeted military activity may have long term effects throughout the campaign. Prompt and timely successes may also influence the duration of the campaign.

SECTION 2 - THE INSURGENT

5-4. The insurgent is often underestimated and not given credit for having coherent thought or strategy. It is worth highlighting here that the insurgents will have their own planning cycle (in situations where there is a large number of ex-military personnel involved in the insurgency there will be value in understanding any national military doctrine). They are likely to operate initially in areas where counterinsurgency forces are at a disadvantage, such as an area where the latter cannot easily deploy, where the effect of their weapons systems is limited, from their powerbases or in ungoverned space. Insurgents are likely to exploit boundaries between counterinsurgent forces and attempt to control border crossings, particularly with bordering states that are sympathetic to their cause. They will probably exploit asymmetric opportunities and new technologies targeted at the counterinsurgents' perceived critical vulnerabilities in that environment. The insurgents may have infiltrated government departments and the security forces, and could have an awareness, if not a detailed understanding, of planned security force actions.




Figure 5-1 Aspirational Effect

5-5. It will be difficult to discriminate the insurgent from others in the local population, as, unlike in conventional operations, they are unlikely to be wearing uniform. One of the insurgent's main strengths, therefore, is his ability to live, move and act with great freedom. Accurate and actionable intelligence will be key to minimising civilian casualties. There are also likely to be a number of different insurgent factions and it is important to distinguish between them and act against them according to their intent and capability. As outlined in Chapter 2, there may be differing localised insurgencies, producing an overall insurgency of a mosaic nature, meaning that counterinsurgency units could face differing manifestations of the insurgency with differing motivations across their area of operation.

5-6. Understanding insurgents' motivations should be a primary task. The majority of insurgents are likely to reside towards the middle of a sliding scale from pure paramilitary to pure political in focus. It should be the initial aim of the counterinsurgent force to drive the different insurgent elements below the line of self-sustaining violence as shown at Figure 5-1 in order that other lines of operation,

primarily political, can be brought to bear, and then to maintain it there while supporting the other lines of operation. The intelligence effort may have to initially focus on identifying those who are feeding the self-sustaining violence, in order that they can be targeted.

5-7. Figure 5-2 depicts an approach successfully employed in countering insurgency in Iraq that also highlights the requirement to employ a cross government approach to the spectrum of counterinsurgency operations. The main groupings in the insurgency produced a number of splinter groups as the insurgency matured, and a number of groups overlapped, making it difficult and time intensive to identify who belonged to which group. The important factor is whether an insurgent is reconcilable or irreconcilable, rather than necessarily which group he belongs to. In the diagram, those insurgents (possibly classed as terrorists) at the extreme edges are hardliners who will not engage in any form of reconciliation, regardless of the pressure brought to bear on them. They should be neutralised by either being captured or, where necessary, killed (a military or indigenous security force function). Those slightly closer towards the centre may be persuaded to participate in some form of reconciliation if the right lever is identified and suitable pressure is exerted (an influence activity function which could require either military or civilian action). They will need protecting or isolating from the hardliners' influence. Those in the centre are open to reconciliation efforts (a primarily civilian function), and they may also need some form of protection to avoid them sliding back up the scale. This diagram shows just two insurgencies, but if a more complex scenario is faced involving multiple insurgencies, warlords and/or criminals, more strands to reflect these could be added and the model would still remain useful. Understanding this spectrum of insurgency will influence a scheme of manoeuvre which is dependent on actionable, accurate and timely intelligence and a thorough understanding of the theatre of operations.




Figure 5-2 -The Spectrum of Insurgency Operations

5-8. As explained in Chapter 2, members of an insurgent organisation generally fall into five broad and overlapping categories: movement leaders who determine the approach and tactics and do the planning and organising, the political cadre who conduct information and political activities, the combatants who conduct the violent activities, the auxiliaries, and the popular support who provide support functions. Importantly, however, insurgents often deliberately employ a flat and/or cellular structure in order to enhance their own OPSEC and survivability, and to speed up their decision-making cycle. Therefore, attempts to apply traditional order of battle factors and templates on the insurgents can produce oversimplified and misleading conclusions.

5-9. In counterinsurgency operations, the threat will be all-pervasive. There are unlikely to be traditional front lines or echelons and the insurgent will avoid decisive engagements, employing instead harassing and delaying tactics rather than attempting to defeat the counterinsurgent forces in the short term. This means that situational awareness, OPSEC and force protection at all levels of the counterinsurgent force is important and there may be an increased requirement for intelligence collection and assessment/analysis resources to be developed or deployed with units that would not normally receive such intelligence support on conventional operations. Many ISTAR assets that are traditionally associated with formation level will become battlegroup or even sub-unit assets for limited or extended periods.

SECTION 3 - INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

5-10. When defining Areas of Intelligence Interest (AII), it is worth remembering that Areas of Operational Responsibility (AORs) may be relatively static, but people and information will pass through continuously. Thus, an AII should take into account physical geography and civil considerations, particularly human factors. The AII will need to account for the various influences that affect the AOR such as family, tribal, ethnic, religious, economic or other links or influences that transcend the AOR and the host nation.

> We compiled a lot of information and handed it over when we left. It was not particularly sophisticated. Our ability to understand the local population was constrained by language and an alien culture. The Brigade was dealing predominantly with the upper end; of people who were relatively educated and supportive; but at Battlegroup level we were at the other end; dealing with a population who were anything but that, and who had the most to fear and the most to lose.
>
> CO Infantry Battalion – Afghanistan 2009

5-11. Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE) and the Intelligence Estimate should be conducted routinely as part of the staff planning process, but with the conventional template adapted accordingly. Conventional terms, such as vital ground and key terrain, may not be geographic (for example ‘key terrain’ could well be the populace) and the intelligence effort required to support a commander in the early stages of planning should not be underestimated. Conducting a comprehensive SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis may be a useful start point in assessing the insurgency and identifying courses of action. Analysis of the operating environment forms a fundamental part of the IPE, and G2 staffs should be engaged in researching it as early as possible, and included in all aspects of it. The difference in IPE for counterinsurgency operations is the degree of socio-cultural information to be gathered, analysed and understood, with the focus being on the ‘so what?’ question at each stage. As already highlighted, as much effort should be devoted to understanding the people (culture and current influences) as to understanding the insurgent. The IPE should inform a commanders’ direction to his units on interaction with the population as their actions will shape opinion; a soldier should be given the tools to enable him to navigate the human terrain as easily as he navigates the geographical terrain with a map and GPS. The IPE will also inform the overall cross government approach, and support influence activity and civil-military operations planning. In order to develop an effective IPE, input may be required from suitable, possibly external, experts on areas such as economics, anthropology and governance.

5-12. As highlighted in Chapter 2, a detailed understanding of the historical background to the insurgency (often going back centuries and including external influences) is important. If only the immediate causes of the insurgency are addressed there is a serious risk of causing unintended consequences or creating an imbalance in other factors within the operating area and beyond. Similarly, understanding external influences on both the state and the insurgency is important in order that a response to those influences may be reflected in the campaign plan.

5-13. The IPE should also consider and define the multitude of other organisation active in the theatre of operations – coalition partners and allies, local military, paramilitary and police forces and private security companies. Knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of these organisations is required in order to establish their impact on (or complicity in) the insurgency, their value in counterinsurgency operations and their role in providing intelligence and information. There may be a requirement to develop working relationships and procedures for sharing information with such other forces in order to develop and maintain a common intelligence picture and harness unity of effort. Early direction will be required on the degree of authorised intelligence sharing and processes for doing so developed. The myriad non-governmental organisations and structures that influence the lives of the populace should also be considered.

5-14. As described in Chapter 2, insurgency will provoke a reaction amongst the population which could range from obvious overt support through passive acquiescence to the (less commonly considered) emergence of a local dictator, or to local defence groups or militias being established in order to protect their local population. If left unchecked, such developments may lead to unofficial policing and the empowerment of militias, which, in time, may lead to intractable problems for counterinsurgency forces. Criminal networks are also likely to be active which may or may not be linked with the insurgents. While not necessarily a direct threat to counterinsurgency forces, all of the above pose a long term threat to law and order and should also be analysed, tracked and possibly even levered.

5-15. Maintenance of the IPE and its importance in developing and maintaining an accurate representation of the operational theatre is a dynamic process, and intelligence staffs should routinely monitor and update its various strands throughout all stages of a counterinsurgency campaign. The intelligence effort cannot be allowed to gravitate solely towards kinetic or purely military tasks. This will allow for the intelligence feed to support planning in other lines of operation. A picture of ‘normality’ has to be gained, baselined and maintained in order that changes may be measured against the norm.

SECTION 4 - THE INTELLIGENCE/OPERATIONS CYCLE (FIND FIX FINISH EXPLOIT ANALYSE (F3EA))

5-16. The Intelligence/Operations Cycle is not designed solely for counterinsurgency activity; it applies across the spectrum of operations and is not a new development. Like all aspects of military activity it relies on command direction to give it coherence and context to ensure that the risk/opportunity balance is fully understood. It is worth recording in some detail here because there will be many subordinate commanders who, naturally, will not be familiar with its details. In counterinsurgency it will not be unusual for a junior commander to be operating far from base and in circumstances where important information may need rapid dissemination prior to any military action.

5-17. The intelligence/operations cycle is continuous and dynamic. In general, equipment, documents, and detainees recovered from overt counterinsurgency operations will generate information, which, when processed, will lead to the development of targets for subsequent operations. It is important that all soldiers engaged in counterinsurgency operations understand this important linkage and know how to exploit a location.




Figure 5-3 The F3EA Cycle

5-18. This intelligence/operations cycle could be described as Find, Fix, Finish (Strike being proscriptively kinetic) is shown at Figure 5-3.

5-19. A robust staff battle-rhythm that controls and maintains this cycle should be developed. This battle rhythm will include commander's direction, the production of targeting priorities, intelligence collection plans and a mechanism to measure the effects of all operations. The battle-rhythm should also allow time for asset coordination and any supporting functions to be brought to bear. This is shown schematically at Figure 5-4 and has been described in previous and current operations as the Tasking and Coordination Group (TCG).




Figure 5-4 - The Intelligence/Operations Staff Battle-Rhythm (Tasking and Coordination Group (TCG))

5-20. Regular direction from the commander at all levels is crucial, and unifying this direction to an end state has proven particularly useful in ensuring understanding of the requirement. It should be informed by the common intelligence picture, dependent in turn on effective IPE and a thorough understanding of the operational theatre. The intelligence picture will be complex, and the commander should understand the implications of, although not necessarily avoid, directing all of his intelligence effort on a specific line of operation. He will have finite resource and should consider coverage, capability, priority and gain. He should also allow time for the strands of intelligence to develop and have an effect, and be wary of switching his main focus too radically or quickly. Hasty reaction to a one-off, single-source, report should be avoided but as the intelligence effort matures, opportunities should be grasped. In counterinsurgency operations, soldiers are often the main collectors of information and the commander should ensure that they are all aware of his Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR).

5-21. Once the commander's direction has been given, the TCG staff should develop this direction accordingly and contribute to the production of the target list. This is not necessarily just hard targets, and should include targeting sources of longer term intelligence strands to support the maintenance and understanding of the operational environment, force protection and OPSEC. These target sets should then be developed - the length of time required to grow them will depend upon the nature of the target - and routinely fed into the collection plan.

5-22. Collection should be synchronised and controlled centrally (although not necessarily conducted centrally), to prevent duplication of effort and missed opportunities. This will allow synergy between the intelligence requirements and the available collection capabilities, including any national agencies that may be present. Particular care needs to be given to the tracking of Requests for Information (RFI), and information requirements management should be an active, rather than passive, function. The collection plan should aim to dominate the AIR (Area of Intelligence Responsibility). Forms of collection are likely to include:

- **Human Intelligence.** Human Intelligence (HUMINT) can vary from passive informal walk-ins and routine liaison, to more active contact handling, detainee debriefs and interrogation, and agent running. Suitably qualified staff will be required to exploit each. Every meeting held with someone from outside the counterinsurgency force is a potential information gathering exercise, and all staff officers engaging in liaison (including with NGOs and host nation forces[1]) should contribute to the intelligence picture accordingly. Soldiers are also an important source and every patrol or operation should be given intelligence collection requirements as well as operational requirements; it is possible that the sole purpose of an operation could be to gather intelligence. Counterinsurgents should not, however, expect people to willingly supply information if insurgents retain the ability to violently intimidate them, and the usual guidelines for protecting sources remain extant. As always, intelligence staffs should be wary of the true motivation of any source

[1] The integrity of the host nation security forces will vary, and the degree of trust in them should be determined and guidance given on information sharing. Ideally, they would be at the heart of counterinsurgency operations, and a principle source of intelligence and information, but this may not always be the case. Risk management will be important. Experience has shown that the fusion of UK and host nation information and intelligence and the utilisation of host nation intelligence assets, can be a force multiplier.

and analyse the information offered accordingly. Sources should be developed depending on the timeframe available; it can take many months and even years to build up a relationship with and access to an agent, and consideration should be given to resource allocation versus gain. A liaison officer from the relevant national agency is likely to be deployed to facilitate coordination between military and civilian activities. Field HUMINT Teams (FHT), if deployed, and some other similar collection agencies may require operational support in the form of force protection, and the resultant requirement should be considered when planning collection tasks. Once a successful working relationship has been established between the FHT and those assigned to support it, commanders should give consideration to making such arrangements as permanent as the situation allows. Continuity, in this context, will serve to act as a force multiplier. There will be some constraints on access to and releasability of HUMINT. The Protective Marking of the resultant product should be clearly stated in the original collection requirement in order that intelligence staffs can 'Write for Release'[2] at the outset.

> There are areas that do need resourcing; HUMINT (and I am not speaking here about a Brit in a dishdash smoking a fag on a street corner, but a proper HUMINT-trained operative and agent handler deployed forward). Currently our HUMINT world thinks that this is merely a liaison function, but it is not. The other strand of targeting is EW (Electronic Warfare) and SIGINT (Signals Intelligence). The difference between not having these and having them is the difference between conducting an intelligence-led operation or an advance to ambush.
>
> CO Inf Bn – Afghanistan - 2009

- **Signals Intelligence.** Traditionally strategic in outlook, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) can be tasked to operate at the tactical level and the resultant intelligence either used to cue other assets or action, or analysed as another form of HUMINT (i.e. analysed as a conversation between two or more people and the usual consideration of their relationship, motivations, etc applied). SIGINT could be the primary source of intelligence in areas under insurgent control, but will be limited by the sophistication of the local communications infrastructure and insurgent OPSEC. Recent experience shows that insurgents may well use this means for deception. Electronic Warfare assets can deliver a similar capability (in addition to an offensive capability) and their employment should be coordinated with SIGINT tasking. A Government Communications Officer is likely to be deployed and will advise on SIGINT capability and keep his national headquarters informed of requirements. There will be constraints on access to and releasability of this form of intelligence, but Write for Release also applies here.

- **Open Source Intelligence**. Open Source Intelligence **(**OSINT) is often overlooked, but is very useful for contributing to an understanding of the contemporary operating environment, public attitudes and public support as well as determining the effectiveness of Information Operations. All levels of command should monitor their local media and there should be a formal

[2] Write for Release is being cognisant of who the audience is and writing the product at a classification that can be release to that audience.

relationship established between Media Operations and intelligence staffs. Analysis in journals and academic papers are also a valuable source of information.

- **Imagery Intelligence.** Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) can be delivered by tactical, operational (theatre) and strategic collection assets and has proven on operations in Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan to be a valuable force multiplier. Its use ranges from general area surveillance to contribute to an understanding of the operational theatre and for force protection, to the production of target packs in preparation for specific operations to cueing action against specific targets. It requires, however, a sophisticated CIS architecture in order that it is accurate and timely. A liaison officer from the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (JARIC) may be forward-based with the intelligence staff, which will facilitate access and tasking. Similarly, a liaison officer from tactical IMINT units should be made available. There may be some restrictions on access and releasability on some of the products, but this can be mitigated by stating the required Protective Marking of the product from the outset.

- **Geospatial Intelligence.** Geospatial Intelligence **(**GEOINT) exploits and analyses imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities. GEOINT units will be important early in a campaign for the generation of accurate mapping and may also be able to provide sophisticated briefing products. GEOINT can be used in a very similar manner to IMINT and may also require specialist CIS support. The interface for this support will be provided by Engineer Intelligence staff who should be available to advise on capabilities and to ensure the timely delivery of GEOINT product.

- **Measurement and Signatures Intelligence.** Measurement and Signatures Intelligence **(**MASINT) sensors can provide remote monitoring of avenues of approach or border regions and can contribute to targeting. This can be tasked through the JARIC LO.

- **Technical Intelligence.** Technical Intelligence **(**TECHINT) on insurgent equipment can contribute to an assessment of insurgent capabilities. This will primarily be provided by the Weapons Intelligence unit that will exploit captured weapons and explosive devices and post-incident fragments. Additional support can be provided by reachback to DIS and through deployed Scientific Advisors (SCIAD).

- **Target Exploitation and Document Exploitation.** Target Exploitation and Document Exploitation is a developing area. The rapid exploitation of any items collected during an operation is likely to lead to further operational activity through contributing to the common intelligence picture, the collection plan or the Find function. Exploitation may include forensic exploitation where such a capability exists. Captured equipment and documents need to be handled appropriately, labelled and tracked accurately and exploited quickly. All soldiers conducting operations should be aware of the value of post operation exploitation and be trained in what top look for and in how to handle captured equipment and documents.

5-23. In the F3EA cycle the collection plan will service the find function. Subsequently, Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets may also assist in the fix function. A standard target pack format should be

agreed with legal staff and adhered to at all levels. The commander will direct the desired effect to the finish function, again contributed to by ISTAR assets, which could include a kinetic operation (kill or capture) or influence activity.

5-24. The finish function will result in further exploitation; either along the lines of tactical questioning and document exploitation as already mentioned, and/or by monitoring the effect of the operation and exploiting any further opportunities this presents. Regarding the former, systematic secondary exploitation and analysis underpins the whole process. For the latter, the intelligence staff should have assessed the likely effect on the insurgents and the environment that the finish function will have prior to the operation, and it is important to monitor the actual effect of any action and exploit opportunities to further influence reactions to it. The effectiveness of a particular operation (and its component parts) should be measured to contribute to the common intelligence picture, as well as to inform campaign progress.

5-25. The exploit and analyse functions in the F3EA cycle are dynamic activities that will be conducted continuously. This will be the primary effort of the intelligence staffs. Throughout the staff battle-rhythm and the F3EA cycle, timely dissemination of intelligence and intelligence products will be essential in order to maintain the common intelligence picture and to generate successful operations. Intelligence staffs should continuously ask 'who might need this intelligence and how can it best be disseminated?' Constraints imposed upon the intelligence staffs (from, for example, inadequate CIS or rules of release) and the need to find appropriate methods to disseminate fused intelligence may often require lateral, proactive thinking and positive action to overcome. Where possible there should be intelligence 'push' rather than 'pull' to ensure that products get to those conducting operations in a timely manner. This necessitates the analyst understanding the mission of all units and being able to judge who needs which product. 'Pull' is a passive form of dissemination whereby products are available by request, or are published centrally and the onus is on units to search for them and this may be appropriate for routine, lower-level reports. Finished products, within the constraints of security and classification, should be widely advertised.

SECTION 5 - THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF

5-26. The intelligence staff are at the heart of the formation's ISTAR organisation. The ISTAR cell should be a stand alone organisation at the hub of the headquarters. This does not mean divorcing ISTAR from fires, influence or J5 but rather placing it centrally within the formation headquarters so it is better able to support all. ISTAR will be central to the understand function supporting the commander, J3, J5, Influence and Fires. With ISTAR as a stand alone function there is a requirement for a Chief ISTAR who is the direct interface with the commander and is his principal advisor on ISTAR matters. He is responsible for briefing the commander and staff and provides the overall assessment of all activity. An example of a brigade ISTAR construct is shown in Chapter 7.

> Our intelligence efforts were but a cottage industry compared to the American fusion machine and use of databases. When we compare what we had in Iraq with what we had in Northern Ireland, we could see what we were lacking. We need to deploy on campaigns with a database that will allow us to fuse, analyse and exploit intelligence and historical data in order to act as a tool for commanders, rather than as merely a TOP SECRET filing cabinet. Divisional COS- Iraq 2008

5-27. Intelligence staffs should not be isolated from the remainder of the headquarters, but should be integrated with the operations and plans staffs in particular, and there should be formal relationships established in the staff battle-rhythm to bring intelligence staff together with those conducting influence activity such as CIMIC and Security Sector Reform (SSR). Key Leader Engagement (KLE) is an important element of effective counterinsurgency operations and the intelligence staff should contribute to and feed off this process alongside the lead staff branch[3].

5-28. The hierarchy and reporting responsibilities of each intelligence cell should be clearly defined, and direction given to non-traditional collectors. Likewise, clear definition of responsibilities for understanding and monitoring host nation forces is required. SSR needs to address the host nation's intelligence function. Staff involved in SSR should establish close liaison with the UK intelligence community as it will both inform the coalition intelligence effort and support the host nation's forces.

5-29. It takes time to build up an effective intelligence organisation, and on initial deployment there may be a requirement to conduct operations in order to generate intelligence. Initial, and certainly pre-deployment intelligence will come from national intelligence agencies, any relevant international intelligence agencies, academia (such as RUSI) and open sources such as travel anthologies, media reports and histories. Use should be made of the Prince Consort's Library in Aldershot, the Defence Academy Library at Shrivenham and other academic centres. As the operation progresses, however, the balance will shift and the majority of intelligence will come from the tactical level, regardless of how it is collected. If deploying on an enduring campaign, the best source of intelligence is the current in-theatre unit and interaction should be followed in line with the relevant HQ LF Mounting Instruction. Consideration should be given to off-setting the deployment cycle of intelligence staffs in order to provide some continuity for incoming staffs and units. ISTAR assets and those trained in analysing their product should be deployed as early as possible.

5-30. All units are simultaneously intelligence producers and consumers, and combined with the likelihood that the insurgency will be many sided in nature; this means that, once established, the intelligence flow in counterinsurgency operations is more bottom-up than top-down. Integrating strategic assets with the correct level of connectivity at the appropriate level of command, while ensuring that the overall collection plan remains synchronised, will facilitate timely and accurate operations. Due to the increased workload this will engender at the tactical level consideration should be given to augmenting intelligence staff. This will enhance collection, analysis and, particularly, their processing and dissemination capability, whether routinely or in support of a specific operational strand. It is essential that an appropriate calibre of soldier is allocated to the intelligence cell at the tactical level – it will pay dividends.

5-31. The intelligence architecture will vary according to the operational requirement, but should remain flexible as operations progress in order to realign with the commander's Main Effort. The need to maintain a common intelligence picture is important (based upon the IPE), and a robust Information Exchange

[3] Continuity of KLE – commanders (naturally) tend to speak to the people they get on with. In a tribal society that means that often Britain is seen to be inconsistent in who it deals with and that can unintentionally play to centuries old tribal rivalries. This reinforces the requirement for intelligence staffs to support KLE.

Requirement (IER) has to be developed early in order that CIS staffs can plan and deliver the CIS to ensure interoperability and accessibility at all levels. Personnel will also be required to maintain the common intelligence picture's integrity – the use of standard databases and effective database management are essential in achieving this. The importance of accurate, authoritative and timely intelligence reports drawn from all of the available intelligence demands rigorous information management, supported by the requisite CIS. The responsibility for developing an information management plan does not singularly rest with the intelligence staff, but they provide an important contribution to this process. The requirement for interoperability, accessibility and robust information management cannot be overstated – without them, the intelligence will fail.

5-32. Fragmenting the intelligence effort, operating separate compartments and providing too many caveats for intelligence should be avoided. While there may be a requirement to establish an Operational Intelligence Support Group (OISG), or similar, where higher level classification and UK Eyes Only intelligence can be received and analysed, it should not work in isolation, and every effort should be made to develop products that are useable at the tactical level, and are releasable to coalition partners and host nation forces. In order to service long-term planning requirements, if a reachback capability does not exist or cannot be provided, there is merit in designating a group of analysts to perform this activity who are insulated from the short-term demands of current operations and day-to-day intelligence demands. A primary function should be to contribute to and monitor the common intelligence picture. Regular liaison between all intelligence organisations should be conducted as part of the staff battle-rhythm. The frequency of such liaison should reflect the tempo of operations in order that intelligence is delivered as demanded by the F3EA process. It is important that the intelligence staffs maintain an understanding of operations and are accessible.

SECTION 6 - CONSTRAINTS

5-33. The caveats and level of protective marking required for some intelligence products will be a significant constraint to intelligence sharing with both allies and our own tactical level troops. However, as highlighted several times in this Chapter, intelligence staffs can, and should, request that the originators of such intelligence reports sanitise and downgrade the report so that it is releasable. Establishing an authorised and timely process to achieve this early on in a campaign will pay dividends. Intelligence staffs should also be trained to Write for Release, and when writing should bear in mind who their target audience is. This is important in maintaining the integrity of a common intelligence picture. Other nations are also likely to have access to their own national intelligence and should be encouraged to do likewise.

> The development of the Basra Fusion Cell was a significant step in setting up Joint intelligence-sharing and targeting with the Iraqi Security Forces. This gave us the opportunity to merge our target lists, so that we were pursuing a common goal. The big issue lay with releasability of information; because the Iraqi intelligence system was quite sharp, the ludicrously woolly intelligence that we were cleared to share (along the lines of "there are bad people in Basra") was an embarrassment. To gain credibility and trust, we must give them information that is actionable; this must be part of the deal – the Iraqis are in control and we must begin to show more trust and confidence in them.
>
> Brigade COS – Iraq 2007

5-34. CIS is likely to be a constraint, both in terms of availability and interoperability, particularly in relation to the dissemination of ISTAR product. Defining a realistic IER in conjunction with the CIS staff is important. Storage capacity is also likely to become limited over time, again reflecting the importance of effective Information Management. There is a requirement for an early deployable database which will capture and record all data surrounding the insurgency.

5-35. Restrictions on freedom of manoeuvre and adhering to host nation regulations may constrain some forms of intelligence collection, and consideration should be given to this when generating the collection plan. Likewise, depending on the operational environment, surveillance and covert HUMINT may be limited by the ability to blend in. The preservation of evidence may be a limiting factor in the planning of any operations. Alternatively, legal, moral and security aspects of using intelligence from a host nation and other states may be an issue, for example when torture of detainees is suspected. Constraints or freedoms imposed on other members of the counterinsurgency forces should be understood and used to best advantage in intelligence collection.

5-36. Linguists are likely to be in short supply at the start of a campaign and the requirement has to be determined as soon as possible. It will take time to train linguists in the specific language or dialect required which may lead to enforced reliance on interpreters which has an inherent security risk.

5-37. If the operation is to be conducted in a state that does not use the English alphabet, transliteration of people and place names is likely to result in a number of different spellings for the same person or place which will degrade the accuracy of the intelligence. Consideration should be given to setting a standard for such spellings to avoid confusion and prevent circular reporting. Ideally this should be adhered to by all personnel involved in the operation, all units in theatre including foreign forces and all personnel supporting the operation in the UK. Use of a spot map system or using English names on routes and certain locations may also assist, but OPSEC should be applied and patterns for their use should be avoided.

SECTION 7 - COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

5-38. Counter intelligence (CI) is an important function in counterinsurgency operations because the threat will be more pervasive, and potentially more opaque, than on conventional operations. CI and security measures should, therefore, be seen as enabling operations through the contribution to OPSEC and force protection. The insurgent will be able to infiltrate host nation organisations and security forces, intimidate potential sources and feed deceptive information, use civilians locally employed by counterinsurgency forces (including third country nationals) and employ women and children in intelligence gathering roles. The insurgent will have his own form of collection plan, and is likely to pursue it aggressively.

5-39. The intelligence staffs should also be engaged in providing Security Intelligence (SI) to support the development of appropriate protective countermeasures and contribute to force protection. This should also be conducted in the pre-deployment and recovery phases of an operation. Security Risk Management (SRM) is a commander's responsibility, fed by the threat assessment produced by the intelligence and security staffs. Security staffs should also be included in the planning of significant building works to advise on any security requirements at the early stages based on a current threat assessment.

5-40. Depending on the collection capability of the insurgency, a counter-ISTAR plan may be required. This could include thorough record-keeping and screening of personnel, the use of biometrics to screen locally employed civilians and host nation forces and robust protection of information (such as through defensive communications monitoring and strict rules on the use of unprotected communications). The proliferation of personal mobile telephones and internet access should be considered a serious threat and should be mitigated against accordingly. Insurgents may also exploit information from these sources at home, and rear parties and families should be considered and included in any CI plan.

5-41. CI Staff can also conduct Security IPE (SIPE)[4], a tool to allow the systematic, continuous analysis of the threat and the local environment in order to contribute to the achievement of the 'security condition' throughout the respective area of operation. This should be integrated into both IPE and the commander's planning.

CONCLUSION

5-42. In counterinsurgency operations it is essential that the intelligence and counter intelligence effort is harnessed, prioritised and targeted by the commander. It should be recognised that a significant majority of intelligence will be generated at the tactical level, and tactical intelligence staff should be resourced accordingly. 'Normality' should provide a baseline as soon as possible in order to better analyse the intelligence against a clear understanding of the operational environment. Time needs to be allowed for intelligence strands to develop, and these strands honed to deliver actionable intelligence. Cultural intelligence is as important as intelligence about the insurgent, and intelligence staffs should also advise the commander on the likely impact of counterinsurgent force action on the populace as well as the insurgent. Indigenous security forces, local militias and criminal networks should also be routinely monitored and should not be overlooked in pursuit of identifying purely insurgent targets. Intelligence staff should not work in isolation, but should be incorporated into the wider operations and plans staff, and intelligence should be the principal enabler in effects-based targeting. Likewise, intelligence in compartments should be avoided where possible, and intelligence reports should have suitable caveats to permit maximum distribution and therefore use. The spectrum of threats is greater in counterinsurgency operations and requires a pragmatic and command-led SRM in order to prevent it becoming hindered by traditional constraints. A robust counter intelligence plan will protect freedom of manoeuvre. There will be much to achieve and insufficient intelligence resources to do everything; the commander's direction will be crucial to success.

[4] SIPE is an analysis of the environment from an enemy's perspective.

CHAPTER 6

INFLUENCE ACTIVITY

SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION

> 'We are in a battle and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle for the hearts and minds of our Umma'.
>
> Ayman al Zawahri to Abu al Zarqawi, 2005.

> 'The information environment is just as much a part of the battlespace as the physical environment, and commanders at all levels must plan to operate in both environments simultaneously'.
>
> Lt General Odierno Commander Multi-national Corps Iraq, Nov 2007.

6-1. **The Psychological Dimension.** The importance of the psychological dimension and the related information environment has not been lost on commanders or their opponents. Nevertheless, the ability to deliver non-kinetic effects has often been hampered by deficiencies in understanding, expertise and training. Chapter 1 introduced the relationship between the physical and the psychological dimensions of counterinsurgency, the concept of influence activities (the combined actions of information operations, media operations and CIMIC) and the importance of a strategic narrative in shaping the perceptions of international, home and indigenous audiences. Tactical influence activities need to be command-led and part of the core staff's responsibility. Influence Activity is the business of all ranks from the private soldier to the general. This Chapter focuses on:

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- Outlining a framework to guide commanders in the application of influence activities during counterinsurgency.
- Describing the contribution of the different elements of influence activities.
- Defining the tools and techniques of information operations.
- Providing practical advice to commanders and staff on organisation, planning and delivering influence activities at both formation and unit level.

- Providing a framework for counter influence – combating the insurgent's narrative and propaganda.

6-2. **Insights from Operations**. Much of the detail that follows is a result of experience and the evolution of concepts 'in contact' on recent operations. The catalyst has been an increasing awareness of the central part that non-kinetic options have to play in counterinsurgency operations and the need to mitigate the unwanted effects of kinetic actions. The ability to actually deliver these non-kinetic effects has been assessed to be a key weakness by operational brigade commanders. Not normally configured to deliver non-kinetic effects, commanders have had to reorganise their headquarters both physically and conceptually to deliver influence activities. Cultural knowledge of the affected society is a prerequisite for influence activity and requires investment in time and expertise. Some of this expertise will come from command led preparation of units within the brigade, and some from civilian experts and advisors. This Chapter aims to capture best practice and guide future commanders and staff in how to deliver influence activity at the tactical level.

SECTION 2 - INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

> 'Traditionally in the course of conventional operations we use information operations to explain what we are doing, but in COIN we should design operations to enact our influence campaign.'
>
> David Kilcullen
> Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General Petraeus in Iraq.

6-3. **Influence Activities in the Context of a Counterinsurgency Framework.** The construct 'Shape-Secure-Develop' is introduced in Chapter 4 as the framework for operations in which a commander should design his tactical concepts. They need not be sequential:

- **Shape**. Taking account of cultural norms, tactical commanders will aim to influence the way local leaders behave through Key Leader Engagement (KLE). KLE needs to be linked to tactical objectives and synchronised with similar activities conducted by civilian partners, and provides the principal means of informing a sceptical population, promoting the indigenous government's plans and setting the conditions for both tactical framework and strike operations.

- **Secure**. Security has both physical and psychological dimensions. The local population needs to be reassured that they will be free from intimidation. In this battle of ideas, the insurgent's propaganda needs to be countered and the potential second-order effects of our tactical activity examined critically. For example, when kinetic activity is likely to achieve the right effect on the insurgent, but will undoubtedly alienate the people; a close judgement call is required. The basic tactical activity which can be applied to an area under insurgent control is *Clear-Hold-Build.*

    - **Clear**. During the Clear stage, PSYOPS will be used to isolate the insurgent and try to win over the neutral majority or at least prevent alienation. For the sub-unit commander there is a need to explain to a confused and vulnerable population why operations are being conducted, what the population should do during such operations and

what will take place after the operations. These activities are often called ‘shaping’ and take the form of a ‘non-kinetic follow-up’ that strengthens the message that military action is a precondition to development and consequent benefits.

- **Hold.** Hold requires not only the physical act of dominating terrain and controlling the population but the constant struggle to retain their support. Measures to control the population, possibly by restrictive practices such as barriers and curfews, need to be explained. Ideally this should be carried out through credible local voices and the psychological impact of such measures carefully monitored.

- **Build.** During the Build phase the population’s expectations will need to be managed through KLE and wider communication. Establishing district radio, run by local people and resourced by the counterinsurgency force, is an effective way of keeping the population informed and gaining vital feedback. While messaging needs to be optimistic in tone it must match visible enhancements to local life that might include the restoration of essential services. Any mismatch between the ‘word’ and ‘deed’ would ultimately be self defeating and exploited quickly by the insurgent’s propaganda.

- **Develop**. While *Develop* within the operational construct implies economic and political development over the long term, the tactical commander will need to ensure his *Build* activities nest within higher level inter-agency development plans. The Commander will have a role in publicising wider development plans through his tactical CIMIC and information operations that are aimed primarily at maintaining consent.

6-4. **Elements of Influence Activities**. Within formation headquarters, and at unit level, dedicated staff officers are required to support commanders and principal staff officers in balancing kinetic and non-kinetic activity to achieve desired effects on the insurgent, the affected population and, indirectly, wider audiences. Tactical influence activities, essentially the non-kinetic side of operations, must sit within civilian-led activity that focuses on longer term economic and political development. At the tactical level this demands close cooperation and mutual understanding between civilian and military components. When the UK civilian component cannot deploy because of the security situation, military teams will have to carry out the initial work to set the conditions for reconstruction and development. The capability of tactical formations to assist the civilian component is called ‘Military Assistance to Civil Effect’ and is delivered by elements of the Joint Stabilisation Group. CIMIC, Media Operations, Information Operations and OPSEC are coordinating operations under the control of the Influence Activities staff (commonly called Operations Support) or at the tactical level directly to the formation chief of staff:

- **Information Operations**. Information Operations is the current term for a number of tools and techniques delivering influence effects, and is a means to coordinate their use within the commander’s plan. These tools and techniques include PSYOPS, electronic warfare, presence posture profile, computer network operations, deception, physical destruction, information security, KLE and the handling of visitors. At formation level these various elements of information operations are coordinated by the Chief of Staff using dedicated staff officers. At battlegroup level, the commander should focus on KLE and the use of tactical PSYOPS to influence the local population and affect the will and understanding of the insurgent. It is critical that the

messages flowing from the information strategy[1] are both consistent and appropriate for local conditions.

- **Civil-Military Cooperation**[2]. CIMIC is a military activity supported by a dedicated staff, which interfaces with civilian actors, whether indigenous or international, and is often part of the PRT. Tactical CIMIC staff and operators will identify consent winning projects and assess civilian needs. CIMIC operators deploy forward as key members of Development and Influence Teams (DIT - covered at Para 6-20) and similar bespoke groupings of military and civilian experts working closely with the chief military engineer.

- **Media**[3]. Media operations are an essential part of any commander's ability to understand and influence local, regional and wider audiences. They must be coordinated and synchronised with other aspects of influence activity and not be viewed as exclusively public relations; in counterinsurgency they have a wider role and utility. Media operations must also be coordinated with indigenous forces and government officials to ensure a coherent message and help build a local capacity to communicate with the population that will undoubtedly be a civilian lead[4]. The ability to counter adversary propaganda requires a coordinated effort between information and media operations at all levels. Tactical commanders need to understand and use indigenous media, regardless of how underdeveloped, to connect with the local population directly using military PSYOPS capability or indirectly through existing local media. Local media, once cultivated, also provides an insight into local mindsets and motives. Developing the local capacity to deliver messages with an indigenous 'face and voice' enhances credibility and will be an area of in-country cross government department action. The protection of local media from targeting by the insurgents may be a tactical responsibility.

- **Operational Security.** OPSEC is a core consideration for the commander in order to protect his critical information, the loss of which would potentially unhinge the operation. OPSEC is defensive information operations, and is linked to deception, EW and counter ISTAR as passive and active measures to undermine the opposition's attempts to understand the plan. While information operations staff provide the expertise, this is primarily a J2, J3 and J5 responsibility. More detail may be found in OPSEC policy and doctrine[5].

- **Interaction of Information Operations and Media Operations.** Media operations has an influence on adversaries, allies and neutrals. It is therefore essential that media operations staff and information operations staff at formation level work closely together to ensure that the right message is put across to the right audiences. A key difference between the two is that while

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[1] This is likely to be the UK cross government department Information Strategy and further MOD guidance. This material will be re-issued at the operational level as part of an OPORD and OPLAN that will include messages and themes from the military coalition.

[2] MC 411/1 NATO Military Policy on CIMIC - The coordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the [NATO] Commander and civil populations, including national and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.

[3] JDP 0-01.1- That line of activity developed to ensure timely, accurate and effective provision of Public Information and implementation of Public Relations policy within the operational environment, whilst maintaining Operational Security.

[4] This is part of capacity building and will have a UK civilian lead although the military may help build an interim media capability for the locals.

[5] Policy: DCDS(C)/DTIO/OPSEC dated 25 Jan 06. Doctrine: JDP 3-80.1.

media operations cannot control a message once it is in the hands of the media, information operations will attempt to control a message at all stages of its delivery to the target audiences. Information operations will on occasions require an aggressive and manipulative approach to delivering messages (usually through the PSYOPS tool). This is essential in order to attack, undermine and defeat the will, understanding and capability of insurgents. When this is the information operations focus, great care must be taken to maintain the integrity and credibility of the media operations organisation. At other times, the activities conducted by formation information operations cells will require more delicate approaches to influencing target audiences in different ways, such as through neutral or uncommitted groups (third parties). When this is so, the interaction and overlap of media and information operations can be significant, but complex. To avoid giving the impression that the media are being manipulated in any way, which would undermine media operations activity, a distinction must be maintained between the two. Essentially, they must remain separate but closely related activities. For example the information operations officer cannot be double-hatted as the media operations officer/spokesman. However, they both serve the commander in his attempt to dominate the information and cognitive domain by being proactive and staying 'on message'. The headquarters layout needs to reflect this rather complicated arrangement and encourage close cooperation.

6-5. **Tools and Techniques**. Information operations is a coordinating function that requires dedicated and trained staff (usually an SO2 at brigade level on operations, sometimes an SO1) with a wider appreciation of media and CIMIC activities. The tools and techniques of information operations are:

- **Deception**. The primary aim of deception is to mislead the adversary, guard our real intentions and thus persuade him to adopt a disadvantageous course of action. Deception has great utility in tactical counterinsurgency operations and requires effective OPSEC in order to succeed.

- **Psychological Operations**. PSYOPS is a tool or capability that requires trained personnel and a means to deliver the message for information operations; which is primarily a coordinating staff function. Traditionally PSYOPS are conducted within the joint area of operations and have focused on the enemy. However, current operations are complex and the information environment is global and interconnected, so intended and unintended audiences are now broader. Even when operating at the tactical level, these considerations are relevant. When operating within a US-led coalition, UK tactical commanders will gain access to the considerable US PSYOPS capability. The primary purpose of PSYOPS within counterinsurgency is to influence the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of selected individuals and groups particularly at the local level. It is therefore an important tool for the tactical commander. PSYOPS will invariably use truthful and/or legitimate information to establish credibility in the mind of the audience. Effective PSYOPS requires timely provision of resources (linguistic support, graphics and print capability, broadcasting capability and other delivery mechanisms). Message presentation should be shaped by the local information environment and include print, radio, TV, handbills, posters, loudspeakers, face to face contact, the internet, faxes, pagers and mobile phones. It should be remembered that PSYOPS products require release authority from formation

commanders, having first consulted the legal advisor, political advisor, cultural adviser and senior civilian component representatives.

- **Presence, Profile and Posture.** The presence, profile, and posture of commanders and troops in contact with a local populace will send a specific message that will either undermine or engender support, and this requires cultural understanding and situational awareness. Within the context of counterinsurgency, 'presence' is necessary in order to protect the population and provide reassurance to enable normal life to resume. Moreover, in counterinsurgency it is only by close contact with the population over time that it is possible to gauge the local 'atmospherics' and build trust. The reputation of the military force is important in gaining popular support and this will rest on being successful against the insurgent, making good on promises and understanding how UK forces are perceived by the locals. Posture and profile reinforce the image given; how visible the force is and how it carries itself. Commanders must understand that perceptions as well as reality count in building trust with a population and a coalition.

- **Key Leader Engagement**. KLE is an area where commanders have an opportunity to change the behaviour of those with the greatest influence over the population; unless they are careful they may also, unknowingly, send the wrong message. Key leaders can be swayed by a range of diplomatic, military, economic and other officials. Whilst all should aim towards a common end state, the reasons for engagement may differ. Coherence in terms of the overall message is therefore essential. Influence activity staff (usually an SO3 Information Operations) coordinate KLE for the commander at formation level, and similar arrangements are required at battlegroup level to ensure that occasions are neither wasted, nor excessive, that protocols are not compromised, and that there is coherence and consistency in messages. The divisional commander will need to engage top tier opinion makers within his area of operations because status, in many societies, is important in such meetings. KLE is a process and a skill that requires dedicated staff support, procedures and preparation. Cultural understanding will set the scene for the engagement; western norms will not necessarily be acceptable to the local population. Location, participation and other protocols must be carefully considered and planned.

- **Electronic Warfare**. Understanding of the insurgent is enhanced by Electronic Warfare Support Measures[6] generated intelligence. EW may also create favourable conditions for aspects of deception (e.g. false transmissions). Electronic Counter Measures can jam an adversary's electronic surveillance assets at crucial moments and deceive and inform/engage the insurgent.

- **Computer Network Operations**. Computer Network Operations (CNO) comprise computer network attack, computer network exploitation and computer network defence. CNO seek to gain access to computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy their capability. Although CNO remain at the strategic level (due to their sensitivity and reliance on other agencies),

[6] *That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to search for, intercept and identify electromagnetic emissions and to locate their sources for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. It provides a source of information required for immediate decisions involving electronic countermeasures, electronic protective measures and other tactical actions*. JDP 0-01.1

desired CNO outcomes may be in support of operational and tactical activity and the products can be accessed through Targeting and Information Operations in the MOD. Success in CNO is directly proportional to the enemy's dependence on such systems. Commanders need to understand CNO and its potential to support their operations.

- **Physical Destruction**. The direct application of force through physical destruction has significant psychological impact. Carefully applied force can play a major role in persuasion, coercion and deterrence and in reducing an insurgent's ability to exercise command. However, undue collateral damage and unnecessary casualties will have an adverse effect on public support. If physical destruction is required to achieve the desired effect, the commander must consider and balance the potential negative impact it may cause against the expected benefits. Influence activity priorities should be considered when compiling prohibited/restricted target lists. The elements of Influence Activity are illustrated in Figure 6.1 below:




Figure 6-1 - Elements of Influence Activity

SECTION 3 – MANNING, STAFF PROCESSES AND PLANNING

ORGANISATION

6-6. Given the complexity of counterinsurgency, organisational enhancements may be required within battlegroup and brigade headquarters in order to improve the coordination and delivery of influence activity. Staff processes and planning considerations may have to be amended to take into account the change in orientation from an exclusively enemy focussed process to one targeted at the perceptions of the local population.

MANNING

6-7. **Manning**. On recent operations deployable headquarters have been reinforced with staff to support the planning and execution of influence activities. Regardless of such augmentation, re-rolling and dual rolling some personnel may be necessary within headquarters and units. An example of manning used to support key influence activity at divisional level on recent operations is at Annex A; it combines core staff and individual augmentees. The early integration, personal preparation and training of all influence activity staff are critical in the build up towards pre-deployment training. Such training and preparation must take account of how influence activity will be coordinated with the civilian component (such as a Provincial Reconstruction Team), the indigenous security forces and local governance.

6-8. **Formation Level Structures**. Counterinsurgency requires a mindset that has influence and perception management at its core. This is command-led business that needs to be understood at all levels and by all staff, assisted by dedicated experts. Conventional brigades and units are not optimised to deliver influence and need augmentation by established CIMIC, PSYOPS and media operations staff as well as staff both re-roled and dual-roled at unit level (see Annex B). Existing key staff and augmented political, cultural and stabilisation advisors will need to understand how counterinsurgency and influence is prosecuted and how staff processes are refined to deliver the necessary balance of kinetic and non-kinetic effects. Reach-out to coalition information operations capabilities and reach-back to the UK human factors experts through PJHQ are an essential part of the wider network.

6-9. **Battlegroup Structures**. Battlegroups require modified structures to take account of influence activity as the diagram in Appendix 1 to Annex B shows. An officer should be identified to provide influence effects on behalf of his commanding officer. There are a number of options that include using the battery commander, as he provides fires coordination or the battlegroup engineer with his CIMIC linkage. A better option would be a dedicated battlegroup influence activities officer. Sub units will need to generate their own non-kinetic effects teams, which provide a basic, front line CIMIC and PSYOPS capability. The role of the battlegroup influence activity officer and his small team is to:

- Compile influence activity reports and returns.
- Request resources such as leaflet drops.
- Help craft messages for the PSYOPS ‘Radio in a Box’.
- Identify consent winning materiel and coordinate it with CIMIC activity and messaging (with media operations).

- Synchronise all influence activity with fires and manoeuvre on behalf of the battlegroup commander.

STAFF PROCESSES

6-10. **Staff Processes/Boards**. Influence activities should be an integrated part of the targeting planning cycle and battle rhythm. Targeting is defined as the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of requirements and capabilities. A target is an area, structure, object, person, organisation, mindset, thought process, attitude or behavioural pattern which can be suitably and effectively influenced by a capability. A shaping process can be any means, physical, cognitive or electronic, by which an effect can be realised. Influence activity develops its own targets which must then be included in the targeting process.

6-11. **The Target Audience**. Accurate identification and definition of the target audience is at the core of influence activity. The target audience may be an individual, an organisation or a section of society. The objective is to modify or reinforce the opinion, position or prejudice of the group; activities that requires in-depth knowledge of the target audience. It is essential to identify the way that that the target audience will be influenced; this may require an indirect approach, influencing other audiences or decision makers, who will in turn influence the original target audience, thus achieving the required objective. For example, in complex social environments, locally elected or appointed officials may not have any real influence compared to tribal, religious or even criminal leaders. Without a detailed knowledge of the potential target audience, the delivery of themes, messages and effective targeting of other influence activity activities will most likely fail.

6-12. **Target Audience Analysis**. A vital element to achieving a better grasp of the social environment is target audience analysis; 'the systematic study of the population and environment of a target audience to enhance understanding of a military psychological environment[7]'. On operations this is principally the task of the PSYOPS support element staff (See Paragraph 6-20) and evolves from the basic psychological study for the area of operations. Target audience analysis is a continuous process conducted on groups and individuals, with priorities informed by mission needs. Information operations staff working with PSYOPS personnel will produce a table that gives the target audience, the effect required and a means of measuring it in support of the J3/5 plan. The PSYOPS support element has a reach-back capability to both HQ 15 (UK) PSYOPS Gp[8] (who also create basic target audience analysis packages for unit and brigade J2 personnel) with higher level support from the human factors element of targeting and information operations. Target Audience Analysis is both time intensive and dependent on the availability of research material and the degree of profiling required, with products taking from a few hours up to three months to generate.

6-13. **Decision Makers**[9]. Decision makers, as a target audience, are central to the targeting process for both kinetic and non-kinetic influence activity. A decision maker's effectiveness is a function of will, understanding and capability. In other

[7] JWP 3-80.1.

[8] 15 (UK) PSYOPS Gp is responsible for the administration, training and readiness of PSYOPS personnel. It is a Land unit under the administrative command of 1 Military Intelligence Bde.

[9] Decision-maker is used in its broadest sense throughout this document. They include political and other leaders and military commanders, influential individuals, military personnel, armed factions and specific population groups (e.g. ethnic, cultural, religious and political). They may be adversaries or other approved parties.

words, a decision maker must understand the situation and have both the will and capability to act. If any one of these elements is not in place, the decision maker's ability to function in the way he wishes will be diminished. The ability of other parties, including the adversary, to conduct similar influence activity on decision-makers must be considered.

6-14. **Influence Activity Coordination Board**. A coordination board is a desirable influence activity planning tool, but other options, such as inclusion within the targeting board, should be explored since headquarters battle rhythms may not be able to support an additional meeting. Its purpose is to ensure that influence activity is coherent and synchronised with other J3 activity. Membership is not fixed; the mission and the role of influence activity in accomplishing the commander's objectives will dictate its composition. Suggested attendance at brigade and battlegroup is at Annex C.

6-15. **Synchronisation Tools**. Influence activity activities must be synchronised with other battlespace measures in order to have sufficient time to contribute to the desired outcome. A useful tool is the Joint Action Synchronisation Matrix or a similar product that can be used at formation level.

6-16. **Measures of Effectiveness.** Within counterinsurgency, Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) are complicated and are often perception based. Influence activity objectives should be achievable and measurable; however some subjectivity may be required for MOE. For example, the extent to which popular support has been gained can be measured by the population's participation in local programmes to counter the insurgency, membership of locally-recruited civil security organisations, and willingness to provide usable information about insurgents.

PLANNING

6-17. **The Tactical Estimate (Six Steps).** Influence activity must be considered at every stage of the tactical estimate; it cannot be retrospectively applied. Within the context of all campaign themes, but particularly counterinsurgency, influence activity is core J2/3/5 business, with the commander taking the lead. All staff branches must be engaged from the outset through influence activity coordination boards (See Para 6-14).

6-18. **The Combat Estimate (7Qs).** The seven questions combat estimate is used primarily at unit and sometimes at formation level either to update an existing plan or for specific operations. This straightforward process can be easily adapted for counterinsurgency with the emphasis on creating the right blend of kinetic and non-kinetic effects. While there is no definitive way to incorporate influence into the estimate, influence activity staffs must be fully integrated into the thinking process through being a vital part of the commander's inner circle of advisors. They should conduct as much concurrent activity as possible in order to prepare the necessary products (particularly PSYOPS that have to be produced, tested and cleared for use). Before the estimate is conducted, influence activity staff need to conduct the time consuming task of gathering the relevant information on potential target audiences. When the formation headquarters has a PSYOPS support element they will contribute significantly to designing and delivering Influence products. Some of the influence considerations are at Annex D.

SECTION 4 - DELIVERING INFLUENCE AT FORMATION/UNIT LEVEL

6-19. **Context**. Counterinsurgency campaigns require endurance as they are conducted over protracted periods. The influence constructs that might be applicable at the outset of a campaign are unlikely to remain unchanged as the campaign progresses.

6-20. **Brigade Level**. A formation commander should ensure that he has both trained staff with which to plan and specialist personnel at all levels to execute influence activities. It is likely that the formation commander will be working closely with the civilian component, and may be subordinate to a senior UK official in theatre. Thus his influence activities will need to be nested within that of the civilian component; that will inevitably include experts from other government departments. The formation commander should consider such factors as continuity of knowledge of an AO, continuity of relationships in KLE and an individual battlegroup commander's temperament and character when assigning AOs. In addition to his headquarters staff he has a number of supporting key teams/elements as follows:

- **Media**. Media operations capability is provided by the Defence Media Operations Centre (DMOC) and augmentees. At the outset of an operation the required media operations assets at formation level will be determined by the estimate processes at MoD and PJHQ. One of the first components to deploy should usually be a Joint Media Operations Team (JMOT) from the DMOC. A JMOT is non-enduring and for planning purposes has 30 days endurance. When the JMOT withdraws, the handover to the enduring capability should be phased to accommodate the operational tempo. The enduring capability is provided by the Front Line Commands (FLC). However, the operational situation could dictate that the JMOT remains in theatre and receives augmentation. The team will provide a press information centre, a spokesman and a media analysis capability.

- **Combat Camera**. Combat camera teams are trained and employed to acquire, process, and transmit still and motion imagery in support of air, sea, and ground military operations. Combat Camera capability is provided by FLCs. Because images are vital in the battle for perceptions, the team is a critical asset for a formation commander.

- **PSYOPS Support Element**. The PSYOPS support element commander will normally be a major, who advises the commander on all PSYOPS matters. He works through the information operations or influence activity senior staff officer. The PSYOPS support element will usually hold the means to disseminate messages through print, radio, television and loudspeaker. In addition, tactical PSYOPS teams are generated within battlegroups. While these teams take their direction from the PSYOPS support element commander, they are directly subordinate to the battlegroup influence activity officer. The composition and key tasks of a PSYOPS support element are:
  - Officer commanding PSYOPS support element.
  - Intelligence support (including target audience analysis and product testing and evaluation) section.
  - Operations/plans section.

- Broadcast section with TV/video and radio production and transmission capability.
- Print section with design and production capability.
- Internet/text messaging capability.

- **Key Tasks**. The key tasks of a PSYOPS Support Element are in Table 6-1 below:

Key Tasks
Support the estimate process by providing PSYOPS analysis.
Integrate PSYOPS, as part of information operations, into planning and conduct of operations.
Conduct target audience analysis, testing and evaluation and assess MOE.
Develop PSYOPS programmes and products.
Support the PSYOPS approval process that includes clearance of all products with the LEGAD assisted by other experts.
Control product dissemination.
Direct and monitor tactical PSYOPS teams.

Table 6-1 – Key Tasks of a PSYOPS Support Element

- **Formation Level Development and Influence Teams (DIT)**. The DIT usually provides the formation commander with a multi-functional group that can deploy forward to co-ordinate development and focus influence activity in support of the mission. It is usually associated with restoring stability through engagement with local leaders, facilitating security and reconstruction & development projects in a non-kinetic follow-up to a specific operation (that might follow a clearance of a town of insurgents that requires immediate security from insurgent interference and consent winning activities). Consent winning activities include gifts, cash for work, reconstruction & development and compensation. The DIT should include experts from:
  - **CIMIC**. When the local government cannot provide for its people, suitable Quick Impact Projects (QIP)[10] and consent winning activities[11] projects should be identified to address the shortfall. CIMIC staff will co-ordinate delivery of military capability for civil effect and will also ensure that military-led projects complement any local government's longer term development plans and are de-conflicted from the activity of other agencies.
  - **Military Engineers**. While the DIT should not focus purely upon infrastructure projects, such projects do allow tangible improvements to be shown. Engineers should be used to assess the state of current infrastructure and identify potential new infrastructure projects. Use of military engineers on civilian construction projects to aid influence must be minimised and only used when the civilian capacity does not exist.

[10] QIPs are a DfID tools designed to deliver short term development in support of the local government. Funding is authorised by DfID or an executive body made up of the fund providers.
[11] Simple projects that gain the consent of the local populace can help to create a permissive environment in which MNF troops may operate. Consent winning activity enables the force to react quickly to address the population's immediate requirements. It is rarely a long term solution, and as such does not generally work towards mitigating their fundamental concerns.

- **PSYOPS**. The PSYOPS element of the team will start by collating target audience information gained from interviews, focus groups and local community meetings.
- **Intelligence**. The DIT requires a firm linkage to J2, both for targeting its actions and for exploitation of its HUMINT opportunities.
- **Interpreters**. Interpreters are an essential part of the DIT and should whenever possible be assigned to each DIT element.
- **Officer Commanding DIT**. The officer commanding the DIT conducts any local KLE, coordinates with the area or district battlegroup commander and reports to the formation headquarters.

6-21. **Battlegroup Level**. A Military Stabilisation Team (MST) is an evolution of the DIT concept and may be used to support key battlegroup level operations or phases of an enduring operation. Like a DIT, it incorporates a range of non kinetic capabilities, but groups them under a stabilisation advisor. The stabilisation advisor will usually be a DfID representative and bring with him his own expertise; although he may have less freedom of movement in a non-permissive environment. Therefore compared to the DIT, the MST operates within a wider civilian context. Though the MST has a command relationship with the battlegroup to which it is attached for protection and life support, it will also have reachback to the provincial reconstruction team for guidance. The MST concept has further evolved in Afghanistan into Military Stabilisation Support Teams (MSST) that are permanently assigned to districts and have their own dedicated civilian stabilisation advisors.

6-22. **Sub-unit Level**. It is at sub-unit level where continuity of relationships and knowledge is required, although seldom achieved. To ameliorate this, sub-units should be allocated an AO and remain in it for their tour. Potentially, the MST/MSST civilian elements should provide some longer term continuity and will support sub-unit influence activity. Experience has shown that dedicated teams are necessary for effective influence activity. Previously, this was confined to tactical PSYOPS teams, but these have now been expanded into non-kinetic effects teams and integrated into the battlegroup framework. Non-kinetic effects teams, commanded by a captain or warrant officer, provide:

- PSYOPS advice to sub-unit commanders.
- Face-to-face PSYOPS activity such as talking with the local population, loudspeaker broadcasts and handbill dissemination.
- Gathering and assessment of information on target audiences and the effectiveness of friendly PSYOPS activity.
- Feedback on local atmospherics.
- Small project management.
- A mechanism for dealing with compensation claims.

6-23. **Training**. Formations earmarked for counterinsurgency operations need to consider their influence activity organisation and its preparation well in advance of normal pre-deployment training. Suitable training scenarios and role playing are necessary to practice low level influence activity. Advice on pre-deployment training should be sought from the Influence Activity Branch of the Land Warfare Development Group.

SECTION 5 – COUNTER INFLUENCE

6-24. **Counter Influence**. The insurgent uses influence activity as the 'main effort' that aims to undermine the authority and credibility of the counterinsurgent's forces and narrative. In fact the insurgent uses 'armed propaganda' through 'the propaganda of the deed' to achieve effect at the strategic through to tactical levels. A subtle blend of force, through terror and intimidation, and messaging is used to undermine the counter insurgent's legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the people. The fact is that they do this well because they are unconstrained by the truth and process but also aided by an often austere information environment. Furthermore, insurgents destroy communications infrastructure to undermine our attempts to communicate with the population. However, while there will always be an asymmetry, commanders need to consider the ways and means to counter this malign influence or mitigate its effects. This is a challenging area and requires expert advice not normally found within a military headquarters, although PSYOPS practitioners will understand some of the methods available. Countering the effects of insurgent propaganda of the deed requires effort, resources and imagination coupled with vigour and must be viewed as a commander's priority. The first step is to understand how the insurgent uses information in an unconstrained manner to undermine our operations by dominating the information domain with propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, and opposing information.

- **Propaganda**. Propagandists seek to mix truth and lies in a way that listeners cannot detect. The insurgent's narrative is likely to be simple and one that resonates with the local's values and customs.

- **Misinformation**. Misinformation is incorrect information from any source that is released either for unknown reasons, or to solicit a response. Many of the insurgent's messages are incorrect as a result of their relatively underdeveloped C2. Misinformation is often best countered by either ignoring it altogether or disseminating the truth.

- **Disinformation**. Disinformation is information disseminated primarily by the insurgent to confuse our decision making and to intimidate. At the tactical level disinformation can lead commanders to expend resources to guard against nonexistent threats. Disinformation can cause rifts in coalitions by playing off historical ethnic, racial, and cultural biases of coalition partners.

- **Opposing Information**. Insurgents will exploit actual events that may undermine the UK force's authority and reputation, and damage the strength of its message or narrative. This is likely to be a planned operation that may encourage an overly kinetic response from the counterinsurgent that then creates an opportunity to exploit through disinformation (usually associated with claims of excessive civilian casualties).

6-25. **Responsibilities**. Countering influence in a foreign country is usually the responsibility of an operational headquarters influence activity staff. Other government agencies counter influence outside the country. At the tactical and operational levels, the focal point for counter influence will be the senior influence activity staff officer (at division or a regional/sector headquarters this might be a Chief Influence Activity or Chief Information Effects at OF5 level aided by SO2 PSYOPS). Countering propaganda is a commander's business and a core staff responsibility with the influence activity staff retaining primary responsibility and oversight.

6-26. **Failure to Conduct Counter Influence**. Common effects of hostile propaganda, misinformation and disinformation, include:

- Losing consent as a result of the local population being uncertain about our intentions, leading to unrest and/or increased insurgency recruiting.
- Undermining of coalition cohesion and relationships with indigenous forces. This is likely to be an insurgent's strategic effect.

6-27. **Counter Influence Plan**. Well established PSYOPS techniques are available to a commander that aim to minimise the insurgent's influence activity or take a more proactive stance by exploiting the insurgent's mistakes and exposing his messages as blatant propaganda. The three most common techniques are rebuttal, material (clear proof) to discredit the insurgent's message and calculated avoidance in the expectation that the topic will be forgotten. The media operations staff has an important role in countering the insurgent's influence and should be part of a concerted effort across the full breadth of the wider influence activity staff to attack the insurgent's strategy while protecting our reputation and that of the indigenous government. Although by necessity our reaction to propaganda is relatively slow given the sensitivities over clearance and the need to coordinate our narrative, a more proactive stance to discredit the insurgent message is possible on a selective basis. Additionally, strengthening our narrative by communicating with the wider population and delivering improvements to the quality of life will maintain consent. Propaganda is likely to be amongst the insurgent's most effective capabilities. Countering this capacity must therefore be a priority activity for the military, civil and indigenous elements of the counterinsurgent force. The following guidance should be considered:

- Because insurgencies are about a battle for the people's support and who is fit to govern, a counter propaganda campaign should focus on strengthening and publicising what a legitimate government can offer by way of a better future. This requires a holistic approach that focuses on the word and deed using credible indigenous voices.
- Go on the information offensive by exploiting the weakness in the insurgent's narrative. Being 'first with the truth' requires a proactive media cell. Build up evidence that the insurgent's messages are inaccurate.
- Emphasise that the population will be protected rather than abandoned.
- Minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage, and where this is not possible then make good on restoration and compensation.
- Strengthen the credibility of the counter propaganda message by using trusted local leaders and local media. Focus on increasing the credibility of local leaders, develop a local media (physical capability and media savvy journalists) and provide protection from attack and intimidation. Let the indigenous spokesmen and media handle the negative stories.
- Undermine the insurgent's capacity to deliver 'spectaculars'.
- Use electronic measures to attack the insurgent's ability to deliver his message through radio, TV and the Internet.

ILLUSTRATIVE MANNING FOR INFLUENCE ACTIVITY STAFF AT DIVISIONAL LEVEL

- SO1 Influence – dual roled as SO1 Information Operations

- Media

  SO1 Press Information Centre (PIC)
  SO2 Media
  SO3 Local Media Spokesman
  SO3 Local Media Plans
  SO3 Press Information Centre
  SO3 Press Information Centre
  OC Combat Camera Team
  SNCO Press Information Centre
  Media Ops Clerk
  Combat Camera Team – 2 pax
  Unit Press Officer - SO3

- Information Operations

  SO2 Information Operations
  SO3 Information Operations


- PSYOPS

  SO2 Chief PSYOPS
  SO3 (Civ) Design
  SO3 Plans
  SO3 Operations
  WO External Production
  SNCO Internal Production
  JNCO Print
  JNCO Target Audience Analysis

- CIMIC (working with Commander RE)

  SO1 – Usually Chief J9
  SO2 Plans
  SO2 Principal Military Officer
  SO3 Civil Military Operations 1
  SO3 Civil Military Operations 2
  SO3 Civil Military Operations 3
  WO Support

ILLUSTRATIVE STAFF STRUCTURE FOR INFLUENCE ACTIVITY AT BRIGADE LEVEL




Ser (a)	Post (b)	Role (c)
1	Chief Influence/SO1	Leads branch, presents options during mission analysis, command boards and targeting boards.
2	SO2 Influence Operations	Leads on coordination during planning, represents branch during course of action development. Deputises for SO1. Links to G3/5 and G5.
3	SO3 Influence Operations	Leads on coordination during operations, represents branch during course of action development. Deputises for SO2. Links to G3 Ops.
4	SO3 KLE	Coordinates KLE for commander, deputy commander and others as directed. Exploits KLE reporting from sub-unit commanders. Links to G2.

Notes:

1. Also called SO1 Messaging. Commanding Officer 7 RHA was used within 16 Air Asslt Bde in Afghanistan and used some regimental staff within Influence – See Appendix 1 to Annex B.
2. The mix within CIMIC/ Reconstruction & Development will be task specific.
3. EW may be grouped with ISTAR if its primary role is to 'FIND'.
4. The battery commander assigned to each battlegroup was used within 16 Air Asslt Bde.

ILLUSTRATIVE STAFF STRUCTURE FOR INFLUENCE ACTIVITY AT BATTLEGROUP LEVEL



Notes:

1. If battery commander is given the responsibility to coordinate effects. If not, then the Influence Activity Officer is responsible within the battlegroup for coordination of effects.

2. Both Non Kinetic Effects Teams and Tactical PSYOPS Teams may be found within a battlegroup dependant on the need and maturity of the counterinsurgency campaign.

INFLUENCE ACTIVITY COORDINATION BOARDS AT THE BRIGADE AND BATTLEGROUP LEVEL

1. Brigade Board attended by:

   a. Chief Influence Activity.
   b. Media Ops.
   c. Legal Advisor.
   d. Cultural Advisor.
   e. Political Advisor.
   f. Electronic Warfare.
   g. PSYOPS.
   h. ISTAR.
   i. CIMIC.
   j. Operational Analysis.
   k. Medical.
   l. Padre.
   m. Provincial Reconstruction Team /DfID.
   n. Artillery.
   o. G2.
   p. G3.
   q. G5.
   r. G6.
   s. Engineer.
   t. Brigade Air Liaison Officer

2. Battlegroup Board attended by:

   a. Battlegroup Chief of Staff (Chair).
   b. Regimental Signals Officer.
   c. Battlegroup Engineer.
   d. Unit Press Officer/Media Ops.
   e. Medical Officer.
   f. Battery Commander (ISTAR and maybe the BG Fires and Influence Officer).
   g. Intelligence Officer (G2).
   h. Joint Terminal Attack Controller / Tactical Air Control Party .
   i. BG Influence Activity Officer (Secretary)
   j. Padre.
   k. Adjutant (visits)

INFLUENCE CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE TACTICAL ESTIMATE

6-D-1. The CIMIC and media operations staff along with the PSYOPS support element SO2 should carry out their own internal estimates in support of the commander's estimate. The following points for consideration should be used by the information operations staff officer or the senior staff officer responsible for coordinating influence activities:

- **Receipt of Orders Brief**. The traditional 1/3 to 2/3 rule of thumb for the production of orders may not be valid in a counterinsurgency environment where the timescale for planning and effects is days and weeks rather than hours. However, the time available should be spelt out clearly in the receipt of orders brief to the commander, based upon the warning order. Time available is a critical factor in planning proactive influence activity.

- **Q1**. In preparing for an operation, influence activity staff must be proactive and quickly collect the necessary information and understanding to provide credible and imaginative responses to an agile opponent and sceptical population. The information environment needs to be examined as part of the Intelligence preparation of the environment; what media (that might be word of mouth and religious teaching rather than radio and TV) is used by the local people, who are the target audiences and how might the insurgent exploit the situation through propaganda? This must be conducted with an understanding of the human terrain; who are the key players and what are the psychological drivers[12]?. This analysis must be conducted within a broader understanding of the affected population, considering not only their culture but their needs and attitudes. The influence staff needs to have ready access to the intelligence staff and the latter must be able to provide suitable product to shape influence activity. Focusing on the adversary, ask the following questions:

    - What messages is the adversary sending out?
    - How does he communicate his ideas?
    - What does he aim to achieve?
    - What is the likely or actual impact of his messaging on relevant audiences and third parties (regionally and beyond)?
    - Are other parties in the country sending out messages and how are they shaping attitudes?
    - Will the adversary attack our command and control and information systems? What are our defensive measures?
    - How will the adversary react, within the information domain, to our messaging and actions?

[12] There are likely to be multiple audiences, intended or otherwise, who could react to our influence activity.

- How can I monitor the adversary's propaganda? What is the adversary likely to target in discrediting our activities? What mitigating measures should I consider?

- What does the adversary's messaging say about us?

- What is the adversary's target audience and their likely reaction? How can we counter their activity?

- **Q2**. The commander's mission analysis must take into account the context of higher command and the UK civilian element intent (Foreign & Commonwealth Office lead) and their information strategy (messages, themes and audiences). The headquarters should carry out further target audience analysis to establish what messages need to be developed to influence specific audiences to achieve the intended effects. For example, the audience might be the local population with the intent to encourage support for indigenous security forces mentored by international forces and to reject the insurgent.

- **Q3**. The effects or outcomes required and the commander's 'direction' at the end of Q3 in counterinsurgency should have a strong influence element (See Annex E) and will usually require a shaping activity such as KLE, use of carefully crafted PSYOPS products, timely media handling and a means to strengthen support through meeting the immediate needs of the target population (CIMIC providing the assessment and close contact with the local population). The effects sought will be explained in influence language: e.g. inform; warn; influence; isolate; cooperation; deceive; promote; encourage. This may need to commence before the formal orders process is completed. Influence may therefore need to be both conducted concurrently with the development of the plan and feed into its development. At this stage the influence staff needs to be giving early direction - a warning order - on the assets and products needed to support the operation; this particularly affects the PSYOPS support element. Influence staff need to ask:

  - What are the target audiences and what behaviour do I want them to adopt?

  - What are the likely ways and means to achieve this requirement?

  - How can we measure effect and will it be sufficiently timely?

- **Q4**. Where can I best accomplish each action/effect? Decision points in the decision support overlay may be based upon target audience attitudes. Areas for consideration are:

  - Confirm target audience and objectives.

  - In time and space when do I see Influence Activities taking place? For example, to shape, then to protect the operation and finally exploit its achievements.

  - Refine ideas on what information operations tools are most appropriate; their availability will affect the final plan. For example,

what influence channels are open to each separate audience and what can be done to set the conditions for the message to have the desired effect?[13]

- **Q5**. What resources do we have or need in order to both deliver the message and assess its effect? Because many Influence products have a long lead time, early recognition of what tools and techniques might be required is necessary to meet expectations. Reach back to MOD, through PJHQ, may be required for both delivery and analysis of effect. PSYOPS staff will need to carry out their own analysis of how they can support wider influence activity.

- **Q6.** The synchronisation of fires and influence to optimise effect will appear within a matrix produced by the influence staff officer and integrated into the wider G3 led synchronisation matrix. The influence part of the matrix will aim to coordinate the activity of media operations, CIMIC and information operations tools and techniques; particularly PSYOPS products and activities (radio broadcasts for example), KLE as part of shaping activity and media operations for exploitation of success. The insurgent's ability to conduct propaganda will also need to be taken into account and countered. This is a complex business, even at the tactical level, and requires considerable thought and effort.

- **Q7.** What control measures do we need? In particular, what are the possible unintended consequences and how are we going to exploit or reduce their impact? Control measures are as applicable to influence (e.g. control of KLE and timing of release of media products) as to normal battlefield activity.

- **Refining the Plan.** Influence staff need to be involved in developing the proposed courses of action, wargaming and any subsequent mission rehearsal or review of concept drill.

[13] Messages do not have to be written or verbal. Presence, Posture and Profile represents another means of transmitting a message to a target audience.

OPERATIONAL TERMINOLOGY

JWP 0-01 (UK Glossary of joint and multinational Terms and Definitions) is the authority for terms and definitions. During Op HERRICK it has been necessary to develop a non-kinetic lexicon. These terms and definitions are shown in **BOLD.**

Advance	Offensive operation designed to gain or re-establish with the enemy
Assault	Climax of an attack
Attack	Employment of firepower and manoeuvre to close and destroy or capture the enemy
Block	Deny enemy access to a given area or to prevent advance in a given area
Breach	Create a lane through a minefield or clear a route through a barrier or fortification
Bypass	Manoeuvre around an obstacle, position or enemy force
Capture	To gain position or terrain
Clear	To clear terrain of enemy direct fire and keep clear until handed over to another unit/formation
Coerce	**To persuade or restrain by force of the threat of force**
Contain	Stop, hold or surround enemy forces
Counter Attack	Attack by part or all of a defending force regaining ground lost or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units
Deceive	Mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification
Defeat	To diminish the effectiveness of the enemy
Defend	To defeat or deter a threat to provide circumstances for an offensive action
Degrade	**Reduce by an appreciable amount**
Delay	Operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time
Deliver	**To set free**
Demonstrate	Attack or show force on a front where a decision is not sought
Deny	To prevent access through direct or indirect action
Deploy	Move forces within areas of operation
Destabilise	**Render unstable**
Destroy	To kill or so damage an enemy force that it is rendered useless
Detain	Capture and hold a person temporarily including the right to search
Deter	**Dissuade through action or the threat of action**
Develop	**To advance capability and competence**
Disengage	**Break of engagement in preparation for eventual withdrawal**
Dislocate	**To deny the ability to deny strength**
Disrupt	**To interrupt and cause disorder to an organisation and tempo**
Empower	**Promote confidence or authority in**
Enable	**Provide the means or authority to make possible**
Envelop	Pass around or over the enemy's principle defensive positions
Escort	**Accompany and protect**
Exploit	Take full advantage of success in battle and follow up initial gain
Extract	Recover reconnaissance, stay-behind or encircled forces
Feint	Distract the enemy through seeking contact but avoiding decisive engagement by the bulk of own forces
Find	**Find, locate and identify assets**
Fix	To deny the enemy his goals, to distract him and thus deprive him of freedom of action

Guard	To protect a force by fighting to gain time, while also observing and reporting information
Hand-Over	Pass responsibility for the conduct of combat
Harass	Fire designed to disturb the rest of enemy troops, to curtail movements and, by threat of losses lower morale
Hold	To maintain or retain possession of force, of a position or area
Identify	Determine by any act or means the friendly or hostile nature of a detected person, object or phenomenon
Infiltrate	Move as individuals or small groups over, through or around enemy positions without detection
Influence	**To persuade – usually covertly**
Inform	**Tell**
Intercept	Search for and listen to and/or record communications and/or electronic transmission
Interdict	Divert, disrupt, delay or destroy the enemy's military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces
Isolate	**To seal off and deny freedom of movement and/or isolation**
Liaise	Maintain contact or intercommunications between elements of military forces
Link-up	Establishment of contact between 2 or more friendly units or formations
Maintain	Take supply and repair action to keep a force in condition to carry out a mission
Manipulate	**Manage to advantage (person or situation)**
Manoeuvre	Employ forces on the battlefield (using) movement in combination with fire or fire potential to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy
Mask	Fire to obscure enemy observation
Mentor	**Develop capacity through example and/or advice through planning and preparation, execution and lessons captured/AAR phases**
Neutralise	**To render ineffective or unusable**
Occupy	Move into and proper organisation of an area to be used as a battle position
Organise	**Give orderly structure to**
Overthrow	**Remove forcibly from power**
Passage of lines	Move forward or rearward through another force's combat positions
Permit	**Give permission or consent**
Persuade	**Convince**
Prevent	**Monitor/ID causes of conflict and act to prevent occurrence, escalation or resumption of hostiles**
Protect	**Keep safe**
Pursue	Catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it
Reassure	**Restore confidence of dispel fear**
Reconstitute	Expand the force structures and the infra-structure beyond existing levels
Reduce	**Make smaller/less**
Rehabilitate	Process during which units recondition equipment and are rested, furnished special facilities, filled up with replacements issued replacements supplies and equipment, given training
Reinforce	Supplement in place forces
Relieve	Replace all or part of a unit in an area
Re-supply	Maintain required levels of supply
Retire	To move away from the enemy when out of contact

Screen	Observe, identify and report
Secure	**To gain possession of by direct or indirect means and to seek to retain**
Seize	**To gain possession of through direct or indirect action**
Stabilise	**Make stable**
Strike	Inflict damage on, seize or destroy an objective
Support	**Encourage and help**
Suppress	Fire to inhibit the enemy's ability to acquire and attack friendly targets
Sustain	Maintain the necessary levels of combat power
Target	**To make the object of an operation**
Undermine	**Weaken covertly**
Withdraw	Disengage from the enemy when in contact with the enemy

CHAPTER 7

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION

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7-1. Planning and executing operations in counterinsurgency is no black art; the tried and tested techniques that are explained in AFM Vol 1 Part 8 – *Command and Staff Procedures* are relevant to counterinsurgency. However, the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous nature of the environment and the absolute requirement to set military action in the context of a coordinated cross government approach means that a more expansive method is often needed. Even though, at the tactical level, the focus of any counterinsurgency must be to gain and maintain the support of the people, the often violent nature of an insurgency must remain in the commanders mind; steps to neutralise the insurgent should be part of the overall plan. The '7 Questions[1]' and the 'Plan, Refine, Execute, Evaluate cycle'[2] will remain the bedrock of the planning process, but there needs to be a method of gaining greater understanding of the myriad of factors that will influence the outcome of any counterinsurgency campaign. Whereas ***military planning*** works well to solve largely understood problems, ***operational design***[3] is needed to deal with the less tangible nature of counterinsurgency through constant learning and adapting[4]. The operational or tactical commander is unlikely to have to design his operation in isolation. He should have his higher commander's operational design available to him in the same way as he will have other aspects of his superior headquarter's planning output. Thus, he should conduct his own operational design with his superior commander's design as the start point in much the same way as he would with his commander's intent and scheme of manoeuvre. How operational design sits within the Campaign Plan is outlined in Figure 7-1.

> That said, I was very clear on the Operational Design that I wished to put in place to conduct Counterinsurgency in Helmand. I wrote it within two weeks of arriving in theatre. A lot of the ideas in the Design had been discussed in detail with the commanding officers before deployment, and it covered the component parts for a COIN campaign in Helmand.
>
> Brigade Commander - Afghanistan

[1] As described in Chapter 3 of AFM Vol 1 Part 8 – *Command and Staff Procedures.*
[2] As described in Chapter 2 of AFM Vol 1 Part 9 - *Command and Staff Procedures.*
[3] "Operational Design is used to lay out the way in which the operation might unfold". (JDP 5-00).
[4] HQ RC(S) OPLAN/03-04 dated 14 APRIL 08 has its Operational Design as Annex A.



Figure 7-1 – Operational Design

SECTION 2 - THE IMPORTANCE OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN[5]

7-2. Operational design is normally carried out at the operational level and above, but the tactical commander should understand how his superior commander's operational design is arrived at in order that he can understand his role in achieving its objectives. The purpose of the operational design approach is to achieve a high level of situational understanding, to craft a coherent and comprehensive solution based on that understanding and ingrain a means to learn and continually adapt[6]. An operational design sets out the context and unifying guidance for how an operation is to progress. It is looser than a conventional military plan because the situation is less predictable and most of the means to achieve ultimate success are not for the military to command or direct. For the counterinsurgent commander, an operational design begins with knowing why an insurgent movement has arisen and why it has gained support, and knowing the purpose of his own involvement. Failure to understand these factors can have disastrous consequences.

7-3. **Complexity.** Counterinsurgency is inherently complex and the natural military inclination to simplify in order to act swiftly and decisively on a battlefield must be

[5] JDP 3-40 discusses Campaign Design and Planning in Chapter 5.
[6] The fundamentals of operational planning and design are covered in Chapter 3 of JDP 5-00

tempered. Headquarters will often find themselves having to plan combat operations at the same time as conducting a range of development activities. This dichotomy should be embraced rather than just accepted, since both types of endeavour should be unified in pursuit of the overall purpose, which is to influence the population. Many activities will have unforeseen and enduring consequences for each other as well as for different target audiences (the most important being the local population); hence the need to develop a deep understanding and a quick and accurate means of assessment.

7-4. **Understanding and Assessment.** Assessment and re-evaluation enable incremental improvements to the design. The military tendency to see changes in a plan as a sign of failure is misguided; rather such changes are a sign of strength and progress against an adaptable enemy in an evolving environment. A dynamic mechanism for assessment should be built into every design and plan and it should be suitably resourced. The results of that assessment should be fed to the appropriate commanders and staff as soon as possible and used to guide current and future action; this will then need to be continually assessed and reviewed. Many headquarters use an 'operational design schematic' to show how their priorities blends with those of the other agencies involved. A simplified outline of a schematic is at Figure 7-2 below.




Figure 7-2 - An Example of Operational Design Schematic

KEY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

7-5. Many planning considerations are the same in counterinsurgency as in other types of operations. Those deserving special consideration are:

- **Warfighting.** Many of the non-military organisations which are involved in countering insurgency consider that the need to take direct military action and

become involved in warfighting is a sign of failure. This is not so. There will be times when the only method of providing security for the population is through direct military action which involves removing the irreconcilable insurgent by whatever legal means is appropriate. Commanders and their staff have a remit to explain to the non-military groups the importance and value of direct military action, when it is needed, and how it is to be applied. This might be through Clear-Hold-Build operations as explained in Chapter 4 or some other method appropriate to the situation. The provision of enduring security can only be achieved when sufficient resources are applied and dedicated to the task.

- **Precision Actions.** The decision as to whether to undertake a kinetic or non-kinetic action to achieve an effect needs careful consideration; the default setting, however, should be that effects are to be achieved by non-kinetic actions. A misjudged, poorly executed or unlucky kinetic action that results in civilian casualties can have a massive negative impact on the overall campaign. Such occurrences can be minimised if the consequences of all actions are thoroughly considered and if all targeting and engagement is executed with meticulous care. This in turn depends on a high level of understanding, excellent situational awareness and the means to deliver precise kinetic or non kinetic effects. In particular, responses to events - including insurgent action (which may be intended to provoke an over reaction) - should be finely judged and precisely delivered so that the risk of collateral damage and the resulting alienation of the local population is minimised. Often, the most effective activities are in the psychological domain and are designed to persuade and influence target audiences using non-kinetic means. In order to co-ordinate these activities many commanders have formed a Joint Fires and Influence branch under a single responsible officer in order to promote synergy and minimise the risk of unintended consequences.

- **Host Nation Primacy.** There will be times, especially in the early phases of a counterinsurgency, when the host nation might not be capable playing a full part in the campaign. Developing the host nation's capacity will be one of the coalition's lines of operation. However, where the host nation government is functioning it is essential that intervening headquarters work effectively with the agencies of the host nation in order to develop and implement politically acceptable and culturally appropriate settlement. The host nation should be encouraged to take 'ownership' of such settlements as part of the process of winning the consent of the people. The planning of transitions should reflect this. Putting the host nation government in the forefront of any political and economic successes may necessitate having to play down the role of the coalition. However, balance is required since maintaining the acceptability of the coalition to the population is also important and there is an aspect of expectation management to be considered if the host nation is still weak. The commander and his staff will have to consider how best to interface with the host nation and may have to adapt the structure and working practices of their headquarters in order to achieve this. The particular mechanisms will depend on local conditions and critically, the level of confidence in the host nation's security and capabilities, but could range from routine combined consultative or steering committees to complete integration of staff branches through to total integration.

> '*Working with the host nation is both a necessity and a constraint'*
> – Paul Cronin

- **Lead Nation or Junior Partner**. It is unlikely, but not inconceivable, that the UK would undertake any form of counterinsurgency operation alone. It is most likely to be part of a US or NATO led coalition and some form of alliance with the host nation will always exist. There is a strong possibility that the UK would be required to provide a formation headquarters to co-ordinate part of the overall coalition force (for example providing a regional headquarters within an overall NATO campaign). This would result in the headquarters having to adapt its working practices, procedures and information systems to take account of other members of the coalition. Ideally, the force should adopt NATO doctrine and SOPs in order to allow all member states to work together, but in reality there are huge variations in the interpretation of these working practices between the nations. A compromise *modus operandi* should therefore be agreed before the operation commences, and a mechanism established to manage the inevitable changes that occur over the course of an operation (e.g. introduction of new information systems by one country). It is critical that UK commanders and staff fully understand the military culture of the lead nation and in particular its command style[7], and train with them before deploying. Commanders and staff should make every effort to get to know personally key members of their superior headquarters and establish good working relationships – these will reduce the inevitable frictions and minimise misunderstanding. As a junior member of a coalition the UK must be prepared to modify some of its national interests in order that the coalition, as a whole, can adhere to a single strategy. Harmonising action across the lines of operation is more difficult to achieve in a coalition due to:
    - Coalition partners' competing international agendas and differing domestic imperatives.
    - Coalition partners' different relationships with other regional protagonists.
    - Coalition partners' views conflicting with those of the host government.
    - Dissonant views and factions within the host government.
    - Coalition partners differing legal parameters.
- **Coordination with Others**. There is no purely military solution to countering an insurgency and the UK is likely to be working in a coalition. It is therefore essential that all agencies involved work closely together. This requires the commander to understand the role of the military in the overall effort, to develop plans that fit with those of others pursuing the same ends and to nest and synchronise his activities with those of the other contributors. To do this effectively the command and control structure at all levels should adapt to accommodate and facilitate partner civilian, host nation and allied military organisations. At the strategic level this will require a partnership between the host nation government (when it is effective) and the coalition partners; at the operational level it will involve close relations between the local government, the civilian agencies and the coalition. At the tactical level, when there is an absence of civilian organisations, the military will need to undertake a variety of

[7] For example, the centrality of the commander and importance of Powerpoint presentations in conveying information and even orders within a US formation headquarters.

non-military tasks (MACE[8]), which will affect the size, composition and *modus operandi* of headquarters.

- **Achieving and Measuring Effects**. In counterinsurgency there is a heightened need to determine the effects (outcomes) of military activity and their impact on the range of participants and audiences in order to learn and adapt. Some of the effects sought, particularly those in the psychological domain, will be very difficult to identify and to measure. A commander may therefore need to devote considerable resources to analysis and assessment, and to develop a set of key indicators in order to inform the design, planning and execution of activity (Measuring Effectiveness is considered in Annex B).

SECTION 3 - OPERATIONAL LEVEL APPROACHES APPLICABLE AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

7-6. **Doctrine**. British armed forces employ a number of complementary approaches to planning and conduct at the operational level, articulated in JDP 01, Joint Operations. Each approach has implications for the conduct of operational design, and should be understood by the tactical and operational level commander alike. The following paragraphs expand on their applicability at the tactical level.

7-7. **Ends, Ways and Means**. A commander will wish to determine how he can achieve his mission (the *ways*), what situation needs to be created (the *Ends*) and what resources are needed to do so (the *Means*). As in any military situation, commanders planning a counterinsurgency will often find that they are constrained as the paucity of *Means* required to achieve the *Ends* impinge of their freedom of action. Commanders should achieve a balance between the *Ends, Ways* and *Means* and compromises have to be made (often in time) as illustrated in Figure 7-3. When tackling *Ends, Ways* and *Means* the following should be considered:

- **Ends**. In order to achieve the *Ends* it is most likely that the military will be required to provide a secure environment in which other host nation's government and other civilian organisations can work.

- **Ways**. The *Ways* will be the full range of those activities that support the development of the lines of operation required to achieve the *Ends.* Even though security should be the line of operation that the military focus upon, there will be circumstances where the situation is too dangerous for civilian organisations to operate and the military will have to fill the void through MACE. If the military forces are to lead across the other lines of operation, the prioritisation and planning should involve the host nation's government and other civilian organisations where possible.

- **Means**. A commander should not limit his ambition to acquiring the *Means* required to achieve the *Ends*. It is likely that he will have to reorganise existing structures, obtain new equipment through Urgent Operational Requirements and use his initiative to fill those gaps that exist. More than any other type of campaign, counterinsurgency lends itself to creative methods of producing the *Means*. The role of host nation security forces cannot be underestimated.

[8] Military Assistance to Civil Effect.




Figure 7-3 - Ends, Ways and Means

7-8. **Planning Concepts**. Plans are expressed using a collection of building blocks known as the Planning Concepts[9]. These have three functions which are to focus planning during the development of an operation, to describe a plan in subsequent directives and orders and to act as a framework for iterative planning informed by assessment.

- **End-State**. There is a debate over the utility of articulating an end-state at the tactical level during counterinsurgency operations; some operational commanders have specified them while others have not. The debate arises because during counterinsurgency there is a dichotomy between trying to provide a realistic purpose for which a subordinate can aim while he is in theatre and the operational end-state that will almost certainly not be reached during the tactical commander's tour. JDP 5-00, Joint Operations Planning, describes an end-state as the desired situation which delivers selected military objectives within a given plan; it should be singular and gives purpose to the plan. It states that commanders should describe the end-state and its decisive conditions as a unifying purpose for each line of operation, otherwise the necessary integration between the various agencies will not occur. An end-state at the strategic level is probably sound but at the operational and tactical levels they may be inappropriate and more short-term objectives might be more apposite.

- **Centres of Gravity**. The concept of centre of gravity (that from which power or freedom to act derives) is applicable to counterinsurgency but it is not sufficient to merely identify friendly and insurgent centres of gravity as a

[9] Examples of the planning schematics can be found in JDP 5-00 at Appendix 2G2.

commander might do during combat operations. A commander will also need to identify the centre of gravity of each of the elements of society (communities/groups e.g. the insurgents, the host nation government, allies etc) with whom he is dealing. Selecting the correct centres of gravity is critical to success and making the wrong choice may skew an operation entirely leading to resources being wasted or inappropriate action being taken. Similarly, in designing an operation its impact on multiple centres of gravity should be assessed less success in one direction sets back others and thus hinders the achievement of a lasting comprehensive solution. Centre of gravity analysis needs to be regularly examined and changes made when and where necessary.

- **Decisive Conditions.** Decisive conditions act as the major building blocks of the overall operational design. They are the effects that need to be created to realise objective. As counterinsurgency operations involve collaboration with other agencies under a cross government approach, the decisive conditions should not be confined to those for which the military has direct responsibility, but should include those of other agencies that the military may be supporting. In this way decisive conditions emphasise how the overall interagency planning meshes; they should be regarded as an important orchestration tool to build unity of effort. Decisive conditions should be:
    - Essential pre-requisites for the achievement of an objective leading to the end-state or objectives.
    - Defined in terms of their effect, that is, a concise statement that identifies who or what is to be affected as well as the desired state of change. Decisive conditions should not be expressed as a transitive verb (to deter) but as a noun (deterrence … *of Insurgent group* A) or a verb in its completed form (*Insurgent group A is*… deterred), to focus attention on outcomes rather than activity.

- **Supporting Effects.** Supporting effects are specific influences on a decisive condition that are generated by linking a range of activities in time, space and/or purpose; they are the stepping stones on the route to creating the decisive conditions. A commander uses joint action as a framework with which to plan, coordinate, synchronise and then execute activities to achieve the supporting effects (described in JDP 3-00, Joint Operations Execution, Chapter 3). He should exploit the full range of available capabilities - joint and multinational - and orchestrate fires, influence activities and manoeuvre together to optimise their impact, issuing subordinate missions and tasks as necessary. A commander should also consider those multi-agency activities which, while not under his control, should be coordinated with his own military activities in order to realise the desired overall effects.

- **Activities**. An activity is action that is taken by an individual or group to achieve a supporting effect. There may be a variety of activities available that could achieve a particular supporting effect, using a combination of fires, influence activities and manoeuvre. Commanders and staffs should seek to identify all possible routes to achieve the supporting effect paying particular attention to the second and third order consequences of potential activities. The previously identified various centres of gravity can be used as a framework for this activity.

SECTION 4 – COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN AND TACTICAL PLANS

7-9. Within the theatre of operation, an overall campaign plan is required to co-ordinate and focus the efforts of all partners across all lines of operation. Ideally, this should be lead by the aspirations of the host nation's government but, at times, this may not be possible due to the absence or weakness of that government. Such an approach fits in with the principle of co-ordinated government action. The campaign plan should be based on appropriate and achievable national strategic objectives formulated ideally by the host nation or, in partnership with its coalition partners or allies. The theatre operational plan must be linked to higher-level objectives because if operational objectives are not linked to the strategic, tactical issues may begin to drive the overall strategy. The gap between the operational plan and the tactical realties can become more apparent when the coalition is made up from a number of different nations who have differing political perspectives and objectives. Unless there is an overall campaign plan on which all nations are agreed each nation will develop its own strategy for its own particular area of responsibility; arguably this became particularly evident in the early stages of the campaign in Afghanistan.

7-10. National campaign plans should support the theatre campaign plan to ensure that national efforts remain coherent with both developments in the host nation and national policy of contributing nations. However, in reality different nations will have divergent views on how to tackle the insurgency. This divergence can be mitigated by having a lead nation or organisation and allowing different nations to take responsibility for differing regions; this is not ideal as these different approaches will be exploited by the insurgent. In practice, being able to reconcile the many influences is difficult and building a coalition is rarely easy.

7-11. It is general practice for the campaign plan to be written using lines of operation which unify the efforts of joint, interagency, multinational, and the host nation's forces toward a common purpose of co-ordinated government action. The specific lines of operation employed will vary from operation to operation, depending on the situation. However, they will generally encompass political, security, economic, governance and justice activity aimed at fostering the political accommodation necessary for the host nation to achieve sustainable security while advancing political and economic development. They are supported throughout their execution by information operations, intelligence, engagement and reconciliation and logistics.

7-12. The lines of operations should not be seen as discrete sets of activities which are conducted in isolation. They are, instead, closely inter-related and they link goals that, when achieved, will lead to the accomplishment of longer term objectives. Campaigns designed using lines of operation typically employ an extended, event-driven and conditions-based timeline with near, intermediate and longer-term objectives. These operations combine the effects of long-term operations, such as neutralising the insurgent infrastructure, with cyclic and short-term events, like improving the delivery of utilities and essential services.

7-13. The overall plan should underscore the importance of advancing the political line of operation to help the host nation establish legitimate, effective governance at the national, provincial and district levels. All other lines of operation will be in support of this end. Typically, the political line of operations will harness efforts to build government capacity, promote good governance, communicate strategically, develop the rule of law and bring about reconciliation among competing factions. The security line of operation will recognise the imperative of enhancing security and

protecting the population. A possible set of such lines of operation is shown in Figure 7-4.




Figure 7-4 - Lines of Operation

7-14. It is worth noting that such a comprehensive approach to planning and the co-ordination of the campaign may not appeal to all involved. This is particularly the case with NGOs, some of whom may be reluctant to be seen to be part of a military plan. Nor can it be assumed that other agencies will have the personnel available to dedicate to planning at the scales that the military would wish. Nevertheless, integrated planning at the very least helps to tease out what all protagonists think they are trying to achieve. This should improve mutual understanding and contribute to improved synergies and effective co-operation.

7-15. **Lines of Operation and Levels of Command**. Commanders at all levels can use the lines of operation which feature in the theatre campaign plan to nest their own plans in a coherent manner. By following a common approach, not only does this help in terms of co-ordinated government action, but the lines of operation will also help commanders identify missions, assign tasks, allocate resources, and assess operations coherently in terms of higher level plans. Once the decisive line of operation has been identified, the others will be used to shape the operational environment necessary for successful achievement of the campaign's objectives. Clearly, lower tactical operations will be conducted shaped by the operational environment in each unit's area of operations, but the general method should reflect that of the overall campaign plan. A common approach, based on the lines of operation, will prove to be mutually supportive between echelons, and between adjacent units and formations. For example, operations along the security line should produce complementary effects between neighbouring units, brigades or task forces, while accomplishments at brigade level should serve to reinforce the achievement of division or regional command objectives. While lines of operation tend to be used at brigade and higher levels – where the staff and unit resources needed to use them are available – battalions can use them and may find them very

valuable in framing their operations in the same way as their brigade and the overall context of co-ordinated government action.

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

7-16. Checking progress toward desired effects is vital if the counterinsurgent is to adapt faster and more effectively than his agile opponent. Care should be taken to ensure that data gathering activities in support of such measurement do not prejudice the safety, efficiency or morale of the counterinsurgent forces. Data gathered should be analysed objectively and impartially if an accurate appraisal is to be achieved. It has proved useful in some circumstances for commanders to develop an independent review team to carry out or perhaps supplement the analyses carried out by military staffs. Details on how to measure effectiveness is described at Annex B.

SECTION 5 - LOGISTICS

PRINCIPLES

7-17. The principles covering logistic support in counterinsurgency are the same as in combat operations. The four Ds of Distance, Duration, Destination and Demand are as applicable in counterinsurgency as in any operation. There are, however, several functions in logistic support where there will be more emphasis on particular functions because of the differing environments in which logistic support will be conducted.

POINTS FOR COMMANDERS

7-18. A commander will note that logistic units and supplies will need to be protected – and under the control of national commanders. While it may appear appropriate to keep the number of bases to a minimum, the basing plan should not lose sight of the overarching requirement to secure the population where they live. This could place a burden on transport and resupply systems and will require a significantly different approach to sustaining the force in distributed operations. Thus an array of distribution methods are required to achieve the requirement. The task of regular resupply to combat units, bases and other troops on location could become an operational problem if the movement of resupply is under threat from insurgents. Decisions about manpower and equipment for logistic troops and, if applicable, escorting troops, their training (both individual and collective) and the frequency of resupply could affect operational planning significantly. A commander must ensure that ground and air vehicles used for resupply provide the crews with appropriate protection from insurgent attack. In a campaign or an area where the insurgent has strength and is very active, logistics operations will be mounted as deliberate operations involving combat, combat support and combat service support elements.

THE GEOGRAPHCAL FACTOR

7-19. In counterinsurgency, there is frequently no distinction between forward and rear, especially when logistic bases form a hub and spoke system. In an era of 360° resupply operations, logistic troops have to be appropriately trained to enable them to ‘fight logistics through’; they must be as capable as their teeth arm counterparts. Specific packages dealing with counter contact measures should be developed. Fundamentally, the logistic plan needs to be in synergy with the overall campaign plan which is not always easy to achieve. Logistic resupply of security force and logistic bases may entail the creation of Combat Logistic Patrols (CLP) which are deliberate operations that may be of an all arms and joint nature.

SECURITY

7-20. Traditionally, logistic static installations have been sited in an area where there is least risk of attack, commensurate with operational and geographical factors. In counterinsurgency operations the best place to site a Combat Service Support (CSS) node is where it can best deliver the necessary support; tempered by operational considerations. If the scale and intensity of the operation warrant the establishment of a forward base, it is likely to be more at risk and will require more security force effort for defence. While a benign area is desirable, efficiency is essential. The availability of fixed and rotary wing aircraft lift make it possible to cut out intermediate bases, with consequent advantages of economy in grounded resources, guards and theatre transport. The use of an afloat logistic base can ease physical security and protection requirements.

OPERATIONAL SECURITY

7-21. Care must be taken to ensure that CSS preparations do not prejudice the security of information and plans. Sudden increases in stock levels, exceptional amounts of road, rail and air movement, the arrival of new combat service support units in a forward areas and the local purchase of unusual items are just some examples of changes in a normal pattern of replenishment which might betray a future operation. A combination of secrecy to hide logistic preparations and convincing cover plans may help to preserve security. Discretion in dealing with contractors and taking care not to discuss operational matters within the earshot of local civilians are essential precautions to maintain operational security. Forward dumping of logistic stocks could assist overall OPSEC and reduce movement between forward and rear locations.

FRAGMENTATION AND DISPERSAL OF LOGISTIC UNITS

7-22. There may be a tendency to fragment and disperse logistic units to support widely deployed security force elements. However, the support of such isolated detachments is a problem better solved by the logistic staff than by an uneconomic dispersal of logistic units. The helicopter is a useful aid, although risk from insurgent action both in the air and on the ground must be carefully managed. Nevertheless, some dispersion of logistic units may be inevitable under the 'hub and spoke' system. In such cases it is necessary to exercise a careful control of resources to keep the size and number of units down to an affordable burden on finite assets. Logistics must be considered from the outset of any planning process, and logistic staff should be integral to commander’s reconnaissance parties at all levels of command.

Commando Logistics Regiment RM Supporting 45 Commando, Sangin Valley

In Afghanistan during the late Winter of 2009, the Commando Logistics Regiment RM was tasked with the resupply of 45 Commando's locations in the Upper Sangin Valley some 90km away from Camp Bastion in the heart of Helmand. The location of the company groups and the nature of the loads meant that this resupply had to be conducted by wheeled vehicles. In order to simplify the task and to break previously set patterns on this particular Combat Logistic Patrol (CLP), the regiment executed a fast, night time inload to one of the required locations in 45 Commando's AOR prior to the main operation. Minimising exposure in the Sangin Valley in lightly protected B vehicles is essential to protecting personnel and equipment.

Due to the heavy nature of the loads on the main operation, it was necessary to use the only road capable of supporting the vehicles needed to resupply Sangin DC. As such EOD and VIKING Group support was utilised ahead of the CLP in an effort to clear a safe passage for the CSS vehicles. During this clearance, some twenty IEDs were found and neutralised. Unfortunately, in one instance, an EOD vehicle was disabled and two of the EOD Team badly injured by an explosion. The recovery of this vehicle became a secondary task for the CLP as it transited the area. Once the IED clearance had been completed, the VIKING Group took up positions of overwatch to ensure that enemy forces could not re-enter the area and re-lay IEDs along the CLP's route as it approached.

The 60 vehicle CLP transited the route to and from Sangin over a period of 48 hours and completed a number of subsidiary tasks. One such task was the repair of a wadi crossing using engineer assets moved on a Light Equipment Transporter as part of the CLP. The CLP encountered seven complex ambushes during this protracted 48 hour period with 27,000 x 7.62mm rds, 2000 x 5.56mm rds, 12 x UGL rds, 200 x 30mm rds, and 1 x Hellfire from supporting AH fired in response. The Force Protection elements of the CLP cleared a further three IEDs and suffered a mine strike on it's lead MASTIFF vehicle during darkness. Despite this the CLP successfully executed all required aspects of the mission with no serious casualties and all assets recovered to Camp Bastion. This resupply operation was conducted in various formats seven times in six months in addition to the other BG resupply operations required to sustain Task Force Helmand.

COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURES

Provincial Headquarters Structure. Each commander will have his own views on how to organise his headquarters, but this section provides a short description of how a successful provincial headquarters was organised in Afghanistan in 2008. The layout of the headquarters is at Figure 7-A-1 with each of the cells represented; these cells will be familiar to most readers but it was the way in which the military interacted with the other agencies that is important.

- **Deputy Military Commander and Interagency Plans**. Traditionally the J5 cell is the focus for the longer term planning within the headquarters; in this case the Deputy Commander and the J5 cell were embedded within the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). This meant that they were responsible for the military contribution to the interagency planning and the military/civilian interface within the AOR. The military contributed about 30% of the PRT manpower including the planning and co-ordination functions. The layout of the PRT is shown at the end of this Annex in Figure 7-A-3.

- **Chief of Staff and Military Plans (J3/5) Branch**. The COS and J3/5 branch were responsible for planning the security line of operation. They were also the branch that interacted with the 2* headquarters to whom they reported as well as PJHQ in London. They combined the traditional roles of both J5 and J3/5 allowing J5 free to become immersed in the interagency lines of operation. They were able to use many of the battlefield IT systems to aid them in their planning and dissemination of orders.

- **Military Operations (J3) Branch**. J3 were responsible for current security operations and were housed in the operations room around a traditional bird table. Even though there were many technically more capable information tools available to the formation they were found to be unreliable, slow to update and sometimes they misrepresented the true battlefield picture. The map and lumocolor® pen were favoured by the J3 staff.

- **ISTAR.** ISTAR should be a stand alone organisation at the hub of the headquarters. This does not mean divorcing ISTAR from fires, influence or J5 but rather placing it centrally within the formation headquarters so that it is better able to support all. ISTAR is central to the Understand function supporting the commander, J3, J5, Influence and Fires. With ISTAR as a stand alone function there is a requirement for a Chief ISTAR who is the direct interface with the commander and is his principal advisor on ISTAR matters. He is responsible for briefing the commander and staff and provides the overall assessment of all activity. An example of a brigade ISTAR construct is at shown at the end of this Annex in Figure 7-A-4.

- **Deputy Chief of Staff**. DCOS was the focus for the traditional J1/J4 functions for the formation but was also responsible for ensuring that both the PRT and indigenous forces had sufficient J4 resources. This sometimes stretched the formation's ability to conduct its own security operations. Until the PRT and the indigenous forces can sustain themselves this responsibility will remain with the coalition military.




Figure 7-A-2 Headquarters Structure

- **Information Exploitation**. Many headquarters have an IX (Information Exploitation) Group which might contain ISTAR, Fires and Influence. It deals in the collection, analysis and exploitation of information - information dominance. The IX Group should shepherd all the collators, analysts and producers to lead the influence campaign and avoid information or message fratricide. The Group conducts influence-led operations: disseminating a range of messages to influence the enemy commander's decision making process by blending information and kinetic effects to a pre-arranged synch matrix or effects schematic as shown below in Figure 7-A-2.




Figure 7-A-2 - An Effects Schematic

- **Military Engineers**. CO Engineers role was split between carrying out day to day military engineering tasks for the formation and controlling those military assets supporting the PRT (CIMIC and R&D). Ideally this role should not be split and an SO1 development (RE capbadge) should be assigned to the PRT.

- **AOCC**. The Air Operation co-ordination Cell was responsible for the planning of air and aviation operations, the control of these assets once on tasks and air space management. It was situated in the J3 branch since the majority of work was in support of current security operations.

- **SSR**. The Security Sector Reform (SSR) companies were integrated at the J3/5 level and were expected to attend planning conferences with their indigenous counterparts. Those companies that were mentoring indigenous forces that were not ready for operations attended less regularly.

- **Policy Advisor**. The Policy advisor (POLAD) is a MOD civil servant who works directly to the commander. He provides advice on the full range of defence and national and international policy focusing on the wider implications of military decisions.

- **Legal Advisor.** The role of the LEGAD is explained in Chapter 12.

- **Cultural Advisor.** The Cultural Advisor is a civil servant who advises the commander and his staff on all matters relating to gaining a greater

understanding of the cultural issues. This process needs to begin well in advance of deployment; a Cultural Advisor should be a key member of the command team from the beginning of the formation's training.

- **Media Advisor.** Media advisors are either civilian or military experts in the field of media who provide advice to the commander and his Media Operations staff on all aspects of media presentation and handling.

- **Civilian Police Advisor.** The civilian police advisor is likely to be a senior MOD Police officer or a civilian police officer on attachment whose principal role is to provide expert advice on host nation police development matters.

- **Scientific Advisor.** The scientific advisor (SCIAD) is a civilian scientist whose primary role is to provide independent, broad ranging scientific advice to the commander. He coordinates the activities of all science and technology staff who deploy to theatre in support of specific tasks. The Equipment Capability (EC) branch within the HEADQUARTERS will provide the most appropriate point of integration for the SCIAD.

- **Operational Analyst**. Working closely with the SCIAD, operational analysts (OA) generally deploy singly or in pairs and may be provided from a spectrum of civil service grades. The primary role of OA is to provide the commander with planning advice based upon the analysis and interpretation of campaign data.




Figure 7-A-3 Possible PRT Structure




Figure 7-A-4- Possible ISTAR Cell Structure

MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATIONS

CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS AND TERMS

7-B-1. Although military and non-military agencies use a similar approach and similar terminology, the terms and phrases used differ at different levels of command and within different organisations. There are three main concepts which are consistent:

- **Where are we trying to get to?**

  Policy goals.

  Departmental strategic objective.

  End-state.

  Decisive conditions.

  Ends.

  Objectives.

  Aims.

- **What do we need to achieve?**

  Outcomes.

  Supporting effects.

  Ways.

  Sub-effects.

  Objectives.

- **What do we need to do (in order to achieve it)?**

  Activities.

  Inputs.

  Means.

  Tasks.

7-B-2. There are a number of different types of measure that can be used in the assessment process. Assume for example, that where we are trying to get to is 'a state of stability within the region'. One of the things we may need to achieve is 'a secure environment' and a task to help accomplish this could be 'conducting patrols'. Measures within the assessment process might be:

- **Measure of Effort** – For example, the number of patrols conducted. This tells us how busy we are but not how well we are doing.

- **Measure of Performance (MoP)** – A measure used to assess the level of success achieved for a given task e.g. the number of streets, villages, city blocks or square km patrolled. This tells us how well we are performing the task but not whether the task is achieving its goal.

- **Measure of Effectiveness (MoE)** – A measure used to assess the level of success achieved for a given desired effect e.g. percentage of the population who feel 'safe'. More than one MoE may exist for any given effect.

- **Measure of Success (MoS)** – A high-level assessment of overall mission success. This may be primarily a subjective assessment but should be supported where possible with objective metrics. For a prolonged operation where there is a succession of headquarters, it may be difficult to establish MoS for each of the headquarters as progress in some areas may be halted or reversed in the short term while longer-term goals are achieved. For example, the preparation and conduct of elections may incite higher levels of attacks on coalition forces or civil unrest.

7-B-3. All of the above measures are useful in the assessment process. However, measures of effort and performance primarily focus on our own actions – they do not tell us anything about the outcomes of those actions or what may have induced those outcomes. Thus to make informed decisions, it is essential to measure the outcomes (MoE and MoS) as well. It is also important to understand that our actions take place in the context of many other activities and events, which it might also be useful to record and measure.

THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS

7-B-4. The assessment process is a continuous cycle with four steps as follows:

- **Activity** – A number of military tasks, diplomacy, influence activity, reconstruction/development or any combination. (Activities will also be conducted by other parties, especially the enemy).

- **Data Collection** – Recording and collation of information relevant to the activity and its effect.

- **Analysis** - Comparison of data against the desired outcome of performing the activity.

- **Decision** – Whether to continue with the activity (with the same/less/greater effort), abandon the activity, replace or augment it with another activity.

7-B-5. Within the military, assessment is led by J/G5 and they are the custodians of the process. Elements that may assist with the process are:

- Operational Analysis (OA) - 'the application of scientific methods to aid military decision-making'.

- Political Advisors.

- Cultural Advisors.

- Development Advisors.

- Other Government Departments (OGD).

In addition, higher level headquaters are also likely to be able to provide advice.

7-B-6. It should be noted that operational and tactical doctrine use different terminology and approaches, but both require similar assessment processes to be developed.

7-B-7. At all levels below the strategic, staff feed into assessments of higher headquarters as well as their own. Every effort should be made to coordinate assessment systems to ensure that they are consistent, but not at the expense of limiting the initiative of lower level commanders.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR MEASUREMENT

7-B-8. Although assessment is led and owned by J/G5, measurement is a collegial effort. All branches generate, collect or collate information to feed into the process.

7-B-9. While assessment can help to achieve short-term targets, its main value is in the long term. When selecting measures, consideration of how quickly change is to be expected is essential.

7-B-10. Measurement should be considered at the same time as the desired effects and courses of action are selected rather than as an afterthought. If it is not clear how an effect will be measured, then that effect is probably not well selected. Regarding measurement as an integral part of the planning process has the following additional benefits:

- Data collection activities can be integrated into courses of action, including possible 'before and after' data collection (OPSEC permitting) to assess changes induced by specific actions.
- It may prompt staff to tailor actions (e.g. by use of Info Ops) to make desired outcomes easier to observe and measure (e.g. use of PSYOPS to suggest that enemy who wish to surrender should form their tanks up in a square, gun barrels pointing inwards). This is particularly important if the impact of actions in the cognitive and social domains is to be understood.

7-B-11. Consideration should be given to who is going to use the measure and how.

7-B-12. Aim to measure what is important. What is easy to measure may not be important and what is important may not be easy to measure.

7-B-13. Measure effects and not just effort. The mix of input and output measures is likely to change over the course of the campaign (i.e. more MoPs at the beginning) but one should strive to develop outcome measures from the outset.

7-B-14. Operations may last a number of years. Select measures and keep measuring them. Continuity is important in order to see trends and measure progress, so draw on the experience of your predecessors and pass on your own experience to your successors.

7-B-15. Information management and exploitation is key to assessment. Good analysis conducted on poor data gives poor results, leading to ill-informed decisions.

7-B-16. Consider where the data source is, how reliable the data is likely to be and how much effort will be required to collect it.

7-B-17. Troops on the ground are a major data collection asset. The quality of the information that they acquire will be enhanced by an explanation of its purpose and utility.

7-B-18. Take note of Rudyard Kipling's serving men and use them at all stages in setting up the measurement system and assessing its outputs.

> *'I keep six honest serving-men*
> *(They taught me all I know);*
> *Their names are What and Why and When*
> *And How and Where and Who.'*[10]

[10] From 'The Elephant's Child', one of the 'Just So Stories' first published as a book in 1902 by Macmillan & Co.

QUALITIES OF A GOOD MEASURE

7-B-19. Measures must always be mission specific, must measure progress/relapse and in addition should be:

- Mapped to a desired objective or effect.
- Meaningful.
- Measurable[11]. } Essential
- Culturally and locally relevant[12].
- Sensitive to change[13].
- Time and geographically bounded[14]. } Highly desirable
- Comprehensive[15].
- Cost and time efficient[16].

7-B-20. In addition to the above bullets, it is important that each measure has an associated definition. This improves the consistency and continuity of data and therefore improves analysis. For example, what constitutes an Indirect Fire (IDF) attack? Is one mortar round an attack and, if so, how does one capture the difference in impact between a single round and a barrage of, say, 30 rounds? The harder it is to answer these sorts of questions, the more one needs to question the quality of the chosen measure. A suggested definition for an IDF attack is:

Measure	**Definition**
# of IDF attacks	# of IDF attacks small (<5 rds), medium (5-20 rds) and large (>20 rds) against unit base location per week.

7-B-21. Measures can be either quantitative (i.e. based on numerical data) or qualitative (e.g. based on Subject Matter Expert [SME]) opinion as to the level of success or failure in a particular area).

7-B-22. Quantitative measures have the advantage that they are easier to compare over time and, if desired, it is possible to use visualisation and statistical methods to examine them17. However, just because quantitative measures are used, it does not imply that these measures are necessarily accurate. Some reliable assessment is therefore desirable.

7-B-23. The qualitative approach allows a subjective assessment whereby, for example, a few large-scale attacks causing many casualties could outweigh a large

[11] Even if a measure would give a perfect indication of progress, it is useless if the data to support it can not be collected.
[12] For example, experience has shown that the local population may have a very different understanding of a term such as 'Security' to that of the British Army. Therefore try to understand and measure progress using the local 'frame of reference' rather than our own.
[13] Measures need to be sensitive to change in the desired effect, with no significant time lag.
[14] Measures should be directly related to the period and area in which the effect is desired.
[15] Measures should apply to the whole of an effect and not just a part of it.
[16] Collecting, collating and assessing data for a measure should use relatively little effort compared to the effort put in to bring about the desired effect.
[17] OA Staff are able to assist in this.

number of less serious attacks. This approach also enables an assessment to be made with incomplete data, or where it is difficult to obtain numerical data. However, the qualitative approach can lead to inconsistency but this can be alleviated by use of two simple techniques:

- Establish a scale with a definition as to what each value means. The scale should have an even number of scores to prevent the tendency to pick the middle value. For example, when assessing the capability of an indigenous army unit, a scale from 1 to 4 could be defined as:

  1 - Unable to operate as a unit.

  2 - Capable of low level operations (*need to further define 'low level operations'*).

  3 - Able to conduct operations unassisted.

  4 - SOPs, rehearsals and exercises, existence of internal training.

- Keep a record of why a particular assessment was made (e.g. "3 – the indigenous army unit successfully planned and executed six minor combat actions at company level in the last month with only minor logistic support from Coalition Forces."). This provides a useful audit trail and helps to ensure consistency over time and between different SME. Experience has shown that if scales are not well defined, and/or the rationale for qualitative assessments is not recorded, the variation between different SME assessments can be greater than the variation in the thing being measured.

CRITERIA & THRESHOLDS

7-B-24. If the effects assessment process is to work consistently and efficiently it is necessary to have tightly defined criteria and threshold values for measures. For example, a measure for attacks on coalition forces could be either a subjective assessment, from low to very high, or an objective metric, defined by the number of particular type(s) of attack as shown below in Figure 7-B-2.

	Subjective	**Criteria and Thresholds**
RED	Very High	No of IDF attacks/week > 10
AMBER	High	No of IDF attacks/week 6-10
YELLOW	Medium	No of IDF attacks/week 2-5
GREEN	Low	No of IDF attacks/week < 2

Figure 7-B- 2 - Subjective and Criteria-Defined Thresholds for Measures

7-B-25. Identification of thresholds, developed in conjunction with SME and supported by data, leads to a more meaningful assessment and helps to define end states and success criteria during the initial stages of the operation. These thresholds also need to be locally and culturally relevant. This can be achieved by getting a baseline from comparable countries or regions that are not subject to the conflict. Thresholds should also undergo periodic review and they are likely to change with any alteration to the mission or changes to the force structure. However,

changing the thresholds will change the assessment and any presentation of the results must contain appropriate caveats.

7-B-26. Threshold values should be chosen such that the increments between one traffic-light colour and the next are indicative of similar levels of improvement or regression across MoE. This is especially true if several low-level metrics are to be combined to form a higher-level metric.

7-B-27. Furthermore, it is important to consider the number of thresholds for each MoE and their characteristics:

- More thresholds mean greater granularity.
- An odd number of thresholds tends to encourage 'middle ground' selection.
- **Different numbers of threshold values for different measures makes comparison diffi**cult (i.e. Amber in a Red/Amber/Green scoring system is not the same as Amber in a Red/Amber/Yellow/Green scoring system).

7-B-28. Thresholds might not be purely numerical, but might be status related. For example:

- Red - the road is closed.
- Amber - the road has been closed in the last 30 days but is now open.
- Green - the road is open and has been open throughout the last 30 days.

DATA AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

7-B-29. Successful assessment is entirely dependent on high quality well managed information. While information management is the responsibility of the appointed officer it is everyone's business.

7-B-30. When data is generated or collected it should be stored in a manner that makes it accessible and useful to anyone in the HQ who needs it. Data should be tagged with its source, date/time stamped and contain an estimate of its reliability.

ANALYSIS AND REPORTING

7-B-31. **Process**. When a set of measures and thresholds have been agreed and data collection against these has been put in train, there is a tendency for the process of collecting, recording and collating data and calculating, plotting and presenting measures to become a time-consuming but routine activity conducted without much thought. Little time is then left for the actual analysis – examining the data, identifying critical points, significant trends and cause-and-effect relationships – which truly informs the decision-making process. The mechanics of running the measurement scheme must never be allowed to crowd out time spent addressing the question, 'what is this telling me?'.

7-B-32. **Analysis**. In identifying relationships between different measures or in determining whether an apparent trend is significant, it is important to apply formal statistical testing to the data since the human eye can be fooled into seeing a spurious blip on a graph as a real change. However, a statistical correlation between two sets of data, no matter how strong, does not mean that one caused the other – trends in both data sets may be caused by a third underlying factor. Statistical testing is an important analysis tool, but is no substitute for common sense.

7-B-33. **Combining Measures**. With a large number of effects for each Line of Operation (LOP) and several measures for each effect, the question 'how is it going?' may be answered by combining measures in a number of ways, including:

- **Averaging**. The scores for individual effects can be averaged to provide an overall score for the LOP. This is easy to do and can be applied consistently but often results in an overall 'score' which tends to the middle and shows little or no change from one reporting period to the next – the 'amber mush', which provides no useful information to the commander.

- **Weighted Averaging**. Weighted averaging is a variant of the above, where a weighting value is multiplied on to the score for a measure before finding the average. The individual weights reflect the perceived importance of the different measures. The weighting scheme can introduce its own distortions as explained at para 41 below.

- **Worst Case.** The 'worst case' is the worst score of any of those of the individual measures. In presentation, the measure giving this worst score must be identified, and it must be noted whether it is the same measure as in the previous period. A drawback of this method is that, for example, continued failure in one district can mask substantial progress in the rest of the area.

- **Judgement**. Rather than using a set, mechanistic means of combining measures, it may be more useful to pick out a few individual measures whose behaviour is considered significant; different measures might be highlighted in different reporting periods or for different areas in the same reporting period. This method focuses attention on points considered, given the totality of measures and analysis, to be most important. Its danger is that the element of subjectivity in choosing the measures to present may lead to inconsistency and bias.

7-B-34. **Amalgamation**. Amalgamation of lower level measures to produce an overall value can be useful, but there comes a point where it is not appropriate. To illustrate this consider an example from the area of economics. At the lower (tactical) level you might measure fluctuations in wages and prices and profits/losses, but if you want to know the state of the economy you would measure the rate of inflation and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Similarly, in a military campaign it is important to use the right sort and level of measure depending upon which decisions are to be based upon the analysis.

7-B-35. **Averaging**. Averaging of measures just within one effect can also have drawbacks. For example, the desired effect is 'improve education of children under 14', for which there are three measures:

- Number of schools per 10,000 children in region.
- Number of teachers per 1000 children in region.
- Number of children attending school.

A colour coded red/amber/yellow/green system is used. In one reporting period, the values of the three measures are all amber and so the overall score is amber. By the next reporting period, a new school has been opened and more teachers recruited and both of these scores are now yellow. However almost no children are attending school and so that score is red. The overall score is still amber despite the fact that if everything then stays the same the education of children has got worse. By averaging the three measures to give one score, an important indicator has been lost. A worst case approach as described above would be better here.

7-B-36. **Weightings**. A common practice is to introduce a system of weightings on measures to reflect their relative importance. Such an approach should be taken with care in order to avoid the following pitfalls:

- **Double-Counting**. The decision maker may assign a weighting, possibly subliminally, to each measure when making his decision. An explicit weighting added previously during the analysis phase may either cause the weighting to be double-counted or take the determination of importance away from the decision maker.

- **Change Over Time**. The relative importance of measures can and probably will change over time. If the explicit weightings are changed to reflect this, the validity of trend analysis may be prejudiced.

- **Inadvertent Weightings**. Inadvertent weightings can be introduced by having different numbers of measures per effect or different numbers of effects per LOP. For example, if one had two measures for Effect 1 and four measures for Effect 2 and amalgamated them by averaging, the measures for Effect 2 would not carry as much weight or priority as the measures for Effect 1. An equal weighting system can be introduced, ensuring each measure and effect carries the same weight. This can be done mathematically or by having the same number of measures per effect, and effects per LOP and so on.

7-B-37. **Trend Analysis**. Operations are very complicated and most things are subject to a number of influences, only some of which can be controlled. Measures will tend to fluctuate over time and so changes from one reporting period to the next may not be significant. Trend analysis looks at the movement of measures over a longer period of time and can identify seasonal variations, data anomalies, systematic errors and indicate true progress.

7-B-38. **Presentation**. Measures and the insights drawn from their analysis may be presented in pure verbal form or may be written out in words or as tabulated numbers, but for ease of assimilation and impact some form of graphical presentation is usual. One of the commonest techniques is the traffic light method, a quick way of presenting complex data in a graphical and easily understood form. In general terms, a green light denotes that the metric is good, a red light implies it is bad or undesirable, and a yellow light indicates that the metric is somewhere in-between good and bad. The traditional traffic light method offers only three ways of characterising each metric, which in itself can be misleading to decision makers. This can be overcome by using more colours which reduces the discontinuity of the sharp transitions from red to yellow and from yellow to green. It also removes the tendency for people to opt for the middle ground of yellow. Thus, the traffic light system is not limited to red, yellow, and green. Instead this method can include four, five or even a whole spectrum of colours. One of the greatest weaknesses in using the traffic light system, leading to ambiguity, is that it is discrete, and offers a limited number of distinct ways of characterising each indicator. It is not clear whether a yellow light is “almost green” or “almost red” for example, or whether a red light means that a particular measurement is likely to recover after a short time, or whether it is on the verge of collapse. Regardless of the presentation method chosen, the analysis phase must consider the questions: What?, Why?, When?, How?, Where? and Who? if the effectiveness of a commander’s endeavours are to be properly measured.

CASE STUDY 4

AN UNSUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN
SOUTH ARABIA AND ADEN, 1963-1967

ASPECTS OF THE CAMPAIGN

1. In contrast to the Malayan Emergency, the British attempt at stamping out an insurgency in South Arabia and Aden[1] (hereafter referred to as Aden) was an unqualified failure. Even 40 years later, it offers numerous lessons which apply to current operations. One veteran described the campaign thus: 'we had to contend with greatly increased terrorism of all descriptions, ranging from assassination to intimidation … We had the effects of the Arab-Israeli War which led to the mutiny in June 1967 … We had at all times to compete with tribalism and the wider struggle between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In all our dealings we had to be mindful of the effect of what we did on other Arab countries … where so much of our oil comes from and we had to be sensitive to world opinion … In short we were involved in a political-military operation of the first magnitude.'[2]

2. Only a few of the principles of COIN were implemented and only at the tactical and operational levels (chiefly neutralising the insurgent); none were implemented at the strategic level. The strategic-level decision makers, particularly those in London, were primarily responsible for this. Strategic planning for the campaign was divided among many different sections of the British government, as well as the local Federation of South Arabia, and none seemed to be centrally coordinated.

3. British control of Aden and South Arabia was a complicated affair. The port of Aden was a Crown Colony controlled by the British Colonial Office. The rest of South Arabia was a series of Emirates divided into the Western and Eastern Protectorates, where British control rested with their foreign affairs and defence departments. Aden and the Protectorates were fundamentally separate in political terms and different in terrain, outlook and development.

4. In the late 1950s, the British government made public the decision to begin the process of withdrawal from Aden. Their plan was to grant independence, with Britain retaining sovereignty rights over the Steamer Point naval base, and the Khormaksar air base. In return for access to these bases, Britain offered military protection to the future Federation of South Arabia. This proposal met with significant opposition in Yemen and Egypt, where it was viewed as turning the new Federation into a puppet regime loyal to the British. From 1963, dissidents from South Arabia organised themselves to disrupt these plans. The dissidents formed into two major insurgent groups, the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY), both of which received support from Yemen and Egypt.

5. The insurgency campaign encompassed several strategies: tribal warfare in the mountainous regions to the north of Aden, chiefly the Radfan; urban terrorism in Aden Colony; and a systematic undermining of the military forces, the Federal Regular Army, the Federal National Guard, and the Aden Armed Police.

6. The dimensions of the British counter insurgency campaign were complex. While the British forces were controlled by Middle East Land Forces, the Federation's security forces were controlled by the Arab officers. British commanders had to have their operations 'up-country' approved by the commander of the Federal Regular Army. There were numerous disagreements between the two military forces when devising strategies to deal with the growing level of violence and lawlessness.

THE LESSONS FROM THE CAMPAIGN

GENERAL

7. The four major defects in the strategy of the campaign were the lack of coordinated government machinery, poor intelligence, the premature announcement of departure dates and the deployment and lack of training for the force.

8. The fighting that took place up-country was complicated by the fact that political control of operations rested with the FSA, while military control rested with British HQ Middle East Land Forces (24 Brigade). Coordination between the two was hampered by tension between the Arab government and the British Armed Forces. The British Army was sent into the Radfan region in 1964, when it became apparent that the Federal Regular Army was unable to pacify the tribes in the region. Many Arab leaders considered the use of British troops unwise, in an area that had not seen such troops since 1906. The fighting in the Radfan was tough, but by the end of 1964, the area was considered to be pacified, although the British army continued to deploy forces there until the withdrawal from Aden in 1967.

9. The major flaw in the Radfan operation was a failure to provide sufficient funds for gaining consent of the people. Brigadier Heathcote recalled: 'the building of roads and opening up of the tribal areas, the winning of hearts and minds of the people, would have been slow and expensive … but would it have cost as much as the last few years of the struggle and disappointment.'[3] The British and Federal authorities' lack of vision ensured that their forces struggled to gain the trust of the community, while insurgents continued to improve their own support and gained access to Aden through the Radfan. Thus there was no attempt to **Shape**, **Secure** or **Develop**

COORDINATED GOVERNMENT MACHINERY

10. The situation in the Crown Colony of Aden was more complicated. The High Commissioner was the Civil Power, and was controlled by the Colonial Office. The Foreign Office also had a role to play in making decisions, as a result of its role in negotiations with Emirs 'up country'. To further complicate matters, the Chief Minister of the Aden State (1965-67), Abdul Qaim Mackawee, who served under the High Commissioner, was a known supporter of the NLF. There was also a Federal Minister of Internal Security, Sultan Saleh bin Hussein, who dealt with security matters for both the Federation and Aden. Despite his position, he could not use Arab troops in Aden, until the summer of 1967, even though he wished to do so earlier in the campaign. The security for Aden rested with Aden Brigade, whose British brigadier had to take into account the views of the RAF and the RN, further complicating his command structure. The whole system was in dire need of restructuring and simplification, but this did not happen until February 1967. Unfortunately, by this time the British who had already announced that they were leaving put themselves in a very weak strategic position.

INTELLIGENCE

11. The collection and collation of intelligence is critical in any campaign, and particularly for counter insurgency campaigns. There were major deficiencies in the intelligence gathering in Aden. Lt Colonel Paget, a veteran of Aden, summed up the situation: 'First, despite similar lessons from previous campaigns such as Kenya, Malaya and Cyprus the authorities were slow to establish an integrated intelligence set-up under one Director of Intelligence until 1965. Second, the local populace was

uncooperative from the start; they saw little future or benefit for themselves in giving help and information to a foreign government which had announced in 1966 that it had intended to withdraw, leaving them to the not-so-tender mercies of the terrorists. Third, the terrorists shrewdly and deliberately set out from the start to neutralize the existing (Arab) Special Branch; and in this they were successful. Steps taken to protect members of Special Branch did not prove effective and this lack of support and security allowed the terrorists to achieve their aim.'[4] This was reiterated by the Aden Brigade commander, Brigadier R C P Jefferies: 'Probably no COIN operations have ever before been carried out with so little operational information. This was caused by the classic elimination by murder and intimidation of the (Arab) Special Branch in 1965.'[5]

THE DEPARTURE DATE FOR BRITISH FORCES

12. Following the British election of 1964, the strategy for Aden changed fundamentally. The new British government decided that the war in Aden was not winnable and planned to withdraw from the campaign. Representatives of the British government arrived in Aden in February 1966 to meet with the British High Commissioner and Arab leaders. The British team stated that the UK would withdraw by 1968 and that, after independence, they would not be able to accept any further military commitment in South Arabia.'[6] This timetable meant that the British planned to withdraw not only before any military campaign had achieved its aims, but also before the British trained and officered Federal Army would be ready to assume responsibility for the security of the country. The Aden Armed Police and the Federal Regular Army would not be strong enough to contend with the insurgency on their own. The announcement also let British forces in the area down as they were perceived as no longer a long-term threat. These troops noted that the number of attacks against them rose dramatically. In 1965 there were 286 recorded acts of terrorism and six British soldiers were killed; in 1967 there were 2,908 acts of terrorism and 44 British soldiers died.[7]

13. The effects of the impending British withdrawal also weighed heavily on the minds of the Arab security forces. As Brigadier Jefferies recalled after the campaign: 'Classically, counter insurgency operations are carried out in support of the Civil Police, but although the façade was kept up for a long time this was not the case in Aden, as there was nothing to support. The police were frightened and had their eyes firmly on the period after we had left; they were unreliable and unhelpful; and in many cases they actively assisted the terrorists.' [8] By 1967, rumours were rife inside the Arab security forces about what the future held. On 20 June 1967, the South Arabian Army and Aden Armed Police mutinied. The Aden Armed Police attacked a British Army patrol and killed 22 officers and men. This incident was a prelude to their disintegration after the British military withdrawal in November 1967.

DEPLOYMENTS AND TRAINING

14. British military forces in South Arabia and Aden were generally deployed on six-month tours. There was no in-theatre training centre such as had been established in Malaya (FTC) or in Kenya (East African Battle School). Brigadier Jefferies commented that: 'special training was, of course, invaluable but every unit did not necessarily have the same amount of time to devote to this.' He went on to say that units were able to adapt. Unfortunately, this was not always true, because units often did not have the lessons from previous operations available to them. As Walker has noted: 'With the notable exception of 45 Commando RM, who used trickle drafting to ensure continuity of experience, most infantry units arrived for a six-

month tour and left together, taking their knowledge of the deserts, mountains or back streets with them: there were handover periods but these were inevitably short.'[9] The lessons of Aden were not properly collated; and passed over in fresh doctrinal thinking. This was made clear when British Army units arrived in Northern Ireland in 1969 and found that the COIN manual of 1969, *Counter Revolutionary Warfare*, lacked lessons from Aden and 'smelled of the jungle'. As a result, many valuable lessons had to be relearned, at some cost, during the first tough years of operations in Northern Ireland.

15. The British withdrew from Aden and South Arabia in November 1967. In the end, the British government negotiated with the NLF as the representative government of the future independent People's Republic of Southern Yemen. As late as the last few days on the ground, British troops were unsure whether their departure was going to be a fighting withdrawal. In the end, it passed without incident.

16. British forces lost more than 200 killed and 1,500 wounded over the course of the campaign in Aden and South Arabia. Lt Colonel Paget summed up the experiences in Aden well when he wrote: 'There are those who believe our men should never have been placed in such a situation. The fact remains that they were. The fact remains too that they responded magnificently to the challenge, and wrote another fine page in the annals of British military history. There was little glory to it, but they served their country well.'[10]

SUMMARY

17. At no stage in the campaign was there any real effort made to gain the consent of the population; chances to **Shape** opinions or influence Key Leaders were missed. There was little dialogue which led to the lack of trust between military forces and the population and this was further manifested by a void in intelligence. Security (**Secure**) was never achieved and as the British announced a date for their withdrawal any hope of real security was lost; in fact the situation deteriorated. **Development** was never resourced and the population realised that their lot would not improve by supporting the British Authorities. The building of roads and opening up of the tribal areas was thought to be too expensive and so was not done; the consent of the population of these areas was never achieved.

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1 For more details of the campaign, see J Paget, *Emergency in Aden*, British Army Review No 141 (reprint); J Paget, *Last Post: Aden 1964-1967,* The Infantryman, No 84, 1968; Brigadier R Jefferies, *Operations in Aden – Some Infantry Lessons*, RUSI Journal, March 1969; S Harper, *Last Sunset*, 1978; J Walker, *Aden Insurgency*, 2005.
2 Walker, p 289-90.
3 T Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency in the Post Imperial Era*, 1995, p 55.
4 The Infantry Man No 84, November 1968.
5 Ibid.
6 J Walker, *Aden Insurgency*, p 165.
7 J Paget, p 264.
8 *Infantry Man*, No 84, 1968.
9 J Walker, p 288.
10 J Paget, p 260.

CHAPTER 8 - EXECUTION

SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

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8-1. Chapter 4 explains how the framework of Shape-Secure-Develop can be used as a way to think about counterinsurgency. This Chapter explains how certain activities might be undertaken within that framework. Of all the chapters in Part B this is the one that will read most like a collection of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP). It is important for the reader to realise that these TTP are based on current best practice and are constantly being revised as conditions change and lessons are learned; the most up to date versions may be found in the Army's Electronic Battlebox on the Defence intranet.

8-2. It is also important to remember that the framework of Shape-Secure-Develop in no way implies a sequential approach. Activity in each category should be carried out simultaneously, with elements rising and declining in prominence as the campaign progresses. There is little doubt that the majority of the military force will be focussed on the provision of security on a daily basis and the military will ultimately be judged on the effectiveness of that provision. However, it is highly likely that the most important activities leading to ultimate success will take place within Shape and Develop and generous military attention should be paid to them. The provision of security is but a means to an end and unless it enables meaningful political, governance and economic development (as show in the model in Figure 8-1), real and lasting progress cannot be made.




Figure 8-1 – Elements of a Functioning State

SECTION 2 – SHAPE

CONTEXT

8-3. *Shape* involves wide scale dialogue with the population in order to influence their behaviour. This might be person to person or by other means such as the media or internet; at its heart is Influence Activity. It starts the process of gaining an understanding of a problem and then exploiting that understanding (intelligence). Elements of *Shape* (liaison and key leadership engagement, for example) continue throughout the campaign. *Shape* activity also initiates the contest for security with the adversary through the conduct of disrupt, dislocate or interdict in depth, normally executed by Special Forces (SF).

8-4. Commanders must be involved with the formal shaping process, largely through dialogue with influential individuals at assemblies and meetings. This process is known as Key Leader Engagement (KLE). Even though such meetings might have a specific purpose and agenda they offer a good opportunity to carry out routine discourse aimed at building relations and understanding the wider concerns of the community. Often the specific purpose of the meeting might be sacrificed to discuss issues that, at the time, concern the community more. Troops on the ground have a significant part to play in shaping since every encounter they have with the population will in someway influence attitudes. Such encounters offer the parallel benefit of gaining information which may be of intelligence value.

THE COORDINATION OF KEY LEADER[1] ENGAGEMENT

8-5. **Purpose Of Key Leader Engagement**. KLE is conducted to gain information or to affect behaviour through influence activity. In the latter case, the aim should be to maintain the support of those who are sympathetic or neutral, persuade those who are not to adopt a more favourable view or position and isolate those who are irreconcilable or actively hostile. This is illustrated in Figure 8-2 below and discussed in detail in Annex A.




Figure 8-2 – Where to Influence

[1] Key Leaders are often referred to as Elites (as in JDP 3-40).

RECONCILIATION

8-6. Reconciliation of insurgent leaders and groups is an inherently delicate and risky business for both coalition forces and the host nation. However, it is important to achieving a long-term solution and should be part of an overall campaign strategy linking to the political resolution of the drivers of conflict. For these reasons the reconciliation effort is driven from operational and strategic levels. However, commanders at all levels may become involved in the process and are likely at times to find themselves interacting with opponents and even enemies who are being or have been reconciled. Commanders, staff and troops therefore need to understand the importance of the activity and the main tenets which are in Table 8-1:

Reconciliation is a tri-lateral deal between the insurgent (group or individual), Coalition and Host Nation Government and inherently difficult and painful to achieve.
Reconciliation is a strategy and needs to be planned carefully and co-ordinated at the highest level.
Intelligence is vital to identify who can and who cannot be reconciled and through what inducements. Intelligence has another vital role in determining what communication channels can be employed to the target – “Smart Engagement”.
Successful reconciliation gathers its own momentum as it is seen to work. For this reason irreconcilable insurgents will often target the process and individuals who are part of it. This needs to be guarded against and may be exploited.
If successful it will split the hardliners from the rest – thus allowing strike operations to follow to remove the irreconcilable.
Long term reconciliation is one of the many goals; this cannot be seen to be a short term tactic (we may leave – they won’t).
Conditional immunity for those that seem reconcilable should be balanced with the natural popular desire to bring to justice those who should be prosecuted. This will require guidance from higher authority.

Table 8-1 - Main Tenets of Reconciliation

USING MONEY ON THE BATTLEFIELD

8-7. **The Utility of Money**. Properly spent within a context of longer term planning, money offers a cost effective means for pulling community support away from the insurgents and provides the military with a much needed economy of force measure. Unemployed or under employed military-aged males typically provide the richest vein from which insurgents recruit ‘foot soldiers. Short-term, labour-intensive projects are therefore the best way to disrupt such recruiting, although but longer term employment through a stimulated economy is what is needed to produce lasting effect. Prompt and fair payment is a vital component of ameliorating the minor grievances or irritations that counterinsurgent activity will inevitably produce. The counterinsurgent should be careful not to be over generous since this will distort local economic and social activity and may lead to unproductive dependency. Emphasis

should be given to putting a local face on the distribution of funds and to creating a strong sense of local ownership of projects.

> The hoops that I had to jump through to get the very few UK pounds that were available were also amazing; the American Divisional Commanders were resourced and empowered in ways that we could only dream of. Our great fortune was that we had direct access to and control over American resources; whether it was money or troops on the ground. That was one of the reasons why there was a radical transformation in Basra.
>
> GOC MND(SE) Iraq, March 09

8-8. **Local Security**. The population should be encouraged to provide individuals to support the security forces in the provision of low level local security for cleared areas. Paying these individuals will produce cash to help stimulate the economy as well as relieving troops of routine tasks. This might include key point security or the picketing of roads and markets. For best effect this activity should commence as soon as possible once an area has been cleared.

8-9. **Tactical Level Uses**. At the tactical level money might be used for:

Recruiting local civilians to provide low level security.
Paying compensation for damage done by the coalition (including payment of 'blood money' in some cultures).
Paying compensation for resources used by the coalition such as the occupation of houses.
Rewarding the capture of insurgents or provision of intelligence.
Creating initial local governance by the setting up and resourcing of local meetings and administrative infrastructure.
Short-term job creation.
Settling grievances which are either real or perceived.
Support of local media e.g. local radio or newssheets.

Table 8-2 – Tactical used of Money for Security Effect

8-10. **Target Selection**. Careful target selection for the use of money may prove as important as targeting for kinetic operations. Often a large number of lower-cost projects will mean wider coverage and more people involved. These projects will often have better completion rates and will get money to people more quickly. Larger-scale projects are likely to be vulnerable to insurgent sabotage because they are more complex, take longer and are often highly visible.

8-11. **Other Benefits**. This small-project approach can create more opportunities to engage civilians constructively and promote positive perceptions. More frequent opportunities to talk with civilians under favourable circumstances help build relationships that may provide actionable intelligence. Additional benefits include bolstering local leaders' prestige, helping them build credibility and enabling them to better control their areas and constituents. Influential local leaders, such as town elders, technocrats, doctors and lawyers, can often be powerful allies since they are crucial to attracting people to coalition projects. However, care must be exercised to

ensure that neither the central government's authority nor the development of egalitarian democracy is undermined.

8-12. **Coordination**. Because most such projects only generate employment and income that lasts for a short time, there is a need to align short term, quick win building projects with broader and longer term programmes. The real goal should be to build a blossoming economy which offers employment to the local population and gives them confidence in their future well being. This level of development is covered in greater detail later under 'Develop'.

8-13. **Obtaining Money**. One of the theoretical benefits of a cross government approach is that money should be made available from a variety of sources including other government departments, international organisations and, possibly, the host nation itself. In reality, UK commanders on recent operations have not had quick access to the same levels of cash as say, their US counterparts. Often money is tied up in government imposed bureaucracy which means that commanders on the ground either cannot get it or it takes so long to arrive that its effect is negated. Securing such funding is the task of operational level headquarters, but at lower levels knowing what is available from all sources and understanding the mechanisms necessary to secure funds is essential and should be considered core business. Where possible, mission command should apply to money as much as any other weapon or enabling system and equally, suitable education and training is essential.

8-14. **Understanding the Pitfalls.** Commanders should guard against uses of money that fritter away large sums for little lasting effect. Lasting effect requires coordinated expenditure on longer term reconstruction efforts that contribute more generally to stabilisation. Recurring costs such as salaries and maintenance are often overlooked leading to schools without teachers and medical centres without nurses. An holistic approach to funding such projects must be adopted. Although it is an essential tool, money can also fuel resentment and prolong conflict if used inappropriately or distributed unevenly, or even more importantly, if distribution is perceived as unfair or discriminatory. All projects should fit into the overall reconstruction strategy – some ostensibly positive projects can in fact undermine such a strategy and can sometimes do more harm than good. For example, building another classroom at a school in a small village might draw teachers away from the larger and more important school in the local town where the main education effort is focussed. The principles for the use of money are at Table 8-3.

PRINCIPLES FOR THE USE OF MONEY FOR SECURITY EFFECT
Coherence - of spending strategy between the military and civilian agencies as well as between short and long term projects.
Empowerment – of commanders to access and spend money at the lower levels.
Oversight – ensure that money spend contributes to the overall reconstruction strategy.
Legitimacy – by gaining local government endorsement of spending patterns.

Table 8-3 - Principles for the use of Money for Security Effect

SECTION 3 - SECURE

8-15. **Background**. Providing a secure environment for the population, host nation governance and coalition and host nation security forces involves activity in both the physical and psychological domains. The framework for operations within Secure (Clear, Hold, Build) is explained in Chapter 4 of Part A. Guidance for action in the psychological domain i.e. Influence Activity is given in Part B Chapter 6. This section covers some of the other activities that might be undertaken during security operations.

8-16. **Framework Operations**. Framework operations are primarily intended to secure and reassure the population, to deter terrorist activity, and to assist in the development of intelligence; they are very manpower intensive. They are conducted by the unit or formation responsible for an area of operations using its integral capabilities and must be integrated into the overall plan for the district or province. Even though coalition troops require bases from which to operate, the establishment of permanent large operating bases in secure areas can alienate the security forces. Small 'patrol houses' from which both coalition and host nation troops can interact with the population tend to be more effective, as are 'dwell' patrols that live amongst the people. Eventually, all framework operations should be led by host nation security forces. During framework operations there are a number of actions that can be undertaken to ensure the security the local population:

- **Patrols**. The only way that soldiers can interact with the people is by being amongst them on their feet; soldiers who live in their bases are contained by the insurgents. The local population is unlikely to talk to security forces who are behind barriers or in vehicles. Patrolling is the most effective method of achieving this interaction, but it must be carefully planned and correctly resourced. Each patrol must have clear security and intelligence gathering objectives and the correct equipment to carry out such tasks. Every patrol should return having enhanced their overall understanding of the human terrain; gaining intelligence about the benign population as well as the enemy. Framework patrols should be led by host nation forces but have interpreters to support the coalition forces involved. Framework forces should aim to have between one and two thirds of their troops on the ground at any time, and maximise the number of patrols by keeping them as small as is practicable. Patrols must get away from fixed points, dominate the ground and fix the insurgent.

- **Counter Corruption**. Corruption is often rife where an insurgency exists. Indeed it could be a major contributor to the financing of the insurgency and, if left unchecked, may remain a significant threat to resolving the crisis. Where it exists, it may pervade the whole of society. Corruption is invariably difficult to eradicate and has to be handled sensitively. In some cultures, certain levels of what may be considered by us to be corrupt practices will be perfectly normal in the eyes of the indigenous population. However, where corruption undermines the counterinsurgent effort it must be addressed. Overall counter corruption is a legal issue that should be addressed by the law enforcement agencies where they exist; in practice it will be the framework security forces that will make the significant contribution in this area. Security forces must have clear direction as to how to deal with corruption when discovered. Arresting a tribal leader who has offered or accepted a small bribe may cause more harm than good in the long term. Corruption within the indigenous forces undermines their credibility and must be countered as a high priority within security sector reform.

- **Restrict Access to Secure Areas**. Restrict Access to Secure Areas. Areas that have been secured need to be protected from the ingress of insurgents, arms and explosives. Initially this can be achieved through the use of check points, Vehicle Check Points, routine patrols and where necessary temporary barriers, for example T-Walls, berms and ditches. As the campaign progresses, and security improves control measures can and should be relaxed, but this will require careful judgment as public opinion will be disproportionately damaged if security measures are relaxed prematurely with resultant heavy loss of life.

- **Population Screening**. A thorough population screening which includes the collection of biometric data allows the counterinsurgent forces to gain an understanding of the make up of the local population. This will help to identify and eliminate remaining insurgents as well as assisting in tracking the movement of people from outside the area. It will also aid the identification of insurgents through forensic data recovered after hostile incidents.

- **Local Irregular Security Forces**. Much of the local population will wish to actively participate in making their own district secure. Many of the low level security tasks such as guarding infrastructure or securing markets and local trading routes might be given to members of the local population. In order to achieve this they will need some training and they will need to be armed. They will also need to be paid which has the added advantage of putting money into the local economy. Before arming members of the local population, their legal status and command and control arrangements needs to be established, as does a method for ensuring the security of the arms and ammunition provided.

- **Conduct Surveys**. The needs of the population and their attitude to both the security forces and the insurgents need to be regularly monitored. This can be done through surveys, which are most effective when conducted by locals who understand the nuances of the answers provided.

8-17. **Surge Operations**. Surge operations are those where security forces and all supporting activities are concentrated to exploit opportunities in a specific area for a specific period of time. Examples of their utility are where an intensive presence is required, where large scale search operations are to be conducted, or where public order operations are necessary. By their nature, they tend to be carried out by units that may not be familiar with the specific conditions present in the area of operations. Every effort needs to be taken to ameliorate this. The prime means is through thorough intelligence preparation and integration. A secondary means is through detailed consideration of likely consequences of the operation, and how such consequences can be managed. Planning must take consideration of the paradox that what works in one place may not work elsewhere. Security forces conducting surge operations need to be careful to follow the lead of framework forces.

8-18. **Strike Operations**. Strike operations can be conducted by framework forces as well as those employed on surge operations. They are highlighted as a specific category because they are both complex and risky. They are conducted to secure, search and if required, seize equipment and/or personnel from a specific target location within the area of operations. The intention is usually to reduce the insurgent's ability to operate. Although they are pre-planned operations, they are likely to be mounted at short notice, normally into a non-permissive environment. A rapid and violent backlash should be expected. As with all security force operations, they should not be conducted in isolation. They have to be integrated into the overall plan for co-ordinated government action. This means that they should be based on

carefully prepared intelligence, supported by focussed information operations, and reinforced by civil, economic and civic initiatives that ameliorate the immediate impact of the operation and serve to demonstrate the government's longer-term intentions. Strike operations are discussed in detail in Annex B.

DETENTION OPERATIONS

8-19. **Purpose**. Detention operations are an essential means of separating the insurgent from the population. They require very careful preparation, planning and execution if the maximum benefit is to be obtained while minimising unwelcome or unintended consequences. Detention can be conducted as a discrete operation or it can be used in support of other types of operation. The main purposes for detention operations are outlined in Table 8-4 but discussed in greater detail in Annex C:

PURPOSES FOR DETENTION OPERATIONS
Gaining intelligence from the target.
Removing the threat (direct or indirect) posed by individuals.
Disrupting insurgent C2.
Detention of indicted war criminals or other criminal elements.
Support to host nation law enforcement.

Table 8-4 – Purposes of Detention Operations

SECTION 4 - DEVELOP

8-20. **Capacity Building**. The purpose of developing capacity within a state is to enhance governance and provide the necessary infrastructure by which a secure, stable and prosperous state is able to govern itself and be capable of achieving development and sustainability goals. Developing capacity has two elements: Military Capacity Building (MCB), which is dealt with at Chapter 10, and civil capacity building. Civil capacity building is best performed by civilian bodies, but in a non-permissive environment much of the responsibility will fall to the military. This is known as Military Assistance to Civil Effect (MACE). MACE can be broken down into three main categories of initial restoration of essential services and facilities, interim governance tasks and initial economic tasks.

8-21. **Initial Restoration of Essential Services and Facilities**. At some stage during a conflict or insurgency there is likely to be disruption or even a complete breakdown of essential services (the most important being water, food, electricity and health provision). Without civilian agencies to provide these services, the military will be expected to get them working and keep them working as soon as possible. The local population is likely to see these services as a minimum requirement and will judge the military and the host nation's authority by their ability to provide for their basic needs.

8-22. **Interim Governance Tasks**. Interim governance tasks are important to the development of a state but are fraught with difficulties and pitfalls. Without effective governance nothing moves forward, and bad governance can undermine the authority of the state and often reflect badly on the military who support it. Military support to governance focuses on restoring public administration and resuming public services. At the tactical level these tasks range through providing security and planning assistance to enabling meetings and the delivery of essential services. Whenever and wherever possible, the military should aim to build on existing host

nation capabilities rather than creating whole scale new ones. Potential tasks are at Table 8-5:

INTERIM GOVERNANCE TASKS
Assisting in political negotiation at local level.
Providing a cross agency command and control framework as an enabler to the introduction of governance.
Re-establishing the rule of law by reforming or establishing a strong, local justice system and institutions.
Supporting elections.
Assistance with disaster planning and response.
Assistance with tackling corruption and associated crime.
Conducting anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking operations.

Table 8-5 - Interim Governance Tasks

- **Co-ordination of Interim Governance.** An organisation and procedures have to be created to coordinate the activities of the civil administration and the security forces. Commanders should note that there are substantial risks involved in, for example, supporting a government which commands little popular support. They should also be wary of undermining an effective local leader by their very association with him. Military officers who are involved in helping to create this coordinating machinery should appreciate that the local culture, customs and political traditions are bound to be reflected in the manner in which affairs are run. This means that the military have to be much more the advisor than the operator. While it may be easier and at times essential for the coalition security forces to conduct operations independently, it is far better to start from the premise that an approach that strengthens the host nation and forces it to recognise its responsibility to solve its own problems is highly desirable.

- **Representation at All Levels**. Joint civil/military committees should be established at each level of government to enable the civil administration and security forces to formulate and implement policy. Representatives of the administration and the security forces must be given the authority to make decisions jointly and have the power and capability to implement such decisions in their respective spheres. The names of the committees and their detailed *modus operandi* will vary according to local circumstances, but the structure described below may serve as a model.

- **National Level Coordination**. Ideally the host nation government will have established some form of national defence council or similar body, to ensure that security aims and priorities are applied by all government agencies in accordance to a national plan. Ideally, a national minister or very senior official should be appointed to oversee the military and civil aspects of the campaign. At this level it is likely that the military representative will be at least 2*.

- **Regional, Provincial, and District Committees**. Fully integrated coordinating committees are necessary at each subordinate level based on civil administration and local government boundaries. Additionally:

    - The lower level coordinating groups can be referred to as operations or action committees.

- The chairman is ideally the senior official of the local civil administration in whose area the security forces are operating. Depending on the size of the area, he could be a minister appointed for the purpose, a provincial governor, the chairman of a county council or his chief executive officer. However, early in a campaign and in the absence of effective, trustworthy local officials, the senior coalition military officer may need to take the lead. This situation should be reversed as soon as possible, but in the interim the appointed officer must strive to understand local conditions and exercise significant diplomatic skill. Officers placed in this role need to have clear purpose, clear parameters and the resources to 'earn' their position.

- The local police, military, intelligence and any other security organisation representatives should be members. Local civilian subject matter experts may either be full members or 'in attendance' as the occasion demands. British formation commanders of the appropriate level would normally attend the appropriate host nation's committees.

- **Coordination at Town and Village Level.** Smaller, less formal committees are needed to coordinate civil, police, military and intelligence operations at the lower levels without jeopardising security or creating a cumbersome bureaucracy. This is the level where the implementation of national plans is most visible to local people and it is thus essential that it is seen to be effective and fair. It is important that local interests are represented and that the people understand the government policy. The chairman would normally be the head of the civil administration, perhaps the mayor or a nominated local community leader. The membership should include the police, military and others who represent key local interests. The coalition military representative may be a battalion or company commander, depending on the scale of the force present.

- **Boundaries**. Civil administration, police and armed forces boundaries should ideally coincide to promote liaison, planning and coordination and to avoid operational and intelligence muddles and accidents. In cases where this alignment is absent, military boundaries should conform to those of the police because security is the primary imperative and it will be the police who will remain when the coalition withdraws. Occasionally, it may be expedient to adjust boundaries in order to bring a single insurgent organisation within the area of responsibility of one commander.

8-23. **Initial Economic Tasks**. Without a sound economy no state is viable. It is not the military's duty to construct long term economic wellbeing but it is its obligation to assist others in this task. The more the military can do to stimulate the local economy and provide opportunity for local businesses and entrepreneurs, the more positive will be the impact on the force's legitimacy and the greater its contribution to the stabilisation effect. A foreign military presence typically introduces a major economic element into a local area and this needs careful handling if the result is to be wholly positive. Negative results could occur if the military paid locally employed civilians salaries well in excess of local standards, and thus drew in people with high profile jobs from elsewhere. On a more macro scale, coalition counterinsurgents may need to ensure that the supported state has reliable access to international markets for its goods through the suppression of crime and the maintenance of facilities like ports or pipelines.

KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENT

8-A-1. **Purpose Of Key Leader Engagement**. Key Leader Engagement (KLE) is conducted to gain information or to change behaviour through influence activity. In the latter case, we seek to maintain the support of those who are sympathetic or neutral, persuade those who are not to adopt a more favourable view or position and isolate those who are irreconcilable or actively hostile as shown in Figure 8-A-1:




Figure 8-A-1 – Where to Influence

8-A-2. **Coordination**. Key leaders will inevitably be engaged by a range of diplomatic, military, economic and other parties. Within military lines of action, Information Operations (Info Ops) staff will co-ordinate KLE – and liaise accordingly – to ensure that exploitation opportunities are optimised. This will ensure that occasions are neither wasted, nor excessive, that protocols are not compromised, that there is coherence and consistency in messages and that the equally important lines to take when acknowledging responses are sustained. This is particularly critical where KLE is conducted indirectly via family or other networks.

8-A-3. **Selection of Personnel**. Selection of the appropriate personnel to conduct KLE is critical. The convention has been for the senior officer within a particular area of operational responsibility (AOR) to engage directly with the perceived key leader of the intended target audience. This requires closer consideration however, and the following factors should also be borne in mind when selecting personnel for this task:

- **Rank**. Key Leaders and their communities are likely to be extremely status conscious. Correctly matching personnel of the appropriate rank to the individuals with whom they are to engage maintains 'face' and also avoids an inappropriately high level of engagement in matters of low importance. It may be necessary to consider the use of acting or local rank to achieve the correct level of engagement.

- **Background and Training**. The ability to influence a target audience through its key leader, as well as correctly interpreting the nuances of the verbal and non verbal feedback received requires a combination of background and training. As well as an understanding of the language and culture, personnel will need a grasp of the issues being discussed and knowledge of the techniques for negotiating with and influencing both individuals and groups. In the likely event that all of these qualities are not invested in one person, it may

be necessary for two, or even three individuals (as well as the interpreter) to conduct KLE – the principal, a Subject Matter Expert (SME) and a PSYOPS trained individual.

- **Continuity**. The requirement for continuity in the conduct of KLE is paramount in building rapport, maintaining consistency of message and in detecting changes in feedback over time. The selection of individuals who are likely to remain in theatre for a reasonable period should, therefore, be considered early in an operational tour. After initial identification of existing and potential key leaders, it may be appropriate to 'assign' individuals (and alternatives) to them for the remainder of the tour, either as the principal or in attendance during any engagement.

- **Gender**. Consideration should be given to the gender of the person selected to conduct KLE. In some cultures and in certain situations, the selection of a female may produce sub-optimal results or even prove to be counter-productive.

8-A-4. **Target Audience Analysis**. Failure to adequately differentiate between the separate constituent elements of a society can lead to the mistake of over-simplifying either the message or its method of delivery, to the point where little or no effect is achieved. Even within a small village or town there are likely to be numerous 'sub-audiences', including the ruling and subordinate tribes, merchants, farmers, criminals, enemy forces, police, schoolchildren and foreign aid agencies. To be effective, the same message may have to be tailored and delivered in many different ways if it is to have the desired impact across the breadth of a community. A degree of Target Audience Analysis (TAA) is therefore necessary prior to the conduct of any KLE. This may have to be re-visited continuously, particularly if the composition of a community changes. Examples of such changes are an influx of refugees, the rotation of a host nation army unit or the eviction of enemy forces. TAA in the field is a key task of PSYOPS Support Element (PSE) staff and evolves from the basic psychological study for the AOR. This will also be the source of general cultural awareness guidance in theatre TAM inserts. The PSE has reach-back capability to both HQ 15 (UK) PSYOPS Gp (who also conduct basic TAA packages for unit and brigade G2 personnel) and human factors experts within the Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations. Products may take from a few hours to up to three months to deliver.

8-A-5. **Forecast**. A KLE forecast should be maintained. This should be visible to the primary branches of the headquarters, including G2, G3/G5, PSYOPS, Media Ops, POLAD and CIMIC. Such a forecast enables oversight and coordination of the KLE effort as a whole and allows additional input where required.

8-A-6. **Briefing**. As for any patrol or operation, those conducting KLE should obtain sufficient and appropriate planning information beforehand. As a minimum, a G2 update is needed but wider input may also be required to avoid confliction with other military or OGD activities, or to establish the most appropriate approach to address particular issues.

8-A-7. **7 Questions**. In order to clarify the purpose of a KLE event, principals should go through a version of the seven questions process beforehand as described below in Table 8-A-1. In particular they should satisfy themselves, at the level of the KLE event concerned, of:

Q1 – What are the overall political, security and economic situation within which the meeting is going to take place?
Q2 – Who are the 'real' target audience is – it may not be anyone actually represented in the meeting itself?
Q3 – What are the effects which we wish to have on the target audience and how will we know if we achieve them?
Q4 – How might the target audience be trying to influence me?
Q5 – If the engagement goes awry, what pressure can be employed to recover the initiative? What undertakings might be offered that could be honoured?
Q6 – What are the requirement to avoid confliction with other current or planned activities?
Q7 – What is the potential for any preparatory shaping and can the event be rehearsed?

Table 8-A- 1 Questions for KLE

8-A-8. **Community Structures**. It is important to understand the community dynamics of the population within any chosen AO. Different communities will react differently to KLE and the influence that is being brought to bear. Some communities may be routinely used by the other tribes as go-betweens and these should be identified early. Establishing the identities of the leaders within a particular group or tribe should be part of the G2 preparation of any KLE.

8-A-9. **Force Protection**. KLE will often take place within locations and be attended by persons under the control of the key leader concerned; which may present security challenges. Although it is desirable to create an atmosphere conducive to the successful conduct of the meeting, the requirement for adequate and appropriate Force Protection (FP) must be considered. It is worth remembering, however, that FP in this instance extends beyond the physical protection of the individuals involved – there is a requirement to protect the wider force from any potential damage resulting from real or perceived insensitivity to elements of cultural awareness which may be exploited, or even deliberately orchestrated, by the enemy. FP factors should be considered when planning a KLE as described Table 8-A-2:

FORCE ELEMENTS	PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Inner Cordon Troops	Threat (SIED,VBIED, IDF, SAF etc)
Outer Cordon Troops	C2 concept
Compound Security	OPSEC
AES Dog and Handler	Recces
Medical Support	Alternative Location
JTAC	LOs
ISTAR	Size of group
IEDD, CMD	Arrival and access at venue
J6 enablers	Routes in and out

Table 8-A-2 – Force Protection of KLE

8-A-10. **Conduct.** Cultural awareness plays an vital important role in the successful conduct of a meeting; other wider coordination issues should also be addressed as follows:

- **Responsibility**. It is likely that KLE will be conducted by more than one person. The tasks and responsibilities of each individual should, therefore, be clearly understood beforehand. Table 8-A-3 outlines some of them:

PRINCIPAL	INTERPRETER	SME/VISITOR	PSYOPS
Establish seating plan where possible Demonstrate hierarchy Act as the primary speaker	Identify those able to understand English Translate accurately and only advise or explain only when requested	Advise principal beforehand and during the meeting Lead on subject area of expertise	Provide close FP Note-taker for principal Observe and assess inputs/reactions from others in engaged Key Leader party

Table 8-A-3 – KLE Individual Responsibilities

- **Rapport**. One of the main aims of KLE is to build up a rapport between the main players on both sides. The establishment of trust and mutual respect adds validity to the message being conveyed and allows greater confidence in the feedback received. Building such rapport is not easy, however, but it should overcome numerous barriers, including suspicion, frustration, and scepticism at a personal level first, if the positive effects of KLE are to be subsequently felt amongst the wider population. It may that no rapport or common ground can be achieved at all. In this event, it is critical that the principal recognises the longer term view and avoids undermining the basis of subsequent meetings[2].

- **Other Meetings**. The identified local key leader is likely to receive numerous visits from other groups which are also attempting to influence the population. If they are also from the coalition or friendly civilian organisations a strategy of consistency should be devised in order to promote continuity and demonstrate unity. Other meetings may involve criminals or insurgents; just because a key leader meets with such elements does not mean that he has sympathy with them (just as meeting with the military might not be to his liking). An important function of KLE is to establish the identity of these groups and, where possible, gain some idea of their likely future engagement. This information may subsequently be used by the info ops staff to:
  - Prevent overloading a key leader with meetings.
  - Coordinate the delivery of the same message from different sources.
  - Convey a message from a third, perhaps more trusted, source entirely.
  - Counter the impact of conflicting or negative messages.

[2] Experience on current operations has shown that it is often necessary to build a trusting relationship by holding several meeting to discuss a range of less relevant issues before it becomes possible to broach any intended subject matter.

8-A-11. **Follow Up Action**. The recording and prompt dissemination of the results of KLE is vital in order to exploit any opportunities which may arise, contribute to wider situational awareness and the G2 picture, and to coordinate any subsequent or related meetings. Where possible, debriefings should be conducted by the BG Intelligence Officer or the SO2 Info Ops. Where this is not possible, the principal should debrief his KLE team personally, using the appropriate formats. There are two principal elements to the post KLE report – G2/G3 and Human Factors:

- **G2/G3**. The G2/G3 element of the post KLE report records details of the meeting which may be of intelligence or operational value. It should include an indication of the success or progress of any influence activity objectives, as well as suggestions as to how these might be taken forward at the next meeting. This part of the report may follow the normal brigade or unit conventions and format for any post patrol report.

- **Human Factors**. The human factors element of the report concentrates on the personality of the key leader himself. This information is vital in building up a picture of the individual concerned in order to devise appropriate strategies to influence his behaviour and actions and to assist in the planning and conduct of future meetings.

Distribution of the completed report should be directed and coordinated by the info ops staff if it is to contribute to coherent follow up activity by the relevant staff elements.

8-A-12. **Maintaining Engagement**. The maintenance of a relationship between the principal and key leader during periods between meetings is an important element in building rapport. It may also significantly reduce the amount of time spent in social manoeuvring during the conduct of KLE meetings. Engagement may be maintained in any number of ways, but principally via personal letter and telephone. Factors to consider include:

- The requirement to continue to coordinate any contact through Info Ops.
- OPSEC/COMSEC.
- The safety of the key leader concerned.
- The potential for releasing material which may, subsequently, be used by the enemy in propaganda, or by the media.

ANNEX B
TO CHAPTER 8

COUNTER INSURGENCY STRIKE OPERATIONS

8-B-1. **Purpose**. The purpose of counterinsurgency strike operations should be to provide greater overall security for the population by removing undesirable elements from it. This can be: to search a building or site to remove illegal weapons, sensitive material (Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE)) or munitions; to search a building to gain evidence with which to enable an internment or successful prosecution through the appropriate justice system; to detain an individual for subsequent questioning, internment and prosecution; the exploitation of action taken or information gained for Information Operations or PSYOPS purposes. The nature of the operation, to arrest then search or search then arrest on information gained, will largely depend on the initial intelligence that prompts the operation. Evidence relating to criminal activity should, where possible, be recovered in accordance with formal policing procedures to ensure the integrity of all evidence recovered and successful use during subsequent analysis and judicial proceedings.

8-B-2. **Criteria for Success**. The target area is likely to be non-permissive, and any cordon or strike team should remain aware of the rapidity with which the insurgents can react to operations, including: ambushes on withdrawal routes, public order incidents, indirect fire attacks and any subsequent re-organisation. Thus the success of the operation will depend on many factors not least of which is the prior preparation and training of the cordon and strike teams, including joint, combined, multi agency and multi-national agencies[3], coupled with the initial and ongoing ISTAR feeds. The time spent on the ground will be a major but finely balanced factor in success, as, after the initial surprise, the duration of the operation will be become inversely proportional to security and consequent success[4].

8-B-3. **Coordination**. A counterinsurgent strike should not be conducted in isolation from the wider campaign objectives. For example, strike operations might need to be harmonised with information operations that explain the rationale for the activity.

8-B-4. **Principles**. The principles applicable to counterinsurgent strike operations are:

- **Offensive Spirit**. A successful strike operation will have a positive effect on friendly forces morale; furthermore success will also stamp the counterinsurgency Force[5] authority onto insurgent groups and the wider population. Within the principle of offensive spirit is tempo. A rapid operation, conducted with spirit and tempered aggression, will aid the element of surprise and help dislocate the insurgent's response, especially when supported by a timely information operation and Key Leader Engagement (KLE).

- **Flexibility**. The timeliness and quality of the intelligence feed often mean that much of the target detail is uncertain. Insurgent reactions and the potential for follow-up from tactical questioning mean that the full task will sometimes not be confirmed until the force is on the ground and may change at very short notice. Flexibility should be included in the planning and embraced in the

[3] Especially Host Nation support for the provision of tactical questioners and interpreters.
[4] The tipping point will vary on each operation and must be judged by the commander on the ground.
[5] This can include, but is not limited to Host Nation Government and other authorities as well as British Forces acting either unilaterally or as part of a coalition.

command and conduct of the operation. True flexibility is engendered by the use of mission command, reinforced by rigorous training in mental agility.

- **Surprise and Security**. In a hostile insurgent environment complete surprise is unlikely[6]; however, some relative tactical surprise will potentially dislocate the insurgent forces and thus reduce the effectiveness of their reactions. Surprise is most likely to be achieved by deception, both physical and conceptual, and its effects will be enhanced by aggressive action and a high tempo, thus achieving greatest security for the force. Rigorous OPSEC is essential throughout.

- **Simultaneity**. In order to achieve the highest level of security and tempo the operation should be planned to achieve simultaneity. The cordon and strike forces should arrive on task at the same time, which reinforces the limited opportunity to achieve surprise, and also reduces the time on task and therefore the time available to insurgent forces to shoulder effective counter operations.

- **Simplicity**. Strike operations are often reactive and, due to the number of agencies and assets involved, have the potential to be complex, often occurring in areas where communications are difficult. The plan should not rely on continuous communications but should instead reinforce the essentials of mission command based around a sound but simple plan. Where junior commanders have a thorough understanding of a simple scheme of manoeuvre and particularly the intent, and are appropriately empowered, they are better able to react to the unforeseen circumstances.

- **Reserves**. The use of reserves remains a sound military principle. However unless they can be inserted in a timely and secure manner, either by armour or aviation, their committal may cause greater problems then they are intended to resolve. They should be held as near to the operation as possible but where they do not become a target themselves.

8-B-5. **Service Support**. The areas in which such operations take place are often hostile. Insurgent reactions can be fast and aggressive and leave very little time for reactive CSS planning. Thus CSS should be embedded from the outset and cover the following areas:

- **Casualty Extraction**. Casualty extraction, of both personnel and vehicles, should be pre-planned to ensure that waiting times are minimised.

- **Detainees**. The operation will almost certainly detain insurgents who require further questioning. Plans should be in place for their immediate extraction and transport back to a secure location and then on to the base location using appropriate restraints and means to deny them information[7]. The use of host nation forces may facilitate immediate tactical questioning[8] and thus rapid, immediate follow-up operations akin to a quick attack. Plans must also be in place for the safe release of persons that have been lifted during the Strike Operation but who are of no intelligence/criminal value. Facilitating such a safe release not only discharges a moral obligation; it also has a positive psychological effect as part of the overall counterinsurgency operation.

[6] In the urban environment complete tactical surprise is very unlikely due to the limited number of routes and the high likelihood of warning from the local population.
[7] Arrest kits may include: SOIs, blackened goggles, ear defence and plasticuffs.
[8] Tactical questioning without host nation support will reduce the chances for immediate follow up, thus reducing tempo and missing fleeting opportunities for success.

8-B-6. **Conduct**. The planning, preparation and conduct of an Urban Strike can be broken down as follows and is shown at Figure 8-A-1 below:

- **Find**. The find phase, producing actionable intelligence, is usually conducted by a number of agencies other than the strike force, such as HUMINT and EW. However in some situations the commander may have insufficient detail. In such cases commanders should consider the use of all available ISTAR assets at their disposal[9], or task appropriate imagery and intelligence from the chain of command. Full motion video may be available at the formation level and units conducting such a task should endeavour to place liaison officers to fully exploit such assets. Whilst the availability of ISTAR assets may not necessarily provide a go/no-go criteria, the addition of overhead surveillance assets will significantly enhance the commander's warning of insurgent reactions in the preliminary and execution phases of the operation. The end result of the find phase should be a developed target pack that contains all the information required to conduct the planned parts of the operation.

- **Prepare**. Preparation for the operation includes the gathering of intelligence and dissemination of the product, including aerial pictures, site diagrams and maps where possible. In close urban terrain maps may not be as useful as a good aerial photograph overlaid with grid and other reference points. For short notice operations a quick intent, scheme of manoeuvre and grid reference graphic may be all that is required. For pre-planned operations, flexibility on the ground is aided by the full planning and rehearsal process. Close liaison between elements is an important aspect to ensure that once on the ground the task can be completed in a timely manner and all relevant information, such as evidence and target marking, is fully exploited. Exploitation can be enhanced by active media lines which will have to be cleared beforehand.

- **Insert**. Crucial to the operation is the swift insertion, by a secure route[10], to establish a simultaneous cordon and strike, balancing speed against the security of a deliberate route clearance. The number of vehicles and troops likely to be required to secure a route should not be underestimated, particularly if an adverse reaction from the local population is expected. For instance, entry into a built-up area will often necessitate the insertion of piquets at every junction. Deception is an important element to this phase, aided by the appropriate use of ground and air assets[11]. Planners need to consider the risk on known routes and the ability of insurgents to mine or conduct IED ambush at short notice if routes are limited. To counter this, force elements should be task organised with EOD, counter-mine and Conventional Munition Disposal (CMD) teams, supported by responsive firepower to push through ambushes if required. The use of C-IED equipment in all vehicles is essential[12] and

[9] This may include J2 Int, Geo, JARIC and Coalition/Theatre assets, if available.
[10] Recent experience on Op TELIC has shown that when faced with a limited number of entry and/or exit routes, it was often best to use one route in and secure it for the subsequent extraction of the force. The use of more than one route would reduce the ability of the force to extract through an ambush using overwhelming firepower. A single route also simplified the recovery plan.
[11] Lightly armoured protected patrol vehicles (PPV Light, i.e. JACKAL) offer a stealthy option, but only if the threat permits it. Armour increases the chances of being compromised, but the enhanced protection of WR and CR2 may warrant their use. Foot insertion maintains the greatest stealth but leaves the Strike Group most vulnerable and increases the complexity of CASEVAC.
[12] C-IED equipment can affect communication equipment. The priority of ECM over communications is a tactical commanders decision based on the current situation, however once static and after appropriate checks have been completed TTPs may allow ECM coverage to be reduced.

consideration should be given to the use of electronic-attack (EA) if the RoE and mission parameters permit. As well as disrupting insurgent reactions, targeted EA may also force the insurgents onto means of communications that permit intelligence gathering as a by-product. The planned locations for the cordon and strike force control points should take into account known insurgent areas and provide protection and mutual support from potential counter operations mounted by the insurgents. This is particularly pertinent if multiple targets are included into the one cordon operation. In certain conditions the insertion may sensibly be treated as an advance to contact, planning for when, rather than if, the force comes into contact[13].

- **Establish the Cordon**. The cordon is broken down into two parts.
    - The inner cordon is placed on the target site and its primary purpose is to prevent persons escaping from that site; it is looking inwards and will cover roads and alleys in positions that provide cover from view and fire. To maintain surprise and deception the inner cordon should be inserted simultaneously to the strike force.
    - The outer cordon is to prevent insurgents, or the local population, from interfering with the operation; it is outward facing and its positioning and distance from the target will depend on the ground and areas of likely threat. In a high risk urban environment the outer cordon will most likely be mounted in armoured vehicles, but insertion by aviation may be possible if the environment permits.

- **Strike**. The intimate strike of the target will usually be conducted by a specially trained strike force. This specialist task is usually based on an Infantry unit, often with armour acting in intimate support. It requires pre-training in building clearance and Advanced Close Quarter Battle (ACQB) [14]. Procedures for formal target identification on site need to be in place to complement the intelligence provided. For example it is likely that intelligence provides a name and address but this needs to be translated into the correct building and person. This can probably be best achieved by local knowledge and on site questioning. It is important that the strike force is given intimate security support, including the use of protected mobility; this is achieved by use of the cordon force, the inner cordon of which will also act to capture personnel attempting to evade the strike. The decision to strike with a 'hard' (forced entry) or soft knock (compliant entry) should be taken on the basis of the available intelligence, the current situation, the likely effect on the local population[15] and be based upon extant rules of engagement. Time is a key element and the strike force should be able to execute the task rapidly.

[13] Strike operations in Basrah invariable came into contact as the force moved into the urban environment.
[14] Also commonly known as Enhanced House Assault (EHA)
[15] Experience from Op TELIC has been that the local population respected a strong force and were usually understanding of a hard knock if correctly targeted.




Figure 8-A-1 - Example Urban Strike Laydown

- **Fix and Dominate**. During the strike operation it is important to deny the insurgents the chance to conduct counter operations. This is best achieved by dominating the ground in the vicinity of the strike. Dependant on the ground and threat the cordon should be prepared to conduct patrolling activities where possible[16]. Whilst it may be dangerous for the cordon force to become too static, the use of armour with its visibility and firepower, can provide an ideal focus for small foot patrols, providing mutual support and all round defence. Indeed the use of static armour may provide a focus for insurgent reaction, thus drawing them in for subsequent engagement.

- **Extract**. The extraction phase is possibly the most exposed element of the operation. The possible route options are likely to be known, and thus targeted, and the insurgents or local population will have had time to react to events. Whilst reason would infer that the insertion route should not be re-used, experience has shown that it is better to hold and secure one route in and out when the threat of IEDs is high[17]. Best use should be made of available ISTAR assets to monitor the route and known or possible ambush positions.

[16] The inner and outer cordon forces will be in relative proximity, sometimes with insurgent forces in between. Good situational awareness is essential to prevent Blue on Blue incidents. This may be aided by keeping the inner cordon static, on the target building facing in, with the outer cordon providing the mobile element.

[17] Experience in Basrah has shown that once a route had been forced in and secured, insurgents were usually unable to approach it for long enough and in sufficient strength to place IEDs, and the use of armour meant that the force could extract safely through any small arms ambush. The use of a

- **Exploit**. The exploitation phase may involve immediate follow up after tactical questioning, resulting in another immediate strike in the near vicinity, or in the longer term the non kinetic effects associated with media and information operations. An important part of the post incident procedures is thorough debrief and information capture from the troops involved, both for evidential purposes if required, but also to allow for TTP feedback.

8-B-7. **Training**. Training for strike operations is essential. Every opportunity to practise and co-ordinate such operations should be taken throughout the training progression, including the use of ISTAR feeds and armour. Where possible the same element of the force should be dedicated to the same task[18], so that actions become drills leading to faster response times. The provision of standardised target packs and the allocation of fixed tasks to troops (e.g. the same troops always conducting the cordon) will enhance this[19].

8-B-8. **Rehearsal**. By their nature, and the timeliness of intelligence, most strike operations happen very quickly and the chance for rehearsals can be minimal when coupled with all the other mission preparation tasks. However, the requirement for rehearsals remains as strong as ever; indeed given the multi agency nature of such a task they are essential. Teams that are likely to conduct, or support, such missions should study and practice in a safe environment prior to commitment. These rehearsals should include practical drills for the cordon and strike as well as rehearsal of the communications plan and its backup. Actions-on drills should be rehearsed, especially if outside agencies or inexperienced units are involved, until they are second nature. In the event of a short notice mission then a mission brief and a collective walk through of the sequence of events in lieu of the orders may well suffice.

8-B-9. **Rules of Engagement**. Depending on the area of operations the rules of engagement for a specific strike may change from those normally experienced in the AO. It is important that any changes are communicated to, and understood by, all troops involved. In some instances discrete force elements may be on differing rules of engagement. The avoidance of collateral damage must be a high priority.

8-B-10. **Target Reconnaissance**. A balance needs to be made between the risks of compromise inherent in conducting target recces prior to the strike versus the risk of having insufficient information or area knowledge should recces not be undertaken. This balance will alter with the experience and familiarity of the area by the troops involved. Recces will often be the reserve of special forces or formation level surveillance troops. Regardless, commanders should ensure they have sufficient detail to conduct and command a strike operation.

8-B-11. **Air and Aviation Support**. The use of air and aviation in such an operation is highly desirable although it is possible to conduct operations without them. The ground and target location will dictate whether aviation can be used for the insertion and extraction of troops, or provide CCA or ISTAR support. Air assets (attack or lift) provide an effective means to assist in the cordon of a specific targeted area. Lift can provide an in-air Armed Reactionary Force (ARF) able to influence directly against targets in the outer cordon (combatant/non-combatant). It can be used to quickly dominate key terrain around a targeted area.

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differing extraction route increased the risk of a successful insurgent IED ambush and thus the risk of coalition casualties.

[18] Route clearance and security, outer cordon, inner cordon, strike, ISTAR.

[19] Experience on Op TELIC has shown that there is reduced confusion, greater security and a greater tempo achieved when the same company group conducted either the cordon or strike elements.

8-B-12. **Host Nation Security Forces**. Where J2 considerations permit, the use of host nation security forces should be considered for the strike. Their use will encourage the concept of UK assistance to the host nation, whilst encouraging the host nation to take on its full security responsibilities. They can also facilitate quick information wins during an operation, allowing for rapid follow-up[20]. However, planners should take into account the differences in RoE and TTPs. The use of host nation forces should not provide a convenient method for bypassing UK RoE and ethical behaviour.

8-B-13. **Vehicles**. The terrain, threat, type of operation and troops available will all dictate the most appropriate vehicles. Ideally the troops involved should be familiar with all types of vehicle being used.

8-B-14. **Evidence Capture and Cameras**. Where possible troops should be equipped with digital cameras and helmet mounted video cameras; as a minimum there should be one camera for the strike team and one for tactical questioning[21]. This will allow post operation evidence to be captured, as well as informing post incident reviews, whilst minimising the time required on target. In addition the correct evidence recovery equipment should be utilised to secure and preserve any items seized.

8-B-15. **Building Clearance**. The detailed TTPs for Advanced Close Quarter Battle (ACQB) can be found elsewhere[22]. However it is important to consider the three dimensional aspect of all potential targets and ensure that appropriate equipment, such as ladders or torches, are available for the strike team.

8-B-16. **Public Order**. The strike operation may well result in public demonstrations and civil action, possibly instigated by insurgent action. Contingency planning for the continuance of the operation and subsequent extraction of the force from a public order situation should form part of the plan. This should include a confirmation of the ROE and equipment with a reminder of the correct use and escalation of non-lethal to lethal force.

8-B-17. **C3**. Command, control and communications are pivotal. Particular attention should be paid to the difficulties of communications at distance in an urban environment. Plans should take into account the likelihood of a breakdown in communications.

8-B-18. **Post Strike Activity and Information Operations**. A strike operations may induce fear and uncertainty in the local population; if left unchecked this will lead to a loss of support and perhaps open hostility. Therefore, it is important to let the local population know what is going on and why, and to explain why any detainees are being held. An important component of this is KLE as well as media and information operations.

[20] The use of Iraqi Security Forces as the Strike Teams in Basrah enabled immediate tactical questioning and allowing subsequent follow up to occur in the same operation. It also meant that the operation was seen to be led by the host nation forces.
[21] Ideally there should be one camera per element (e.g. strike force, inner and outer cordon).
[22] AFM Vol 2 Part 5 – Urban Operations, revised version due for publication in 2009.

STRIKE OPERATIONS - TERMINOLOGY

The following terminology is commonly used when conducting strike operations in an counterinsurgency environment:

Detain and Search Operation. Priority is to arrest individual(s) with a subsequent search to gain additional evidence. Implies there is already sufficient evidence to warrant detaining, or internment.
Search and Detain Operation. A strike to remove illegally held material, detaining persons if there are grounds to do so. The detention can be specified, or implied.
ALPHA. The target house.
BRAVO. Target individual.
CHARLIE. Target vehicles.
Unknown Male (UKM). Unspecified male.
Unknown Female (UKF). Unspecified female.
Unknown Child (UKC). Unspecified child.
Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE). IT, documents, hard drives, flash drives, photos, mapping.
VDOP. Vehicle Drop off Point.
FAP. Final Assault Position.
H Hr. The point at which the Strike Team is knocking on the door (hard or soft).
Hard Knock. Forced entrance.
Soft Knock. Compliant entrance.
Inner Cordon. A cordon around the house, or block whose purpose is to prevent runners escaping, and locals interfering.
Outer Cordon. To prevent interference with strike activity in depth.
Time Sensitive Target: A strike launched with little preparation time in order to exploit intelligence

URBAN STRIKE IN A COIN ENVIRONMENT – PLANNING POINTS

The following planning points should be considered when preparing for an urban strike operation in a COIN environment:

Refining the target pack, using JARIC, ISTAR, Geo, and Int.
Tasking of agencies, possibly including the following: o Advisor (USA). o Evidence NCO (RMP). o Dogs. o Royal Engineer Search Advisor (RESA). o REST. o Unit Search o RMP (and if required, Military Provost Staff (MPS)). o Interpreters. o Female Searcher. o Information Operations. o Combat Camera Team (CCT). o Method of Entry (MoE) Team. o Bde Surveillance Coy (BSC) LO. o ATO and Weapons Intelligence Section (WIS). o Host Nation Forces – Police, army, SF. o Air and Aviation. o UAV and other ISTAR
Battle Procedure including rehearsals.
Selection and preparation of eqpt. Key issues that are specific to Strike Ops are as follows: o Method of approaching the Target Area – PPV Light, Armour, Helicopter, Foot, Boats. o Method of entry – Ladders, Enforcer, Hooligan, Bolt Cutters, Sledge Hammer, Rabbit.. o Arrest Kit comprising gloves, evidence bags, tags, relevant evidence continuity forms, plasticuffs, blacked-out goggles and ear defenders. o Cameras for evidential purposes, incl head mounted video cameras. o IFF equipment – Mockingbird, Firefly, IR Cyalumes. o Weaponry – Sniper Rifles, Javelin, Light Laser Marker (LLM), Pistols, Rifles, Minimi and FRGs. o Night Vision – VIPER, HMNVGs, CWS, SOPHIE, LION, Veh borne TI and loc. o Comms – PRR, VHF, HF, TacSat, Sat Phone, Mob Phone. o Spare capacity for detainees and attached personnel. o Public Order equipment for cordon troops if required.
Other: o Media responses and line to take. o Public Order o Command, control and communications. o Information Operations.

URBAN STRIKE OP TASKS/CHECKLIST

ACTION ON THE OBJECTIVE				
Insertion	**Confirmation of Tgt Hse**	**Strike and Secure**	**Search**	**Extraction**
• Mov from FAA to FRV (if there is one) • OOM Escort, Cordon, Strike, Tac, Main, Escort • Silent/Noisy • Road Access • Foot or veh approach • ZULU Shoulder/VDOP • Compound or Detached Hse	• Cfm Tgt Hse:ISTAR Map Recce (worst case), Ground Recce, GPS • Cfm Inner cordon Posns • Cfm CP locs • Cfm entry point • Top Cover	• Go/No go Trigger? • Estb Inner Cordon, incl Top Cover • Estb CP Team Locs • Block Hse Doors • H Hr • ISTAR Steer • Gain entry to House • Freeze all movement in house • Cfm correct hse through TQ and interpreter • Report Clear/Initial Sitrep	• Switch from Strike to Search (Posture change) • Search occupants • Separate occupants once searched and checked into separate rooms (women and children, BRAVOs and males) • Women and children can be moved into one room before being searched to keep out of sight of men. Female to search and intimate guard. 1 male guard on the door. • RESA/USA cntl Search Agencies • Thorough Search using AAST and REST. • Search Rooms • Detailed SITREP • OC Orders detention of BRAVOs • Floor plan and photos of bldg, eqpt etc	• Plan extraction • ID escorts • Veh Plan • ZULU Shoulder reorg • Detainees removed • Orders to Extract • Bouncers to guard extraction point • Veh Comds/Pl Sgts/CSM accounts for all pax

DETENTION OPERATIONS

8-C-1. **Purpose**. Detention operations are an essential means of separating the insurgent from the population thus increasing security and quality of life. They require very careful preparation, planning and execution if the maximum benefit is to be obtained while minimising unwelcome or unintended consequences. Detention can be conducted as a discrete operation or it can be used in support of other types of operation. The purposes for detention operations are outlined in Table 8-C-1.

PURPOSES FOR DETENTION OPERATIONS
Gaining intelligence from the target.
Removing the threat (direct or indirect) posed by individuals.
Disrupting insurgent C2.
Detention of indicted war criminals or other criminal elements.
Support to host nation law enforcement.

Table 8-C-1 The Purpose of Detention Operations

8-C-2. **Considerations**. Table C-8-2 is a list of possible considerations for a commander when planning and conducting detention operations:

CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETENTION OPERATIONS
The conduct of these types of operation is cyclic – Capture-Detain-Release-Capture. The cycle is fed by the conduct of security operations and is refined by the ever-increasing and accurate intelligence generated through interrogation.
If the force is not specifically structured, trained or resourced to conduct detention operations there is high risk to its effectiveness. The exploitation of detainees within the rule of law by well trained personnel is critical. Poorly conducted detention operations will be damaging and may drive large numbers of the uncommitted population into the ranks of the insurgency.
The detention infrastructure itself should be well resourced and well managed if it is to be capable of identifying and separating out the hard-core from the less motivated insurgent.
There is significant risk to these types of operation if they are conducted in the absence of a functioning host nation judiciary. To that end, detention operations and the conduct of security sector reform are linked activities at the strategic level.
The process should involve a mechanism to identify what caused the individual to support or join the insurgency and provision to educate and rehabilitate those that are detained. The aim is to release them back into society as peaceful citizens with a stake in the future success of the state at the appropriate time.
There should be a transparent and demonstrably fair process for case review and release back into society.
Conduct of a detention operation by UK forces does not automatically require that the detainee is taken into UK custody. This is particularly the case where UK Forces are acting in support of host nation forces as an enabler.

Table 8-C- 2 - Considerations for Detention Operations

8-C-3. **Legal Aspects**. Detention Operations are inherently sensitive whether carried out in the context of either international or non-international armed conflict[23]. They can be carried out in both cases but are governed by different legal regimes under both domestic and international law including the Geneva Conventions and associated Protocols. The degree and type of force that can be used during a detention operation and whilst a person is in detention will be set out in ROE and Standing Operating Instructions. The ROE covering self defence will apply at all times. This is discussed in Chapter 12.

8-C-4. **Who Can/Should UK Forces Detain?** UK Forces can detain anyone within the confines of international law, the UK Operational Orders, ROE and policy for the theatre, tempered by any host nation limitations. These will vary from theatre to theatre and should be verified during the planning cycle. If it is considered that there will be a need to detain somebody outside of the accepted lists (the detention 'envelope') advice and clearance should be sought from higher authority LEGAD and POLAD as early as possible within the planning cycle. Groups that may be outside of the 'detention envelope' may include accredited diplomats, journalists, government officers, members of international organisations, minors and perhaps in some cultures, females. In every case the detention of females will require special attention and the employment of female handlers. In some cases it is necessary to detain people for their own protection rather than on account of their actual or suspected actions. Personnel in this category might, for example, be at-risk female and minor dependants of a detainee who is the head of their family.

8-C-5. **Deliberate Targets**. Deliberate targets will normally be developed over time with a detailed intelligence assessment supporting the case for detention. They may either appear as opportunity targets requiring a rapid response or be the subject of a deliberate and pre-planned operation. In either case the detention operation must be considered and planned in detail allowing time for contingency planning and the gathering of relevant additional assets.

8-C-6. **Reactive Targets**. Reactive targets are those arising from situations on the ground. It is unlikely that troops will know who is being detained or their potential value. A reactive target might be an insurgent detained at a checkpoint or someone detained as the result of a contact.

8-C-7. **Handling**. All detainees should be disarmed, restrained, searched and protected. This requires troops to be able to carry out simple, non-invasive, body searches and subsequent restraint in the form of plasticuffs to wrists held in front of the body. Only when there is a military necessity to protect information is it acceptable to apply blacked-out goggles. Examples include preventing detainees from seeing other detainees from other locations, interpreters or specialist equipment. Goggles should be applied for the minimum period and should not be used purely to prolong the shock of capture. Under no circumstances may hoods or sandbags over the head be used on detainees. Hearing protection may be applied to protect information; for example preventing detainees hearing answers given by other detainees. **Sensory deprivation is not to be used to prolong the shock of capture or as an aid to interrogation.**

[23] International armed conflict is between two or more states. Non-international armed conflict is between the forces of one or more states and one or more non-governmental armed groups, or between two or more non-governmental armed groups.

8-C-8. **Medical**. All detainees must be examined by a medical officer at the earliest opportunity and records of such examinations must be kept. If medical attention is required it should be provided immediately. Where possible the detainee should sign the record of examination.

8-C-9. **Additional Assets**. Necessary additional assets may include military police for collection and processing of recovered material and detainee handling, including on-scene forensics; medical assets in cases where the target is suspected or known to be in poor health; search teams and advisers; ordnance disposal assets; Info/PSYOPS staff; and interpreters.

8-C-10. **Security of Property**. Recovered property must be identified and retained. This can be done **by** placing all the property recovered in a clear plastic bag and marking the bag with an identifier which links the detainee and the property. Property from different detainees should not be mixed as this can reduce the value of the property for exploitation purposes and may even result in a detainee being released for lack of evidence. Provost assets should be considered for this role where appropriate.

8-C-11. **Evacuation**. Once they have been searched and secured detainees should be removed from the point of detention as soon as practicable. Local procedures will normally lay down timelines to be met for processing detainees. Subject to operational circumstances, such timelines should be adhered to. Likely causes of delay should be considered whilst planning the operation. The detainee will be removed to a holding facility; this may be at BG, brigade or division level depending on the nature of the operation, and should be determined during planning.

8-C-12. **Record Keeping**. In-processing begins at the point of detention and record keeping should reflect this. Local proformas should be provided for recording relevant details of the detention. Such details are likely to include details of the actual detention; the detaining soldier, material recovered and anything said at the point of detention.

8-C-13. **Reception at Detention Facility**. On arrival at the detention facility the detainee should be handed over to the commander of that facility together with all personal effects and recovered property. The detaining soldier and patrol commander should brief the receiving commander on the detail of the detention and actions taken up to that point. Statements will normally be taken from the detaining soldier and the patrol commander. Taking statements and carrying out the handover can be time consuming and may therefore remove the individuals from other duties for a period. However, the level of detail provided in the handover and the statements can be of major benefit in the subsequent exploitation of the target. High Value Individuals (HVI) should be identified and fast-tracked through in-processing for early exploitation; however, they should still be properly in-processed for the purposes of ensuring that they can be tracked throughout the period during which they are detained up to and including their ultimate release.

8-C-14. **Investigative Dialogue**. Investigative dialogue takes two forms; Tactical Questioning (TQ) and interrogation. Specific formal training is required before an individual can carry out either operation. This training is provided by the Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC). Once qualified each individual is allocated an identifier as evidence that the individual has been trained to carry out TQ or INT activities.

- TQ is generally carried out in order to gain information for exploitation. An individual may have information on his associates, safe houses, the location of

weapons and IEDs that has to be acted upon immediately before it is no longer of use. It may therefore, take place on the ground or in a processing facility. Each battlegroup should include a number of trained personnel available to deploy on the ground or to a processing facility in order to carry out TQ. In either case a record should be kept. TQ is distinct from asking questions on the ground in response to an immediate incident for immediate force protection.

- Interrogation is carried out on specific detainees at a detention facility. It is only to be carried out by specifically authorised and trained personnel. There will either be a permanent in-theatre interrogation capability or one will be called forward for a specific operation or target. Interrogation is a time consuming process and is heavily reliant on information gathered prior to and during the detention operation.

8-C-15. **Transfer**. Compliance with national and international legal requirements is likely to impact on any decision about whether and how to transfer detained individuals to other nations, including the host nation. The nation which initially detains an individual retains responsibility for that individual until their final release from detention of any form, whether or not that nation retains custody throughout that time. If there is an expectation or likelihood that a target is going to be transferred to the custody of another nation, advice should be sought from the theatre LEGAD and POLAD. The advice received is likely to influence planning and execution of the detention. In some circumstances it may be necessary for members of the receiving nation to deploy on the operation. The intent of such a deployment would be to enable that nation to carry out the initial detention so that the UK is not fixed as the detaining nation with the responsibilities that entails. Where the requirement to transfer only becomes apparent after the detention has taken place, advice should be sought from the theatre LEGAD and POLAD before any transfer takes place.

8-C-16. **Responsibilities**. Each theatre will have specific instructions including ROE, detailing who has the authority to authorise detention operations and the circumstances in which UK forces can detain individuals. The force commander is responsible for the use of detention powers in theatre. The on-scene commander is responsible for the initial decision to detain an individual. The commander of the processing facility is responsible for all actions within the processing facility. This includes ensuring that detailed and accurate records are made and retained. Theatre LEGAD and POLAD are responsible for the provision of timely and accurate legal and policy advice to support the force commander and the commander of the processing facility.

CASE STUDY 5

A CLASSIC CAMPAIGN
MALAYA, 1948-1960

ASPECTS OF THE CAMPAIGN

1. The Malayan Emergency is one of the most discussed and cited counter insurgency campaigns of the twentieth century. It is generally defined as the most successful British campaign, and one that has provided much of the doctrine for current British operations. Despite this, it is necessary to be careful about drawing conclusions and applying them to other, often different, types of campaign without an understanding of the appropriate context. A veteran of the Malaya campaign, discussing counter insurgency with other Allied officers in 1962, warned against '...overemphasising the British operational experiences in Malaya; with its framework of established British administration and a loyal native police, it had been an atypical theatre, where commanders like himself never faced some of the formidable problems and obstacles that confronted other[s].'[1]

2. The Malayan Emergency was badly coordinated, planned and conducted in its first years. It was only after a series of setbacks that fundamental reforms were made to the apparatus of the state administration, police and security forces that resulted in eventual success. The origins of five of the current principles for counter insurgency were developed during the campaign but it took time, and trial and error, before they were established and applied.

3. The insurgency in Malaya was primarily supported by the Chinese population resident in the country who felt disenfranchised from the rest of Malayan society. They supported the Malayan Races People's Liberation Army (MRLA) who sought independence from Britain. The insurgency had little support from the Malay or Indian populations.[2]

4. Following two years of failure, British fortunes took a turn for the better in April 1950 with the appointment of retired Lt General Sir Harold Briggs as the new Director of Operations. Briggs' mandate was to coordinate the efforts of the civil administration with those of the security forces. He produced a report which became the Brigg's Plan. In Malaya this approach was referred to as 'war by committee'; in contemporary parlance this has become known as a Comprehensive Approach. The work of the administration, police and security forces was coordinated from the federal down to the state and district levels in order to avoid intelligence overlaps or gaps, and to carry through pacification programmes after forces had secured a given area.

5. In a major feature of this strategic plan, large portions of the Chinese squatter population, supporters of the MRLA, were arbitrarily moved into 'New Villages'. The Army acted as a barrier between the insurgents and the people who had been moved, cutting off access to food, support and intelligence. This concept was not new; Briggs (and other commanders) had utilised similar stratagems in other areas within the Empire.

6. It is of interest to note that the concept of 'Hearts and Minds', (part of **Shape**), which is frequently raised as integral to the practice of counter insurgency in the context of this campaign, has often been misrepresented. Resettlement was not about giving candy to children; it was about coercion. Certain regions were

designated ‘black’ (ie dangerous) areas, where emergency regulations were imposed. These included forced movement of people, detention without trial, deportation to China, and the use of ID cards. By 1952, more than 423,000 people had been resettled into New Villages, which were in effect barbed wire camps with a local Home Guard force providing security (**Secure**). These measures were designed to impose security first and then provide a legal process. Brigadier Powell-Jones, a veteran of the campaign, recalled that ‘the severity with which the civilian population had to be controlled and restricted depended on how desperate or favourable was the military situation, a fact that served as a strong incentive to the people to help the legitimate forces, whose success meant less local terrorism and greater freedom for the civilians’.[3]

7. Despite these developments, the security situation was jeopardised by the assassination in October 1951 of the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney. General Sir Gerald Templer was appointed High Commissioner and Director of Operations, which put him in charge of both civilian and military efforts. This enabled him to carry forward plans with minimal interference, either from within Malaya or from London. He continued the process of implementing the Briggs Plan.

8. The difficulty of achieving balance between civilian and military aims in carrying out counter insurgency should not be underestimated. A contemporary senior staff officer commented that although the Briggs Plan was efficient and desirable from a military standpoint, it was apt to alienate the people by some of the highhanded and sometimes crude methods it involved, and thus ran counter to other major aim, to win the populace. In other words, granting that you simply cannot keep everybody happy at all times and still win a war, you may have to begin by impressing on the people, quickly and perhaps rather brutally, the fact that you are the strong side; once you have convinced them that you are going to succeed, you can then start making allowances for local needs, wishes and prejudices (**Shape**). On this principle, General Templer devoted his first six months in Malaya to becoming a man feared; thereafter he could afford to be kind.[4]

9. British Army units arriving in Malaya in 1948 found themselves out of their depth. Many of the officers and soldiers had experience of combat in the Second World War and Korean War, the goal of which was to engage with and destroy an enemy. The concept of civilian and military cooperation was not new; Indian Army troops had significant experience acting as ‘Aid to the Civil Power’. Most units, however, had to be retrained to understand the complexities of the situation in Malaya. Even on the most basic tactical levels, the British Army was unprepared to wage jungle warfare against a seasoned insurgent force.

10. To rectify these deficiencies, the British established a training centre, the Far East Land Forces Training Centre (FTC) at Kotta Tinggi for all units arriving in theatre. They received specialised training for one month in all aspects of a successful counter insurgency operation. Training included jungle fighting techniques, instruction in the intricacies of the Briggs Plan, the role of the Malayan Police, collation of intelligence with the Malaya Police Special Branch, and the political grievances underpinning the MRLA campaign against the British administration[5] (**Shape**). The FTC also provided a refresher course so that units in theatre could keep abreast of developments. One officer from the Green Howards described the FTC as ‘an opportunity to collect [our] wits and think … to study success and find out its secrets and to profit by the lessons of those failures which every battalion in that theatre at one time or another experienced’.[6] The FTC also

served as the central repository for lessons learned from the jungle, ensuring that training for new units and replacements was up to date.

11. By 1951, the British Army units had stopped battalion-sized sweeps of jungle in favour of company-sized patrol bases to deny the MRLA access to the local population (**Secure**). Units rotated through Malaya on three-year tours, with National Servicemen serving two years and Regulars three. This system ensured an immense level of corporate knowledge and continuity of information.

12. In 1952, the accumulated experience of the previous four years was encapsulated in a theatre doctrinal booklet, *Anti-Terrorist Operations Malaya*. The primary focus was on disseminating the methods for success in counter insurgency. General Templer, who spearheaded the production of this publication, described its rationale in the foreword thus:

> 'Since assuming my appointment … I have been impressed by the wealth of jungle fighting experience available on different levels in Malaya and among different categories of persons. At the same time, I have been disturbed by the fact that this great mass of detailed knowledge has not been properly collated or presented to those whose knowledge and experience is not so great. This vast store of knowledge must be pooled. Hence this book.'

13. The authors added in the preface: 'The responsibility for conducting the campaign in Malaya rests with the Civil Government … The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture communist terrorists in Malaya'. The book shows in a clear and easily readable form the proven principles by which this can be done.

14. From 1951-58, the British Army deployed some 175,000 soldiers for the campaign (25,000 at any one time). They worked in cooperation with 5,000 Empire and Commonwealth of Nations troops, plus 75,000 Malaya Police and 180,000 Home Guard, against 6,500-7,000 insurgents. After subtracting base security and other supporting roles, the appropriate force ratio was roughly 2:1. The final death toll was 519 British and Commonwealth soldiers killed, compared with more than 6,000 insurgents.

THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CAMPAIGN

15. As a result of these initiatives, the forces, from 1952 onwards, were well trained, embodied the newly crafted principles of counter insurgency, were imbued with the concept of lessons learned and constant assessment, and understood the overall strategy. Brigadier H C A Henniker, writing in 1955, noted that 'new men, new ideas, new methods will always produce improvements in techniques and ways of waging wars … At the time I was in Malaya, the Authorities were always receptive of new ideas. There were very few suggestions made that were not listened to attentively.'[7]

16. The security forces recognised that the Malaya Police and its Special Branch, with their ability to gather intelligence amongst the local population, were vital to operational success. The Malaya Police in 1948 were in a dangerous position; they, like all police services during an insurgency, tended to be the first target of the insurgents. Initially the British administration sought a quick solution; they rapidly expanded the police with no thought for the quality of the recruits. As a result, many unsuitable recruits joined the force, no proper vetting or training was undertaken, and no major effort was made to recruit from the Chinese population. Consequently, by

1949, the Malaya Police were considered corrupt by both the community and the British military forces. Recognising their mistake, the British undertook a wholesale reform of the police force (**Secure** and **Develop**).

17. With a reformed and viable police force, and military forces trained and ready to engage in counter insurgency, the framework was established to carry out a long-term campaign. Coordination between the police and the Army ensured that intelligence was properly collated and disseminated, eliminating overlaps and gaps. General Templer and his civilian and military commanders were able to continue the Briggs Plan. They eradicated the insurgency completely by 1960, although the British had already granted independence to Malaya during 1957, in recognition of the improved political situation which was more representative of all three major communities - Malayan, Chinese and Indian.

CONCLUSION

18. The authorities in Malaya would not know about the term **Shape-Secure-Develop** but they would recognise that, after a disastrous start, this form of concept was adopted, which had the support of a majority of the population. The political and security environment was amenable to full engagement by the authorities once a clear purpose for the campaign had been set in London. This allowed General Templer to be flexible and pragmatic in influencing (**Shaping**) local views and setting long term policies. At the same time, tactics were revised and refreshed for the security forces to gradually push the terrorists further and further away from urban areas (their support) and eliminate them in remote jungle areas. The economic revival (**Develop**) as a result of the Korean War assisted in medium and long term development of a whole range of light industrial and other businesses which allowed for society to grow. The insurgents and their cause had been effectively neutralised and eliminated.

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[1] Colonel White, RAND COIN Symposium, 1962.

[2] See Sir R Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, 1966, R Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 1972, R Clutterbuck, *The Long Long War: The Emergency in Malaya, 1948-1960*, R Stubbs, *The Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency*, 1989, J. Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency*, 1992, J. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 2003, for a much more detailed description of the background, progression and outcome of the Emergency.

[3] RAND COIN Symposium, 1962.

[4] RAND COIN Symposium, 1962.

[5] See Daniel Marston, "Lost and Found in the Jungle" in Professor Hew Strachan's *Big Wars and Small Wars*, 2006.

[6] J B Oldfield, *The Green Howards in Malaya*.

[7] H C A Henniker, *Real Moon over Malaya*, 1955.

CHAPTER 9

THE SPECIAL FORCES, AIR AND MARITIME CONTRIBUTIONS

SECTION 1 - SPECIAL FORCES

INTRODUCTION

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9-1. In counterinsurgency operations Special Forces tend to operate more closely with conventional forces than in most other types of operation. Due to the nature of counterinsurgency operations and the paucity of Special Forces, many of the tasks normally associated with Special Forces may become routinely undertaken by specially trained counterinsurgency forces. Nevertheless, Special Forces are a significant force multiplier and can operate ahead of the deployment of conventional forces and in depth.

PRINCIPLES

9-2. As Special Forces are a scarce and valuable resource they should be employed in accordance with the following enduring principles:

9-3. **Employed for Strategic Effect**. Special Forces should only be employed on high value counterinsurgency tasks. Many of the tasks they undertake offer the prospect of a high pay-off, with the potential for strategic effect. Employed at the operational level, they should act in direct support of the campaign commander's main effort.

9-4. **Command at the Highest Appropriate Level**. Special Forces should be commanded at the highest appropriate level to ensure they are used to best effect. Command and control relationships with other counterinsurgency troops operating within the same area must be unambiguous.

9-5. **Timely Decision-Making**. Where Special Forces are likely to be involved in a particular operation, it is important that they are involved in the earliest stages of planning, so that they can provide advice and expertise. Decisions may need to be made quickly, for example to deploy Special Forces early in order to provide critical information in time to inform political decision-making and subsequent military planning.

9-6. **Access to Intelligence**. Special Forces require access to the full range of available strategic, operational and tactical intelligence for the detailed planning, direction and execution of their operations (and their subsequent evaluation). Intelligence, focused on the mission, must be collected, processed and disseminated sufficiently quickly, and with sufficient quality and clarity, to provide them with a decisive knowledge advantage over their adversary. These intelligence requirements demand dynamic connectivity between the different intelligence collection agencies and Special Forces to ensure effective intelligence flow at all levels.

9-7. **Security**. Security (both protective security and Operations Security for particular operations) is vital, to ensure the effectiveness, survivability and, at times, the psychological impact of their activities.

CHARACTERISTICS

9-8. **Precision**. Special Forces provide the Government and military commanders with strategic and operational options in situations that require a tailored and precisely focused effect. They can deploy, recover and operate discreetly, securely and with a degree of precision that may reduce casualties and collateral damage. Moreover, the impact of Special Forces operations may be disproportionate compared with the effort or resources required to conduct them.

9-9. **Agility**. The agility of Special Forces has both mental and physical aspects. Special Forces have a culture that encourages operators to think creatively, to be resourceful, imaginative and resilient, especially in adversity or when facing the unexpected. The quality and motivation of Special Forces personnel, their wide range of skills, experience and extensive training in varied terrain and climatic conditions enable them to adapt quickly to new situations and exploit fleeting opportunities.

9-10. **Tempo**. Special Forces operations, especially Offensive Action (rather than Surveillance and Reconnaissance and Support and Influence), are conducted at high tempo (the rhythm or rate of activity relative to the enemy) to enable them to gain and retain the initiative. Speed of execution, especially if repeated on a cycle that an adversary is unable to match, denies him the opportunity to reorganise, adapt or re-focus his efforts.

9-11. **Endurance**. Special Forces can operate in hostile environments for extended periods, isolated from main combat forces, surviving on relatively limited resources and exploiting indigenous support where possible. They are trained to evade capture and, if caught, to resist interrogation.

9-12. **Risk**. Special Forces operators, with their high level of training and resources, tend to accept a commensurately high level of individual and collective physical risk, in order to minimise the risk of mission failure. Nevertheless, Special Forces operations tend to be inherently more risky than conventional operations, especially in terms of political and legal risk. Despite a record of continuing success, Security Force operators are not infallible and high risk operations can go wrong.

SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE ROLE

9-13. Special Forces can provide strategic insight on behalf of political and military decision-makers, support planning at different levels, help to develop targets for offensive operations, and contribute to the assessment of operations.

- **Strategic Insight**. From the early stages of a crisis Special Forces can deliver timely and accurate reporting, that may not be available from other sources, in order to provide strategic insight. In particular, they may provide the most appropriate means of obtaining information in a hostile terrain or climate, or through contact with civilians and indigenous forces (HUMINT). Information provided through Special Forces contributes to the overall intelligence picture, within a single intelligence environment, and may also be used to corroborate other information (including technical intelligence) already held.

- **Support to Planning**. Special Forces provide information to inform strategic or operational level planning, and in support of other components' planning. They can be inserted discreetly at the start of an operation, in advance of conventional forces, or independently as part of a particular discrete operation. Where uncertainty or ambiguity is delaying decision-making or reducing tempo, Special Forces may be able to confirm assumptions by providing an element of 'ground truth'.
- **Target Development**. Special Forces may be used to obtain information (which may be fused with intelligence from other sources) to develop targets for offensive operations. It may also be used to cue other ISTAR or strike systems directly. Target development in Special Forces operations, particularly against high value individuals, is an inter-agency process that must be command-led, highly concentrated and focused on a specific set of targets.

OFFENSIVE ACTION ROLE

9-14. Offensive Action can be carried out to seize, capture or inflict damage to an adversary's capability in order to achieve specific and often time sensitive results; this might include the detention or neutralisation of High Value Individuals. Offensive Action may be conducted independently by Special Forces elements or supported by conventional or irregular forces. Although Special Forces can operate for extended periods in hostile territory, for example to conduct a succession of offensive tasks, they do not generally hold ground but are extracted, or extract themselves, for future tasking.

OTHER TASKS

9-15. **Military Capacity Building**. Special Forces can deploy training teams in support of other nations' security forces and enable the UK Government to gain significant influence in other countries; they play an important role in foreign and defence policy. Special Forces have an extensive range of skills which can be taught to the military, police or other civilian law enforcement agencies in permissive or non-permissive environments, either covertly or overtly, depending on the situation. Military Capacity Building is discussed in Chapter 10.

9-16. **Influence Activities**. Influence activities, along with fires and manoeuvre, form the three elements of Joint Action. Influence activities encompass Information Operations (Info Ops), media operations and Civil- Military Cooperation (CIMIC) as described in Chapter 6. Special forces can conduct both CIMIC and Info Ops, but do not conduct media operations.

SECTION 2 - AIRPOWER IN COUNTERINSURGENCY

INTRODUCTION

9-1. By their nature counterinsurgency operations are joint operations in which air and land forces are interdependent elements and important force multipliers for coalition and host nation forces fighting an insurgency campaign. However, the airpower contribution to counterinsurgency operations goes far beyond the delivery of Close Air Support (CAS) and helicopter lift. Aircraft can, for example, strike insurgents, and that can be enormously important in many situations. However, given the nature of the counterinsurgency environment, airpower will most often be employed in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, shows of presence to reassure and deter, and the transport of troops and materiel. This section discusses the contribution of air and space power across four fundamental activity areas: control of the air; attack; intelligence and situational understanding; and air mobility and logistics[1]. These four basic activities are underpinned by command and control and Information Operations (Info Ops). The section concludes with discussion on the role that airpower plays in host nation capacity building over the longer term and support to the wider aims of security.

TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION

9-2. Today's high-technology air and space systems have proven their worth in COIN. Unmanned aircraft such as the Predator and Watchkeeper have given unprecedented capabilities in surveillance and target acquisition. Long loiter times can place an entire region under constant surveillance, whilst an unmanned aircraft equipped with precision munitions can successfully be employed in the attack role against time-sensitive targets. Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP) now provide ground commanders with beyond-line-of sight awareness with full motion video receivers (such as Rover and Britannia), which links to aircraft targeting pods, whilst air- and space-based Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) platforms can provide important information collection capabilities. Modern munitions, such as GPS guided bombs, can allow accurate targeting through clouds and bad weather to destroy insurgent targets under adverse conditions.

9-3. Equally low-technology aspects of airpower have also proven effective in counterinsurgency operations. Light, slow and inexpensive civilian aircraft can be used to successfully patrol border areas and main roads to report suspected ambushes to deter insurgent attacks. Light aircraft patrols can spot insurgents crossing a border, whilst stationary balloons equipped with video cameras and infrared sensors can watch for border incursions. These unmanned balloons are a simple, inexpensive and effective means to monitor activity in remote areas.

CONTROL OF THE AIR

9-4. Airpower provides a considerable asymmetric advantage for the counterinsurgent. In current operations, control of the air and subsequent protection from aircraft and missile attack is largely assumed; however, this may not be the case in the future. Several non-state actors have, in recent conflicts, fielded both manned and unmanned aircraft [2] and may opt for less expensive ballistic or cruise missiles as a cost effective alternative to fielding large forces. Should this trend continue there may be a

[1] AP3000.

[2] For example the Tamil Tigers used light aircraft to deliver ordnance in 2004 and Hezbollah employed unmanned drone aircraft in the 2006 conflict with Israel.

requirement to gain and maintain control of the air to permit freedom of manoeuvre and protect friendly forces, population centres, logistic sites, critical assets and politically sensitive assets of the host nation, whilst limiting or denying the use of the air by the enemy.

9-5. Air units generally use expeditionary airfields or Forward Operating Bases and counterinsurgency planners must carefully consider where to place them with respect to the threat, particularly if they are also used as Airports of Debarkation. Commanders must properly protect their bases and coordinate their defence within the wider security framework. Factors to consider include: projected near-, mid- and long-term uses of the airfield; types and ranges of aircraft to be operated; shoulder-launched, surface-to-air-missile threats to aircraft; stand-off threats to airfields; proximity to other threats; proximity to land lines of communication; and the availability of fuels.

9-6. One advantage of aircraft and unmanned aircraft operating from operational airfields is that they may present a smaller signature than large numbers of land forces, possibly lessening host nation sensitivities to foreign military presence.

ATTACK

9-7. Precision air attacks can be of enormous value in counterinsurgency. However, commanders must exercise judgment prior to employing airpower in attack operations. Tactical and even strategic effects can be enormous when an attack achieves its aims; but any benefits will quickly be outweighed by the negative impact of unintended or undesirable effects resulting from misplaced ordnance. Even the most precise of weapons will cause unintended civilian casualties when insurgents merge with the local populace to make detection, positive identification and targeting difficult. Commanders at all levels must weigh the benefits of every air strike against its risks; an air strike that causes collateral damage and turns people against the host nation government and supporting forces provides insurgents with a major propaganda victory. Even when attacks are justified under the Law of Armed Conflict, such as destroying an obvious insurgent headquarters or command centre, bombings that result in civilian casualties will bring media coverage that works to the insurgents' benefit.

9-8. New, precise munitions which minimise the probability of collateral damage through improved accuracy and smaller yield can limit collateral damage; however, commanders must weigh the possibility of collateral damage against the consequences of taking no action when considering the risk of civilian casualties. Avoiding all risk may embolden insurgents while providing them sanctuary; whereas a legitimate and well-executed use of air attack can conserve resources, increase effectiveness and reduce risk to our own forces. Given timely, accurate intelligence, precisely delivered weapons with a demonstrated low failure rate, appropriate yield and proper fuse can achieve desired effects while mitigating adverse effects. However, inappropriate or indiscriminate use of air attacks can erode popular support and fuel insurgent propaganda. For these reasons, commanders must carefully consider the use of air attacks in counterinsurgency, neither disregarding them outright nor employing them excessively.

INTELLIGENCE AND SITUATION UNDERSTANDING

9-9. Given the challenges faced in finding and penetrating insurgent networks, counterinsurgents must employ all available intelligence collection capabilities as effectively as possible. A combination of manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft and space-

based platforms can provide counterinsurgents with a broad range of collection capabilities that are capable of concurrent strategic and tactical support tasks. However, such diverse tasking can cause issues of command and control, and ultimately, the flexibility to support units and other end users. The complexity of providing a product in the right format to the right person in an appropriate timescale to allow relevant decision to be made can cause issues in prioritisation of assets.

9-10. Air reconnaissance and surveillance can prove useful when insurgents operate in rural or remote areas when integrated closely with SIGINT collection platforms. Imagery and infrared systems can find hidden base camps and insurgent defensive positions whilst SIGINT detects insurgent communications and locating their points of origin. Persistent air surveillance will often identify people, vehicles and buildings, even when they are hidden under heavy vegetation. Manned and unmanned aircraft have proven equally important in tactical operations and in convoy and route protection. They can patrol roads to locate insurgent ambushes and improvised explosive devices whilst helicopters have been especially useful in providing overwatch, fire support, alternate communications and aeromedical evacuation.

9-11. At the tactical level, air support requires a decentralised command and control system that gives supported units immediate access to available combat air assets and to information collected by air reconnaissance and support assets. However, intelligence obtained through air and space platforms works best when it is quickly and efficiently routed to a joint intelligence centre that can fuse HUMINT information with that collected by other intelligence disciplines. It is essential that air and space intelligence be combined with HUMINT; for example, while SIGINT and air surveillance and reconnaissance assets can determine that people are evacuating a village, they cannot explain why the people are leaving.

9-12. HUMINT is also a key enabler of air attack operations where commanders require the best possible intelligence about a target and its surrounding area when considering an air attack. With proper placement and access to a target, a HUMINT source will often provide the most accurate target data, which might include optimum strike times, detailed descriptions of the surrounding area, and the presence of sensitive sites like hospitals, churches and mosques. Target data can also include other important factors for collateral damage considerations. Post-attack HUMINT sources equipped with a mobile phone, radio or camera can provide an initial battle damage assessment in near real time. With a thorough debriefing, the HUMINT source can provide an accurate assessment of the functional and psychological effects achieved on the target which can be used to assess re-attack options.

AIR MOBILITY AND LOGISTICS

9-13. The ability to move military and non-military stores and personnel both between (inter[3]) and within (intra[4]) theatre at speed is a key enabler in counterinsurgency. Air mobility provides significant asymmetric advantage to counterinsurgency forces,

[3] The airbridge that links the operational theatre to the Home-Base and/or other Theatres of Operation. Given the ranges involved, inter-theatre airlift is normally comprised of strategic Air Transport aircraft. Civilian charter can be used depending on theatre threat analysis. .

[4] Provides airlift/mobility within a theatre or JOA that is normally conducted by FW and/or RW aircraft that are able to conduct a wide range of tactical operations that includes austere, small and unimproved field operations. Whilst intra-theatre enables routine sustainment operations, more than likely it would be used to provide time-sensitive sustainment to enable operational and tactical objectives to be met.

enabling commanders to rapidly deploy, redeploy, sustain and reposition land forces throughout the theatre. It also provides support to government, non-government and international civilian agencies to safely transport local politicians and officials to assist the governance strategy and to move aid and equipment[5] to deliver direct support to the local population when the host nation does not have the capability or capacity to do so. Air mobility also provides a relatively[6] secure line of communication enabling counterinsurgency to be conducted at reach whilst providing a direct link with the home base and giving confidence to deployed forces.

9-14. Air mobility includes both fixed wing and rotary wing flying operations and may also include multi-national/coalition assets. Air mobility assets should be centrally task organised to enable a synchronised approach to logistic and operational support with sequential use of strategic and tactical assets. This also ensures a coordinated use of air transport from the strategic home base into, within and on return from theatre. However, tactical OPLANs/FRAGOs may need decentralised control of intra-theatre air transport assets for specific periods of activity, and as such, tactical air transport[7] may be allocated to support specific missions or military activity out with 'routine' tasking[8].

9-15. The basing and operation of air transport in a counterinsurgency environment needs serious consideration and mitigation strategies. Counterinsurgency planners should select bases that are as close to the battle zone as possible to ensure that the key strengths of airlift mobility can be employed, gaining maximum benefit from payload, speed and responsiveness to tactical emergencies[9]. Whilst the insurgents may not be able to field an integrated air defence system, their strength lies in their ability to be persistent in an applied direct threat constraining air mobility freedom of manoeuvre. Air mobility assets present the insurgent with a high value target. Force protection, employed through air aware friendly land environment forces and the aircraft operating with defensive aid suites supported by specialist flying techniques with random scheduling[10] mitigate risk, but does not necessarily remove the risk in total.

9-16. Where counterinsurgent forces operate without an established or temporary landing strip or where combat forces are in contact and require immediate logistical support, air mobility can still sustain through precision airdrop, which has advantages over 'traditional' airlift operations by providing direct support without the need for airfield infrastructure. However, it also constrains as it cannot recover personnel or equipment and is payload limited. Airdrop can be utilised as part of the wider comprehensive approach to support humanitarian work. Airdrop can, therefore, support the Info Ops campaign and indicates to the populace the reach that the established authorities has to

[5] Equipment includes such items as life support equipment, generators for power, pumps for water and signal masks for communications.
[6] Secure air routes cannot be guaranteed, but risks can be mitigated by use of tactics and procedures.
[7] Both rotary wing and fixed wing.
[8] Rotary wing assets are integral to the land scheme of manoeuvre and provide operational support that includes battlefield mobility, logistics and medical evac. Tactical aircraft may be employed to support airborne assault operations but the subsequent shortfall in theatre air logistics lift would need to be factored during the air assault planning phase.
[9] Includes Aero Medical evacuation
[10] Random scheduling is logistically inefficient, however military effectiveness should have precedence over efficiency, and may require additional Air Transport, both fixed wing and rotary wing to be used beyond that of peacetime routine activity to offset threat denial activity.

it citizens, especially those in remote isolated areas that sit beyond the safe range of rotary or surface support.

9-17. One of the most critical roles of air mobility is to support the medical services in the transportation of critically ill and injured serviceman, combatants and critically ill or injured local population to medical support centres. The ability to transport critically injured people at short-notice from the front-line or remote villages to medical facilities within theatre and ultimately back to the home base is a unique air capability and maintenance of morale issue. Likewise, it supports the wider aims of the strategic counterinsurgency campaign.

9-18. Air mobility is one of the military strengths that cross all lines of operations. It supports Info Ops when counterinsurgency forces provide humanitarian airlift and it clearly supports combat operations. Likewise airlift supports capacity building, governance and economic development. Therefore, given the importance of air mobility to national capacity building, air mobility development should be considered as the first component of air and space power that allows the host nation governance structure to be seen by the population as having the ability to reach out and support. Air mobility, used in both military and non-military effect roles supports the comprehensive approach that is ultimately required to defeat insurgency.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

9-19. Counterinsurgency operations require a joint and multinational command and control architecture for air and space that is both effective and responsive and able to coordinate air assets of coalition partners and the host nation. Counterinsurgency planning must establish a suitable airpower command and control system, together with the necessary policies, rules and conditions for employing airpower in the theatre. Most counterinsurgency planning occurs at lower echelons; however, all components must fully coordinate these plans with the air and space planners at all echelons to provide the most effective air and space support. Counterinsurgency planning is often fluid and develops along short planning and execution timelines which often necessitates informal and formal coordination where essential integration is vital for safety and efficiency. One of the key challenges facing commanders in counterinsurgency operations is the efficient planning and employment of usually scarce air assets and space enablers that are generally fundamental to success. The air commander needs to know the land scheme of manoeuvre and his part in that plan. The land commander and his leaders must consider the requirement for air and space support at the very earliest stages of planning to fully exploit the benefits enjoyed by a fully integrated operation. From the outset, air and space forces can pursue strategic, operational or tactical objectives, in any combination, or all three simultaneously. Therefore, unified action is essential to effectively exploit diverse and multiple tasks simultaneously.

- **Centralised Control** places responsibility and authority for planning, directing and coordinating air capabilities with the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) to maximise operational effectiveness and avoids duplication of effort. It allows a single commander and his staff to prioritise, synchronise, integrate and deconflict the requests and actions of assigned, attached and supporting capabilities in time, space and purpose to achieve assigned objectives as rapidly and as effectively as possible.

- **Decentralised Execution** delegates execution authority to responsible and capable subordinate commanders to make on-scene decisions that exploit opportunities in complex, rapidly changing or fluid situations to provide maximum responsiveness to cope with the uncertainty, disorder and fluidity of operations and generate the tempo of operations.

BUILDING HOST-NATION AIRPOWER CAPABILITY

9-20. Air makes significant contribution in host nation capacity building across all the lines of activity. Air focuses its contribution in two areas: airpower capacity building and support to the wider aims of security.

9-21. **Airpower Capacity Building**. Building any host nation airpower capability requires careful planning, time and financial investment. An early review should be conducted to identify the host nation ability to command, control and employ airpower independently or as integrated as part of the coalition air effort. This review should initially consider counterinsurgency related activities[11] and focus on self-sufficiency and integration into the campaign plan. Most developing nations would need considerable support to develop an appropriate organisation, a suitable force, structure and bases.

9-22. The technical nature of airpower, its application, equipment and logistics support can prove a significant expense for a small nation. Therefore, priority areas for host nation airpower development should be considered in line with the counterinsurgency strategic plan for self-governance. Airpower capacity building planners will need to consider host nation technological resources and the availability of suitably qualified personnel to undertake both aircrew and support training to ensure that the developing air force can endure. Capabilities for development include air mobility and logistics[12], command and control, ISTAR, control of the air, and attack. It is likely that the initial focus would be on the development an air mobility capability to enable the host nation to promote security, governance and economic growth[13]; a capability that might expeditiously be 'bought in' from the civil market until indigenously developed.

9-23. The training of aircrew, maintenance and specialist staffs to support flying operations takes considerable time and is closely related to a host nation equipment programme. Whilst the host nation may be assisted in deciding its requirements, decisions on procurement should remain with the host nation as the prime operator and maintainer of its own aircraft and support systems. It is probable that specialist training of aircrew and maintenance staffs would initially be conducted outside of the host nation to gain maximum benefit from existing training facilities, reducing immediate development costs and gaining capability within the shortest timeframe. It may be in the host nation interest to conduct follow-on training locally.

9-24. Developing a capable air force usually takes longer than developing the equivalent army, police or other security forces. As a result, that mission is likely to require specialist air units, advisors and trainers to remain long after other trainers and advisors have completed their mission.

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[11] But the longer-term plan would also consider wider defence need beyond counterinsurgency.
[12] Includes Fixed and Rotary Wing and aeromedical evacuation.
[13] It is important that national politicians are seen by the local population to be transported in national transportation assets.

9-25. **Support to the Wider Aims of Security**. To enable economic growth and stability, nations require amongst other factors, secure entry and exit points linked by established and secure internal lines of communications. Confidence is a key factor in economic prosperity and whilst the military business is to support military operations, the second order effect of conducting air operations from secure, established and well found bases can be exploited for the wider needs of the campaign plan. More specifically, airfields that have been upgraded to handle large strategic military aircraft can directly, or preferably indirectly[14], support commercial air operations. Investment in airfields and supporting infrastructure[15] must consider the future role of the airfield, in particular whether it would retain a military footprint or become a civil operation.

9-26. Finally, airpower is able to provide expertise beyond the air domain to assist the campaign plan in delivering wider reaching campaign objectives. Air supporting services, such as logistics, general engineering and communications could be employed to deliver training or specific support to enable nation capacity building.

[14] Indirectly implies civilian personnel employed to handle, process and maintain civilian movements.
[15] This includes air traffic control services, Fire and Rescue, Freight and Passenger facilities, Security, Bulk Fuel Storage and Lighting

SECTION 3 - THE MARITIME CONTRIBUTION TO COUNTERING INSURGENCY[16]

9-27. Naval forces have a number of general characteristics. These are described in naval doctrine[17] as access, mobility, versatility, joint and multinational attributes, sustained reach, resilience, lift capacity, poise and leverage. The ability to use international waters provides access and strategic mobility, permitting maritime forces to get where they are required, without having to rely on the availability of and permission to use foreign bases or overflight rights. The versatility of maritime forces allows them to perform roles across the spectrum of operations from combat operations through to the benign, and to switch between them rapidly. Their sustained reach and lift capacity allow them to support themselves and also to carry and support land-based forces. These traits make naval forces particularly well suited to that broad category of military activities that falls short of major combat operations. This includes counterinsurgency and counter terrorism as well as limited-scale interventions and peace support operations such as sanctions enforcement, or combating criminal activities.

9-28. Naval forces have a low political and diplomatic footprint ashore in comparison to land-based forces. This feature might well be desirable for regional allies, for the local population that is to be influenced, or for decision makers concerned about a large and vulnerable commitment ashore.

9-29. Naval forces can be held ready, as visibly as desired and in international waters if required, with the ability to conduct a wide range of missions, either simultaneously or sequentially – for example, enforcing a maritime embargo at the same time as deterring a particular state and standing ready to reinforce or withdraw forces ashore. Maritime forces possess an inherent mobility, responsiveness and flexibility which, crucially, they can confer upon land and air forces and across various theatre simultaneously. Naval forces from different states can more easily work together than is the case with land or air forces, which has the political and diplomatic appeal of allowing friendly states to show support tangibly as well as to share the burden. Also, while the relative vulnerability of naval forces could be an issue against the typical threats faced in counterinsurgency operations, warships and 'afloat support' tend to be less vulnerable than forces deployed ashore.

9-30. Maritime power, then, has several characteristics that offer distinct advantages in counterinsurgency. Principal among any limitations is the caveat that applies to all armed forces; namely that military means, however skillfully used, will only at best be part of the solution. And more so than in major combat operations, the main effort of the military element of counterinsurgency will be the responsibility of ground forces, which limits the naval role. Although maritime forces can reach further inland than is often appreciated, their impact ashore declines as the distance from the sea increases. Warships are desirable, prestigious targets, albeit difficult ones for insurgents to attack. While they are very elusive in open waters, when operating close inshore – as they are likely to in counterinsurgency campaigns – or in ports or choke points further off, they are vulnerable targets.

[16] Adapted from an article in the British Army Review No 142 of Summer 2007 by Doctor Tim Benbow, co-director of Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies.
[17] BR 1806 *British Maritime Doctrine*.

CHAPTER 10 – MILITARY CAPACITY BUILDING

SECTION 1 – THE FUNDAMENTALS

INTRODUCTION

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10-1. Military Capacity Building (MCB) is the generic term used to describe a range of activities in support of developing an indigenous security force, such as training, mentoring, partnering, monitoring and enabling.

10-2. The history of UK counterinsurgency operations, greatly reinforced by recent operations, highlights the essential and enduring nature of MCB activity in setting the conditions for indigenous security forces to play their part in defeating an insurgency. Without sufficiently large, capable, reliable and confident indigenous security forces a coalition is unlikely to be able to create lasting security. The ability to develop a credible indigenous army capable of contributing to its country's long-term security is the vital component of UK military support to Security Sector Reform (SSR). UK military personnel are capable of providing world-leading expertise and leadership if they possess the skills necessary to impart that contribution. The foundations of those skills are described in this Chapter.

10-3. In theory the development of fighting power in indigenous armies does not differ from that employed to develop UK forces. However the application of this theory is often a complex and subtle process that is frequently misunderstood due to a common assumption that it is a simple task.

10-4. It is assumed throughout this Chapter that in all foreseeable future operations UK forces will conduct MCB as part of a multinational coalition, in which the UK is likely to be a junior partner. If the security environment has degraded to a state where MCB forces require force protection to allow them to conduct their task, then there is likely to be a distinct force focused on the defeat of the insurgents pending the development of the indigenous force.

THE ENDSTATE OF CHANGE

10-5. The ultimate goal of change to any indigenous security force is an accountable, self-sustaining, capable and credible force, able to meet the security challenges faced by the state and with police primacy for matters of internal security. Achieving this may take years but all restructuring and training activities should seek to promote those aims from the outset.

10-6. Deployments to engage with indigenous armies range in scale and type, from small team deployments which assist development and strengthen or create military ties and alliances within a benign environment, to full-scale deployments of units and formations dedicated to developing an indigenous army in the wake of national indigenous security collapse and in the context of constant, significant threats to security. Regardless, each deployment will form part of the long, slow, steady path of transition.

> 'We were embedded in a battalion from Maysaan Province, which was serving in Baghdad as part of an Iraqi surge. Whilst the Iraqi soldiers would confront al Qaeda-Iraq during the surge to Baghdad, they did not to want to face up to Militant Jaish Al-Mahdi in SE Iraq. MJAM was part of the community, the members lived next door to the families of the soldiers and if no Iraqi attempt was made to confront them, they were only interested in attacking MNF. They saw AQ-I as enemies of Iraq and were happy to take them on. The situation in Baghdad was also made easier because they were further from home.'
>
> Iraqi Army Military Transition Team Member Iraq, 2007 TELIC

10-7. The skills required to contribute to change demonstrate uniform principles that hold true across the spectrum of engagement with indigenous forces.

PRINCIPLES

10-8. **A Partnership**. The planning and conduct of operations should be shared jointly between the local security forces and their allies/partners. This can only be achieved when the coalition forces and those they train, monitor and mentor live and work together. However, it should be remembered that coalition forces are principally deployed to enable the indigenous forces to become and remain effective counterinsurgent forces. This partnership will go through various phases from recruiting to transition as explained below.

> 'It is a strange irony that a low-tech war is no less demanding of the preparation and training that you give your people. Arguably even greater care is required in this sphere. The patience and tolerance to live harmoniously in an unfamiliar culture; the fortitude to be content with less than comfortable circumstances for prolonged periods; an understanding and sympathy for a foreign history and religion; a humility necessary to climb into the head of people who live by a very different set of assumptions; none of these are found automatically in our modern developed Euro-Atlantic culture. These attributes, and the attitudes they imply, often need to be taught in addition to purely military skills. We seem to be able to churn out in large numbers officers who can manoeuvre around the high-intensity battlefield in armoured vehicles by day and night. Finding and training people who have the necessary attitudes, skills and quality of character to live with, to be accepted by, and to lead successfully a group of Dhofari Firqat is another matter altogether.5
>
> Ian Gardiner: 'In The Service of the Sultan: A First Hand Account of the Dhofar Insurgency'

10-9. **Understand the Indigenous Soldier**. Motivating the indigenous force requires a complete understanding of those who make up the army, which can only be achieved by being with them as much as possible. Each soldier and commander will be driven by an individual mix of selfish and altruistic motivations – kudos and money, family and tribe, short term and long term perspectives – the best are exemplars to any coalition soldier, the worst will skimp training and shy away from operations. In this case a coherent, ruthless system of rewards given or withheld may be required. Any such system will be reliant on operational policy. Ultimately, if the members of an indigenous force feel that they have nothing to gain from interaction it will be difficult to both influence them to accept development efforts and support UK military aims.

10-10. **Define the Enemy**. Inherent in understanding and motivating the indigenous soldier is the need to define his enemies, his relationship with them and the resultant impact on the moral component. The answer is rarely simple, particularly as the indigenous security force is training to fight an insurgency within its own country, where family, tribal and religious loyalties may blur the issue. The enemy that the UK perceives may be very different to that which the indigenous force perceives.

10-11. **Apply Local Solutions.** Local solutions to MCB should always be sought. A snap judgement on the military capabilities of an indigenous security force measured against UK military standards, followed by the attempted imposition of a UK military-cultural paradigm, is a typical and erroneous sequence followed by soldiers who are eager to effect quick, tangible results on their own terms. This is almost always followed by mutual frustration, a breakdown of rapport and a failure to develop the force. Any plan for engagement must start with acquiring an understanding of the indigenous force's military culture and how close or far it is from an acceptable UK standard[1]. Setting standards against this norm, coupled with an appreciation of what can and cannot be changed and how best to affect any change, will ensure lasting results. In all cases it will be the responsibility of the appropriate commander to determine the acceptable standard.

10-12. **Identify and Exploit Appropriate Indigenous Leadership.** Modern western armies tend to rely on education and capability-based selection of military leaders, followed by intense training. Some indigenous armies may be incapable of adopting such objective selection criteria and rely instead on non-military factors such as ethnicity, social or family ties, wealth and religion. If an army is being developed from scratch, the leadership selection process should strike a balance between these two poles. On the one hand, imposition of a UK-style selection process may produce good military 'leaders' that are culturally inappropriate; on the other, total reliance on cultural factors may produce militarily inappropriate 'leaders'. In an existing army the leaders should be subject to intense scrutiny and assessment, and concerted and knowledgeable efforts made to align them with UK motives where possible.

10-13. **Select and Maintain Long Term Goals**. MCB is characterised by slow, steady progress and demands continuity and consistency. Attempts to achieve quick wins at the expense of long-term progress should be avoided. As such, a coherent plan based on total understanding of all aspects of the operating environment should

[1] This is most often found around the Values and Standards: drug taking, theft, corporal punishment, PW handling, sexual activity, bribery and corruption, equal opportunities for other races, women, disabled etc.

be implemented from the outset, and formally handed over to successive units and followed during subsequent deployments. Ultimately, the single long-term goal must be a self-reliant indigenous army capable of containing the insurgency to a manageable level or eradicating it altogether. To that end, any goals selected must represent an enduring, indigenous solution complemented by clear and demonstrable metrics of success.[2]

> 'Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward; but ensure that they are put forward in the first instance privately to you. Always approve them, and after praise modify them insensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are in accord with your own opinion.'
>
> The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence, The Arab Bulletin, 1917

10-14. **Flexibility.** There is no universal template for MCB. Each plan should be unique to the circumstances of the indigenous force and its component military, social or cultural parts. 'Bottom-up' advice from day-to-day practitioners will be critical in developing specific plans.

10-15. **Coordination.** A closely co-ordinated and coherent military approach to MCB from the outset is vital. Coordination between those developing the indigenous forces (not just army) must be achieved; however coordination is also required with the campaign as a whole. There will often be three groupings in the partnership: the indigenous forces, the coalition forces, and the MCB forces[3]; achieving unity of effort amongst the three will prove hugely challenging at times. The commanders of the three forces at each level from operational to sub tactical must agree the objectives, their prioritisation and the allocation of resources to deliver a scheme of manoeuvre to meet them. Success will thus be as much about formal missions and command status as personal relationships between the commanders and their staffs. Time and energy must be dedicated to establishing those relationships before and during the deployment in order that they are sufficiently robust during the testing times of close combat operations. The training of the indigenous forces is a key element of the campaign, and decisions over which geographic areas or ethnic groups to focus on first and to where newly trained units will deploy must be made in the wider context of the overall campaign. If co-ordination between those developing the indigenous army and the other lines of development is not achieved, coherence will be lost.

> 'If you are fighting for the will of the people, however many tactical successes you achieve they will be as naught if the people do not think you are winning.
>
> Gen Sir Rupert Smith: 'The Utility of Force', 2005

10-16. **Command Relationships.** The command relationships between the three groupings will be determined based on the specific factors at play in the country and operation, at the particular time. In practice as much is achieved by cooperation as by formal command. For the MCB force, a key decision will be whether they are

[2] T E Lawrence found that each successful relationship is an enigma.
[3] MNSTC-I in Iraq or CSTC-A in Afghanistan

OPCOM/CON to the coalition force, or whether they have the independence to offer impartial advice and support to the indigenous commanders. It is the norm that the sovereign indigenous forces have no command relationship with the coalition force. This can prove an advantage and a hindrance to the MCB forces at different times; more significantly commanders from coalition nations may find this ambiguity unsettling leading to erratic decision making or mental paralysis.

10-17. **Information**. Exploiting indigenous army successes is a powerful tool in the information campaign. Those who own access to these stories must be alert to their utility and be resourced appropriately. Advertising and emphasising success will bolster both the army's confidence and the respect in which it is held by the population. To enemy forces it should have the reverse effect. Eventually the indigenous force will need its own influence activity capability which must be developed alongside other military capabilities.

SECTION 2 – PREPARING FOR THE TASK


INTRODUCTION

10-18. Preparation for an MCB task must initially focus on understanding and assessing the indigenous soldier before any development effort takes place. The preparation process straddles deployment and ends when reasoned, informed decisions have been made, based on indigenous factors and co-ordinated with previous and existing development efforts.

PLANNING

10-19. **Diagnosing the Problem**. The first stage of planning focuses on identifying the various state actors[4] and understanding their motivations as individual soldiers and senior commanders and collectively, defining the enemies and understanding the local environment. Identification of indigenous leaders through whom any interaction should take place should also be complemented by an assessment of their appetite for engagement. Pre-deployment planning should be complemented by a detailed in-theatre assessment of how UK interaction might complement and assist the indigenous force. Even if the operation is mature, individual UK personnel will need time to absorb the culture before they can have a useful impact. In some cases, this may take weeks or months as understanding will only be achieved by addressing all aspects of the operating environment. It is also important to establish how developed the indigenous force is and therefore what possible tasks will need to be undertaken within the duration of the deployment period and in what order they may be achieved. Different indigenous force units will be at different stages of development, and thus the raising and training of a unit may be conducted concurrently with liaison to a unit that is operating independently.

10-20. **Finding the Internal Solution.** Effects must support the operational endstate which is a self-reliant indigenous army and should be selected and maintained to support that long-term goal. They should also provide clear, logical direction based on how mature the development effort is. A simple ladder of scaled transition effects, leading from raising the force to identification of surge support requirements through liaison, is shown below.



[4] Army, gendarmerie, secret police, civil police, border security forces etc.

Effects must be targeted at, and take into account, the full spectrum of development of fighting power. Target areas for development must therefore include Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units and staff as well as those in the combat arms. Development is likely to include commanders' cadres and other specialist training, the introduction into service of new equipment, organisational and administrative procedure changes, and infrastructure builds and investment. Each of these disparate projects must be brought together in an integrated plan which in itself will deliver coherent MCB. The plan must be jointly owned by the indigenous army as the subjects of the change, the MCB forces who will in the main deliver the change, and the coalition forces who must support the delivery and compensate for the temporary reduction in capability[5] whilst these projects are brought to fruition. Effects should also be aimed at developing and sharpening the indigenous appetite for engagement. An inclusive approach including leadership engagement, kinetic operations, media, psychological and information operations, SSR and reconstruction must be adopted and co-ordinated.

10-21. **Coordinating the External Solution**. Leadership engagement with civilian actors must also be co-ordinated, preferably by a single/the primary[6] headquarters. Identification and exploitation of development opportunities can best take place if each figurehead understands what the other is saying[7]. Other units or agencies should see the indigenous force as a distinct area of operations into which they should not go without both a full understanding and complicity of the headquarters responsible for development. Metrics should measure success against regional and local as opposed to western normality. Timelines will need to be carefully considered and a robust attitude taken towards unrealistic schedules throughout the chain of command. Reports & returns and information management in general will require significant resources in order to ensure the development effort works with maximum effectiveness.

PERSONNEL SELECTION AND ORGANISATION

10-22. **Qualities**. The qualities that personnel require to develop an indigenous soldier vary in importance with each task, and are as follows:

- **Self Confidence and Motivation** to act in the absence of frequent and explicit direction from his commanders.
- **Humility** to accept a different culture and its customs as the norm, and pay deference to indigenous commanders whether they have earned that respect or not.
- **Patience** and **perseverance** to accept and impose small, steady developmental steps, whilst robustly accepting repeated and frequent setbacks.
- **Humour** to build relationships and stave off frustration.
- **Social skills** to quickly build robust working relationships that can facilitate Leadership and Mentoring, and often deliver conflict resolution amongst individuals and groups.

[5] Indigenous forces may have to return to training centres and schools to prepare for the arrival of new equipment and procedures etc, forcing coalition forces to increase their commitment on the front line.
[6] This is likely to transition from the coalition HQ to a Provincial Reconstruction Team over time as the security situation improves.
[7] This is achieved in Helmand during the 'Helmand Principals' Conference' involving the Governor, UK SRSA, Comd TFH, Comd MEF, Comd ANA, Comd ANP, and Comd NDS.

- **Improvisation Skills** to compensate for the lack of available specialists: - logistics, RAO, Signallers, Medics, Fire Observers, maintainers etc.

- **Professional Knowledge** of what is being taught and proposed for operations, to maintain credibility amongst soldiers who may have a deal more practical fighting experience than the UK practitioner.

> '…Many people don't understand the concept, and some who do can't execute it. It is difficult, and in a conventional force only a few people will master it. Anyone can learn the basics, but a few 'naturals' do exist. Learn how to spot these people and put them into positions where they can make a difference. Rank matters far less than talent…'
>
> Dr David Kilcullen, Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level COIN

10-23. **Rank**. Successfully MCB is an art that relies heavily on intuitive soldiers. Some of the best infantry-trained NCOs may struggle to relate their talents to the different cultural paradigm; other less obviously talented soldiers will find they have a natural flair for working with the indigenous soldiers. Conversely, many indigenous forces are particularly conscious of the rank/status of their mentor. MCB commanders should consider granting local promotion to skilled individuals not possessing the requisite substantive rank.

10-24. **ORBAT and C2**. It may be difficult to reconcile a regular military ORBAT with that which is required to conduct a development task. This issue should be addressed at the operational level with input from tactical practitioners. A clear C2 structure is required from the outset. The acid test for command and control is that the UK structures must be at least as coherent as those of the indigenous force; if the engagement effort is unwieldy, there will be little chance of influencing what may be a well-established chain of command, fighting for its own agenda on home turf.

TRAINING

10-25. **Building an Understanding.** Preparation for a MCB task should focus on relentless study of the endeavour and *acceptance* of the indigenous soldier. Soldiers must understand that they may have to start softly and they should recognise that lasting solutions will often come from indigenous roots.

10-26. **Professional Understanding**. The Mentors must also have a complete understanding of the coalition force, the MCB force, and the civilian actors appropriate to their mentees'[8] level of command. It is the norm that MCB commanders are operating at up to three ranks above their own, thus a senior major should have the awareness of issues commensurate with a 1* commander. They must know what military and financial resources are available through each of the three groupings, how they can be mobilised in support of the indigenous commander, and their constraints and interrelationship.

10-27. **Cultural Understanding.** MCB demands more than awareness of culture; it demands the ability to exploit that culture to complement UK aims. It is not sufficient, for example, to understand that a given culture is highly reliant on 'face'; techniques should be developed and taught that enable the practitioner to provoke good performances based on the fear of public shame, in a culturally appropriate manner.

[8] Mentee - A person who is advised, trained, or counselled by a mentor. Concise OED.

Advisors from the indigenous population should be used to demonstrate and explain their own culture. Equally important are those UK personnel who understand that culture and can arm UK military personnel with techniques to exploit their understanding. First generation immigrants, embassy staff, FCO staff and military loan service personnel are ideal.

10-28. **Military Cultural Understanding.** An understanding of a specific indigenous *military* culture should also form part of training. Each army has its own cultural norms and behaviours, some of which will be strengths and some of which will be weaknesses. Changing any of them is likely to meet with resistance and present considerable challenges. Understanding of the military culture must include understanding of all staff functions. The vagaries of indigenous equipment support, supply and distribution, military planning, pay and leave etc will all play a critical part in understanding and formulating the appropriate development of an indigenous force. Studying the armies of neighbouring countries, or countries with similar cultures, is likely to provide a useful understanding of what can or cannot be achieved within the target indigenous force. Those members of the coalition who have an awareness of the military culture of the host nation will be invaluable during training. Lectures from practitioners from various campaigns will provide a broad understanding of the challenges inherent in working with indigenous soldiers, many of which are generic. Current experts from the target country should be able to conduct both theoretical and practical lessons and exercising, if necessary as part of a wider mission rehearsal. Indigenous soldiers should if possible be brought to the training area *en masse* to act as recipients of development techniques; alternatively well-briefed UK armed forces personnel acting as indigenous soldiers may be usefully employed. Deployments to appropriate countries prior to deployment to the target country may be suitable. A UK practitioner working in Iraq, for example, might profit from a few weeks in Jordan immersed in an Arab battalion learning the language, understanding generic Arab-military problems and absorbing the culture in a low-threat environment where the impact of mistakes is likely to be minimal.

10-29. **Use of Interpreters**. The complexity of using interpreters is commonly underestimated in the initial stages of a deployment. Interpreters are unlikely to understand the full spectrum of UK military language and regional accents. During training, native speakers of the relevant language are preferable to those for whom it is a second language. The former will highlight any particular idioms that may need to be addressed prior to deployment, whereas the latter may translate with unrealistic ease. British Army interpreters can prove to be highly useful bringing balance to the native interpreters' explanations, and should be used during pre-deployment training and the deployment. It should be remembered that the interpreters are another group who need to be carefully managed as individuals and as a group. They have their own culture, motivation, and beliefs. They are also interpreters, not translators, and the MCB troops will need to practice methods of conversing, information gathering, argument development, and conflict resolution through their interpreter prior to engaging with the indigenous troops.

10-30. **Language Training**. Ideally, all those training an indigenous army should be proficient in the language of that army. When this is impossible great emphasis should be placed on ensuring that UK soldiers can employ a few phrases, including local slang. Demonstrable enthusiasm for the language is as (if not more) important than actual knowledge and continuing to wrestle with it during the deployment is likely to enthuse and impress the indigenous soldier and ensure that rapport is developed quickly. Some of the indigenous soldiers will have a competent level of English language through formal education or the continued exposure to MCB troops

or popular culture over the years. These individuals' skills can be exploited with the agreement of the indigenous commanders.

10-31. **Knowledge of Indigenous Equipment**. Subject matter experts who have intimate knowledge of indigenous equipment will need to be created or acquired. Relevant MCB troops will need to become competent and confident, and in some cases qualified, to operate and maintain the indigenous equipment[9] and associated infrastructure. This may require considerable and long-term investment in skills and training systems in the UK. Without the ability to train and develop the battlefield enablers at all echelons, other efforts will be significantly degraded.

10-32. **Leadership Engagement.** Productively engaging with leaders of all ranks from another army is a vital skill, particularly in the early stages of the deployment when first impressions will be formed. Meetings can be practised in a classroom environment, preferably with others watching to increase both pressure and learning opportunities. With an interpreter and a role-player (preferably from the indigenous country, and if possible with military experience) it is possible to run through likely vignettes. Cultural research and understanding will assist enormously. Engagement should be researched and planned as thoroughly as any other operation, particularly during early deployment. Visits by indigenous leaders to pre-deployment training in the UK may be possible. These give kudos and R&R to the individuals selected to come to UK and are thus usually very welcome, but they also give the individuals an understanding of the background and realities of life for the MCB troops. Very strong and tangible relations may be forged through social interaction with such visitors.

10-33. **Human Intelligence.** The indigenous army will provide a constant stream of highly useful situational awareness which will be culturally attuned. All ranks should be tutored in awareness of the value of HUMINT and the initial stages of recognising a valuable source, and if possible they should practise working alongside embedded HUMINT specialists. The coalition force must be encouraged to utilise this information as part of their information collation matrix, and a process for validation and cross cueing should be established within the J2 community.

SECTION 3 – RECRUITMENT OF INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES

INTRODUCTION

10-34. Recruiting soldiers is a crucial activity in the development of an indigenous army and UK practitioners should strive to secure a role in choosing recruits. Success or failure at this stage will resonate for years.

> 'Creating reliable, dedicated local forces during the course of an insurgency that targets not just the local soldiers and police but also their families truly is a task as difficult as "eating soup with a knife".'
>
> James Corum: 'Training Indigenous Forces in COIN: A Tale of Two Insurgencies', March 2006

ACTIVITY AND FACTORS

10-35. **Find.** Activity will initially focus on finding potential recruits. This will include locating, identifying and assessing the potential soldiers. In a developing country,

[9] Combat, Combat Sp, and CSS weapons, vehicles, plant, and machinery.

locating people who are willing to be paid as soldiers is likely to be the least demanding task. Assessing those people, and identifying those who are capable and willing to work as soldiers when the situation demands it, is likely to be a difficult but nevertheless vital task. In general, the focus should be on quality rather than quantity. However there will often be a requirement to grow the indigenous army as quickly as possible which will necessitate a degree of compromise.

10-36. **The Moral Component**. Understanding and motivating the indigenous soldier and defining the enemy are fundamental at this stage. In particular, care should be taken to avoid infiltration by 'spoilers', rogue elements or those incapable of soldiering because they are prey to intimidation. If necessary, geographic dislocation may have to form part of the recruitment process in order to insulate the recruit from conflicting influences, such as family or tribal affiliation. A culture of loyalty to the service, the state and its people should be engendered, whilst expected values and standards and the schema of punishments for those that transgress must be established.

10-37. **Sustainment**. The necessary G1 and G4 infrastructure and staff machinery for sustaining recruits must be in place before training commences. It will be difficult to persuade recruits to continue training if they are not paid or administered correctly. At the early stages of an army's development these functions may need to be carried out by UK personnel until the indigenous personnel become competent.

10-38. **Finding Relevant Expertise**. There are likely to be various types of indigenous security forces belonging to the host nation. UK military expertise is best employed in training those armed security forces in the use of force. It is likely that UK armed forces will have to coordinate with other Subject Matter Experts (SME) such as police, border control agencies, immigration officials and customs services. However there may be occasions when UK armed forces have to assume wider responsibilities in the absence of such SME. In such circumstances they should reach back to the UK for advice and be guided by common sense.

SECTION 4 – INDIVIDUAL BASIC TRAINING

INTRODUCTION

10-39. Preparation for training an indigenous army is characterised by understanding and assessment of the indigenous recruit soldiers' capabilities (the training programme for Ghurkha candidates to the British Army is an excellent example).

10-40. Within the indigenous paradigm, judicious application of UK Army training doctrine will ensure that all aspects of training and the training cycle are addressed, provided that the coalition has not laid down a training regime based on one of the other coalition member's doctrine.

PLANNING AND EXECUTING TRAINING

10-41. **Appetite**. It may be that some individuals and groups, particularly former combatants of the indigenous army, are reluctant to engage in basic training. If this is the case, appropriate leaders must be influenced to accept training whilst those who are willing are trained and used to demonstrate the utility of engagement. Charm[10] may help to encourage participation and save face.

[10] Awarding badges, certificates, new clothing and equipment, or even financial incentives.

10-42. **Holistic Development of Fighting Power.** Consideration should be given at all levels to ensuring that training is co-ordinated with and complemented by the development of all components of fighting power as per the UK Defence Lines of Development[11].

10-43. **Systematic Approach.** Training should be conducted in accordance with a clear, systematic approach focused on analysis of the operational task. This will allow a succession of trainers to understand why and what they are training, and provide a forum for informed change as necessary, rather than knee-jerk response. The model for the Systems Approach to Training, (SAT)[12] is simple and effective, and its use should be considered.

> 'After about six minutes of theoretical explanation during a lesson, the attention of the Iraqi soldiers would start to wander. We routinely employ lively teaching methods including audience participation, competition, threats and rewards and we had to simplify our lessons, otherwise the Iraqis would simply switch off.'
>
> Trainer at the Iraqi Army Divisional Training Centre, Basra Province,

10-44. **Training Content.** Ideally, training content will be decided in agreement with the host nation military authorities. Deciding what to teach an indigenous army is a complex task, and requires the selection and maintenance of a well thought out long-term plan steeped in understanding of the indigenous soldier, diagnosis of the enemy and the application of local solutions. If possible, some form of country-specific indigenous doctrine, mission essential task lists and training objectives (based on or complementing any existing indigenous doctrine, and with full complicity from indigenous personnel) should be developed jointly, translated into all relevant languages, and jointly managed. This will ensure continuity of tuition and provide a forum for explaining to incoming practitioners what is being taught and why. Practical lessons such as vehicle maintenance and a platoon attack are likely to be relatively simple to teach, but the more conceptual training involving the estimate and orders less so. Whilst it might be possible, for example, to successfully teach mission command, the combat estimate and a full set of orders at an officers' academy, indigenous officers may baulk at the idea of mission command for cultural reasons, mission verbs may be lost in translation, and a full scheme of manoeuvre may be entirely inappropriate for an illiterate, under-trained indigenous NCO. Multi-national deployments can complicate the issue of lesson content, even for simple lessons. Different mnemonics, military terminology and tactics (including such basic drills as hand signals and section composition) will confuse indigenous soldiers if all personnel engaging in the task do not agree them from the outset. In extremis it may be necessary to train UK soldiers in the tactics of another western nation; indeed this is likely to cause fewer problems than expecting the indigenous army to constantly adapt its procedures to suit the background of the trainer. Generally it is far easier to start teaching at a low standard and raise the complexity than vice versa; and if the indigenous practice is different to UK practice but workable, it should be adopted.

10-45. **Lesson Plans.** A lesson plan that adheres to the strictures of UK Army instructor training may require considerable adjustment before being used to develop indigenous soldiers. The literacy levels and traditional learning methods of the target audience can vary considerably, sometimes within a single group. In general, if

[11] Training, Equipment, People, Information, Doctrine, Organisation, Infrastructure, and Logistics.
[12] As described in 'The Systems Approach to Training', Army Code 7060.

literacy levels amongst the target audience are low, the reliance on visual aids and demonstration will be commensurately higher. A lesson to a poorly educated audience with low levels of literacy and numeracy is likely to require a more dramatic and entertaining teaching style, with less reliance on dry explanations of principles and factors.

10-46. **Embeds**. There is a danger in training indigenous forces that a divisive atmosphere develops between the UK trainers and those soldiers who are being trained. In order to overcome this consideration should be given to embedding UK soldiers into the student body. Frequently the trainer will be able to push the students much harder as a result and competitiveness will increase.

10-47. **Identification of Individual Talent.** During the basic training period, MCB instructors should be alert for those showing leadership and instructional potential so that they can be forwarded for NCO or Officer training. Additionally those with aptitude and enthusiasm for CS and CSS roles, or those with above average literacy and numeracy, should be identified for further training: engineers, artillery and mortar-men, mechanics, medics, drivers, clerks, signallers, and MPs (also, see Train the Trainer below). The very top individuals should be highlighted for training at UK schools (Infantry Battle School, RMAS etc) as part of the defence diplomacy approach to the country. Training those who have displayed a natural curiosity for the subject will be more effective than loading such courses with random, disinterested students. After training, it may be necessary to check that trained personnel are being appropriately employed by the indigenous leaders.

10-48. **Time.** A useful rule of thumb is to assume that it will take four times as long to train indigenous soldiers as it might take to train a UK soldier.

TRANSITION TO SELF RELIANCE

10-49. **Train the Trainer**. Training the trainer is an essential component of transition to self-reliance and is a clear metric of success. During training, strenuous efforts should be made to identify and record those personnel who may be suitable as instructors. They should be included as instructors on the recruit courses as soon as they have the requisite experience and credibility. Indigenous soldiers training their own will have a marked effect on morale even if it is at a token level in the early stages of transition.

10-50. **Training Transition**. The timing of the transition from UK forces providing direct training assistance to UK forces mentoring the indigenous trainer will largely be reliant on advice from those directly involved in the training, since they are most likely attuned to the vagaries of the military culture. The transition plan should be understood and agreed by both parties, gradual in nature, temporarily reversible if the necessity arises, and conditions rather than time based.

10-51. **Mentoring**. During the mentoring phase, attention should focus not on the student but on the indigenous instructor. Identification and implementation of remedial training is likely to be the chief activity, with the maintenance of standards by the indigenous instructor being the greatest challenge. Mentors should observe, and influence the instructor behind closed doors and during top-up training between classes. The greatest challenges at this stage are: preventing over-eager mentors overstepping their remit, particularly in the early stages of a deployment when understanding of the operating environment is minimal; and mentoring without detracting from the credibility of the indigenous instructor.

10-52. **Monitoring.** Monitoring during training should focus on gauging if and when remedial action is necessary, usually based on sporadic observation. The requirement for detailed understanding of local military normality will be acute in order that the monitor does not assume failure by measuring performance against a UK yardstick.

10-53. **Liaison.** If the indigenous force is clearly capable of training itself, the monitors can draw down and rely on a liaison officer. At this stage the onus is on the indigenous troops to request training assistance. At the national level, a defence attaché will usually provide this function as part of defence diplomacy.

SECTION 5 – OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

10-54. The rewards of successfully using indigenous troops on operations can potentially be enormous. The indigenous soldier can provide UK forces with an understanding of the operating environment far more complete and deep than that provided by a UK soldier alone, put an indigenous face on an operation to achieve significant information operations successes and free up UK forces for other tasks. A balance may have to be struck between the assessed operational capability and level of readiness of the indigenous force and any political and/or military pressure to deploy it. However the allocation of tasks for which the indigenous forces are not yet ready can lead to a local failure which can lower morale, credibility and undermine wider progress.

TRANSITION TO CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

10-55. **Operational Readiness Assessment.** An operational readiness assessment will assist in informing the military chain of command of a force's readiness to undertake combat operations. In common with the structure of training, the assessment should adhere as far as possible to UK doctrinal methods (unless another nation has primacy for the operation in which case their methodology must be understood and employed) and should be based partly on metrics and partly on informed assessment. The use of the UK Collective Training Competence Gauge down to platoon level is ideal. Complex systems demanding detailed statistical breakdown and voluminous paperwork will confuse the advisor and misdirect his efforts.

PARTNERING

10-56. **Scope**. Whilst embedded mentors can achieve considerable results, indigenous security forces must be partnered with UK/Coalition forces for best effect. There are various levels of partnership between indigenous and UK/Coalition forces which are determined by the level of involvement of each party and the scale of support. Any combination of the various types of such bi-lateral operations might be suitable in the context of both the threat and the level of self-reliance. The types of operations themselves will represent a clear move from dependency to autonomy. Transition to self-reliance can be achieved in a plethora of ways and some possibilities are discussed under each heading below.

10-57. **Forming Units with UK and Indigenous Soldiers.** At the greatest level of commitment, UK soldiers might form an integral part of the indigenous units, particularly in command, staff and CSS positions. As the indigenous soldiers grow in confidence and capability, they will promote and replace UK personnel until the force is entirely indigenous. This was achieved to great effect in Dhofar and ensures not

only that the indigenous force is both supported as well as possible, but that the move to self-reliance is truly capability-based as only proven soldiers are likely to be promoted by UK forces.

10-58. **Embedded Training Advisory Teams.** Embedded Training Advisory Teams (ETAT) represent an advisory and liaison function that will be most effective when they live with their indigenous unit constantly. This model has seen indigenous troops in Iraq and Afghanistan co-ordinating with and operating effectively alongside UK forces. Theatre specific awareness of factors such as force protection and awareness of the indigenous military culture will be at a premium, as will the burden of expectation on the team member.

10-59. **Levels of Command**. The particular mix of leading, training, mentoring, liaising, and monitoring will depend on the level of command, the unique strengths of a particular commander and his staff, the competence of troops, and the enemy and environment that face them at any particular time. It is unlikely that there will be a homogeneous level of support required across the whole force at any one time. MCB forces must be configured to deploy sympathetically and then manage this variance. It should be part of the campaign plan as to whether the most developed, or the least developed, areas of the indigenous force should be the priority for MCB force intervention.

10-60. **Operating Alongside Indigenous Security Forces.** As the indigenous security force becomes increasingly capable the nature of integration – the partnership - on operations will change. In the early period, the indigenous forces may be constrained to assisting the coalition forces in tightly controlled supporting roles (flank guards, 'first knock', rear area security etc). As their ability to deal with more expansive and complex operations grows, they will be able to command and control the majority of the simple parts of the operation (the infantry, and fire support for example) whilst the coalition controls the more intricate parts (CASEVAC, EW, air sp, IEDD perhaps) and overall control. The final stage would see the indigenous army command the whole operation, and provide the majority of capabilities and forces. As recent operations have proven, in order to optimise the effectiveness of conducting joint operations with indigenous security forces, two areas require particular consideration:

> '…the people responded well to the ANA because of their professionalism and fairness. The local people were amazed to see all the ethnicities that were working well together, that they did so professionally…The ANA's presence was definitely paying dividends so much so that the governor came to see me and thank me. I told him to thank Sayeed Mohammed and to give him the credit he deserved.'
>
> US Army Captain/OMLT Member, Afghan National Army, April 2005

- **Sharing of Intelligence**. Commanders must be prepared to share intelligence. The benefits must be measured against obvious potential risks to the mission, but a true partnership will not exist until both sides are sharing information and intelligence on a routine basis.

- **Joint Command and Control**. Joint Command and Control (C2) nodes must be established at every level, the effectiveness of which are likely to be critical to mission success.

10-61. **Scaled Provision of Assets.** If the delivery or transition of esoteric capabilities[13] to the indigenous forces is not part of the campaign plan, the coalition may have to continue provide these capabilities to the indigenous force until the insurgency has been defeated. Once the insurgency has been defeated and coalition forces are looking to withdraw or relocate, a surrogate capability[14] must have been developed for the indigenous army. MCB forces must should guard against the indigenous force becoming over-reliant on the assets provided; this will be a difficult issue if the force has little hope of obtaining such assets for itself in the longer term.

> We had an ANA Kandak collocated with us. They filled the cultural space between us and the Afghans. To be honest, they do not need much G3 (Operations) mentoring (in fact there was a standing joke as to who was mentoring who), but they are hugely constrained by their G1/G4 (Personnel/Logistics). They badly need the sort of support that was given by the contract officer in Oman[1]. The ANA were a great bunch, but sometimes they did not get their pay or their CO ran out of enough money to buy rations. We need to move away from short term mentoring to far longer term; from six months to two years. That will need substantial inducement.
>
> Commanding Officer – Afghanistan 2008

TRANSITION TO SELF RELIANCE

10-62. **Sustaining and Motivating the Force.** Before any move can be made to step away from an indigenous army, it must be able to sustain itself. Understanding of the indigenous soldier and application of local solutions will be at a premium at this stage. For example, some level of corruption or weakness in long term planning may be an inherent characteristic of the commanders and soldiers that make up the army; in which case the challenge will lie with expressing success or failure in terms of regional norms. The repercussions of a premature withdrawal of UK support must be carefully assessed since this is likely to be a significant source of tactical leverage.

SUMMARY

10-63. Success in MCB is measured by the degree to which indigenous forces are able to carry out effective operations and how positively they are regarded by the local population. UK military engagement with indigenous forces is perhaps best summarised by the following quote from The 27 Articles of TE Lawrence:

'Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably well than you do it perfectly. It is their way and you are there to help them, not win it for them.'

[13] Standoff ISTAR, long range and precision OS, CIS, ECM, IEDD & CMD, EW, etc.
[14] Commonly delivered with simpler soviet era or military-commercial equipment.

ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 10

MCB: NOMENCLATURE FOR CURRENT OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

10-A-1. Current operations have become characterised by the increasing importance of developing the indigenous security forces and partnering them through transition. The primary military functions of this development and partnership are the Monitoring, Mentoring and Training (M2T) of the indigenous army through the provision of Military Transition Teams (MiTT) in Iraq and Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT) in Afghanistan. It is expected that M2T will be a recurring theme in future operations undertaken by UK forces.

DEFINITIONS

10-A-2. **Security Sector Reform**. Security Sector Reform (SSR) is the overall (and largely political) process by which effective security structures are developed in order to allow the citizens of a state to live in safety. It is likely to be a core task in countries emerging from conflict but may also make a significant contribution to conflict prevention. The military contribution to SSR is likely to focus on developing the technical competence and capability of the host nation's armed forces through the process of training, mentoring and monitoring. It is a critical activity that provides the basis for longer term stability and addresses two broad areas; the quality of governance in the state and the technical competence and professionalism of those in the security sector.

10-A-3. **Partnering**. Partnering is a relationship between two equals and involves transparency, not ownership, control or command. Partnering will involve all force elements working together on a permanent basis with indigenous units. It has five key characteristics:

- Full planning integration. Integration of HQs, ops rooms, planning cells and other functions.
- Building of enduring relationships. Indigenous forces should be empowered, and be seen by their subordinates to have been empowered, if credibility is to be achieved.
- Sharing intelligence, information and enablers.
- Continue to the work of the mentors (see below).
- Live and train together.

10-A-4. **M2T**. M2T is an operational level term used to describe military support to indigenous armed forces during a period of transition. Its components are defined as follows:

- **Monitor**. To stand back and observe, only advising in particular circumstances. Monitoring will normally include measuring progress against prescribed objectives at set intervals. Observation and feedback through the M2T chain is essential.
- **Mentor**. To guide, counsel, support or direct indigenous armed forces on the best practice to be adopted in particular prescribed circumstances. Mentoring will usually focus on assisting the indigenous armed forces to

improve their own systems and processes. UK models or doctrine should only be considered if nothing else exists.

- **Train**. To deliver military instruction direct to indigenous forces in order to achieve a given state or objective. Where possible, consideration must be given to Training the Trainer (T3).

10-A-5. **MiTT and OMLT**. MiTTs in Iraq and OMLTs in Afghanistan refer to military teams that broadly fulfil the same function. Their aim is to make the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Afghan National Army (ANA) tactically, operationally and logistically capable of conducting independent counter-insurgency operations. They form a central part of the strategy to train and equip indigenous armed forces. As well as M2T, both also provide military liaison and enable indigenous armed forces through the provision of a Scaleable Support Package[15], ranging from deliberate combat operations to maintaining a QRF and providing specialist or niche capabilities. They greatly assist in maintaining or enabling the supporting nations' situational awareness. They also work towards enhancing their host nations understanding of the rule of law and fundamental human rights. Specific descriptions are as follows:

- **OMLT**. OMLT is an ISAF/NATO term used to describe the military teams that are embedded within the Afghan National Army (ANA) in order to train, advise and support them on operational deployments. It is used exclusively in Afghanistan. OMLTs (known as 'omelettes') are embedded into ANA battalions (kandaks), brigades, garrisons and corps headquarters as a means of developing the ANA as part of a wider SSR programme. They can also provide a conduit for liaison and C2 between ANA and ISAF forces, co-ordinate the planning and ensure that the ANA units receive enabling support. They are usually composed of between 12-19 personnel, depending on the type of ANA unit they are supporting. OMLT activity may therefore range from establishing and running training facilities to conducting operations with and providing additional capabilities to the ANA units they have trained.

- **MiTT**. MiTT is a term used to describe the military teams that are embedded within the Iraqi Army in order to train, advise and support them on operational deployments. They are embedded into Iraqi Army formation headquarters and most units. Their aim is to develop the full spectrum of Iraqi Army expertise, including strike capability, intelligence exploitation, C3 (command, control and communications), fire support, logistics and infantry tactics. During normal activity, they go wherever their paired Iraqi Army unit goes and support them on combat operations. Where appropriate MiTTs have enablers, such as Joint Terminal Attack Controllers, to call in support ranging from ISTAR assets, medical evacuation and logistics to attack helicopters and indirect fire support.

[15] A Scaleable Support Package can provide a range of capabilities to an indigenous armed force including ISTAR, Communications, Fire Support, Air, Support Helicopters, Medical and Logistic support.

ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 10

OVERWATCH – A SCALEABLE SUPPORT PACKAGE

GENERAL DEFINITIONS

10-B-1. **UK Campaign-level Definition of Overwatch**. At the campaign level, overwatch is defined as *a strategy of observing from nearby so as to be able to support a fighting ally with military force.* It is essentially a process whereby a Supporting Nation (SN) provides an appropriate scaleable military scaleable support package at the request of a Host Nation (HN) as it progresses to being independently capable of maintaining an acceptable level of security against both internal and external threats. It effectively starts when the HN security forces reach an initial operating capability and assume responsibility for the battlespace (the ground and its immediate environs). It ends when the HN security forces reach a full operating capability[16] and a political agreement is reached to transfer full responsibility for security.

10-B-2. **Endstate**. The desired endstate is *the disengagement of external military forces at the behest of the HN once a secure environment has been established*. This may not necessarily be the end of all military support as activities are likely to continue through normal Peacetime Military Engagement (PME) or alliance obligations, such as the provision of long-term training teams.

10-B-3. **Cross Government Approach**. Military overwatch stages will have to be carefully orchestrated with the levels of involvement and assistance provided by OGDs. Both military and OGDs will require clear national as well as multi-national policy, if necessary, to guide the overwatch process.

PHASES OF OVERWATCH

10-B-4. The graph below at Figure 10-B-1 represents the various stages in the development of overwatch. Overwatch will form a major part of the overall counter-insurgency or stability operation and is likely to start shortly after major combat operations have ceased. There will be a transitional phase leading to overwatch during which the HN forces will gradually assume increasing responsibility until a time at which their capability is such that the battlespace can be passed to them. Once overwatch commences, the level of military support from the SN continues to drop as its posture progresses from Tactical Overwatch through to Strategic Overwatch. The graph has wide applicability; it could be entered at any point and may regress as well as making progress. It may be necessary to have varying levels of overwatch in different geographic areas or by function; for example the gradual handover of SE Iraq by provinces or the handover of military responsibility whilst still retaining other governance responsibilities.

[16] FOC is achieved when the HN security responsibilities are matched by its capabilities.




Figure 10-B-1 – Handover of Battlespace

PRE-TRANSITION

10-B-5. The SN will need to plan how best to maintain situational awareness during overwatch. Emplacement of covert and overt sensors may have to be conducted during this period as well as a 'surge' effort to increase HUMINT contacts whilst access to the indigenous population is still possible.

TRANSITION TO OVERWATCH

10-B-6. The move into Transition to Overwatch *is the start of a reversible process of tactical or psychological adjustment***.** It is likely to be a Decisive Condition[17] in the overall campaign. It will see a move away from the SN taking the *lead* in security to becoming a security *partner* with the HN. It should be entirely conditions based and arrangements to reverse the process or for the HN to seek SN assistance should be agreed during or prior to this period. Throughout transition there is unlikely to be a requirement for formal policy decisions, announcements or an articulation of campaign progress. However this stage will potentially be a confusing area that is likely to be politically charged. It is therefore likely to require an information operation to manage expectations.

10-B-7. Throughout the process an acceptable level of security must always be maintained. This level will usually be defined by the HN with the SN military and political agreement, although it will rarely be articulated and will often be subject to short notice change, depending on political and media influence.

10-B-8. During the transition to overwatch, routine and non-essential activity should steadily reduce and HN self-reliance should be emphasised. Initially there is likely to be a surge of logistic activity to enable the gradual reduction of the SN military footprint, the level of which will be determined by HN growth.

[17] The Decisive Condition is the necessary state of affairs brought about by the consequences of a range of influences that contribute to the desired Endstate.

10-B-9. The general message will be one of progress being made towards meeting the conditions laid down for security transfer. It should emphasise that the HN is increasingly in the lead and that it has the continued military support of the SN when it is needed and requested.

10-B-10. Transition is likely to be highly complex. The principals of sovereignty and legitimacy will be powerful underpinning influences which must be taken into account. Transition planning therefore needs to start as much with HN ambitions and imperatives (political as well as practical) as with HN capabilities. Where the two match, transition can take place. Where there is an imbalance, for example ambitions outstripping capability, transition to overwatch should be cautious and the emphasis should remain with the political Line of Operation to temper HN expectations.

CONDUCT OF OVERWATCH

10-B-11. Once security transfer has been achieved and the predominant battlespace handed over to HN security forces, the SN military forces will move into a position of overwatch. It is a decisive step *supporting* security transfer and a move to self-reliance. As with the move to transition, the move to overwatch itself must be entirely conditions-based and requires formal satisfaction of agreed conditions, as forces will change posture and bases may start to be handed over or closed. It will require the political and military agreement of the SN.

10-B-12. Overwatch will mark the change of the SN military forces into in-theatre reserves for which mechanisms and timelines for re-engagement will need to be agreed and rehearsed. The SN military forces will concentrate on delivering three key effects:

- Its own force protection, including the maintenance of logistic freedom of manoeuvre.
- Support to the HN security forces through the provision of a scaleable support package, ranging from deliberate combat operations to maintaining a QRF and providing specialist or niche capabilities.
- Support to other lines of operation, the wider campaign and HN government legitimacy through an improved cross-government approach.

10-B-13. The move into a period of overwatch is likely to lead to a substantial loss of intelligence and with it situational awareness. To mitigate this, the SN forces are likely to move through three distinct stages of overwatch as follows:

- **Stage 1 – Tactical (Enabling) Overwatch**. During Tactical Overwatch there are unlikely to be any significant force reductions or redeployment of SN military forces and their posture is likely to remain proactive and robust. The following is likely to occur:
  - The formal in-theatre SSR[18] programme is likely to continue, if requested by the HN. This is likely to include provision of a range of M2T[19] tasks[20].

[18] SSR (Security Sector Reform) is a programme of activities co-ordinated to create capable indigenous security forces (police and armed forces).
[19] M2T – Monitoring, Mentoring and Training.
[20] MiTTs (Military Transition Teams) in Iraq and OMLTs (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams) in Afghanistan have been the lynch-pins during this process in both Theatres, providing situational awareness, forward presence and support to the indigenous security forces.

- Direct engagement in support of HN operations is likely to continue, albeit at a much reduced level and at the request of the HN as it builds capability. Such engagement will generally be on a case-by-case basis and for a finite period. It will require SN endorsement and will be subject to extant ROE.

- SN forces are likely to reconfigure into 'Tactical Overwatch Battlegroups' (TOBGs). These TOBGs are likely to be organised to provide balanced, high-readiness, dedicated coverage of each AO, but may not be routinely based in that AO. Any re-intervention into an unoccupied AO will necessitate detailed Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE), primarily focused on the people (the 'human terrain'). Mobility and agility will be central to the TOBG concept.

- SN ISTAR operations are likely to continue and may well need to be enhanced in order to maintain situational awareness.

- The SN forces may continue to provide capabilities not yet integral to the HN, for example a dedicated tactical QRF, intelligence and other ISTAR capabilities, fires, C2, logistic support, medical support including CASEVAC, SF and air/aviation.

- **Stage 2 – Operational (Supporting) Overwatch**. If the Tactical Overwatch stage has been successful in terms of maintained levels of security and further developments in HN security capabilities, SN forces will be able to move into a position of Operational Overwatch. The following is likely to occur during Operational Overwatch:

  - SN forces are likely to be held as operational reserves to reinforce HN QRFs, although specialist enablers may continue to be provided as required or requested for deliberate operations. Any re-intervention is likely to be in accordance with conditions agreed in formal protocols and will need to be clearly articulated. Direct engagement in support of HN operations is therefore likely to be substantially reduced and may only be conducted in extremis.

  - SN forces are likely to draw in to a declining number of bases, if not a single base, in order to reduce profile whilst continuing to hold agile reserves to a HN lead, or to protect SN interests. The SN force could even adopt an 'over the horizon' reserve capability at this stage.

  - SN forces should continue to maintain the capacity to conduct operations independently of the HN in order to protect or sustain the SN forces[21], so long as those operations are deemed essential and are conducted with the approval of the HN.

  - SN forces will assist in the preparation for normalised bilateral defence relations through training support to the HN. The requirement for M2T may continue and may necessitate an increase in the seniority and quality of mentors. Mentors should expect to accompany HN forces in combat.

[21] For instance protecting key SN vulnerabilities such as bases and supply routes.

- As part of a unified cross-government approach, the presence of OGD personnel may increase, necessitating bespoke security to protect them. Alternatively, private military security companies may be responsible for OGD security, necessitating close co-operation and intelligence sharing.

- **Stage 3 – Strategic Overwatch.** Strategic Overwatch is a regional long war posture. The move from Operational Overwatch to Strategic Overwatch is likely to be characterised by independent HN operations supported by limited SN enablers, generally provided by exception. It is also likely to see a shift in UK emphasis from the land environment, where SN forces are likely to have withdrawn into central overwatch bases, to the air and maritime environments. It may include the positioning of a strategic reserve capable of responding in a timely manner to a strategic level crisis and to deter external threats. The size and duration of this presence will be matters of national policy, but there is likely to be greater potential for strategic divergence between allies at this point as differing national views of strategic overwatch criteria, conditions and Endstates develop. Mentors should no longer be expected to accompany HN forces in combat. The conditions under which SN forces would revert to Operational or Tactical Overwatch must be clearly articulated. The Endstate will be the restoration of normal Peacetime Military Engagement (PME).[22]

PRINCIPLES

10-B-14. The transition to overwatch will mean that whilst some SN tasks such as logistics will become easier through the concentration of forces in fewer bases, others such as re-intervention will become more difficult due to the degradation of situational awareness. Continued engagement with key leadership and with HN security forces through M2T activities is likely to be essential in meeting this capability shortfall.

10-B-15. The term 'overwatch' encapsulates the essence of the mission from a SN perspective but may be seen as patronising by the HN. Its expectation will be for military deliverables from the SN in the form of a scaleable support package and the credibility of the SN is likely to be directly correlated to the size, breadth and willingness to use these capabilities. The force make-up will be dependant on the situation but is likely to be based on the following principles:

- ***Understand*** in order to maintain situational awareness with a reduced force footprint, through intelligence and surveillance assets (including SF), Key Leadership Engagement (KLE) and M2T activities. It is an enduring element of overwatch and **the** key operational and strategic decision enabler. The aim is for the SN forces to retain an understanding of the wider situation in order to allow it to deliver the other four effects.

- ***Enable*** the HN through the provision of key capabilities to fill gaps in capability within the HN security forces, such as ISTAR, air, support helicopters (lift), logistics and C3 support. It is likely to also include M2T and SF activities.

- ***Demonstrate*** on behalf (or in support) of the HN that the SN forces retain an effective capability to re-intervene in direct support of the HN, through fast air, AH, fires, SF and SN force manoeuvre (presence, posture and profile).

[22] PME may include providing security assistance under normalised defence relations.

- ***Intervene*** through direct action in support of the HN when requested, or unilaterally when a situation cannot be allowed to deteriorate any further. It could involve the direct action of one or all SN capabilities but more usually fast air, AH, fires, SF and the deployment of battlegroups.

- ***Consequence Management*** which should continue throughout, principally through direct engagement and a range of influence activities including media and psychological operations. As the level of support to the HN increases, so will the level of consequence management. As the consequences are managed, the level of SN understanding evolves, illustrating the cyclical nature of the process.

10-B-16. The framework showing the relationship between these principles is shown below at Figure 10-B-2:




Figure 10-B-2 - Principles of Overwatch

CHAPTER 11

LEARNING AND ADAPTING

SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

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11-1. As has been recorded throughout this publication, counterinsurgency operations require a different attitude of mind to that needed for conventional operations. Even though there will be times when troops are involved in intensive warfighting, for the most part different tactics and procedures are required. More important than this is the mindset with which the troops carrying out counterinsurgency operations approach those tasks and the understanding they have for the overall aims and objectives. This implies that education and training has to reflect that different approach to operations. Furthermore, since the population is at the centre of much of what counterinsurgency hopes to achieve, it follows that cultural understanding has to be integral to all training for such operations.

11-2. Officers are introduced to the study of counterinsurgency in their initial training at RMA Sandhurst. The topic should be continued during subsequent education through to formal staff training. Understanding the nature of counterinsurgency early in an officer's career makes the training for such operations easier to absorb. This principle applies equally to SNCOs and WOs.

LEARN AND ADAPT

11-3. There has been a view put forward that the Army's ability to learn has been inhibited by a resistance to external criticism, a sense of anti-intellectualism, conservatism in its approach to change and the absence of a suitable 'seat of learning' about counterinsurgency.[1] In recent years the American army has had to learn and adapt their education and training in the face of two of the most intense insurgencies for many years. Not surprisingly, they have learnt a great deal and their adaptation has been considerable. The imperative of *'Learn and Adapt'* about counterinsurgency now runs through their doctrinal thinking in the following way:

> *'An effective counterinsurgent force is a learning organisation. Insurgents constantly shift between military and political phases and approaches. In addition, networked insurgents constantly exchange information about their enemy's vulnerabilities – including with other insurgents in distant theatres. A skilful counterinsurgent is able to adapt at least as fast as the insurgents.'*
>
> US Army FieldManual 3-24

[1] A view expressed by Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely in *Learning about Counterinsurgency*, RUSI Journal, December 2006.

11-4. General Kitson's dictum that 'there is no such thing as "*a purely military solution" because insurgency is not primarily a military activity'* remains apposite. The British army has been slow to respond to, as Kitson made clear, a battle '*fought, in the last resort, in the minds of the people*' where information, media, perceptions and the law shape consent, support and tolerance. These themes have been recognised throughout this publication. General Kitson went on to say that:

> *'So many of the people who will be most influential in determining success or failure are not in the Armed Forces at all. They are the politicians, civil servant, local government officials and police, in the area where the insurgency is taking place, and that may be in someone else's country'*[1]

11-5. **Doing The Right Things Or Doing Things Right?** Doing the right things is primarily about how we respond to uncertainty, develop our understanding of the environment and refine our assumptions, leading in time to better focused and more effective operations. Doing things right is more about refining TTPs, and adapting and procuring equipment where necessary. The learning process should lead to both; doing the right things and doing things right.




Figure 11-1 Learn and Adapt Cycle

11-6. **Adapting on Operations**. At the tactical level the learn and adapt cycle shown at Figure 11-1 must revolve quickly in order to maintain the initiative. The process must be driven by the commander, delegated with the authority to produce mission specific

doctrine. Such doctrine does not need to go through the formal ratification necessary at the Defence level as it concerns only the requirements of a specific operation. Its purpose is to exploit a particular situation and it is likely to be required immediately. This doctrine could take many forms such as commander's guidance notes, an operational handbook, headquarters' SOPs or unit TTPs. Whichever form it takes, what matters is that it must be rapidly inculcated into the force through leadership and training, either as an aspect of in-theatre continuation training, (formal or informal), or as part of pre-deployment training. It should also be captured as current best practice for both pre-deployment training and the updating of formal doctrine.

11-7. **The Lessons Process**. There are currently two lessons 'loops' that identify the need for change and develop those changes in order that they can be inculcated into improvements in capability and processes and are outlined in Figure 11-2 below. The short 'loop' is largely based in the theatre of operations with reachback support from the UK and elsewhere; it aims to solve the immediate, theatre specific problems as they arise (doing things right). The medium-long term loop is largely based in the UK with strong links to the theatre of operations, and aims to overcome those problems that cannot be resolved in theatre, have cross-theatre implications or have major equipment, training or structural implications. The Lessons Exploitation Centre at LWC and the embedded officers in theatre are the key drivers for identifying the requirement for change on current operations. The Centre manages the central collection effort capturing information, from across the Army and wider defence community, as well as that which emerges from operations, training and experimentation. This data is then analysed, exploited and subsequently shared across Defence. In addition, there are numerous operational 'debriefings' and study days which support this process.




Figure 11-2 – The Lessons Loops

SECTION 2 - APPROACH TO TRAINING AND EDUCATION

11-8. To be successful, commanders and troops at all levels have to develop a deeper understanding of counterinsurgency, its military history and the doctrine that has developed as a result – they should understand the nature of the conflict and their part in it. Clear statements articulating the nature of the conflict from the Defence chain of command are required in order to focus minds down to individual soldier level. Successive early deployments to Helmand province in Afghanistan produced differing views of the nature of the conflict, from war-fighting to high intensity counterinsurgency – indicating a lack of guidance from above on the nature of the campaign and a tendency to confuse the intensity of individual operations against insurgents with the nature of the counterinsurgency in which they were involved.

11-9. The approach to preparing for counterinsurgency is little different to preparing for any specific campaign theme within the British Army training regime. Formations and units should first undergo a period of foundation training in order to develop individual and collective skills to the highest standard against an adversary who can be lethal, generate high tempo and conduct complex operations. This training should be couched within a contemporary scenario in order to introduce soldiers to the complexities of the environment which they will be operating. Successive post-operational reports have emphasised that it is the skills learned in foundation training that allowed them to win engagements in counterinsurgency theatres.

> 'BATUS training ended up being pivotal to our success; indeed had I been forced to take a choice, I would have forgone pre-deployment training to preserve it. It gave us sufficient training to enable us to improvise; without it you will never be able to get yourself out of a muddle quickly.'
>
> Commanding Officer – Afghanistan 2007

11-10. Having completed foundation training, formations and units should then focus on preparation for counterinsurgency through mission-specific Pre-Deployment Training (PDT). An important part of this transition is education and intellectual preparation. All ranks, but commanders in particular, should study counterinsurgency doctrine and history early in this process in order to grasp the nature of the campaign and the theatre to which they are deploying. This should take place before and during the transition to PDT, in order to both effectively design such training and immerse everybody in the complex wider non-military elements of counterinsurgency. This intellectual development is largely a command responsibility, but the Afghan Counterinsurgency Centre at Warminster provides a theatre-specific commanders' cadre that includes study of counterinsurgency doctrine, theory and history at the beginning of the PDT period. Following this, the themes of counterinsurgency should be woven into all subsequent training.

11-11. PDT itself should therefore take the sequence of:

- Specialist individual training. Individuals will be required to acquire mandatory individual skills and qualifications on 'special to theatre' equipment'

such as motor vehicles. The timing of such instruction must not prejudice the trainees' participation in other elements of PDT.

- A counterinsurgency commander's cadre.

- 'Train-the-trainer' training by the Operational Training and Advisory Group (OPTAG). The formation and unit command teams are trained over a period of several weeks and are subsequently responsible for training all other personnel. This reflects British Army policy that training is a command responsibility.

- Individual and collective training culminating in either a unit or battlegroup exercise aimed at confirming preparation at that level, or a mission rehearsal exercise at formation level. To be effective this training must be conducted using the same equipment as will be found in theatre.

- Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI). On arrival in-theatre, as much time as possible should be spent on confirmatory training before the assumption of operational responsibilities. This will be particularly important in theatres where climatic conditions are extreme and where acclimatisation is part of the RSOI process.

11-12. Integral to the five stages of PDT above must be a rigorous approach to absorbing the culture of the state and theatre of operations as well as an understanding of the other agencies operating within theatre. Cultural training is directly linked to securing the consent of the people. The greater the absorption of this aspect of the state and its people, the easier it will be to secure the consent of the people and thus achieve long term success.

11-13. The remainder of this Chapter examines the details of PDT and aspects of cultural understanding training, the completion of which will allow troops to deploy to operations fully prepared and with confidence.

SECTION 3 - PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

THE NATURE OF INSURGENCY

11-14. Training and education for insurgency should involve all officers and soldiers. The nature of subversion and of how insurgencies begin is fundamental to the understanding of the role of military forces in an insurgency campaign. Study of this form of conflict should place particular emphasis on the way military force can be applied in both insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns to achieve political ends. The principles of war should be shown in a new light and explained as equally relevant, though their application in this environment will be different. Such education about the nature of this form of conflict is fundamental to further training and should occur throughout an officer's career and be part of non-commissioned officer's basic military education. This is touched on in the scheduled commander's cadre, but the responsibility for ensuring this understanding is achieved rests largely with the chain of command.

UOR EQUIPMENT

11-15. During any period of intense operations there will be a vast number of new equipments that are rapidly brought into service in order to meet Urgent Operational Requirements UOR). In the past these equipments have been procured with an operational fleet but no PDT provision. This has three obvious but often overlooked operational consequences. First, soldiers are less effective when arriving in the theatre of operations than they might be due to their unfamiliarity with the equipment. It may take a number of weeks until they have enough experience to use the equipment to its full utility. Second, there is a risk of increased casualties as soldiers may not fully understand how to most effectively use force protection equipment. Third, the equipment will suffer through misuse or lack of effective maintenance due to unfamiliarity or ignorance.

TRAINING OF COMMANDERS

11-16. **Understanding the Culture and the Theatre.** Training should reflect the realities of operating within a cross government approach at the appropriate level and an understanding of the strengths and limitations that other interlocutors may have placed upon them. It also calls for an understanding of culture and theatre specifics. Cultural training is covered in more detail below. An understanding of theatre-specific factors is underpinned by a commander's involvement in reconnaissance to his area of operations. The more commanders that are able to carry out a reconnaissance, the better the PDT will be. However, flight availability and the capacity of the receiving units to deal with large numbers will be a constraint. Ideally reconnaissance should be down to and include at least sub-unit commanders. It is also routine for OPTAG commanders and staff to carry out reconnaissance with formation and unit commanders so that subsequent training is seamless, but owned by the chain of command and facilitated by OPTAG as applicable. This approach should result in a better understanding of the optimum balance in military training between offensive operations, intelligence gathering, framework operations, SSR, DDR, and reconstruction. It will also allow training to be couched firmly in a cultural context and against a background of influence operations.

11-17. **Leadership.** Counterinsurgency can place different demands on commanders to those experienced during conventional operations. This paragraph examines several challenges that commanders will face in counterinsurgency. They are neither definitive nor exhaustive.

- **Mission Command**. Mission command remains extant, but has to be applied in the context of the theatre in cultural, political, social and economic terms, the threat and the level of experience of subordinate commanders.

- **Leadership and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)**. A fundamental understanding of the Functions in Combat and the application of offensive, defensive and enabling operations should be achieved during Foundation Training. In PDT, theatre-specific TTPs are overlaid upon these fundamentals. It is the duty of junior commanders at every level to ensure that these TTPs are grasped and applied rigorously. Insurgents adapt their own TTPs very quickly and thus junior commanders also have to be able to adapt in quick response. In modern insurgencies, the IED threat has evolved and become increasingly sophisticated and will continue to do so. Only excellent junior

leadership overlaid upon firm TTPs and the effective use of equipment will diminish this type of threat. All of the above needs to be addressed in PDT.

- **Influence Operations**. Commanders at all levels have a duty to interact with the people. In doing so they have a direct influence on securing the centre of gravity. They will also be meeting with local leadership at several levels and therefore play a part in applying a cross government approach. It is therefore important that they understand and apply the important IO messages that should pervade all operations.

- **Media Training**. The modern media pervades all aspects of life. They are neither a threat nor an ally but have a job to do and role to fulfil. Junior commanders have to be trained to deal with them routinely, recognising when engagement with them reinforces the mission and being cognisant of a commander's intent and the relevant important messages.

- **A Cross Government Approach.** During unit and formation training, an understanding of a cross government approach should be introduced. This should include its application at each level and how it may be conducted. It should play a major part in both unit and formation Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRX) activity, ideally with the involvement of OGD representatives. The earlier that military commanders and OGD personnel can become familiar with operating together the more effective the training will be.

SECTION 4 - INDIVIDUAL AND SPECIALIST TRAINING

INDIVIDUAL SKILLS

11-18. Counterinsurgency operations requires a series of specialisations that do not figure prominently or are absent from conventional military operations. Some of these are individual skills that cannot easily be developed instantly. Ideally a reserve of these talents should be built up through training in peacetime against their possible eventual use in a counterinsurgency campaign. Many of them will be utilised in HQs that adopt new functions, for example J9 Reconstruction. Other specialisations will require retraining or re-roling of conventional skills. The number of individuals involved could be high and the training bill significant. There will be an imperative to identify the training and course requirements early and bid accordingly.

SPECIALIST SKILLS

11-19. Specialist Individual skills which may be required in counterinsurgency operations include:

- Intelligence staff.
- Specialist driving techniques.
- Media operations.
- IO.
- Civil Affairs.
- Helicopter handling specialists.

- Electronic counter measures (ECM) skills.
- Amphibious and riverine skills.
- Environmental specialists e.g. jungle or urban.

MISSION REHEARSAL EXERCISES

11-20. There are two categories of Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MRX). The first is aimed at unit or battlegroup level and is designed to confirm that units are ready for deployment. These exercises usually comprise live firing as well as dry training and should encapsulate all aspects of PDT training: cultural, TTPs, theatre-specific, SSR, DDR, leadership engagement, urban operations, air operations and others. The exercises are facilitated by OPTAG staff.

11-21. The second category, the formation MRX, is aimed at confirming that brigade or higher HQs are ready for deployment. They are facilitated by the Land Warfare Centre, and exercise military operations plus other activities such as Key Leader Engagement, joint planning and the application of a Comprehensive Approach. Subordinate units should also be involved in order to fully exercise the superior HQ, and although they are not the primary training audience, it offers a further opportunity to confirm TTPs. It is important during a formation MRX that as many interlocutors from OGDs including FCO and DfID attend in order to fully practise aspects of a Comprehensive Approach. Of equal importance is that the existing in-theatre formation sends back suitable personnel to introduce the very latest factors into the training.

11-22. A common failing is that logistics units are neglected in PDT since they may be involved in supporting the exercising combat and combat support units. By its very nature there is no defined rear area in counterinsurgency and therefore rear operations become vulnerable. Logistic activities and operations are likely to be mounted as formal operations in their own right. This demands specific training for CSS units and thus formation commanders should ensure that their logistic units receive the appropriate training.

RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT AND INTEGRATION TRAINING (RSOI)

11-23. Training areas and time may be limited during RSOI. Thus commanders should plan their RSOI training as an integral part of their overall PDT. The minimum required is confirmation of key TTPs and zeroing of weapons, but ideally RSOI should last a minimum of 7-10 days, not least for reasons of acclimatisation. It may well be that because of equipment shortages in the home training organisation, the RSOI will involve conversion to new vehicles or weapons in the theatre. Clearly this is very undesirable but may be necessary. RSOI represents the last chance to absorb the experience of the outgoing units and those units have to be fully involved in its execution.

11-24. RSOI will also be the last opportunity for confirmation of cultural understanding training, details of which appear below.

11-25. If possible and if the pace of operations allow, in-theatre training should take place in order to maintain and refresh skills, pass on new or adapted TTPs, train on new equipment or as part of a period where troops are rested from operations. In-theatre training should be a norm within counterinsurgency operations, not least because the

insurgent is likely to observe and change tactics in the light of experience and in response to counterinsurgent TTPs.

SECTION 5 - CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING

> Cultural understanding and cultural training are essential to the successful prosecution of counterinsurgency. Not enough is made of this important area; there needs to be strong cultural education as well as cultural advisors during deployment, to ensure that the effects of our actions are understood by the HQ, at whatever level, during the planning of operations.
>
> HQ ARRC Post Operation Report from Afghanistan

INTRODUCTION

11-26. Experience confirms that the understanding of culture is important to all aspects of military operations and needs to be addressed in training. Cultural understanding can reduce discord and friction and assists in improving the ability to accomplish the mission. It is directly related to securing the consent of the people and thus protecting the centre of gravity. Understanding gives insight into the intent of insurgents, and thus assists counterinsurgents to out-think and out-manoeuvre their opponents. Cultural understanding also serves to reduce friction and assists in building rapport with other agencies within a host country thus helping to prevent misunderstandings. Cultural understanding is more than deploying linguists and locally employed interpreters to communicate with people. It is the deliberate attempt to understand the major drivers of language, religion (if applicable) structures, politics, tribes (if applicable), history, conflict and geography that make the people what they are in terms of their thinking and actions. It is a major element of the shaping process; by understanding people better will it be easier to achieve their aspirations. It also enables a counterinsurgent force to see through the eyes of the people that they are supporting. The themes of cultural understanding are described below in Table 11-1.

Theme		Content
1	Structures	The structures, dynamics and agendas of government, defence, law and order and commerce.
2	History	The effect that ancient and recent history has in shaping national, regional and tribal attitudes, beliefs and relations. Critically the perception of 'The West', Britain and Christianity.
3	Lifestyle	The pattern and quality of life; employment, education, worship, sport, literacy, poverty, diet, home ownership, access to utilities, wages.
4	Conventions	The social, religious or cultural conventions shaping operational interaction; entering homes, searching, meetings, use of weapons, accepting hospitality, alcohol, gift giving, dogs and sanitation.
5	Greetings	Greetings; words, phrases, gestures and taboos.

Table 11-1 Cultural Understanding Themes

'Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards were at my finger ends. The enemy I knew almost like my own side. I risked myself among them many times, to learn.'

T E Lawrence

TRAINING

11-27. Cultural understanding is defined as: *the development of understanding of the culture, customs and philosophy of the indigenous people to enable British military personnel to conduct operations efficiently in that social environment*. Cultural understanding training should commence from the outset of conceptual and physical training and has to be command led. Early liaison with particular cultural advisors for specific theatres is seen as essential to understanding host country people (both reconcilable and irreconcilable) so that cogent IO can be mounted. Defence Academy Subject Matter Experts (SME) can recommend reading material for commanders and offer briefings to all ranks on the major ethnic, tribal and geographical considerations along with cultural historical issues that affect the mind set of those in whose state the counterinsurgent is operating.

11-28. OPTAG staff offer basic language and cultural understanding training at most stages; from the outset of unit and formation PDT packages and during individual reinforcement courses. At all rank briefings (mandatory for all military personnel deploying to specific theatres) basic linguistic and cultural understanding training is conducted using nationals from the states and regions to which the troops are assigned. At unit level, additional training can be undertaken with local religious and cultural experts, and the recent incorporation of a forces Imam has offered opportunities for in-depth understanding training at all levels. During unit confirmatory exercises local nationals (including Host Nation forces and civilians) are provided in significant numbers to assist with assessing the troops undergoing training aptitude and understanding of local custom and culture. This allows interaction, through shura, jirga and casual contact, with actual members of the communities to which they will deploy.

SECTION 6 - SUMMARY

11-29. In summary, in order to train fully for counterinsurgency operations commanders and soldiers have to first understand the theory and development of counterinsurgency doctrine, the nature of the conflict and their part in it. Theatre-specific training should be built upon a firm adaptive foundation which then transitions into PDT. PDT itself should involve a Comprehensive Approach throughout, ideally with OGD involvement early. The transition to PDT should begin with a commander's cadre that focuses minds on principles, tenets and issues associated with countering insurgency. Training will then go through unit and formation individual and collective training culminating in MRX. The final element of PDT takes place at the RSOI stage. However, if possible and if the pace of operations allow, in-theatre training should take place in order to maintain and refresh skills, pass on new or adapted TTPs, train on new equipment or as part of a period where troops are rested from operations.

CHAPTER 12

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE LAW

INTRODUCTION

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12-1. UK Armed Forces should always conduct operations within a legal framework; this includes the legal basis for the operation itself and the manner in which any operation is conducted. The operation may also be constrained by policy. This combination of law and policy will influence many aspects of the operation including Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the ability to conduct surveillance, detain and interrogate. Military lawyers should, therefore, be involved in all aspects of operational planning and review all draft orders and instructions to ensure that taskings are in accordance with the law and extant policies. It is important, however, to realise that the law is also an essential enabler. In counterinsurgency Legal Advisers (LEGAD) should also be involved in military activities that lie partly, or wholly, outside the control of a military commander. Such external activities will be related to the maintenance or development of the rule of law. In so doing, military LEGAD will have a role in coordinating and influencing a range of non-military individuals and groups such as local legal entities and NGOs. A legal contribution to Influence Activities is one means by which military activity can be linked to the overall campaign lines of development.

DEFINITIONS

12-2. The following sub-paragraphs define a few legal expressions that are fundamental to any understanding of the impact of the law on counterinsurgency operations.

- **ROE.** ROE are directions for commands that set out the circumstances and limitations under which armed force may be applied by UK forces to achieve military objectives for the furtherance of British government policy. ROE are thus issued as a set of parameters to inform commanders of the constraint imposed and freedoms permitted when carrying out their assigned tasks. They are designed to ensure that the application of force is appropriately controlled.[1]

- **Jurisdiction.** The term jurisdiction determines which state has the legal authority to try an individual for an alleged crime or civil claim. Where soldiers are deployed abroad, jurisdiction should be defined in a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or an Exchange of Letters between the government of the host nation and the government of the troop contributing state (or the international organisation representing the same). In the unlikely situation where there is an absence of any agreement or arrangement of this type, the local criminal and civil courts would have concurrent jurisdiction with those of the UK. The consequences of this could be

[1] See The United Kingdom Manual of National Rules of Engagement (JSP 398).

far reaching, particularly for UK troops in areas where the rule of law has collapsed, or cannot be properly implemented.

- **SOFA.** SOFA deal with issues such as the terms of employment for troops overseas, their legal status, the authority of the troop contributing state and Host Nation to exercise jurisdiction, border controls, operational aims, use of weapons, taxation and payment of customs and claims for injury and damage. It should be noted that any agreement by a state to allow UK troops to be tried under UK law does not automatically authorise a UK commander to try a soldier in that state. This has to be agreed specifically. The agreement is usually endorsed at government level and its contents should be passed to the military commander as soon as it has been agreed – preferably before any troops reach the area of operations. SOFA are legally binding documents. Although neither an MOU nor an Exchange of Letters is legally binding, there will always be significant political pressure to adhere to their terms and it is likely that they will, in practice, be treated in the same way as a SOFA.

- **Multinational Operations.** UK forces' participation in multinational operations may be as part, and under the framework, of an international organisation (such as the UN, NATO or the EU) or be part of an *ad hoc* coalition between the UK and one or more other states. In order to ensure coalition cohesion there should be an Operation Plan (OPLAN) agreed between the participating states. The OPLAN will set out the command relationships for the units participating in the planned operations, the role planned for the troops, ROE and financial responsibility. As with solely UK operations, there will need to be a SOFA or similar arrangement with the host nation. In well established military structures there will also be a range of policy documents (such as NATO's "MC 362" for the interpretation and application of ROE) that will need to be complied with. Military LEGADs have to be familiar with all such documents. For example, there have been instances where coalition headquarters have issued a draft Operation Order or a Warning Order to a subordinate headquarters. It is possible that in these circumstances subordinate formations within coalition allies may indicate that they are unable to comply, in part or in full because of national ROE restrictions.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

12-3. This Chapter is not concerned with the law governing the legal basis for any engagement of UK troops in a counterinsurgency campaign. Such an issue would be decided by the British government (on the advice of the Attorney General) prior to the deployment of troops. Rather this Chapter deals with the law, and the role of military LEGADs the operational and tactical levels in theatre.

12-4. Each counterinsurgency campaign will need to be conducted in accordance with the applicable legal framework. Therefore the tactics, techniques and procedures that were permissible in one campaign may not be permitted elsewhere or, perhaps, even during the same campaign if the legal framework changes. For instance, it would be plainly illegal for troops, when responding to a domestic riot at the request of the local police, to establish ambush positions with a view to killing those attempting to leave the area. However, if the insurgency has developed to the point that it has become an international armed conflict then it would be legally sustainable to establish an ambush of this type so long as the engagement was authorised by the UK military chain of command and those targeted were positively identified as falling within the target set as approved by the government and set out in the applicable ROE and Targeting Directive. Therefore, during the first stages of

campaign planning (Review of the Situation) the military LEGAD should be involved in advising on the legal framework as summarised in the paragraphs below. It will be necessary to maintain a constant review of the applicable law as the campaign develops.

12-5. The legal framework will comprise the following sources:

- In whatever capacity British troops are employed they will always have to operate within UK domestic law and the appropriate international law binding on the British government. For instance, the international Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) has to be followed in situations where there is an armed conflict (either an international or non-international one). However, LOAC is specifically excluded from situations of internal disturbances and tensions. Human rights law will also have an impact on operations overseas as well as in Britain, particularly when UK troops are responsible for detaining people.

- The domestic law of the state in which the operations occur (the host nation) will bind the troops of that state and may, depending on the arrangements between the UK and the host nation, be binding in part on UK troops. The applicable arrangements should be set out in a SOFA, MOU or an Exchange of Letters. The position for troops of any other coalition partner supporting the Host Nation may, or may not, be the same as that of the Uk depending upon the arrangements between each supporting state and the host nation.

- Further, if UK troops form part of a coalition there will be legal arrangements setting out both the authorisations and constraints applicable to the troops when operating together. In addition, it is quite possible that different states will adopt different interpretations of parts of the applicable international law and the legal arrangements between coalition partners. If coalition cohesion, and operational effectiveness, are to be maintained it will be essential for there to be regular consultation between the various LEGAD within the coalition.

- It is also desirable for the LEGAD (in cooperation with other military staff) and, preferably with support from other British government departments, to make an assessment of the effectiveness of the rule of law within the Host Nation. Ideally, this will involve a mapping and analysis of the capacity and quality of the justice institutions (to include the criminal laws, police, prosecutors, judges and prisons) and the history of justice provision in the state. This review should, if at all possible, also analyse the perceptions and experiences of local people, particularly women, the poor and marginalised groups.

THE IMPACT OF LAW ON COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

12-6. **Training and Orders**. Service personnel have to be in no doubt as to their position in relation to the law. Apart from the need to brief all ranks on the law as it affects their powers (if any) in respect of the use of force, search, arrest, seizure of evidence and other pertinent matters, everyone has to be kept up to date with the important aspects of any changes. Standard Operating Procedures or Standard Operating Instructions have to be produced before the commencement of the campaign (and should be regularly reviewed to incorporate both changes to the law and lessons learnt) which set out, in a readily comprehensible manner, practical direction as to what soldiers can and cannot do in order to comply with the law. These have to be rehearsed and exercised within units before deployment.

12-7. **Maintaining Discipline**. Although the vast majority of servicemen perform their duties in accordance with the law and to an exceptionally high standard, on

occasions it may be necessary to investigate and punish service personnel during operations. Counterinsurgency operations are complex and demanding and require strong leadership. Service personnel remain subject to UK law at all times and have to be investigated and, where appropriate, prosecuted for crimes including murder, manslaughter, mistreatment of detainees, assaults, thefts and criminal damage. It is essential that the host nation population does not develop a perception that British service personnel are being treated with impunity.

12-8. **Civilian Personnel and Contractors**. Current operations involve many MOD civil servants as well as civilian personnel. The means of disciplining such persons for violations depend upon their exact status. Generally, those who "accompany the force" will be subject to military law. Locally employed personnel will be subject only to host nation law.

12-9. **Command Responsibility**. In addition to the general principles of individual criminal responsibility, commanders at all levels are also accountable for war crimes that they knew, or (owing to the circumstances at the time) should have known, were being committed by forces under their effective command and control when they failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress the commission or to submit the matter to the competent authority for investigation and prosecution. This matter is dealt with at greater length in Chapter 16 of JSP 383, The Law of Armed Conflict, and summarised in JWP 3-46, Legal Support to Joint Operations.

LAW APPLICABLE TO INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

12-10. **Types of Armed Conflict.** Armed conflicts fall into one of two categories: internal (or non-international) and international. An internal armed conflict is one between the armed forces of a state and one or more armed faction in that state or one between factions within the state. In situations where troops are engaged in a counterinsurgency campaign that is, or includes, a conflict between two or more states it will constitute an international armed conflict. The Government will give direction on whether or not an insurgency has reached the level of an armed conflict and, if so, whether it is an internal or international one.

12-11. **Applicable Law.** The four fundamental principles of the law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) are summarised in paragraph 16 below. There are many more detailed provisions, some of which apply to only one or other of the two types of armed conflict. A detailed analysis of LOAC is set out in JSP 383. The law relating to internal armed conflicts (which is set out in Chapter 15 of JSP 383) is more limited than that applicable to international armed conflicts. The rules are found mainly in Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (which is binding on all states at all times) and Additional Protocol II (AP II) of 1977. AP II only applies if there are dissident armed forces which are sufficiently organised to be under responsible command, exercise such control over part of the state's territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and the state in which the armed conflict takes place has signed and ratified AP II.

12-12. **Common Article Three to the Geneva Conventions 1949.** Common Article Three to the Geneva Convention 1949 requires that:

- Persons taking no active part in hostilities, including those who have laid down their arms and those unable to participate due to sickness, injury, detention or any other cause shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are

and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

- Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.
- Taking of hostages.
- Outrages upon personal dignity in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.
- The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilised people.

- The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.

USE OF FORCE

12-13. **General.** So far as UK troops are concerned, the offensive use of force (i.e. force that exceeds what is permitted for self-defence) may not be used unless, and only to the extent that, it complies with both LOAC and Government policy.

12-14. **Self-defence.** British domestic law (both Section 3 Criminal Law Act 1967 and common law) recognise that all persons (including soldiers) have the right, wherever they are in the world, to use such force as is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances in their own defence or defence of another. The degree of force used in defence has to be proportionate to the threat. The courts have recognised that in acting in self-defence a person cannot weigh to a nicety the exact amount of force to be applied. A person can also use force to ward off an anticipated attack provided that it is anticipated as imminent. If an individual believes that there is an imminent threat to life and there is no other way to prevent the threat, he or she may use lethal force to prevent the threat. Guidance Card A reflects the position of British domestic law in respect of the use of lethal force in self-defence. Therefore, any force used has to be limited to the degree, intensity and duration necessary for self-defence. Any person who honestly, but mistakenly, believes the circumstances to be such as would, if true, justify his use of force to defend himself or another from attack, and uses no more force than is reasonable to resist the attack, is not acting unlawfully and would be entitled to plead self-defence. Use of force in crowd control situations poses its own challenges. Guidance Cards D and E (which deal with the use of public order control equipment and batons respectively) should be made available to troops in order to supplement the direction given to them by their commanders. These principles are expanded in paragraphs 6 to 11 of Annex A to JSP 398, UK Manual of National ROE (2004 Edition) and Chapter 5 of Vol II of the Manual of Mlitary Law..

12-15. **Offensive Use of Force.** If the level of violence within a state does not rise above what might be categorised as internal disturbances and tensions (such as riots and isolated and sporadic acts of violence) LOAC will not apply and UK forces will not be authorised to use force offensively. Naturally, the domestic law of the state in which the violence is taking place will apply to the police and troops of the Host Nation. The main body of international law applicable to these situations is Human Rights Law (which includes a right to life). The law of the host nation may permit the deprivation of life in situations that would not be authorised by Britain. However, if the insurgency within a state reaches a level of violence that is properly

categorised as an armed conflict then UK forces may be authorised to use force offensively in accordance with LOAC.

12-16. **Use of Air**. The most challenging aspect of lawful application of force from the air is distinction. When the adversary takes every effort to blend in with and operate from within the civilian population it is extremely difficult for the soldier on the ground to target him with distinction. That difficulty is multiplied for Air assets: Range makes visual identification difficult, even with modern sensors; the majority of air-delivered weapons have a large blast effect. This may generate a public perception of indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force, a perception capable of undermining our legitimacy. The cross-coalition sharing of air capabilities may lead to UK air assets being asked at the tactical level to conduct activities that the UK considers unlawful. Centralise control of air assets ensures such requests are considered at a level with visibility of such legal and policy issues.

12-17. **Fundamental Principles of the Law of Armed Conflict.** The four fundamental principles of LOAC (which are dealt with in detail in Chapter 2 of JSP 383 and summarised in paragraph 5 of Annex A to JSP 398 (2004 Edition)) are: Military Necessity, Humanity, Distinction and Proportionality.

- Military necessity permits a state engaged in an armed conflict to use only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by LOAC, which is required in order to achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete or partial submission of the insurgent at the earliest possible moment with the minimum expenditure of life and resources.

- Humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.

- Distinction requires that (since military operations are to be conducted only against the insurgent's armed forces and military objectives) there is a marked difference between the treatment of combatants and non-combatants and between objects that might legitimately be attacked and those that are protected from attack. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.

- Proportionality, in the context of LOAC, requires that the unavoidable losses (such as incidental civilian casualties and collateral damage to civilian property) resulting from legitimate military action should not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack as a whole, rather than any isolated or particular part of it.

12-18. **Civilian Participation in Hostilities.** Civilians are entitled to the protections referred to above unless they take a direct part in hostilities. Those who do take a direct part in hostilities may only be attacked (subject to ROE authorisation) while they are directly engaged in such activities. Military LEGADs will advise on the types of activity that constitute direct participation. Unlike combatants in international armed conflicts, civilians who take a direct part in hostilities during an armed conflict and members of dissident armed forces participating in an internal armed conflict, remain liable to prosecution for offences and are not entitled to prisoner of war status. However, if there is any doubt whether a person who has committed a violent act and been captured during an international armed conflict is entitled to prisoner of war status then such a person should be treated as a prisoner of war until their status has been determined by a competent tribunal. Detaining troops should, unless it is operationally impossible, also seize and tag weapons as well as produce short statements detailing the activities of the identified captured personnel. This evidential activity will facilitate the work of both the tribunals responsible for determining status

and the courts responsible for the prosecution and punishment of those who are not entitled to prisoner of war status. Legitimate and fair prosecutions of captured personnel will support the rule of law in the host nation. Military LEGADs will assist with this process.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

12-19. ROE are issued with the objectives of ensuring that the action taken by British forces is lawful and that such action is within the parameters of political acceptability, as determined by Ministers. ROE can be applied world wide to all arms of the Services and to all environments (ie land, maritime, air). They govern the use of force in its widest sense, from the firing of weapons and use of ordnance to any conduct of British forces that could be interpreted as provocative (such as detention). ROE may be issued when forces are deployed to participate in contingent operations overseas or standing overseas commitments; additionally, standing ROE Profiles exist in peacetime. JSP 398, the *United Kingdom Manual of National Rules of Engagement*, should be consulted for a full explanation of the British approach to the interpretation, practice and procedures associated with ROE. MC 362 will have to be consulted if British forces are operating within a NATO framework. ROE are usually written in the form of prohibitions or permissions. When ROE are issued as prohibitions, they will be orders to commanders not to take certain designated actions. When ROE are issued as permissions, they will be guidance to commanders that certain designated actions may be taken if the commanders judge them necessary or desirable in order to carry out their assigned tasks. The conformity of any action with any set of ROE in force does not guarantee its lawfulness, and it remains the commander's responsibility to use only that degree of force which is necessary, reasonable and lawful in the circumstances. If the offensive use of force may be necessary a Targeting Directive will be issued. This will set out any target sets authorised by the Government and detail collateral damage assessment methodology. JDP 3-46 summarises the targeting process and the role of the military LEGAD in it.

HUMINT AND SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS

12-20. Under UK domestic law HUMINT and surveillance operations are conducted under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). Although RIPA does not, as a matter of law, apply outside Britain, it is applied overseas by reason of MOD policy. While it may, at first sight, appear to be cumbersome on operations it provides a well established regulatory framework for such operations and reduces the chances of improper conduct and abuse. The LEGAD will need to be involved in the planning and conduct of all HUMINT and surveillance operations and will, therefore, need an appropriate level of security clearance.

12-21. **Intelligence Support to Law Enforcement**. All intelligence has the potential to support law enforcement and hence promote the rule of law and our legitimacy. However, the level of classification of much air and space sourced intelligence prevents its disclosure to host nation police, undermining potential to support host nation law enforcement capacity building. Declassification of intelligence, or use of less classified systems, coupled with processes tailored to allow admissibility of gathered information in host nation courts could act as a force multiplier for the exercise of host nation sovereignty.

DETENTION OPERATIONS

12-22. Detainees may be categorised as either criminal detainees or security internees. Whatever their status they should, from the point of capture to release, be treated humanely. If ROE authorise British forces to detain or intern individuals for prolonged periods then they have to be held in an adequately designed and resourced facility in accordance with applicable law (LOAC and/or Human Rights) and JDP 1-10. The military personnel operating such facilities need to be appropriately trained, organised and equipped. The military LEGAD should participate in the planning and conduct of all detention operations so as to ensure that that there is sufficient intelligence and/or evidence to justify detention/internment and that the conditions meet international standards. The management of captured personnel (whether they be prisoners of war, detainees or internees) requires coordination in order to maintain effective facility standards and to ensure regular reviews of the reasons to continue depriving captured personnel of their liberty. A number of staff branches (G2, G3, G4, Engr, Med and Provost), in addition to the military LEGAD, have important parts to play in the process and their activities have to be coordinated to ensure that Britain meets its international obligations. Experience has shown that a board chaired by the Force commander is the most effective way of reviewing decisions to intern people and that another board, chaired by the Chief of Staff is the best way to ensure that standards are maintained in an internment facility. The military LEGAD will always be present while a detention facility is being inspected. Transfers of detainees to the host nation, or any other foreign nation, raise significant legal issues and can only be conducted in accordance with extant policy. Legal advice is mandatory prior to any transfer taking place.

TACTICAL QUESTIONING AND INTERROGATION

12-23. Human intelligence is of vital importance in counterinsurgency operations. This need, together with time limits which may be imposed upon the period of detention, can create pressure to obtain information from detainees. Commanders have to put in place effective measures to prevent British service personnel from committing unlawful acts such as the torture, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment of anyone. MOD policy (such as JDP 1-10 and JDN 3/05) will be applicable irrespective of the Human Rights Law position. Nevertheless, legal advice should be provided during the drafting of instructions that are intended to regulate tactical questioning and interrogation. Tactical questioning and interrogation will only be undertaken by service personnel who have the appropriate, and up to date, qualifications.

INTERNMENT AND PROSECUTIONS

12-24. Internment, if authorised, is unlikely to remain an option for the duration of a counterinsurgency campaign. There is, therefore, a likelihood that those who are (albeit legitimately) detained on the basis of intelligence only, will have to be released (because the intelligence cannot be disclosed during judicial proceedings) when the mandate for internment is withdrawn. There is also a real risk that release will be necessary before the security situation is sufficiently advanced to cope with such individuals being granted their freedom. Thus, even if there is both the authority and sufficient actionable intelligence to justify detention and internment, commanders should consider the security situation and decide whether a particular detention operation can be delayed pending the gathering (by British or Host Nation assets) of sufficient releasable (to the Host Nation criminal justice system) evidence to enable a successful prosecution. It is likely, once the rule of law is sufficiently mature to try such people, that successful prosecutions will lead to longer periods of imprisonment

than detention. In addition, fair and successful prosecutions will be a public demonstration of the effectiveness of the rule of law within the Host Nation and thereby reinforce the primacy of civilian control. Although it may not be possible to release intelligence to Host Nation investigators, it should be possible to release sufficient information to enable them to begin their own investigation in order to gather evidence that is admissible before the Host Nation courts. For certain insurgents it may be possible to take a risk and impose security measures (if authorised and practical in the prevailing security climate) that are less restrictive than internment, for instance: assigned residence, reporting, curfew or other restrictions on movement. Such restrictions are examples of ways to integrate civil and military activity and also demonstrate proportionality in the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign.

INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

12-25. In order to avoid infringing the law, staff officers responsible for the conduct of psychological and deception operations should consult military LEGADs during the planning phases of such operations. The involvement of a LEGAD in the planning and authorisation of physical destruction operations, the targeting process, was referred to in paragraph 18.

RULE OF LAW

12-26. There is a range of possible rule of law instances in Influence Activity where military LEGADs may need to be involved. The most obvious are the training of Host Nation military lawyers and liaison with local prosecutors and judges to secure the prosecution of personnel detained and interned by British forces. The military LEGAD should also consider initiating a review of the security arrangements for such officials as their murder and intimidation is likely to have a crippling affect on the development of the rule of law in the host nation.[2] Ideally, OGDs (such as Department for International Development (DfID) and Stability Unit (SU)), international organisations and NGOs will be present to work on justice reform (development of Human Rights compliant laws, training of prosecutors and judges, inspection of prisons and the enhancement of court facilities and procedures). However, the security situation may be such that military LEGADs are the only lawyers available to undertake some or all of these activities. It will be for commanders to decide the extent to which they wish military lawyers to become involved in rule of law activities. If a military LEGAD does become involved in extended rule of law activity then it is important that he draws upon (if necessary by reference back to Britain) the resources of DfID and SU in order to ensure that local initiatives are consistent with, and support, longer term objectives. Such liaison will foster continuity of development and facilitate an easy transfer to DfID/SU of their personnel upon the arrival in theatre.

SERVICE INQUIRIES

12-27. Service inquiries will have to be convened (due to either the Armed Forces Act 2006 or applicable MOD policy) to investigate certain types of incidents that occur during counterinsurgency operations. Military LEGADs should review the terms of reference and the reports produced by inquiries.

FORMAL DIALOGUE

12-28. During the course of a campaign, formal dialogue with potential or actual adversaries may be contemplated with a view to agreeing, for example: a cease fire,

[2] See paras 312 and 320 of JDN 2/07 Countering Irregular Activity Within A Comprehensive Approach.

a truce, amnesty, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) or a variation of a Military Technical Agreement. Ideally, the military LEGAD will be a member of the team. As a minimum, legal advice should always be obtained before such formal dialogue starts and in respect of any drafts prepared during the course of the negotiations.

ROLE AND FUNCTION OF A MILITARY LEGAL ADVISER

12-29. These paragraphs identify the important features of Chapter 2 of JWP 3-46[3]. The LEGAD will be a member of the Command Group within a deployed headquarters. He should be readily available to both the commander and staff for legal advice on matters affecting military operations conducted by that headquarters. His duties are likely to cut across the usual staffing functions within a headquarters but his responsibilities for legal matters lie directly to the commander. He may well be required to act in a legal capacity at a joint Service or a multinational headquarters. Thus he will need to have suitable security clearances and access to information commensurate with his responsibilities to the commander.

12-30. In a headquarters the LEGAD will need to develop close working links with the COS and POLAD. A commander may anticipate that the POLAD and the LEGAD will work in harmony both to interpret political, legal and policy direction and to present information emanating from outside the headquarters in a coherent manner. Legal difficulties should, ideally, be resolved by the cooperation within the staff. In order to achieve this, and minimise disruption, the staff should obtain legal advice early in the planning of any proposed course of action. The military LEGAD should, for instance, be present at operational planning meetings and make himself available to the G2 and G3 staff. He will also need to be aware of the legal implications associated with longer range planning and should be involved with G4 and G5 staff to identify and resolve such issues. It is important that the military lawyer is viewed by all units in the relevant chain of command as their LEGAD and that he is not seen as the adviser to commander and headquarters staff only. In order to develop the awareness of unit commanding officers, operations officers and intelligence officers in legal matters it will be necessary for the military LEGAD to visit units within the command. In coalition operations it will be necessary for him or her to provide liaison with counterparts from other national contingents in order to be aware of legal issues that may have an impact upon operations and be able to advise accordingly.

OPERATIONAL LAW BRANCH

12-31. When troops are warned for deployment on operations the Operational Law Branch will provide a military LEGAD who will be attached to the headquarters prior to deployment in order to ensure integration with the commander and staff and to assist with the pre-deployment legal training of units. The Branch is also responsible for providing practical operational law support to operations by:

- Providing individual and collective training and operational support in cooperation with the other branches within the Operational Support Group and with the Land Warfare Development and Collective Training Groups.
- Recognising and disseminating lessons learnt and reviewing the legal aspects of tactical doctrine.
- Providing a reference capability (in the form of research and opinion drawn from experience) to deployed LEGAD to assist them in developing options prior to receiving direction from the Mounting Headquarters and thereby support

[3] JWP 3-46. See Annex A para 7 for reference details of this important publication.

operational continuity. The Branch will also, when appropriate, use the permanent links that it maintains with lawyers and others within the MOD and other government departments.

- Improving interoperability by maintaining regular links with military lawyers from other nations.

LEGAL REFERENCES

1. The most important source documents for the law and policy in relation to counter insurgency operations are described in the paragraphs below.

2. JSP 383 *The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict 2004*. This covers the legal aspects of international, and non-international, armed conflict. Of particular interest for land commanders are the last three Chapters of the JSP (Chapters 14, 15 and 16) – which concern the applicability of LOAC to Peace Support Operations, Internal Armed Conflict and the Enforcement of the Law of Armed Conflict.

3. *Manual of Military Law (MML)* Vol II, Chapter 5. "Legal Background to the Employment of Troops in Situations Falling Short of Armed Conflict" sets out legal principles that are applicable to counterinsurgency operations in Britain. By analogy, many of the principles and issues identified will be relevant to operations overseas

4. JSP 398 *United Kingdom Manual of National Rules of Engagement*. This governs the use of force in its broadest sense including the political considerations that may be applied in a conflict.

5. Joint Doctrine Publication 1-10 (JDP 1-10) *Prisoners of War, Internees and Detainees.* This sets out the doctrine applicable to the treatment of all types of captured personnel, an issue that military LEGAD have to be consulted.

6. Joint Doctrine Note 3/05 *Tactical Questioning, Debriefing and Interrogation* and related publications may also, depending upon the role undertaken by British troops, need to be applied during counterinsurgency situations.

7. Joint Warfare Publication 3-46 *Legal Support to Joint Operations*. This provides commanders with guidance on what may be expected of a military LEGAD both before and during an operation as well as information concerning the legal checks that need to be made before operations begin.

8. Joint Doctrine Note 3/07 *The Military Contribution to Security Sector Reform*.

9. The OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform (SSR), *Supporting Security and Justice,* is an important reference for establishing the range of possible rule of law activities in which military LEGAD may be engaged.

CASE STUDY 6

A COMPLICATED CAMPAIGN – MOZAMBIQUE 1976-1992[1]

BACKGROUND



1. Mozambique has certainly come a long way from the early 1990s. Then, it was left exhausted and destroyed by years of war, first for independence against Portuguese colonial rule and afterwards between two domestic parties, the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the opposition Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). The reason that this Case Study has been titled as complicated is because it portrays an insurgency that was conducted and controlled by a number of external parties on both sides who had little interest in Mozambique as such but only in their own separate agenda. When these external supporters left, again for reasons which had nothing to do with Mozambique, the insurgency collapsed. The domestic adversaries have beaten their swords into ploughshares and now argue out their differences at the ballot box. The ruling party dropped its Marxist credo 20 years ago, though some of the rhetoric remains. The economy has grown by an average of 8% a year since 1996, and the country has become a magnet for foreign investment because of its minerals.

2. Of the many insurgent wars in Africa, few have been as bitterly controversial and marked by disinformation as the one which raged in Mozambique from 1976 to 1992. The war, which pitted the central government of Mozambique against the guerrillas killed between 350,000 and 600,000 people, displaced another two million (of a population of about fifteen million total), and virtually destroyed most of the rural infrastructure. By October 1992 a ceasefire had been agreed.

3. In 1962 an insurgent group was formed (FRELIMO[2]) to fight the Portuguese Authorities in Mozambique and operations began in 1964. The original founder, Eduardo Mondlane was murdered in 1969 and he was replaced by Samora Machel who claimed close links with the Soviet Union and the other communist inspired liberation movements in Southern Africa such as in Angola, South West Africa and in Southern Rhodesia. Military assistance from China was also available to FRELIMO. The insurgency continued until April 1974 when a coup in Portugal established a military government determined to relinquish Portuguese possessions in Africa. Mozambique was granted independence in June 1975 and FRELIMO took over the government.

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[1] Adapted and extracted from *Continent Ablaze The Insurgency Wars in Africa 1960 to the Present* by John Turner, Arms and Armour Press 1998.

[2] Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique after the merging of three other groups formed in 1961.

4. After independence Machel became more autocratic and increased his communist connections. Dissenters within FRELIMO were brutally suppressed. However, through FRELIMO's attempts at Marxist-inspired social engineering, the stage was set ultimately for widespread popular discontent that generated internal support for any movement that would give hope to the rural population.

5. Internationally, Machel and FRELIMO steered Mozambique into the communist camp, formalising a number of economic and military agreements with the Soviet Union and its allies in hopes of receiving badly-needed economic assistance. Regionally, FRELIMO joined with its supporters in Zambia and Tanzania and the newly-independent Angola to work against the white-dominated regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa. It continued to actively assist guerrillas working against Rhodesia (which it had done before Mozambique's independence), providing them bases and logistical support in border areas. FRELIMO also continued its ties with the ANC, providing its operatives with bases and other facilities in Mozambique from which they conducted operations against the South African government. Machel and his FRELIMO supporters thus helped set the stage for Rhodesian and South African support for internal dissent by supporting anti-regime dissidents of both of these neighbours. Mozambique also (following United Nations guidance) cut economic ties with Rhodesia and South Africa, thus giving those countries little to lose by supporting the destabilisation of the FRELIMO government in reprisal for the latter's support of insurgents working against the white regimes.

6. RENAMO was originally conceived by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) in 1976 as a means to counter the Machel government's support to insurgents of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and its armed wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). ZANLA was established in bases in Mozambique along the Rhodesian border, and allowed to proceed with its 'rolling infiltration' of eastern Rhodesia from February 1976 onward. Thus the genesis of the proposal: Dissuade the Mozambican government from supporting Rhodesian insurgents by fostering one in Mozambique itself.

THE PHASES OF INSURGENCY

7. The insurgency within Mozambique from 1976 can be split into several phases:

- The origin of RENAMO and its early operations, during which period it was supported by the Rhodesians, up to 1979.
- A transition phase, during which RENAMO almost collapsed before being taken over and rebuilt by the South Africans, 1979-1981. This was highlighted by:
    - Increased efforts by government security forces to counter the spread of the RENAMO outside border areas.
    - The first major operations by RENAMO against targets outside the Rhodesian border region.
    - Development of a major base complex by RENAMO in northern Mozambique.
    - The major subsequent developments in this phase of the conflict were the change of government in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe and the decision of the newly-independent regime there to support FRELIMO in its struggle with RENAMO.

- The period of South African support and RENAMO expansion to most of Mozambique, 1981-1984, a period ending with the March 1984 Nkomati Accords. This is characterised by several important developments:
    - Cessation of any organised support from former Rhodesia (see b.(4) above).
    - The assumption of RENAMO's external basing by South Africa, with its training and external support facilities provided by the South African Defence Force (SADF) at bases in the eastern Transvaal region of South Africa.
    - The rapid rehabilitation of RENAMO by the end of 1980 and reinsertion of insurgents into South Mozambique provinces.
    - The development of an extensive logistical network in western Mozambique that later spread north and east to the Zambezi to support a growing number of base camps.
    - Spread of the insurgency to southern Mozambique.
    - Spread of the insurgency northward into northern Mozambique from bases west of Beira with additional support from bases in Malawi operated by South African military intelligence.
    - The continued inability of the Mozambique Armd Forces to prevent the spread of the insurgency and the emergence of major differences within the Government and the Armd Forces as to how to address the problem.
    - The tactical initiative passed to RENAMO by late 1983-early 1984, with the insurgents initiating well over half of the number of contacts with the Army.
- The period of continued RENAMO growth and FRELIMO decline, marked by the first major involvement by Zimbabwean forces, 1984-1986/7. This is marked by a number of developments.
    - South Africa withdrew formal government support to RENAMO, but some elements within the government, especially Military Intelligence, continued to support the insurgents.
    - RENAMO, bereft of South African help, remained a viable insurgent organisation, but with redirected strategic goals.
    - RENAMO also began to receive outside assistance to replace that lost as a result of the Nkomati Accords, and struggled to build an external lobby independent of South African control. The external RENAMO support community was often riven with internal disputes as a result.
    - Zimbabwe intervened militarily in the war, occupying the Beira corridor and assisting the Mozambique Armd Forces in large-scale offensives against RENAMO targets.
    - In October 1986 President Machel was killed in an aeroplane crash; his successor, Joaquim Chissano, began to attempt a restructuring of the Army the better to counter RENAMO; at the same time Chissano and the

government leadership began to implement reforms to reverse many of the programmes of the Machel era.

- In addition to Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, and Tanzania all provided help to Mozambique in the form of troops and military assistance.
- British and Portuguese military training assistance was provided to the Mozambique Armd Forces.

- The revival of the Mozambique Armd Forces and the decline of RENAMO, leading to a stalemate by the early 1990s and the 1992 ceasefire.
  - The progressive improvement in military capabilities of the Armd Forces following the 1987 reorganisation.
  - A major series of offensives by the Army in central Mozambique from late 1986/early 1987 that succeeded in reversing RENAMO gains.
  - The failure of RENAMO to establish itself in southern Mozambique and launch an attack to capture Maputo.
  - Increasing involvement in Zimbabwean and other foreign forces in the fighting, and expansion of the ZNA areas of operation in support of the Mozambique Army.
  - A peaking of RENAMO's control of both population and territory, and an increase in acts of violence against the population.
  - A gradual decline of RENAMO capabilities at the end of the 1980s due, in part, to a severe drought that affected the rural population base
  - A stalemate between RENAMO and the government, marked by a decline in military capabilities on both sides.


8. During the early 1990s, RENAMO declined as a viable insurgent force, maintaining often precarious control of a drought-ravaged countryside which was increasingly unable to support it. It continued desultory operations despite its diminished military capabilities due to the famine, but was at best able to maintain a stalemate in areas of its former strength, losing ground in other regions. By the early 1990s, government security forces, following their victories of the late 1980s, were again facing a crisis due to increased RENAMO aggressiveness as well as declining morale in the army. By mid-1992 there was widespread hope throughout Mozambique that a peace agreement was near. One of the tentative conditions for the 1992 peace settlement was a new army made up of both former FAM and RENAMO; many government soldiers feared for their future employment in such a post-settlement dispensation.

THE LESSONS FROM THIS INSURGENCY

9. This short outline of the 16 year insurgency only sets out the basic facts surrounding the campaign and illustrates all the components of an insurgency described in Chapter 2 of this publication. For the insurgents the use of the stages of an insurgency to develop their campaign; the acquisition of territory inside Mozambique as a safe base, and to gain the support and consent of the rural population. Between the lines other factors such as tribal links, language, religious views and customs all played a part in gaining or losing the support of communities and regions. For the government the ideological links with other African communists, the concept of nationality and the welcome release from Portuguese control all had an influence on communities who resented foreigners and the insurgents that they

encouraged. Above all it can be noted that neither the government nor the insurgents had the ability to maintain their activities without large scale external support over this prolonged period. Once this support disappeared then the rationale for continuing also disappeared and agreements between the rival parties was finally achieved in 1992.

CASE STUDY 7
A POTENTIAL CAMPAIGN – 2009 ONWARDS



1. Case Study 7 describes a particular campaign which did not involve British forces and was not widely reported or condemned in the international media. Nevertheless it is a classic example of the sort of insurgency that could easily occur again which could, in future, involve British forces. A quick look at a map of Africa would show that nine separate UN sponsored peacekeeping missions are now being mounted across Africa in 2009 which include the Sudan and Congo. African Union (AU) forces are also involved in Darfur with UN force and are involved in operations in the Comoros and Somalia. Elsewhere in the Horn of Africa boundary disputes and tribal animosities have caused the region to be permanently on the point of a conventional war. Zimbabwe has also become the latest failed state in a once prosperous region of southern Africa and may well need some form of international assistance.

2. It is with the prospect of continued potential disorder and chaos in parts of Africa that differing forms of insurgency are bound to develop in the future. Porous borders, differences of tribal cultures, ethnic groupings and religious differences make for complex and volatile circumstances facing any counterinsurgent commander. These forms of insurgency are probably on the increase and could surpass the collective ability of the international community to control.

3. Most of these potential forms of dispute are not bound up with religious animosity or extremism but could be inspired by territorial aggrandizement, economic issues or shortages of basic requirements such as water. The underlying reasons for the growth of insurgency in the future will probably remain, as always, the acquisition of power, the ability to control resources and perhaps the environment. It may well have less to do with religious or racial influences.

4. A cursory check of British involvement since 1945 in the affairs of other states which have little or no connection with either the Empire or the Commonwealth (Vietnam, Indonesia, Greece, Iraq and Afghanistan) indicates that unless there is some concerted international agreement for intervention (as in the instances of Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo) there will be serious difficulty in gaining any consent or support from the state or the local population concerned. In addition, it will be necessary to adopt a Comprehensive Approach, probably on an international scale, as an essential first step in providing assistance which will then need continued monitoring and supervision. Policing global level insurgency in today's world has strayed far from defending borders, sorting out local security issues and organizing humanitarian aid. The extension of this policing role because of internal politics indicates that intervention becomes an enemy and not a friend of peace. Sun Tzu's quote, some time before 320 BC, at the start of this publication remains apposite: **"If not in the interest of the State – do not act. If you cannot succeed do not use troops"**.

GLOSSARY

AAST	All-Arms Search Team
ABCA	A program aimed at optimizing interoperability between member armies (USA, UK, Canada, UK and New Zealand on combined operations
ACQB	Advanced Close Quarter Battle
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
AFM	Army Field manual
AH	Attack Helicopter
AII	Area of Intelligence Interest
AIR	Area of Intelligence Responsibility
ANA	Afghan National Army
AO	Area of Operations
AOCC	Air Operations Co-ordination Cell
AOR	Area of Operational Responsibility
AP	Additional Protocol, Air Publication
APOD	Airport of Debarkation
AQI	Al Qaeda in Iraq
ARF	Armed Reactionary Force
AT	Air Transport
ATC	Air Traffic Control
ATO	Ammunition Technical Officer
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
BG	Battlegroup
BGIC	Battlegroup Influence Coordinator
BSC	Brigade Surveillance Company
DfID	Department for International Development
C-IED	Counter-IED
C2	Command and Control
C3	Command, Control and Communication
CAS	Close Air Support
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CBE	Commander of the Order of the British Empire
CCA	Close Combat Attack
CCT	Combat Camera Team
CFA	Commander Field Army
CI	Counter Intelligence
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIS	Communications and Information System
CMD	Conventional Munitions Disposal
CN	Counter-Narcotics
CNO	Computer Network Operations
COA	Course of Action
COE	Contemporary Operating Environment
CofW	Clerk of Works
CoG	Centre of Gravity
COIN	Counter-Insurgency
COMSEC	Communications Security
CONCO	Officers and NCOs in long-term continuity posts
COS	Chief of Staff
CP	Close Protection
CR2	Challenger 2 (tank)

CS	Combat Support
CSM	Company Sergeant Major
CSS	Combat Service Support
CWA	Consent Winning Activity
CWS	Weapon Site
DCDS	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
DCOS	Deputy Chiref-of-Staff
DDR	Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration
DEVAD	Development Advisor
DISC	Defence Intelligence and Security Centre
DIT	Development and Influence Team
DMOC	Defence Media Operations Centre
DOB	Deployed Operating Base
DTIO	Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations
EA	Electronic Attack
EC	Equipment Capability
ECM	Electronic Counter Measures
EHA	Enhanced House Assault
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ES	Equipment Support
ESM	Electronic Warfare Support Measures
EU	European Union
EW	Electronic Warfare
F3EA	Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse
FAA	Forward Admin Area
FAP	Final Assault Position
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FHT	Field HUMINT Team
FLC	Front Line Command
FM	[US Army] Field Manual
FMV	Full-Motion Video
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FOC	Full Operating Capability
FOM	Freedom of Manoeuvre
FP	Force Protection
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
FRG	Federal Riot Gun
FRV	Forward Rendez-Vous
FW	Fixed Wing
GEOINT	Geospatial Intelligence
GIRoA	Government of the independent Republic of Afghanistan
GMR	**?p7-15**
GOC	General Officer Commanding
GPS	Global Positioning System
GSK	**?p7-15**
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
HMNVG	Head-Mounted Night Vision Goggles
HN	Host Nation
HQ LF	Headquarters Land Forces
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
HVI	High-Value Individuals
IA	Irregular Activity
IAI	Islamic Army in Iraq

ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IO	Information Operations
IDF	Iraqi Defence Force
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IEDD	Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
IER	Information Exchange Requirement
IFF	Identification – Friend or Foe
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
INT	Intelligence
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IPE	Intelligence Preparation of the Environment
IR	Infra-red
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
JARIC	Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre
JASM	Joint Action Synchronisation Matrix
JDP	Joint Doctrine Publication
JDN	Joint Doctrine Note
JFACC	Joint Force Air Component Commander
JMOT	Joint Media Operations Team
JOA	Joint Operation Area
JSCSC	Joint Services Command and Staff College
JSP	Joint Services Publication
JWP	Joint Warfare Publication
KLE	Key Leader Engagement
LEGAD	Legal Advisor
LLM	Light Laser Marker
LN	Local National
LO	Liaison Officer
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
LOC	Line of Communication
LWC	Land Warfare Centre
M2T	Monitoring, Mentoring and Training
MACE	Military Assistance to Civil Effect
MASINT	Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
MCB	Military Capability Building
MiTT	Military Transition Team
MML	Manual of Military Law
MND	Multi-National Division
MNF	Multi-National Force
MOD, MoD	Ministry of Defence
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
MoE Team	Method of Entry Team
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Military Police
MST	Military Stabilisation Team
MSST	Military Stabilisation Support Teams
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Orgnaisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NITAT	Northern Ireland Training Advisory Team

NKET	Non-Kinetic Effects Teams
OA	Operational Analyst
OBE	Officer of the Order of the British Empire
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGD	Other Government Departments
OISG	Operational Intelligence Support Group
OMLT	Operational Liaison and Mentor Team
OOM	Order of March
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OpO	Operation Order
OPSEC	Operational Security
OS	Offensive Support
OSINT	Open-Source Intelligence
PDT	Pre-Deployment Training
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirement
PJHQ	Principal Joint Headquarters
PME	Peacetime Military Engagement
PMT	Project Management Team
POI	Post-Operational Interview
POLAD	Political Advisor
PPP	Presence Posture Profile
PPV	Protected Patrol Vehicle
PREE	Plan, Review, Execute, Evaluate
PRR	Personal Role Radio
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSE	PSYOPS Support Element
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
QIP	Quick Impact Project
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
R&D	Reconstruction and Development
R2	Reports and Returns
RAF	Royal Air Force
RAND	Research and Development Corporation
RE	Corps of Royal Engineers
REME	Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
RESA	Royal Engineers Search Advisor
REST	Royal Engineers Search Team
RFI	Request for Information
RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
RMP	Royal Military Police
ROC	Review of Concept
ROE, RoE	Rules of Engagement
RofL	Rule of Law
RUSI	Royal United Services Institution
RW	Rotary Wing
RZ	Reconstruction Zone
SAT	Systems Approach to Training
SCIAD	Scientific Advisor
SF	Special Forces
SI	Security Intelligence
SIED	Suicide IED
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIPE	Security Intelligence Preparation of the Environment

SME	Subject Matter Expert
SN	Supporting Nation
SNCO	Senior Non-Commissioned Officer
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOI	Standing Operating Instructions
SOM	Scheme of Manoeuvre
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SRM	Security Risk Management
SSE	Sensitive Site Exploitation
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STABAD	Stabilisation Advisor
SU	Stability Unit
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
T3	Train the Trainer
TA	Target Audience
TAA	Target Audience Analysis
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
TCAF	Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework
TCG	Tasking and Coordination Group
TECHINT	Technical Intelligence
TI	Thermal Imager
TOBG	Tactical Overwatch Battlegroups
TPT	Tactical PSYOPS Team
TQ	Tactical Questioning
TT	Training Team
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
TST	Time-Sensitive Target
UA	Unmanned Aircraft
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UKC	Unspecified Child
UKF	Unknown Female
UKM	Unknown Male
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USA	Unit Search Advisor
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VBIED	Vehicle-Borne IED
VDOP	Vehicle Drop-Off Point
VCP	Vehicle Check-Point
WIS	Weapons Intelligence Section
WO	Warrant Officer
WR	WARRIOR IFV

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